FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 29 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-30350
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:08-cr-00149-JDS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DOMINGO BAEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jack D. Shanstrom, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 14, 2011**
Portland, Oregon
Before: FISHER, PAEZ, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Domingo Baez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for return of
$1,351.00 in cash seized from him by drug enforcement agents in September 2008.
Baez contends that the declaration of civil forfeiture must be set aside because he
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
did not receive actual notice of the forfeiture.1 The plain language of the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1)(A),
forecloses Baez’s argument. The statute requires only that the government take
reasonable steps to provide notice to potentially interested parties; it does not
require actual notice. Moreover, Baez cannot show that he did not know, or have
reason to know, of the seizure within sufficient time to file a timely claim, as
CAFRA requires, since the monies were seized from his person. See 18 U.S.C. §
983(e)(1)(A).
Baez’s additional contention that due process requires that he receive actual
notice prior to the forfeiture of his assets is likewise without merit. “The Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States . . . from
depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’” Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). “[I]ndividuals whose property interests
are at stake are entitled to ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard.’” Id. Due
process requires only that the notice afforded to interested persons be “‘reasonably
1
The government contends that Baez waived this argument by raising it for
the first time on appeal. Pro se litigants, however, are held to a lesser standard
where their compliance with statutory procedural requirements is at issue. See
Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). We therefore construe
Baez’s arguments before the district court that his attorneys advised him against
pursuing the return of his property as having raised the notice issue.
2
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Id. at 168
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)).
CAFRA’s requirement that the government take reasonable steps to provide
potential claimants with notice mirrors the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
Due process plainly does not require actual notice. See id. at 170-71 (rejecting
inmate’s claim that the government was required to assure delivery of notice of
forfeiture to his cell and noting that “our cases have never required actual notice”).
AFFIRMED.
3