Maracich v. Spears

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD F. MARACICH, individually 
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; MARTHA L.
WEEKS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated;
JOHN C. TANNER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
 No. 10-2021
v.
MICHAEL EUGENE SPEARS; MICHAEL
SPEARS, PA; GEDNEY MAIN HOWE,
III; GEDNEY MAIN HOWE, III, PA;
RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN; RICHARD
A. HARPOOTLIAN, PA; A. CAMDEN
LEWIS; LEWIS & BABOCK, LLP,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg.
Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(7:09-cv-01651-HMH)

Argued: December 8, 2011

Decided: April 4, 2012

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
2 MARACICH v. SPEARS
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Davis wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Wynn joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Philip N. Elbert, NEAL & HARWELL, Nash-
ville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Morris Dawes Cooke, Jr.,
BARNWELL, WHALEY, PATTERSON & HELMS, LLC,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
James G. Thomas, W. David Bridgers, Elizabeth S. Tipping,
NEAL & HARWELL, Nashville, Tennessee; Gary L. Comp-
ton, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellants. E. Bart
Daniel, Charleston, South Carolina, John B. White, Jr., HAR-
RISON, WHITE, SMITH & COGGINS, P.C., Spartanburg,
South Carolina, for Appellees; Curtis W. Dowling, BARNES,
ALFORD, STORK & JOHNSON, LLP, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellees Michael Eugene Spears and Michael
Spears, PA; Craig E. Burgess, John W. Fletcher, BARN-
WELL, WHALEY, PATTERSON & HELMS, LLC, Charles-
ton, South Carolina, for Appellees Gedney Main Howe, III,
and Gedney Main Howe, III, PA; Charles E. Hill, TURNER
PADGET GRAHAM & LANEY, P.A., Columbia, South Car-
olina, for Appellees Richard Harpootlian and Richard A. Har-
pootlian, PA.

OPINION

DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the dismissal of all claims alleged
in a putative class action complaint filed pursuant to the Driv-
er’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA or the Act), 18
U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, which "regulates the disclosure of per-
sonal information contained in the records of state motor
vehicle departments." See generally Reno v. Condon, 528
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 3
U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (holding the DPPA constitutional as a
proper exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce
Clause).

Appellees Michael E. Spears, Esq., Gedney M. Howe, III,
Esq., Richard A. Harpootlian, Esq., and A. Camden Lewis,
Esq., ("the Lawyers" or Appellees) are South Carolina attor-
neys who in 2006 and 2007 instituted several "group action"
lawsuits in South Carolina state court against numerous car
dealerships pursuant to the South Carolina Regulation of
Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act ("Dealers Act"),
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-10 et seq. They alleged that certain
dealerships had collected unlawful fees from car buyers.
Through requests submitted to the South Carolina Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) under the state Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 30-4-10 to -165 (FOIA), the
Lawyers obtained "personal information" protected by the
DPPA, viz., the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and car
purchase information of thousands of car buyers, from which
they identified potential named plaintiffs in the Dealers Act
group action.

Appellants Edward F. Maracich, Martha L. Weeks, and
John C. Tanner ("the Buyers" or Appellants) are car buyers
who received mailings from the Lawyers regarding the Deal-
ers Act litigation. In 2009, individually and on behalf of a
putative class of all others similarly situated, the Buyers sued
the Lawyers in this action in the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina alleging that the Lawyers
violated the DPPA when they obtained and used the Buyers’
personal information without their consent in connection with
the Dealers Act litigation.

On cross-motions for summary judgment in the district
court, the Buyers argued that the liability of the Lawyers was
established as a matter of law because the Lawyers had
obtained their personal information for use in a mass solicita-
tion which, without the Buyers’ consent, is prohibited by the
4 MARACICH v. SPEARS
DPPA. The Lawyers argued, to the contrary, that they
obtained and used the Buyers’ personal information for pur-
poses that are permitted notwithstanding the absence of con-
sent, most particularly, under the "litigation exception" to the
DPPA’s general prohibitions on the use of personal informa-
tion. In a thorough opinion, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Lawyers, concluding that the
Lawyers did not engage in prohibited solicitation but that,
even if they did, their actions nonetheless satisfied the so-
called "litigation" and "state action" exceptions to the statu-
tory prohibitions under the DPPA, and therefore their actions
comported with the requirements of the Act. The Buyers have
timely appealed from the adverse judgment.

Having carefully considered the record and the parties’
contentions, in light of the plain language, purpose, and over-
all structure of the DPPA, we affirm the judgment, albeit on
reasoning differing somewhat from that of the district court.
Specifically, we hold that the district court erred in ruling that
the Lawyers did not engage in solicitation. Yet, the Lawyers
indisputably made permissible use of the Buyers’ personal
information protected by the DPPA, here, for use "in connec-
tion with [litigation]," including "investigation in anticipation
of litigation." 18 U.S.C. §2721(b)(4). Ultimately, the Buyers’
damages claims asserted under the DPPA fail as a matter of
law, notwithstanding the fact that the Buyers can identify a
distinct prohibited use (mass solicitation without consent) that
might be supported by evidence in the record. In short, where,
as a matter of settled state law and practice, as here, solicita-
tion is an accepted and expected element of, and is inextrica-
bly intertwined with, conduct satisfying the litigation
exception under the DPPA, such solicitation is not actionable
by persons to whom the personal information pertains.

I.

The issues presented arise out of the process and circum-
stances surrounding the Lawyers’ efforts to investigate, and in
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 5
due course to institute, claims cognizable in the Dealers Act
litigation they filed in state court. Accordingly, we first set
forth in some detail the facts and procedural history relevant
to the state court litigation. We then proceed to describe the
facts and procedural history of this action filed in federal dis-
trict court. As the parties indicated in their cross-motions for
summary judgment filed in the district court, the essential car-
dinal facts are undisputed.

A.

In early June 2006 the Lawyers were contacted by several
persons who complained that local car dealerships were
engaged in unfair practices. The pursuit of these potential
claims led the Lawyers to make the first of a series of FOIA
requests to the South Carolina DMV. The requests indicated
to the DMV that information was being sought "in anticipa-
tion of litigation," under the DPPA provision commonly
referred to as the "litigation exception," which authorizes a
state DMV to disclose drivers’ and/or car owners’ "personal
information":1

for use in connection with any civil, criminal, admin-
istrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State,
or local court or agency or before any self-regulatory
body, including the service of process, investigation
in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or
enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to
an order of a Federal, State, or local court.
1
Under the Act, "personal information" is defined as:
information that identifies an individual, including an individu-
al’s photograph, social security number, driver identification
number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone
number, and medical or disability information, but does not
include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations,
and driver’s status.
18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
6 MARACICH v. SPEARS
18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4).

