UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5055
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DONNIE CHARLES BERGERON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-00911-PMD-1)
Submitted: March 1, 2012 Decided: March 12, 2012
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donnie Charles Bergeron appeals the two-year sentence
and one-year supervised release term imposed following the
revocation of his supervised release. Counsel for Bergeron has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal,
but questioning whether the district court imposed a plainly
unreasonable sentence. Although informed of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, Bergeron has not done so. We affirm.
In reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines
sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439 (4th Cir. 2006)). We will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th
Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a
determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 438. Only if the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable does the inquiry proceed to the
second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.
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A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered Chapter
Seven’s advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors applicable to supervised release
revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at
438-40. “A court need not be as detailed or specific when
imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Upon review of the record, we agree with counsel’s
assessment that Bergeron’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. At the final sentencing hearing, the
district court reasonably found that the sentence was necessary
in light of Bergeron’s criminal history, the need to afford
adequate deterrence, and the need to protect the public.
Because the district court articulated a proper basis for
imposing the statutory maximum sentence, there is no substantive
error. Because Bergeron’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable, it is not plainly unreasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires
that counsel inform Bergeron, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Bergeron requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Bergeron. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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