FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SABIN BARENDT, No. 10-15954
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00161-LRH-
RAM
v.
JIM GIBBONS; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 17, 2012 **
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Sabin Barendt, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his action under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Shakur v. Schriro, 514
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
record. Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Barendt’s
RLUIPA claim relating to other inmates’ ability to participate with Barendt in a
candle-lighting service, because he failed to introduce evidence that this limited
restriction on a group religious service substantially burdened his ability to
exercise his religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); Warsoldier v. Woodford,
418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (prisoner has initial burden to demonstrate that
prison policies constitute a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious
beliefs); id. at 996 (prison policy imposes substantial burden when it “intentionally
puts significant pressure on inmates . . . to abandon their religious beliefs”).
Insofar as Barendt’s complaint can be construed as seeking damages for
temporarily restricting Barendt from participating in the candle-lighting service at
the appropriate time, summary judgment was proper because defendants would be
entitled to sovereign and qualified immunity. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct.
1651, 1663 (2011) (“States, in accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive
their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages under RLUIPA”);
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009) (state officers entitled to qualified
2 10-15954
immunity if their actions do not violate clearly established law); see also
Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 997 n.7 (“There exists little Ninth Circuit authority
construing RLUIPA.”).
To the extent that Barendt sought the disgorgement of federal funds for any
alleged RLUIPA violations, the district court properly determined that granting
such relief would not be likely to redress his alleged injury. See Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) (party invoking federal
jurisdiction must establish the “likelihood that the requested relief will redress the
alleged injury”).
Barendt’s appeal of the denial of his motion for preliminary injunctive relief
is moot. See Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th
Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of a
preliminary injunction would have no practical consequences, and the issue is
therefore moot).
Barendt’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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