In the original FOIA request, Appellee Harpootlian
explained to the DMV: "I have plaintiffs who have com-
plained of certain conduct as a result of their transactions with
car dealers, conduct which I believe to be a potential violation
[of] state law. I am attempting to determine if this is a com-
mon practice, and am accordingly submitting this FOIA
request." J.A. 206. The request was for information on "pri-
vate purchases of new or used automobiles in Spartanburg
County during the week of May 1-7, 2006, including the
name, address, and telephone number of the buyer, dealership
where purchased, type of vehicle purchased, and date of pur-
chase." J.A. 206. Apparently satisfied that the litigation
exception applied, the DMV provided the requested informa-
tion.

About one month later, Harpootlian made a second FOIA
request to the DMV. This request likewise invoked the litiga-
tion exception of the DPPA and extended the inquiry to pur-
chases of new or used cars in Charleston, Richland, York,
Lexington, and Greenville counties for the week of May 1-7,
2006. Again, the DMV provided the requested information.

It is undisputed that at the time of these first two FOIA
requests (despite Harpootlian’s reference to "plaintiffs who
have complained of certain conduct") the Lawyers had not yet
filed an action under the Dealers Act or otherwise. Just days
after the second FOIA request, however (and presumably
before it was answered), the Lawyers filed in state court a
Dealers Act case referred to by the parties and the district
court as the Herron litigation, alleging violations by 51 car
dealerships.2 The suit was filed on behalf of four named plain-
2
The Dealers Act prohibits automobile dealerships from engaging in
"any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable and which
causes damage to any of the parties or the public." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-
15-40. The specific allegation in Herron was that dealerships deceptively
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 7
tiffs and "for the benefit of all others," J.A. 220; see S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-15-110 (providing that "when such action is
one of common or general interest to many persons or when
the parties are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court, one or more may sue for the benefit of
the whole, including actions for injunctive relief.").

Immediately following the filing of the complaint in Her-
ron, various defendant dealerships filed motions to dismiss on
the ground that they had not sold cars to any of the four
named plaintiffs, who therefore lacked standing. With these
motions pending, Harpootlian submitted a third FOIA request
to the DMV in October 2006, again citing the litigation
exception, in which he requested the personal information and
types of vehicles purchased for people who bought cars from
328 listed dealerships between May 1 and May 14, 2006.
Included on the list were those dealerships that had filed
motions to dismiss for lack of standing in the Herron litiga-
tion. Again, the DMV complied with the request.

On October 31, 2006, the Lawyers filed an amended com-
plaint in the Herron litigation, which added four named plain-
tiffs to the suit and increased the number of defendant
dealerships from 51 to 324. As with the original complaint,
defendant dealerships that had not engaged in transactions
with any of the now eight named plaintiffs filed motions to
dismiss for lack of standing. In all, more than 183 motions to
dismiss were filed.

On January 3, 2007, the Lawyers mailed the first of another
series of letters to the car buyers identified through the FOIA

grouped "administrative fees" on invoices with taxes and other required
fees to mislead purchasers into believing that the charges were mandatory
and non-negotiable. The suit requested permanent injunctive relief, disgor-
gement of all fees to all purchasers who paid them, double actual damages,
litigation costs and attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.
8 MARACICH v. SPEARS
requests. The first letter was prefaced, just below the letter-
head, with the phrase: ADVERTISING MATERIAL. J.A.
487. The letter stated, in its entirety:

We represent a group of consumers in a pending
lawsuit arising from South Carolina car dealerships
charging an add-on, often referred to as an "adminis-
trative fee," a "recording and processing fee," "clos-
ing fee," or "dealer documentation and closing fee."
We believe that these fees are being charged in vio-
lation of South Carolina law.

We understand that you may have been charged
one of these fees on your recent purchase of an auto-
mobile. We obtained this information in response
to a Freedom of Information Act request to the
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles.

The exact nature of your legal situation will
depend on facts not known to us at this time. You
should understand that the advice and informa-
tion in this communication is general and that
your own situation may vary. However, we would
like the opportunity [to] discuss your rights and
options with you in a free consultation. If you are
interested in participating in the case or in a free con-
sultation, please mail the enclosed postage paid card
and we will contact you soon.

You may wish to consult your lawyer or another
lawyer instead of us. You may obtain information
about other lawyers by consulting the Yellow
Pages or by calling the South Carolina Bar Law-
yer Referral Service at 799-7100 in Columbia or
toll free at 1-800-868-2284. If you have already
engaged a lawyer in connection with the legal
matter referred to in this communication, you
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 9
should direct any questions you have to that law-
yer.

J.A. 487 (emphases in original). The Lawyers filed a copy of
the letter and a list of recipients’ names and addresses with
the South Carolina Office of Disciplinary Counsel, as
required by South Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3,
which regulates the solicitation of prospective clients. The
emphasized text of the third and fourth paragraphs, and the
prominent placement of the phrase "advertising material,"
complied with the provisions of Rule 7.3, as well. See S.C.R.
Prof. Con. 7.3(d)(1), (2).

Later in January 2007, Harpootlian made two more FOIA
requests of the DMV, seeking personal information of people
who had purchased cars between June 1 and September 2,
2006, from an additional 31 dealerships. Then, Harpootlian
submitted the final FOIA request on January 23, 2007,
requesting personal information and dealership information
for all purchasers of new and used cars during September 1-
14, 2006, and December 10-24, 2006. The three requests
again cited only the litigation exception to the DPPA and all
were granted by the DMV.

On the same day as the last FOIA request, the Lawyers
mailed a second round of letters to car buyers whose personal
information had been disclosed by the DMV. These letters,
which differed from the first mailing only by minor format-
ting changes, were sent to 1,283 people. Meanwhile, in state
court, various defendant dealerships filed a Joint Memoran-
dum to Dismiss, again asserting that "for every named Dealer,
there had to be a corresponding named Consumer who was a
customer." Appellees’ Br. 8; J.A. 666.

In March 2007, the Lawyers mailed two more rounds of
letters to a total of 21,116 purchasers identified through the
FOIA requests. Shortly thereafter, counsel for some of the
dealership defendants in Herron wrote to the Lawyers, assert-
10 MARACICH v. SPEARS
ing that the FOIA requests and subsequent mailings violated
a state law generally prohibiting certain solicitations based on
information obtained from state agencies, but not mentioning
the DPPA. The Lawyers responded by invoking the DPPA
and reiterating that the litigation exception to the DPPA
applied to their FOIA requests. The Lawyers further asserted
that the letters mailed to car buyers had been made to conform
to the requirements of a client solicitation under the South
Carolina lawyer disciplinary rules only because "we knew
that your group would try to see if we had met the require-
ments of the Disciplinary Counsel. In an abundance of caution
we followed the requirements." J.A. 337. The Lawyers
asserted that no violation of state law regarding prohibited
solicitation had occurred because "we are not marketing or
selling a consumer product or service." Id.

