IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 94-40368
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEROME ARTHUR CHAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
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(March 17, 1995)
Before KING, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-appellant Jerome Arthur Chavis (Chavis) was
convicted, following a jury trial, of possession on August 26,
1992, of cocaine with intent to distribute it, contrary to 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced therefor to seventy months'
imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. About
11:00 p.m. on the evening of August 26, 1992, Chavis was the driver
and sole occupant of a car headed east on Interstate 10 in Orange
County, Texas, and was stopped by a Texas Department of Public
Safety Officer who observed him change lanes without a signal,
contrary to Texas law. The vehicle was subsequently searched by
the officer at the site of the stop, and a piece of luggage in its
trunk was found to contain some 2.5 pounds of cocaine. This was
the basis of the prosecution. Chavis moved to suppress the fruits
of the search, contending that it violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. Following a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the district
court overruled the motion. United States v. Chavis, 841 F.Supp.
780 (E.D. Tex. 1993). Chavis now appeals his conviction and
sentence, complaining only of this ruling.
As Chavis correctly points out, the district court erred in
placing the burden of proof on him. Id. at 782. Chavis had
established, and it was always undisputed, that the stop and search
were without a warrant. He had also adequately shown standing, and
that, too, was never contested. In these circumstances, "'the
burden shifts to the government to justify the warrantless
search.'" United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1993)
(quoting United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 2640 (1977)). The district court's
findings hence may have been influenced by an erroneous view of the
law.
We accordingly vacate Chavis' conviction and sentence and
remand to the district court to redetermine the suppression issue
under the correct burden of proof. If in doing so the court
overrules the motion, it shall reinstate the conviction and
sentence, and Chavis may again appeal (if the court grants the
motion, the government may appeal). See United States v. Robinson,
625 F.2d 1211, 1220-21 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Karman,
849 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir. 1988). On remand the district court
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maySQindeed, shouldSQreopen the suppression hearing to allow
additional evidence.1 It should also address the "good faith" rule
of United States v. DeLeon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.
1991), particularly as it might relate to the length of the
detention.
The conviction and sentence are VACATED, and the cause is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith.
1
We note that Officer Davis who stopped Chavis testified that
he radioed for information on Chavis personally and on his vehicle,
and that when, not long after the stop, he asked, and Chavis
declined, permission to search the vehicle, he had received back
information on Chavis himself but not on the vehicle. Several
minutes thereafter, at the call of Davis, other officers arrived
with a narcotics-sniffing dog who ultimately alerted to the
vehicle. Davis was never askedSQand never statedSQwhether by this
time he had heard back concerning the vehicle. Cf. United States
v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993). As the district
court observed, "the record does not specify when the computer
check on the car's registration was completed." Chavis at 783.
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