FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 29, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KATHRYN L. JOHNS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-4099
(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00104-BCW)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, in his (D. Utah)
capacity as Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Kathryn Johns appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for
attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)
(EAJA), which followed the court’s remand to the Commissioner of Ms. Johns’s
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
claims for Social Security disability benefits. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm.
Background 1
In denying Ms. Johns’s application for disability benefits, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that her diagnosed mental impairments
were not severe apart from alcohol abuse. Before the district court, Ms. Johns
argued that the ALJ had failed to apply the correct analysis in assessing her
alcoholism. Specifically, the ALJ did not first find that Ms. Johns was disabled,
and only then determine whether she would still be disabled if she stopped using
alcohol. See Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001). The
government admitted that the ALJ did not follow the specified procedure, but
argued that the error was harmless because the dispositive question (whether
Ms. Johns would be disabled if she stopped using alcohol) was the same. While
stating “that the Government’s position does have a certain allure to it because it
1
Ms. Johns’s appellate appendix is not “sufficient for considering and
deciding the issues on appeal,” 10th Cir. R. 30.1(A)(1), because it omits integral
documents such as the parties’ briefs regarding the merits, not to mention her
EAJA fee motion and the Commissioner’s response. Further, those documents are
sealed in the district court. Rather than affirming this appeal based on an
inadequate appendix, see Burnett v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 555 F.3d 906, 908-10
(10th Cir. 2009), however, we have relied on the district court’s descriptions of
the parties’ positions and the arguments before it. Counsel is cautioned that “an
appellant who provides an inadequate record does so at his peril.” Id. at 908
(alteration and quotation omitted); see also 10th Cir. R. 30.1(A)(3) (“The court
need not remedy any failure of counsel to provide an adequate appendix.”).
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is probable that on remand the end result will be the same,” the district court held
that Drapeau was controlling. Aplt. App. at 27. Accordingly, it remanded
Ms. Johns’s claims for further proceedings before the Commissioner.
Ms. Johns then moved for fees under the EAJA. In response, the
government argued that an EAJA fee award was inappropriate because the
government’s harmless-error position was substantially justified. The district
court concluded that it was reasonable for the government to advocate for
applying the harmless-error doctrine because (1) the court had already
acknowledged that the argument had “a certain allure to it” given the evidence in
the record supporting the ALJ’s decision, id. at 33; and (2) the harmless-error
doctrine has been applied in Social Security cases, and the state of the doctrine
with regard to alcohol disability cases was unclear. Accordingly, the district
court concluded that the government’s position was substantially justified and
denied Ms. Johns’s motion for fees.
Analysis
The EAJA provides that in civil actions, a party who prevails against the
United States is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees “unless the court finds that
the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The only
dispute in this appeal is whether the Commissioner’s position was substantially
justified. Showing substantial justification (e.g., reasonableness in law and fact)
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is the Commissioner’s burden. Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172
(10th Cir. 2007). “[T]he government’s position must be ‘justified to a degree that
could satisfy a reasonable person[,]’” and it “‘can be justified even though it is
not correct.’” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 566 n.2
(1988)). We review a district court’s denial of an EAJA fee award for abuse of
discretion. Madron v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011). “Our
appellate role is limited to ensuring that the district court’s discretionary decision
did not fall beyond the bounds of the rationally available choices before the
district court given the facts and the applicable law in the case at hand.” Id.
(alteration and quotation omitted)
Ms. Johns argues that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially
justified because, regardless of the Commissioner’s litigating position, the ALJ
was unreasonable in failing to apply the proper analytical procedure to her
alcoholism. She is correct that we must consider the Commissioner’s position
both in the agency and in the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B),
(d)(2)(D); Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1172-73. Further, it is true that the ALJ failed to
apply the correct legal standard in the benefits analysis, and “EAJA fees generally
should be awarded where the government’s underlying action was unreasonable
even if the government advanced a reasonable litigation position,” Hackett,
475 F.3d at 1174 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in denying an award of EAJA fees.
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This court has recognized that a harmless-error analysis may be appropriate
in Social Security cases. See Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir.
2004) (stating that harmless error may apply “where, based on material the ALJ
did at least consider (just not properly), we could confidently say that no
reasonable administrative factfinder, following the correct analysis, could have
resolved the factual matter any other way”). In Hackett, the court held that Allen
was inapplicable because the Commissioner was not supplying a missing
dispositive finding, but instead was presenting an entirely new legal theory on
appeal. 475 F.3d at 1175. Here, in contrast, it appears that the Commissioner
hewed more closely to Allen, arguing that the ALJ considered Ms. Johns’s
alcoholism, just not properly, and that the ALJ ultimately arrived at the
conclusion required by the evidence. Further, it appears that the district court
believed that application of harmless error in this case was a close call. Under
these circumstances, the district court did not cross the bounds of the rationally
available choices available to it when it concluded that the Commissioner’s
position was substantially justified.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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