In March 2007, Appellant Maracich received one of the let-
ters mailed to car buyers by the Lawyers. While his personal
information had been disclosed to the Lawyers because he
was one of many buyers from a particular dealership, Mara-
cich also happened to be the Director of Sales and Marketing
at that dealership.

Two months later, the Lawyers sent two rounds of letters
to a total of 11,547 car buyers identified from the FOIA
requests. Appellants Martha Weeks and John Tanner allege
that they received letters from the Lawyers around this time.
According to Tanner, after receiving the letter he called Har-
pootlian to find out how his contact information was obtained.
During the conversation, he was subjected to "an aggressive
sales pitch" to "sign up as a client for a lawsuit," and was told
that he could receive "two to three times" the fee amount he
had paid at purchase. J.A. 1448. Tanner further avers that dur-
ing this conversation, Harpootlian never asked about the cir-
cumstances of his purchase.

In June 2007, in response to continuing disputes over stand-
ing in the Herron litigation, the Lawyers moved to further
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 11
amend their Amended Complaint to join nearly 250 additional
named plaintiffs who had come forward in response to the
mailings. The dealerships opposed the motion, now arguing
that the proposed additional plaintiffs had been contacted in
violation of the DPPA. The state court ultimately denied the
motion to amend, and ruled that the named plaintiffs had
standing only as to dealerships with which they had engaged
in transactions.3

Consequently, in September 2007, the claimants who had
been denied joinder in Herron brought independent actions in
state court, which were then consolidated with Herron. All
claims against dealerships without a corresponding plaintiff-
purchaser were dropped in the interest of foreclosing any fur-
ther controversy over standing.

Addressing another Motion to Substitute a plaintiff, the
state court in the Herron litigation in October 2009 reiterated
a number of key rulings in the case up to that point: (1) the
plaintiffs had "a substantive statutory right . . . to proceed ‘for
the benefit of the whole’. . . ‘without a requirement that the
plaintiff plead and prove the class certification requirements
under S.C.R.P. Rule 23’"; (2) "each named Plaintiff had
standing to sue for himself and in a representative capacity for
other[s] against the Defendant that transacted business with
that named Plaintiff"; (3) "This is not a Rule 23, SCRP class
action. This is a group representative action under the Dealers
Act . . . . Nothing in the Dealers Act requires the Plaintiffs to
move for class certification"; and (4) "Plaintiff’s counsel, as
private attorneys general, from the inception of this litigation
have represented the public interest in attempting to regulate
allegedly unfair practices . . . and therefore represent all those
affected by such practices." J.A. 1354, 1355, 1357.4
3
The court further ruled, however, that the existing plaintiffs could
acquire standing as to any defendant that was shown by discovery to have
joined a conspiracy to charge improper fees.
4
The long-pending Herron litigation has had something of a tortuous
journey. When the trial court denied the dealerships’ motion to compel
12 MARACICH v. SPEARS
B.

Nearly three years after the Herron litigation commenced,
the Buyers (who are represented in this case by the same
counsel who represents several of the dealerships in the Her-
ron litigation) filed the instant putative class action against the
Lawyers, alleging violations of the DPPA related to the acqui-
sition and use of the Buyers’ personal information from DMV
records through the Lawyers’ FOIA requests. The Complaint
asserted damages claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). Specifi-
cally, the Buyers alleged that the Lawyers unlawfully
obtained personal information as defined by the DPPA, 18
U.S.C. § 2725(3), see supra n.1, by knowingly requesting,
"under false pretenses," information for the prohibited use of
solicitation, "and then using the Personal Information for the
statutorily prohibited purpose of mailing lawyer advertising
and solicitation materials to Plaintiffs." J.A. 19. The Buyers
sought liquidated damages of $2,500 for each instance of
unlawful conduct, compensatory and punitive damages, a per-

arbitration, the dealerships took an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina granted certification, brought up the appeal from
the Court of Appeals, and reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial
court’s ruling, concluding, ultimately, that although the arbitration clause
at issue was otherwise enforceable, its prohibition on class arbitration vio-
lated the public policy of South Carolina. See Herron v. Century BMW,
693 S.E.2d 394 (S.C. 2011). Upon the filing by the dealerships of a peti-
tion for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court granted the writ,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the action to the South Carolina
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that California state law rule that
prohibited a waiver of class arbitration in a retail sales contract was pre-
empted by the Federal Arbitration Act). Upon the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s reconsideration of Herron after the remand, the court held that the
dealerships had forfeited the argument that the class arbitration bar under
the public policy of South Carolina was preempted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act by failing to raise it in the trial court or before the South Carolina
Supreme Court in the interlocutory appeal. Herron v. Century BMW, 719
S.E.2d 640 (S.C. 2011).
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 13
manent injunction, attorney’s fees and costs, and interest on
the monetary awards.5

The Lawyers promptly moved to dismiss all counts in the
Complaint, arguing (among other issues) that the Buyers’ per-
sonal information was obtained for the permissible use pro-
vided in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4), the litigation exception, and
in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), the state action exception.6 The
5
Section 2724 provides:
(a) Cause of action.—A person who knowingly obtains, dis-
closes or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record,
for a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to
the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring
a civil action in a United States district court.
(b) Remedies.—The court may award—
(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the
amount of $2,500;
(2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disre-
gard of the law;
(3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reason-
ably incurred; and
(4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court
determines to be appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 2724. See Condon, 528 U.S. at 146-47 (stating that the
§ 2724(a) cause of action is for knowingly obtaining, disclosing, or using
personal information "for a use other than those specifically permitted by
the DPPA"). The Buyers alleged four separate counts in their Complaint,
all arising under the DPPA, against all four of the Lawyers (and their
respective law firms), and seemingly resting on the following separate the-
ories: (1) willful violations of the DPPA; (2) negligent violations of the
DPPA; (3) respondeat superior liability, generally; and (4) concert of
action, generally.
6
The so-called "state action" exception under the DPPA provides as fol-
lows:
(1) For use by any government agency, including any court or
law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions, or any pri-
vate person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local
agency in carrying out its functions.
14 MARACICH v. SPEARS
motion also argued that the Lawyers "already represented" the
people they had contacted using the DMV information by vir-
tue of the group action under the Dealers Act, and the attor-
neys had moreover been "obligated" to find and contact
buyers to ensure that the suit was not dismissed on standing
grounds as to certain members of that group.

