UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2405
BENJAMIN BELROSE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00764-LMB-TRJ)
Argued: January 26, 2012 Decided: April 13, 2012
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and J. Michelle CHILDS,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Childs wrote the
opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Duncan joined.
ARGUED: Susan A. Leslie-Fraser, LAW OFFICE OF SUSAN LESLIE-
FRASER, Warrenton, Virginia, for Appellant. David Edward
Constine, III, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Laura D. Windsor, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
CHILDS, District Judge:
Benjamin Belrose (“Belrose”) appeals the district court’s
order granting Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company’s
(“Hartford”) motion to dismiss 1 Belrose’s action challenging the
termination of his long-term disability benefits. We affirm.
Belrose became a full-time employee of the Camber
Corporation (“Camber”) on August 1, 2002, and became eligible
for disability benefits under the Camber Group Benefit Plan (the
“Plan”) provided to employees through Hartford.
On September 10, 2002, Belrose underwent arthroscopic knee
surgery. As a result, Belrose began receiving short-term
disability benefits under the Plan in September 2002. After his
surgery, Belrose received a diagnosis of aortic valve disease,
coronary angina, and coronary artery disease. In December 2002,
as a result of his heart condition, Belrose applied for and
began receiving long-term disability benefits under the Plan.
Belrose received the benefits until October 5, 2005, when
1
Belrose incorrectly states in his brief that the district
court granted summary judgment. J.A. 8. In granting Hartford’s
motion to dismiss, the district court considered the Camber
Group Benefit Plan document which Hartford attached to its
motion. Although Belrose did not attach the Camber Benefit Plan
to his complaint, it was not improper for the district court to
consider the document “in determining whether to dismiss the
complaint because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in
the complaint and because [Belrose does] not challenge its
authenticity.” Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618
(4th Cir. 1999).
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Hartford terminated the benefits. Belrose appealed the
termination of the benefits. The decision to terminate
Belrose’s benefits was affirmed on administrative appeal, and
Hartford issued a final denial letter to Belrose on June 14,
2006.
Belrose filed a complaint against Hartford in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria on July 9, 2010. Belrose brought a cause of action
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461, regarding termination of his long-term
disability benefits. Hartford filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on the grounds that the limitations period within
which Belrose could file suit had expired. The district court
granted Hartford’s motion. Belrose now appeals.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma,
Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2006). Like the district
court, we “must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.” CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 51 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Erikson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Further, “we draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting
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Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d
250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)).
“‘[W]here facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative
defense’—including ‘the defense that the plaintiff’s claim is
time-barred’—‘are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be
reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).’”
Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334,
336 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d
458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007)).
The policy at issue is an employee benefit plan, which is
governed by ERISA. The cause of action available to those
seeking benefits due under an ERISA plan does not specify a
statute of limitations or a time of accrual. See 29 U.S.C. §
1132 (2000). Generally, ERISA allows plans the flexibility to
set their own limitations periods. White v. Sun Life Assur.
Co. of Canada, 488 F.3d 240, 250 (4th Cir. 2007). However,
where a plan does not contain a valid limitations period, courts
may apply the applicable state statute of limitations. See id.
at 250 n.4 (“In the absence of a valid contractual provision
governing limitations, we borrow a limitations period from the
law of [the state] . . . .”); Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of
Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975, 981–82 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying
the applicable state statute of limitations). Regarding the
date of accrual of a limitations period in an ERISA plan, we
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have held that despite the terms of accrual which may be
contained within the plan, “[a]n ERISA cause of action does not
accrue until a claim of benefits has been made and formally
denied.” White, 488 F.3d at 246 (citing Rodriguez v. MEBA
Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir. 1989)).
