FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 06 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONNA MARCELLE ZAMORA, No. 10-17787
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-04852-JSW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 16, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, NOONAN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Donna Marcelle Zamora appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
administrative law judge’s denial of disability insurance benefits under Titles II
and XVI of the Social Security Act. We affirm the finding of Zamora’s residual
functional capacity for work.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The ALJ properly determined Zamora’s residual functional capacity. Dr.
Teran opined that Zamora could “frequently” lift and carry objects weighing less
than ten pounds, could “occasionally” lift objects weighing ten pounds, and could
lift up to twenty pounds on rare occasions. She further opined that Zamora was
capable of standing or walking for approximately four hours per day. The ALJ’s
determination that Zamora was capable of light work with a sit/stand option at will
was therefore consistent with Dr. Teran’s medical assessment. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(b) (2011).
The ALJ also properly resolved ambiguities in Dr. Kalman’s opinion. See
Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Dr. Kalman opined that
Zamora could not perform at a competitive pace but that she was nevertheless
capable of following simple job instructions, satisfactorily maintaining her
attention for two hours at a time, and sustaining an ordinary routine. These
limitations are consistent with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
determination.
Finally, the ALJ did not err in discounting Zamora’s credibility due to her
failure to attend either of two scheduled consultative evaluations. See Fair v.
Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).
AFFIRMED.
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