In addition, the Lawyers noted that the lead counsel for the
Buyers in the instant case also represented several of the
defendant dealerships in Herron. They argued that this rela-
tionship created a conflict of interest, and that representation
of the Buyers in federal court by the dealerships’ attorneys
should be prohibited in any event because to the extent that
the Buyers were members of the plaintiff group in Herron,
they were already represented by the Lawyers. In sum, the
Lawyers charged that the DPPA litigation was an "obstruc-
tionist legal tactic," designed to undermine the Herron litiga-
tion. J.A. 158.

The district court rejected each of the Lawyers’ arguments
for dismissal. The court ruled, in pertinent part, that the exis-
tence of an attorney-client relationship between the Lawyers
and buyer group members in Herron was a disputed factual
issue and thus the litigation exception to the DPPA did not
apply at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and that the state action
exception did not apply because the Lawyers, though acting
as "private attorneys general" in a group action context, were
not for that reason alone agents of the government. Further-
more, the court admonished that any assertion regarding the
impropriety of the representation of the class should be
expressed in a motion to disqualify counsel on the ground of
conflict of interest.

18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1) (emphasis added). The Lawyers argued that, in
their role as "private attorneys general" under the Dealers Act, the state
action exception applied to their FOIA requests leading to, and facilitating,
the Herron litigation.
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 15
In their Answer and Counterclaim, the Lawyers asserted, in
effect, that this action was proof of the sports aphorism that
the best defense is an aggressive offense: "This is now clearly
seen as a multi-million dollar-fear lawsuit designed to inter-
fere with and discover the legal bases of an underlying lawsuit
involving consumers against car dealers and their illegal
charging of secret fees. It is designed to chill, if not kill, an
ongoing legitimate lawsuit." J.A. 175. After alleging a host of
affirmative defenses, the Lawyers requested by way of their
counterclaim a declaratory judgment that the DPPA’s solicita-
tion provision does not apply to permissible litigation-related
uses of personal information. Such a construction was proper,
they argued, because "Congress intended for lawyers to have
unfettered access and use of DMV information for use in liti-
gation." J.A. 189.

Discovery commenced, haltingly, but on January 25, 2010,
the district court addressed the Lawyers’ Motion to Stay,
which argued that discovery would involve documents from
the Herron litigation that fall within the attorney-client and
work product privileges, and should therefore be stayed while
that case proceeded. Agreeing that there were "numerous
privilege issues" at stake, the district court ordered a six-
month stay in the federal DPPA action, suspending discovery.
J.A. 196.

Just weeks later, the Buyers moved to lift the stay to under-
take class certification discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Following a hearing, during which the Lawyers "stated that
they could file a motion for summary judgment without the
need for any discovery," J.A. 203, and the Buyers stated that
discovery would likewise be unnecessary to prepare their
response to such a motion and their own motion, the district
court denied the motion to lift the stay with the expectation
that summary judgment proceedings would proceed.

The Buyers and the Lawyers promptly filed cross-motions
for summary judgment only three days apart; the former
16 MARACICH v. SPEARS
sought a partial summary judgment on liability only, and the
latter sought judgment in full as to all of the Buyers’ claims,
relying on several theories. The Lawyers made essentially the
same arguments they had asserted in their unsuccessful
Motion to Dismiss.7 This time, however, the district court was
receptive.

The court first addressed the Buyers’ argument that the
Lawyers had provided no sworn statements as to their subjec-
tive intent regarding the FOIA requests and car buyer mail-
ings, and relied instead solely on the Herron-related pleadings
and other documents to establish the purpose of their conduct
in seeking the Buyers’ personal information. The court
rejected the Buyers’ argument, noting that the Buyers were
themselves relying on the documents related to the Herron lit-
igation in support of their motion, and that the Herron-related
filings were of unquestioned authenticity, legally sufficient,
and ultimately, highly probative regarding the issues before
the court; the documents were therefore a proper basis on
which to resolve the motions for summary judgment.

Addressing the somewhat unusual nature of the Lawyers’
relationship to the group of buyers in Herron, the court
explained that under the state court ruling in the Herron litiga-
tion, there is a "substantive right to representation for the
‘benefit of the whole’" provided by the Dealers Act, and
therefore the Lawyers’ status in the Herron litigation was
"distinct yet analogous to attorney representation in a class
action under [South Carolina’s class action provision]." J.A.
1475. In light of the unique representative function under
group action, the Lawyers had at least a fiduciary duty to all
buyers affected by the Dealers Act violations alleged. As a
7
The Buyers’ motion urged the court to rule that acquisition and use of
information under the DPPA must both (1) meet all the requirements of
permissibility and (2) avoid any impermissible categorization. The district
court addressed the cross-motions together, as discussed above.
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 17
result, the court ruled, "The [Lawyers] did not solicit
unnamed buyers as a matter of law." J.A. 1477.8

The court then ruled broadly that even where the acquisi-
tion and use of personal information does fall within the solic-
itation prohibition of the DPPA (for want of the express
consent of the persons to whom the personal information per-
tained), such conduct is nonetheless lawful under the DPPA
in the absence of consent if it also comes within one of the
permitted use provisions. In this regard, the court rejected the
Buyers’ reliance on the reasoning of Pichler v. UNITE, 542
F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008), and Wemhoff v. District of Columbia,
887 A.2d 1004 (D.C. Ct. App. 2005), and followed instead,
as urged by the Lawyers, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Rine v. Imagitas, Inc., 590 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009).

The court specifically ruled that the acquisition and use of
the car buyers’ personal information before the Herron action
was filed met the "investigation in anticipation of litigation"
permitted use of 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4), and that the acquisi-
tion and use of the car buyers’ personal information after the
commencement of that action were "in connection with [a]
civil . . . proceeding," as also permitted by the litigation
exception. Despite its rejection of the argument when it was
raised in the earlier motion to dismiss, the court also ruled that
the Lawyers’ conduct was lawful under the state action excep-
tion of the DPPA because their role in Herron was adequately
analogous to that of a state attorney general. Summary judg-
ment was therefore granted in favor of the Lawyers and all the
Buyers’ claims were dismissed with prejudice, as was the
Lawyers’ counterclaim, as moot.
8
Concluding that "the undisputed facts" indicated permissible uses of
the information, J.A. 1491, and noting that compliance with the state solic-
itation rules in the wording of the FOIA requests was reasonable and did
not make the letters solicitation per se, the court concluded that there was
no plausible basis on which to find that the DPPA had been violated.
18 MARACICH v. SPEARS
II.

