UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4836
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTINE N. HAMM, a/k/a Niki,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00250-1)
Submitted: February 23, 2012 Decided: February 27, 2012
Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew J. Katz, THE KATZ WORKING FAMILIES LAW FIRM, LC,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II,
United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christine N. Hamm pled guilty to conspiracy to commit
interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle and was sentenced
to twelve months and one day of imprisonment, to be followed by
a thirty-six-month term of supervised release. The district
court deferred her sentence to allow her to receive drug
treatment. After her release from prison, her supervised
release was modified twice, requiring her to reside at community
corrections centers. The probation officer ultimately
petitioned to revoke Hamm’s supervised release. Hamm admitted
she committed the alleged violations, and the district court
sentenced her again to twelve months and one day of
imprisonment, to be followed by an eighteen-month term of
supervised release. She now appeals that sentence, arguing the
district court failed to provide a statement of reasons for the
chosen sentence and that the sentence is plainly unreasonable in
light of the Guidelines range (three to nine months) and her
personal circumstances. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th
Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a
determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This
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initial inquiry takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than
reasonableness review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439) (applying “plainly unreasonable”
standard of review for probation revocation). Only if the
sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable does the
inquiry proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 438–39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the
Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
applicable to supervised release revocation. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438–40. A sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
“A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the
record on appeal and conclude that the district court adequately
explained its reasons for sentencing Hamm within the statutory
maximum to one year and one day in prison, followed by an
eighteen-month term of supervised release. Furthermore, we are
not persuaded that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, let
alone plainly unreasonable. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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