11-505-ag
Jin v. Holder
BIA
Hom, IJ
A089 198 421
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 2nd day of February, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
YULAN JIN,
Petitioner,
v. 11-505-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Lewis G. Hu, New York, NY
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division; Richard M.
Evans, Assistant Director, Office of
Immigration Litigation; Christina
Bechak Parascandola, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Yulan Jin, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of a January 13, 2011, order
of the BIA, affirming the May 12, 2009, decision of
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy K. Hom, which denied her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yulan
Jin, No. A089 198 421 (B.I.A. Jan. 13, 2011), aff’g No. A089
198 421 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 12, 2009). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.
2008). “[W]e uphold the IJ’s factual findings if they are
supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence
in the record.” Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513
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(2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary[.]”). “By contrast, we review de novo questions of
law and the BIA’s application of law to undisputed fact.”
Yanqin Weng, 562 F.3d at 513 (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted).
Because Jin does not challenge the agency’s
pretermission of her asylum application as untimely, the
only issues before this Court are Jin’s challenges to the
agency’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief.
We find that the agency’s denial of relief is supported by
substantial evidence.
The agency reasonably determined that Jin failed to
demonstrate that the harm she suffered as a result of her
participation in a public protest against her government
employer’s alleged corruption constituted persecution on
account of her political opinion. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). For withholding-of-removal applications
governed by the REAL ID Act, “the applicant must establish
that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
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social group, or political opinion was or will be at least
one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93,
100 (2d Cir. 2010); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341,
350 (BIA 2010) (applying the “one central reason” provision
to withholding of removal as well as asylum claims).
Here, Jin argues that her arrest for participating in a
public protest of the alleged corruption of her government
employer constituted persecution for her political opinion.
However, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
conclusion that the protest did not reflect political
opposition to the government policy, but rather an objection
to particular acts of her individual managers. See Yueqing
Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 548 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
that a challenge to institutional corruption can constitute
a political opinion, as opposed to “a challenge to isolated,
aberrational action of greed or malfeasance”). Moreover,
Jin presented no evidence of her arresting officers’
motives, testifying only that she had been informed that she
was arrested because she had disturbed the peace. See id.
at 545-46. Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding
that Jin failed to demonstrate that her mistreatment was
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based on political opinion, as is required to establish
eligibility for relief.
The agency also reasonably found that Jin failed to
demonstrate that it was more likely than not she would face
persecution in China based on her attendance at a pro-
democracy rally in the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135,
138 (2d Cir. 2008). Jin testified that because her husband
never received a letter in which she described attending a
political demonstration, she assumed that the Chinese
authorities had intercepted it. The IJ properly concluded
that such speculation was insufficient to establish that the
government was aware of her pro-democracy activities. Jian
Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that, absent solid support in the record for the
petitioner’s assertion that he would be subjected to forced
sterilization, his fear was “speculative at best”).
Although Jin offered a letter from her husband stating that
the Chinese police had warned him that Jin would be punished
if she continued to participate in pro-democracy activities,
the IJ did not err in declining to accord weight to this
unsworn letter. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). In any event, the agency
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reasonably concluded that Jin failed to demonstrate that,
because the threat of punishment was based on Jin’s
continued participation in such activities, and Jin
testified that she never again observed or participated in
any later demonstrations, the letter does not demonstrate
that she had an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution.
Because Jin’s claims were based on the same factual
predicate, the same rationale supports the agency’s denial
of CAT relief. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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