The Buyers timely appealed and now argue before us that
the district court erred in its ruling on three issues, namely, in
concluding that: (1) as a matter of law, the Lawyers’ conduct
did not constitute solicitation under the DPPA; (2) conduct in
obtaining and using personal information under the DPPA is
lawful and non-actionable, even where that conduct also evi-
dences an impermissible use; and (3) the Lawyers’ conduct
came within either the litigation or state action permissible
use exceptions of the DPPA. We agree with the Buyers that
the district court erred in concluding that no solicitation
within the contemplation of the DPPA was shown. Neverthe-
less, we affirm the district court’s determination that despite
the evidence of non-consensual solicitation, the summary
judgment record establishes as a matter of law that the Law-
yers’ conduct in obtaining and using the Buyers’ personal
information fell within a permissible use under the DPPA, the
litigation exception, and that, under the circumstances of this
case, the Buyers’ claims fail as a matter of law because the
solicitation was integral to, and inextricably intertwined with,
conduct clearly permitted by the litigation exception.9

A.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. News
& Observer v. Raleigh-Durham Airport, 597 F.3d 570, 576
(4th Cir. 2010). As provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), sum-
mary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, the dis-
covery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
9
In light of our holding that the litigation exception applied to the Law-
yers’ conduct and forecloses the Buyers’ claims, we have no occasion to
review the district court’s alternative ruling that the state action exception
also applies under the circumstances of this case.
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 19
Facts are "material" when they might affect the out-
come of the case, and a "genuine issue" exists when
the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. The moving party
is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" when the
nonmoving party fails to make an adequate showing
on an essential element for which it has the burden
of proof at trial. "[I]n ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the nonmoving party’s evidence is
to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in that party’s favor." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).
To overcome a motion for summary judgment, how-
ever, the nonmoving party "may not rely merely on
allegations or denials in its own pleading" but must
"set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for
trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 576 (some citations omitted).10
Similarly, "[t]he district court’s analysis of the statutes in the
instant case presents questions of law which we review de
novo." WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172,
1178 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1117 (1996).
10
In their statement of the Standard of Review, the Buyers briefly raise
the argument that "a court cannot, as in this case, grant summary judgment
while denying the nonmoving party discovery of documents or the right
to take witness or party depositions regarding facts deemed material under
its interpretation of the law." Appellants’ Br. 21-22. The record indicates
quite clearly, however, that the Buyers agreed they would not need discov-
ery to file an adequate opposition to a motion for summary judgment, if
it involved only the same arguments offered in the motion to dismiss. J.A.
201-02. The two motions did ultimately rely on the same arguments, based
on references to the undisputed facts (arising from the existence of
readily-available documents whose authenticity was unquestioned) from
Herron. Because the Buyers waived their right to discovery before the dis-
trict court entertained the motion for summary judgment, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the motion on the record pre-
sented by the parties without the benefit of full discovery.
20 MARACICH v. SPEARS
B.

The first issue before us concerns construction of the word
"solicitation," as it appears in the DPPA’s list of enumerated
"permissible uses" of DMV information: "Personal informa-
tion . . . may be disclosed . . . for bulk distribution for surveys,
marketing, or solicitations if the State has obtained the
express consent of the person to whom such personal infor-
mation pertains." 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(12). The district court
ruled that the mailings by the Lawyers were not solicitations
for the purposes of the DPPA as a matter of law because of
the Lawyers’ actual, if inchoate, representative relationship to
all members of the Herron group of consumers. The Buyers
argue this ruling was erroneous for two reasons: (1) the plain,
express language of the letters — which conformed to South
Carolina’s requirements for solicitation by attorneys, and
were therefore labeled clearly "ADVERTISING MATE-
RIAL" — indicates that they were, in fact, solicitations, and
(2) the Lawyers did not have an attorney-client, or representa-
tive, relationship with the contacted buyers and thus commu-
nication with these people was solicitation insofar as the
recipients were potential clients, not actual clients.

In essence, the Buyers are arguing for an objective standard
for defining solicitation: the letters looked like solicitations,
conformed to the requirements for solicitations, and they
accomplished the aim of solicitations, i.e., finding potential
named plaintiffs for the Herron litigation. In ruling that the
letters were not solicitations, the district court instead applied
a subjective standard, taking into primary account the motives
of the Lawyers and the context in which their requests were
made.

Without question, the South Carolina solicitation regula-
tions for "Direct Contact with Prospective Clients," to which
these letters conformed, are explicitly designed to protect
recipients from overtures that might be overwhelming, con-
fusing, misleading, or against their best interests. See S.C.R.
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 21
Prof. Con. 7.3, cmts. 1, 5, 8; see also Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (noting the acceptability of
restrictions on legal advertising to avoid misleading prospec-
tive clients). These concerns focus on the perception of the
reader or listener, not the intentions of the attorney or the par-
ticular context in which the conduct occurs. In our view, an
objective standard best protects these interests because it pre-
vents the dissemination of material that is likely to cause con-
fusion or misguided reliance.

The Lawyers explain their compliance with the South Caro-
lina Rules of Professional Conduct as simply "an abundance
of caution," rather than an indication that the letters consti-
tuted solicitation in fact. But the Lawyers’ contention proves
too much; caution was needed because, viewed objectively,
the mailings constituted "solicitations." Their argument that
their role in Herron as ostensible private attorneys general,
allegedly ratified by the state court rulings described above,
conferred the rights and duties of counsel on them and there-
fore any communication with group members (named or
unnamed in the suit at the time) is unpersuasive. There is no
inherent inconsistency between their role, even if true, as pri-
vate attorneys general, on the one hand, and their need to "so-
licit" potential clients, on the other hand. By denoting the
letters as "advertising material," a reasonable recipient would
almost certainly have understood the message to be a solicita-
tion from a lawyer.

Even more important than the boilerplate solicitation lan-
guage, the letter encouraged recipients to respond in order to
learn about their rights and "to participate in the case." J.A.
487. No mention was made of an investigation into certain
practices other than the implicit suggestion of investigation
during a "free consultation." J.A. 487. The letters also failed
to indicate to recipients that they may already be de facto cli-
ents of the Lawyers, that is, persons whose interests were
already protected by the senders. In short, the Lawyers pre-
22 MARACICH v. SPEARS
sented their communication as solicitation, whether they
believed it (then or now) to be or not.

Thus, we apply an appropriately consumer-protective
objective standard for construing the DPPA term "solicita-
tion." Accordingly, and consistent with the common under-
standing of the meaning of the word as targeted lawyer
advertising aimed at affording representation to potential cli-
ents, see, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466,
476 (1988) (evaluating constitutional propriety of state’s ban
on "targeted, direct-mail solicitation," and noting that while
such solicitation "presents lawyers with opportunities for iso-
lated abuses or mistakes, . . . . [t]he State can regulate such
abuses and minimize mistakes through far less restrictive and
more precise means [than a total ban], the most obvious of
which is to require the lawyer to file any solicitation letter
with a state agency, . . . giving the State ample opportunity to
supervise mailings and penalize actual abuses"); see also
Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1997), we are con-
strained to reject the district court’s conclusion that, as a mat-
ter of law, the Lawyers were not engaged in solicitation when
they contacted otherwise unknown car buyers they had identi-
fied through their FOIA requests.

