11-493-cr
USA v. Yelverton
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 16th day
of February, two thousand twelve.
Present:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
Circuit Judges,
JANE A. RESTANI,
Judge.*
________________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 11-493-cr
MICHAEL YELVERTON,
Defendant-Appellant,
________________________________________________
For Appellee: RAJIT S. DOSANJH (Daniel Hanlon, on the brief), Assistant
United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian, United
States Attorney for the Northern District of New York,
Syracuse, N.Y.
*
Judge Jane A. Restani, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
For Defendant-Appellant: LISA A. PEEBLES, Acting Public Defender (Molly K. Corbett,
Research & Writing Assistant, on the brief), Office of the
Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of New
York, Albany, N.Y.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
(Kahn, J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Michael Yelverton appeals from a January 10, 2011 judgment of
the district court, issued after defendant’s entry of a guilty plea, finding that defendant violated
the terms of his supervised release and sentencing him principally to five months’ imprisonment
and two years of supervised release. On appeal, Yelverton argues that the district court’s
imposition of a two-year term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.
We review a sentence for a violation of the terms of supervised release using “the same
standard as for sentencing generally.” United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir.
2005). The substantive reasonableness of the sentence and the procedures employed in arriving
at the sentence are reviewed under a deferential “abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2009). “We will . . . set aside a district court’s substantive
determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within
the range of permissible decisions.’” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)).
In challenging the district court’s substantive determination, Yelverton argues principally
that the imposition of a two-year term of supervised release was greater than necessary to
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comply with the purposes outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because the district court also imposed
a term of imprisonment as part of its sentence. He maintains that “[t]he additional
supervised-release term rendered the sentence of Mr. Yelverton unreasonable because the prison
term was adequate punishment for the violations, and the record failed to indicate the additional
supervised release would accomplish anything, especially when the district court could not
articulate reasons for the additional term.” Def.’s Br. 14.
This argument is without merit. It is abundantly clear from the record that the district
court’s decision to impose a two-year term of supervised release in addition to a five-month term
of imprisonment was well within the range of permissible decisions. The district court expressly
considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and reasonably concluded that the sentence
imposed was sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth
under that provision. For example, the district court noted Yelverton’s responsibilities to his son
and to his fiancee, and expressed its hope that a term of supervised release would help Yelverton
stay away from further criminal activity. The district court explained that the purpose of
supervised release was not to “catch” him, but rather to help him avoid further wrongdoing,
including by requiring him to participate in a substance-abuse program that provided for drug
testing and treatment. App. 65, 71, 87-89. The record therefore demonstrates that the district
court imposed the term of supervised release primarily to deter Yelverton’s further criminal
conduct and “to provide [Yelverton] with needed . . . medical care . . . or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (D); see also United States
v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals
in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from
those served by incarceration.”); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1994)
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(noting that courts may consider “medical and rehabilitative needs of the offender” in setting
term of supervised release). In addition, the length of the term of supervised release was
eminently reasonable in light of Yelverton’s history of repeated violations. See 18 U.S.C. §
3583(c) (directing courts to consider “history and characteristics of the defendant” under §
3553(a)(1) when determining length of supervised release term); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)(2)(A)
(directing courts to consider the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”).
We have considered Yelverton’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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