UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4535
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMELL MASON, a/k/a JAH, a/k/a Tremaine Mason,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00087-JPB-DJJ-6)
Submitted: January 31, 2012 Decided: February 16, 2012
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen D. Herndon, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant.
William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, Erin K.
Reisenweber, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamell Mason pled guilty to two counts of possession
of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2011), and was sentenced as a
career offender to a term of 210 months imprisonment. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2010). Counsel for Mason
has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), raising seven issues on Mason’s behalf and
questioning the district court’s denial of a competency
evaluation requested by the government and its denial of Mason’s
suppression motion. Counsel states, however, that he has found
no meritorious grounds for appeal. Mason has filed a pro se
supplemental brief raising four constitutional issues, which he
states he wishes to reserve for a later motion to vacate under
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011). We affirm.
To the extent that the validity of Mason’s guilty plea
is before us, we are satisfied that it was a knowing and
voluntary plea. Because Mason did not seek to withdraw his
plea, any error in the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing is reviewed
for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525-
26 (4th Cir. 2002). We have reviewed the record of the Rule 11
colloquy before the magistrate judge, to which Mason consented,
which occurred after a jury had been empanelled for Mason’s
trial. We conclude that the magistrate judge adequately
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complied with Rule 11. Mason’s remaining claims are without
merit. He was correctly sentenced as a career offender, which
was the determining factor in setting his Guidelines range. The
district court’s decision not to depart below the Guidelines
range is not reviewable. United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367,
371 (4th Cir. 2008). The court’s denial of a three-level
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, USSG § 3E1.1,
which Mason did not request, is not plain error. The record
does not establish conclusively that Mason’s attorney was
ineffective; therefore this claim is not properly raised on
direct appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th
Cir. 1997). By pleading guilty, Mason waived his right to
contest any pre-indictment delay in his prosecution. Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). No error appears in the
district court’s decision, following a hearing, that Mason was
competent to stand trial and its consequent denial of the
government’s motion for a psychological evaluation. The court’s
denial of Mason’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained
during his search and arrest is an issue that Mason waived when
he entered his guilty plea.
We therefore affirm the conviction and sentence
imposed by the district court. In accordance with Anders, we
have reviewed the entire record in this case and the ripe issues
raised in Mason’s pro se supplemental brief and have found no
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meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform his
client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
Finally, we dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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