As the district court correctly recognized, however, this
determination is not dispositive. As we explain within,
although the record supports the Buyers’ contention that the
Lawyers engaged in solicitation, i.e., that they induced the
DMV to disclose the Buyers’ personal information in the
absence of the Buyers’ consent, because the solicitation was
entirely consistent with state law, was integral to, and was,
indeed, inextricably intertwined with the Lawyers’ permissi-
ble use of the Buyers’ personal information pursuant to the lit-
igation exception, the Buyers’ claims fail as a matter of law.

C.

The Buyers’ second argument is equally as straightforward
as their first but far less persuasive. They contend that the dis-
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 23
trict court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, the non-
consensual use of personal information for solicitation is
nonetheless non-actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 2724, see supra
n.5, if the solicitation is sufficiently tied to a permissible use
under the litigation exception. In other words, and more gen-
erally, the Buyers urge a theory of DPPA liability in which
any impermissible use of personal information, e.g., solicita-
tion absent consent, would violate the statute (and support a
damages action), even if, concomitantly, the personal infor-
mation is put to a permissible use, i.e., in litigation.

For the reasons explained below, without undertaking to
lay down a rule applicable in all future cases, we are per-
suaded that the most rational resolution of the manifest ten-
sion between the solicitation and litigation exceptions under
the DPPA compels us to reject the Buyers’ absolute rule.

There is no Fourth Circuit precedent teaching how to rec-
oncile, or read harmoniously, the permissible use provisions
of the DPPA, and indeed, the limited number of cases among
our sister circuits reflect that the law in this area is in a state
of continued evolution. See generally, Deborah F. Buchman,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Fed-
eral Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721 to
2725, 183 A.L.R. Fed. 37 (2011).

That said, we note that the Eleventh Circuit has provided
a rather expansive sweep to the litigation exception of the
DPPA. In Thomas v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer, John-
stone, King, & Stevens, P.A., 525 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2008),
the court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a law firm
that had obtained the plaintiff’s personal information from the
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.
The defendant lawyer had obtained the plaintiff’s personal
information (together with that of 24,000 other Florida driv-
ers)

because the automobile dealers he was litigating
against were asserting that plaintiffs needed to plead
24 MARACICH v. SPEARS
and prove multiple acts of deceptive and unfair trade
practices to state a deceptive and unfair trade prac-
tice claim under Florida law . . . . [T]he information
was [then] used to send one-thousand "Custom and
Practice" letters, which aimed at obtaining evidence
showing a custom and practice of deceptive acts
engaged in by dealerships.

Id. at 1114 (footnote omitted). The court rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that the lawyer’s distribution of "Custom and
Practice" letters to certain car buyers supported a claim based
on impermissible use, i.e., prohibited solicitation. Specifi-
cally, the court reasoned:

as the district court rightly determined, the fact that
many records were retrieved, but only a compara-
tively small number were used for Custom and Prac-
tice letters did not, by itself, raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the litigation clause
applied. By affixing significance solely to the num-
ber of records relating to letters sent out, [plaintiff]
overlooked that [defendant’s] initial review of the
total amount of records is just as much tied to "in-
vestigation in anticipation of litigation" as the even-
tual sending out. [Plaintiff] failed, however to
discredit, or even address, the initial review.

Id. at 1115. Moreover, in considered dicta, the court gave
short shrift to the plaintiff’s complaint that the attorney’s "ul-
terior motive" in obtaining the DPPA personal information
was for use in potential future litigation.11 We can discern no
11
The court stated:
Thomas also argues that a particular excerpt from Hartz’s deposi-
tion indicates a "second ulterior motive" for obtaining the vehicle
records; i.e., they were obtained for the purpose of creating a
database of witnesses for prospective, not-yet-filed litigation—as
opposed to currently pending cases. Our review of the record
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 25
inconsistency between the evident Congressional purpose in
the enactment of the DPPA of protecting privacy and the kind
of pragmatic approach to lawyer access to protected personal
information revealed by the Eleventh Circuit’s understanding
of the litigation exception.

Consistent with its willingness to afford the litigation
exception a pragmatic scope as reflected in Thomas, the Elev-
enth Circuit has also shown its willingness to adopt a prag-
matic reconciliation of the tension arising from the DPPA’s
prohibition (absent express consent) on solicitation when
solicitation is inextricably intertwined with a permitted use
under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). See Rine v. Imagitas, 590 F.3d
1215, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that non-consensual
solicitation that is inextricably intertwined as a matter of state
statutes with the state action exception is not actionable).

In Rine, in which the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion consolidated actions brought by drivers in several states,
the state of Florida contracted with a marketing enterprise to
mail driver’s license renewal information. Id. at 1219. Pursu-
ant to its agreement with the state, and consistent with prior
revenue-generating schemes pursued by the state and several
Florida counties, the contractor included in the driver’s
license renewal mailings focused commercial advertising
materials to such drivers, based on information contained in
and derived from DPPA-protected personal information. Id. at
1219-20. Some drivers sued, among others, the contractor, as

reveals that Thomas did not raise this particular argument below
and, as such, the argument is waived. Irving v. Mazda Motor
Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 769 (11th Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, the argu-
ment is without merit. The litigation clause refers to investigation
in anticipation of litigation. Thus, even if the accumulation of
potential witnesses related, in part, to certain cases not yet filed,
we do not see how pre-suit investigation can be considered per
se inapplicable to the litigation clause.
525 F.3d at 1115 n.5.
26 MARACICH v. SPEARS
the Buyers here have sued the Lawyers, alleging a violation
of the DPPA insofar as the state had failed to obtain their con-
sent for the solicitation. In opposing the plaintiffs’ claims, the
contractor relied on the state action exception, arguing that it
was performing functions on behalf of the state (which exer-
cised final approval over the advertising material).

In sustaining the district court’s legal conclusion that the
state action exception foreclosed the plaintiffs’ claims, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "nothing in the DPPA suggests
that the (b)(12) [solicitation] exception alters the scope or
meaning of the separate and independent [state action] excep-
tion found in subsection (b)(1)." That is, where two provisions
overlap but "both apply to situations not governed by the
other," they "both must be given effect unless they ‘pose an
either-or proposition.’" Id. at 1226 (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 244, 253 (1992)). The Rine court rea-
soned that unlike HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S.
1 (1981), where as between two potentially applicable statu-
tory provisions one was "general" and the other "specific," the
DPPA provisions are equally specific. Rine, 590 F.3d at 1226.
They are, moreover, "not mutually exclusive, meaning any
one or more of them may be applicable to a given situation."
Id. This reasoning commends itself to us.

