UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4515
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARY NIEL HOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00257-FDW-1)
Submitted: March 21, 2012 Decided: April 4, 2012
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Angela G. Parrott, Director, Erin K. Taylor, Ross H. Richardson,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Niel Hood pled guilty to carjacking, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (2006); using a firearm in commission of a carjacking, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006); and possessing a firearm after having
been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On
appeal, he argues that the district court imposed improper
conditions of supervised release. We affirm.
The contested conditions of supervised release include
psycho-sexual evaluations, psychological testing, possible sex-
offender treatment, and a ban against possessing child
pornography and simulated child pornography. Because
“[d]istrict courts have broad latitude to impose conditions on
supervised release,” we review such conditions only for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir.
2009). The sentencing court may impose any condition that is
reasonably related to the relevant statutory sentencing factors.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Armel, 585 F.3d at 186.
In light of the broad discretion afforded district
courts in the imposition of supervised release conditions and in
light of Hood’s particular criminal history, we find that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
challenged conditions of supervised release.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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