02/15/2022
DA 20-0472
Case Number: DA 20-0472
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2022 MT 35N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RONALD EUGENE KNAPP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDC-20-110
Honorable Elizabeth Best, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Haley Connell Jackson, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 26, 2022
Decided: February 15, 2022
Filed:
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__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Ronald Eugene Knapp appeals a July 27, 2020 sentencing order and judgment from
the Eighth Judicial District Court in Cascade County. Knapp pleaded guilty to a charge of
failure to register as a sexual offender, and the District Court sentenced him to five years
with the Department of Corrections (DOC). On the conviction for failure to register, the
District Court designated Knapp a “level 2” sexual offender, and its written sentencing
order required him to complete an intensive sex offender treatment program in order to be
eligible for parole, although the judge did not include this condition in her oral
pronouncement of the sentence.
¶3 Knapp asks this Court to remand the sentencing order with instructions to strike the
“level 2” designation and the parole eligibility condition. Knapp points out that tiered
sexual offender designation levels are only legal components of a sentence for a “sexual
offense”—which failure to register is not—and that parole restrictions are not allowed for
sentences to DOC, as opposed to those to state prison. The State concedes each of these
points and agrees that these components of Knapp’s sentence should be stricken on remand.
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¶4 The parties are correct. We review criminal sentences that include at least a year of
incarceration for legality, meaning they must adhere to the mandates of applicable
sentencing statutes and fall within the parameters set. State v. Parks, 2019 MT 252, ¶ 7,
397 Mont. 408, 450 P.3d 889. Here, the District Court’s July 27, 2020 sentencing order
failed to comport with the applicable sentencing laws in these two respects.
¶5 Regarding the tiered sexual offender level, district courts may only make such
designations at sentencing for “sexual offenses.” Section 46-23-509(1)-(3), MCA; State v.
Greene, 2015 MT 1, ¶ 30, 378 Mont. 1, 340 P.3d 551. Failure to register as a sexual
offender does not qualify as a “sexual offense” as defined by § 46-23-502(9), MCA.
Greene, ¶ 30. Thus, the “level 2 sexual offender” designation must be stricken from the
sentence the District Court imposed here.
¶6 Regarding the parole condition, a sentence committing a defendant to the custody
of DOC is different than a sentence of incarceration in state prison. State v. Bekemans,
2013 MT 11, ¶ 49, 368 Mont. 235, 293 P.3d 843. Section 46-18-202(2), MCA, authorizes
district courts to impose parole restrictions like the sexual treatment requirement imposed
here only for at least one-year terms of imprisonment in state prison. A district court does
not have the authority to impose such a restriction for a commitment to DOC. Bekemans,
¶ 49. Thus, the provision requiring intensive sex offender programming before parole
eligibility must also be stricken from Knapp’s sentence here.
¶7 The parole condition must also be stricken for another reason. At Knapp’s
sentencing hearing, the District Court included no such provision in its oral pronouncement
of the sentence. When oral and written sentences conflict, the oral pronouncement of the
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sentence controls and operates as the legally effective sentence. State v. Lane, 1998 MT
76, ¶ 40, 288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9. Thus, in fact, the controlling sentence in place for
Knapp contains no parole eligibility provision. The District Court’s revision on remand
will serve to correct an error in the written judgment rather than act as a change to the
effective sentence. Lane, ¶ 48; § 46-18-116, MCA. The State argues that on remand, the
District Court should be able to modify the intensive sex offender programing provision to
merely make it a recommendation. But because the controlling sentence—the oral
pronouncement—included no such provision, all the District Court may do is correct the
written order to conform with its effective judgment, not modify the sentence in this
additional respect. See State v. Olivares-Coster, 2011 MT 196, ¶¶ 20, 22, 361 Mont. 380,
259 P.3d 760 (refusing to allow the addition of discretionary provisions on remand when
the oral order in place already declined to include them).
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶9 We remand the District Court’s July 27, 2020 sentencing order and judgment with
instructions to strike the level 2 sexual offender designation and the intensive sex offender
programming condition.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
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We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
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