The Buyers contend that the Eleventh Circuit’s resolution
of the tension between the solicitation prohibition and the per-
mitted uses spelled out in § 2721(b) that do not require con-
sent is misguided and urge us to adopt, instead, the holding
of the Third Circuit in Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380 (3d
Cir. 2008) ("Pichler V" per the Appellants).12 In Pichler V, the
12
Pichler v. UNITE, a class action concerning a union’s use of DMV
information to contact employees for organizing drives and to pursue
impact litigation, has generated at least seven opinions to date. The Third
Circuit’s numbering for the series of opinions related to the case does not
match the numbering set out in the Appellants’ Brief; the Appellants mark
a 2004 decision denying a motion to dismiss as "Pichler I," while the
Third Circuit starts its count with a subsequent 2005 opinion certifying the
class. Compare Pichler, 542 F.3d at 385, with Appellants’ Br. 30 n.5. To
minimize confusion between the briefs before this court and our opinion,
we will follow the Appellants’ numbering.
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 27
court affirmed summary judgment of liability against the
union defendants in a DPPA case, agreeing with the lower
court that "[t]he [DPPA] contains no language that would
excuse an impermissible use merely because it was executed
in conjunction with a permissible [use]." Id. at 395 (citing
Pichler v. UNITE, 446 F. Supp. 2d 353, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
("Pichler III"). The lower court had reasoned that because the
DPPA imposes liability for acquisition and use of information
"for a purpose not permitted," any impermissible use was
actionable, regardless of other circumstances supporting a
finding that a permissible use provision was also satisfied.
Pichler III, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 367. But we find that Pichler
is plainly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances in
the case at bar.13 There, the union conceded that it obtained
13
The Buyers also seek solace in Wemhoff v. District of Columbia, 887
A.2d 1004 (D.C. Ct. App. 2005), in which a lawyer attempted to compel
disclosure of DMV information about drivers ticketed for red light camera
infractions at a particular intersection, when he did not yet represent any
affected person and had no on-going "investigation" of red-light cameras
beyond his attempt to find out the identities of those who had been tick-
eted. The Wemhoff court sustained the agency’s refusal to make the disclo-
sure, finding the request was for use in solicitation rather than in
anticipation of litigation, and was therefore subject to the express consent
requirement of section (b)(12).
Wemhoff held that "in anticipation of litigation" meant use for "the type
of background work or search for material which would determine, sub-
stantively, whether one has a viable theory of litigation, or enough of a
basis to avoid a motion for sanctions that a frivolous lawsuit has been
filed." 887 A.2d at 1011-12. This test for attenuation was adopted from the
district court’s opinion in Pichler, which reasoned that the exception
applied only where defendants could prove "(1) they undertook an actual
investigation; (2) at the time of the investigation, litigation appeared
likely; and (3) the protected information obtained during the investigation
would be of ‘use’ in the litigation. . . " Wemhoff, 887 A.2d at 1011 (citing
Pichler v. UNITE, 339 F. Supp. 2d 665, 666 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("Pichler I")).
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit pointedly noted that it "need not
address the District Court’s interpretation of the litigation and the acting
on behalf of the government exceptions." 542 F.3d at 395.
We find that Wemhoff is plainly distinguishable from this case because,
as the court in that case indicated, the lawyer was merely trolling for cli-
ents in the hope that litigation might be in the offing.
28 MARACICH v. SPEARS
the workers’ personal information for a non-permitted use:
union organizing. It somewhat belatedly and unpersuasively
argued that its union organizing activities could not be disag-
gregated from its litigation activities. The Third Circuit
majority emphatically rejected this argument.14

At bottom, we easily conclude from these somewhat con-
flicting approaches to the DPPA that the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach provides the better reasoned interpretation of the
Act under the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Just
as the Florida statutes in Rine clearly authorized solicitation
in connection with the state’s license renewal schemes, South
Carolina law and legal ethics norms not only permitted the
type of solicitation engaged in by the Lawyers here, but in the
context of the particular investigation and incipient litigation
they pursued under the Dealers Act, contact with potential cli-
ents was entirely consistent with a pragmatic understanding of
the litigation exception under the DPPA.

The DPPA provides, "It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly to obtain or disclose information, from a motor
vehicle record, for any use not permitted under Section (b) of
this title." 18 U.S.C. § 2722. Thus, the DPPA makes unlawful
"any use not permitted" in subsection (b). In Pichler, where
the DPPA defendant claimed to have obtained information for
14
The court could not have been more clear:
The litigation component to UNITE’s campaign should not
obscure what UNITE was trying to accomplish-organizing labor.
The same may be said for its acting on behalf of the government
purpose. UNITE candidly admits that it launched the "campaign
to organize and unionize Cintas workers." App. 226. Moreover,
the organizers themselves, in conducting their home visits, unam-
biguously explained that they were "organizing a union campaign
against Cintas." App. 238. Regardless of UNITE’s attempts to
mask this clear labor-organizing purpose behind the veil of a liti-
gation purpose or an acting on behalf of the government purpose,
Congress has not permitted UNITE to do so.
542 F.3d at 395-96.
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 29
two entirely distinct uses (union organizing, not a permitted
use, and in anticipation of litigation, a permitted use), the
court rejected the union’s disingenuous attempt, admitting of
only marginal coherence, to marry an unpermitted use with a
permitted one. In contrast, the Lawyers here always had only
one use as their purpose, i.e., litigation, litigation that at all
times of their conduct was either imminent or ongoing. The
Lawyers’ satisfaction of the state solicitation requirements
was inextricably intertwined with their intended permitted use
of the personal information they obtained. See Ficker, 119
F.3d at 1153 (noting that "the Supreme Court observed in
Bates that the dissemination of advertising information to the
public had the potential to contribute substantially to fair legal
process . . . . Similarly, in Peel, 496 U.S. at 110, 110 S.Ct. at
2293, the Court noted that such advertising ‘facilitates the
consumer’s access to legal services and thus better serves the
administration of justice’").

In such circumstances, we agree with the Rine court that
full effect should be given to the permissive uses protected by
the litigation exception. To hold otherwise would effectively
transform the DPPA’s phrase, "any use not permitted," into
"use not permitted for any reason" — a shift unsupported by
the language, the purpose or the structure of the Act, and con-
trary to the public interest benefits that can inhere in impact
litigation specifically aimed at protecting consumers on a
broad scale. In the context of the circumstances presented in
this case, it is no stretch to say that the Lawyers simply could
not make appropriate, efficient and ethical use of the Buyers’
personal information under our pragmatic approach to the liti-
gation exception without first engaging in solicitation, and
they did so in a manner that was entirely in keeping with
applicable state ethics norms. Put simply, they did what any
good lawyer would have done; Congress could not possibly
have intended to impose DPPA liability under such circum-
stances.