Belrose argues that the Plan’s limitations term should be
replaced with Virginia’s five-year statute of limitations for
breach of contract actions, see Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-246(2),
because the limitations term created an impossibility of
performance and was in violation of public policy. 2 The Plan
contained a three-year limitations period, which the Plan stated
commenced on the date Hartford required the beneficiary to
furnish proof of loss. Belrose asserts that in order to file
suit in compliance with the limitations provision set forth in
the Plan, he would have had to file suit before he ever received
notice of the final denial of his benefits. Belrose argues that
the limitations period began to run on September 10, 2002, when
he underwent arthroscopic knee surgery. Applying an accrual
date of September 10, 2002 to the Plan’s three-year limitations
2
In the alternative, Belrose asks the court to replace the
three-year limitations period with a five-year limitations
period which he alleges is contained in the short-term
disability section of the Plan. Having determined that the
district court did not err in applying the Plan’s three-year
limitations period, it is not necessary to address Belrose’s
alternative request.
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period, the period in which Belrose could file an action against
Hartford would expire on September 10, 2005, approximately nine
months before Hartford’s final denial of Belrose’s claim.
Belrose argues that to require filing of an action for benefits
due before the benefits are finally denied is contrary to public
policy.
However, in granting Hartford’s motion to dismiss, the
district court reasoned that because the limitations period for
an ERISA claim does not begin to run until the insurer issues a
formal denial—despite the terms of accrual which may be
contained within the Plan—Hartford’s three-year limitations
period was not unreasonable or contrary to public policy.
Finding the three-year limitations period to be reasonable and
in accord with public policy when viewed as accruing on the date
of formal denial of benefits, the district court reasoned, it
was not necessary to substitute the Plan’s three-year
limitations period with the Virginia statute of limitations for
breach of contract. We find no error with the reasoning of the
district court.
Belrose further argues that the district court’s
substitution of the accrual date, without also replacing the
three-year limitations period with the Virginia statute of
limitations for breach of contract, constitutes “blue-
penciling,” or rewriting the contract’s words to make them work
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together. Belrose asserts that such rewriting is inappropriate
because Virginia courts have traditionally refused to rewrite
contracts in order to make them enforceable. However, Belrose
brings his claim under ERISA, and determining the time at which
Belrose’s cause of action accrued is governed by federal law
rather than Virginia law. See White, 488 F.3d at 245 (noting
that, even where a state statute of limitations is applied, the
accrual date is governed by a uniform federal rule); Blanck v.
McKeen, 707 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that, in the
case of a federal cause of action, the time at which the cause
of action accrues is governed by federal law rather than state
law). Accordingly, we find Belrose’s arguments unpersuasive.
Belrose argues that, even commencing the limitations period
at the date of final denial of benefits, the Plan’s three-year
limitations period remains contrary to public policy.
Specifically, Belrose argues that a limitations period of less
than five years is contrary to public policy in this case
because the Virginia statute of limitations for actions derived
from written contracts is five years. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-
246(2).
The Supreme Court of Virginia has “upheld contractual
statutes of limitations for periods shorter than that fixed by
statute when they were not against public policy and the time
period was not unreasonably short.” Bd. of Supervisors of
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Fairfax Cnty. v. Sentry Ins., 391 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Va. 1990)
(citing Bd. of Supervisors v. Sampson, 369 S.E.2d 178, 180 (Va.
1988)). A limitations period of three years fits well within
the intent of Virginia’s legislature. Virginia’s legislature
has expressed its intent with regard to the limitation of
actions derived from insurance policies by its enactment of
Section 38.2-314 of the Virginia Code. Section 38.2-314
provides, “No provision in any insurance policy shall be valid
if it limits the time within which an action may be brought to
less than one year after the loss occurs or the cause of action
accrues.” Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-314. Thus, a limitations period
of three years does not appear to be contrary to public policy.
When viewed in light of this court’s prior holding that an
ERISA cause of action does not accrue until the claim for
benefits has been formally denied, the Plan’s limitations period
is not unreasonable or contrary to public policy, and is
therefore valid. Thus, when faced with a valid limitations
period, the district court did not err in applying the Plan’s
limitations period rather than substituting the Virginia statute
of limitations for breach of contract actions. Belrose received
a formal denial of his claim for benefits on June 14, 2006.
Therefore, the period in which Belrose could bring a cause of
action against Hartford for denial of benefits expired on June
14, 2009. Belrose filed his complaint on July 9, 2010, over a
8
year after the limitations period expired. Therefore, the
district court did not err in granting Hartford’s motion to
dismiss.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
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