We therefore hold that as to DPPA provisions (b)(4) and
(b)(12), conduct that might, prima facie, amount to prohibited
30 MARACICH v. SPEARS
solicitation (i.e., that prohibited absent express consent) lead-
ing to a disclosure of personal information, does not give rise
to a cognizable claim under the DPPA when such use in solic-
itation is coextensive with, and inextricably intertwined with,
conduct expressly permitted pursuant to the litigation excep-
tion. Rine, 590 F.3d at 1226. We determine next whether the
district court erred in concluding that the litigation exception
applies to the undisputed facts reflected in the record of this
case.

D.

As stated above, the district court ruled that the litigation
exception applied to the Lawyers’ conduct because, as a mat-
ter of law, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they
obtained and used the Buyers’ personal information with the
singular purpose of employing it in their investigation in
anticipation of, and in connection with the prosecution of, the
Herron litigation:

The initial complaint and the amended complaint in
the Herron litigation are evidence that the informa-
tion obtained from the first two FOIA requests was
useful in determining whether to file a group action
. . . . The Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with
any evidence to dispute the Defendants’ evidence
that the personal information from the first two
FOIA requests was obtained in order to assist in
identifying the highest volume dealers.

J.A. 1483-84. This conclusion is unassailable on the present
record.

The Buyers argue that this determination was erroneous
because the Lawyers "did not come forward with any evi-
dence that they could introduce at trial in support of their
position [that the exception applied to their conduct] . . . .
None." Appellants’ Br. 39. They assert that the district court
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 31
relied solely on the Lawyers’ "self-serving, unsworn asser-
tions," and a handful of documents that were irrelevant to the
legal question or, in the case of the Herron documents, were
merely contextual. Appellants’ Br. 38-9. The Lawyers counter
that under the DPPA the Buyers have the burden to offer evi-
dence of an impermissible purpose, yet in the face of the doc-
umented FOIA requests and the DMV’s compliance — both
of which were carried out under express invocation of the liti-
gation exception — the Buyers only conclusorily describe the
Lawyers’ purpose and use as "solicitation." The Lawyers
clearly have the better of the argument.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c):

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electroni-
cally stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of
the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish
the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that
an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.

We are satisfied that the district court did not err in conclud-
ing that the Buyers failed to generate a genuine dispute of
material fact concerning the applicability of the litigation
exception.

First, the Buyers’ arguments throughout the proceedings
below had been focused solely on the applicability of the liti-
gation provision as a matter of law, i.e., that it did not protect
the use here because the solicitation provision applied as well
32 MARACICH v. SPEARS
and imposed liability regardless of any other permitted use.
They did not, however, produce or suggest any evidence that
the provision did not apply as a factual matter.

The strongest substantive argument we might construe
from the Buyers’ position is that solicitation cannot occur "in
anticipation of" or "in connection with" litigation, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721(b)(4), and that if the Lawyers solicited they could not,
by definition, have been acting in anticipation of, or in con-
nection with, litigation. Plainly, we have rejected that conten-
tion above. In our view, such a position would improperly
constrict the common meaning of "in anticipation of" and "in
connection with." The solicitation of clients by trial lawyers
is surely connected to litigation in that representation for a
legal claim is the goal. Here, where the Lawyers already had
been contacted by potential clients, it cannot be said they
were merely "trolling." Rather, the summary judgment record
before us leaves no room to doubt that the Lawyers were
looking to build and bolster a case against the dealerships if
their initial information from consumers proved the existence
of plausibly systemic violations of the Dealers Act.

Moreover, as to the Buyers’ contention of procedural irreg-
ularity, the district court properly considered the complaints
in Herron because the allegations made in that case corrobo-
rated the expressly stated intended and actual use of the letters
in dispute. The Buyers failed to provide any evidence refuting
the explicit language of the FOIA requests and letters, which
solely support the claim that the Lawyers’ conduct was either
for use in "investigation in anticipation of litigation" or "in
connection with" a civil proceeding. Id.

To be sure, the Buyers correctly note that the district court
declined to take judicial notice of these documents for pur-
poses of ruling on the motion to dismiss. At the time of that
motion, the court explained:

[T]he court declines to take judicial notice of the
exhibits attached to the Defendants’ motion in this
 MARACICH v. SPEARS 33
case which largely consist of pleadings and tran-
scripts in the Herron litigation . . . . The facts in the
Herron litigation remain in dispute. Therefore, the
court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of
those documents.

J.A. 167. Thus, the district court took a cautious approach in
its consideration of the Lawyers’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, for purposes of the subse-
quent cross-motions for summary judgment, the Herron com-
plaints and related documents were useful (and used) not to
determine the factual basis of the Dealers Act claims, but as
evidence only of the actual use of the Buyers’ personal infor-
mation obtained via the serial FOIA requests in connection
with that litigation. The complaints evidenced the ends to
which the information was requested and used, and therefore
were relevant, material and admissible evidence of facts at
issue—permissible purpose in the Lawyers’ requesting that
the DMV make the disclosure of, and permitted use of the
personal information thereafter. We agree with the Eleventh
Circuit that the Buyers bore the risk of non-persuasion on all
elements of their claims, Thomas, 525 F.3d at 1114-15, and
here the summary judgment record does not remotely show a
genuine dispute of material fact.

We therefore hold that the district court properly took judi-
cial notice of the Herron documents as probative evidence of
the intended, and actual, use of the Buyers’ DPPA-protected
personal information. Furthermore, we agree that the Buyers
failed to offer any evidence generating an issue of material
fact as to whether the use here was inextricably intertwined
with investigation and prosecution of the Herron litigation.
Thus, the district court did not err in its grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Lawyers as to the applicability of the
litigation exception.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court
erred in its determination that the conduct of the Appellees
34 MARACICH v. SPEARS
did not constitute solicitation within the contemplation of the
applicable DPPA prohibition. Nevertheless, the court cor-
rectly ruled that the Appellees’ conduct in respect to the Buy-
ers’ personal information was undertaken in anticipation of
and in connection with litigation, a use clearly permitted by
the DPPA. The propriety of that use having been established
as a matter of law, and the antecedent solicitation being inte-
gral and necessary to, and inextricably intertwined with, the
Lawyers’ permitted use of the Appellants’ personal informa-
tion, the Appellants’ claims fail as a matter of law. Accord-
ingly, the judgment is

AFFIRMED.