[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 8, 2008
No. 06-16336
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-14082-CR-KAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FREDERICK L. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 8, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Frederick L. Jones was convicted in the Southern District of Florida on all
three counts of an indictment: Counts One, possession with intent to distribute
crack cocaine on July 6, 2005; Count Two, attempt to distribute crack cocaine on
September 9, 2005;1 Count Three, possession by a previously convicted felon of a
firearm and ammunition.2 Jones was sentenced to three concurrent prison terms of
300 months. He now appeals his Count Three conviction, contending that the
evidence was insufficient to convict. He argues that aside from his inculpatory
statements that he owned the ammunition, the evidence did not prove the corpus
delicti of any crime; thus, those statements could not support the conviction. He
also argues that the only evidence linking him to the firearm was a utility bill in his
name found next to the firearm, which was insufficient to prove constructive
possession.
To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must
establish that: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; (2)
the defendant was previously convicted of an offense punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year; and (3) the firearm or ammunition was in or
affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Palma, 511 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2008). “Possession may be actual or constructive, joint or sole.” United
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Counts One and Two charged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
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See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1).
2
States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). To establish constructive
possession, evidence must demonstrate that the defendant exercised ownership,
dominion, or control over the firearm or ammunition, or the property concealing
the firearm or ammunition. Id.
“[A] conviction must rest upon firmer ground than the uncorroborated
admission or confession of the accused.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488-89, 83 S.Ct. 407, 418, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). In Opper v. United States,
348 U.S. 84, 92, 75 S.Ct. 158, 164, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), the Supreme Court
considered two inconsistent approaches to the requirement that an admission be
supported by corroborating evidence. We described these approaches in United
States v. Micieli, 594 F.2d 102, 108 (5th Cir. 1979), thusly:
The first approach required extrinsic proof of the corpus delicti, that
is, that there be independent evidence that the harm or injury occurred
and had a criminal origin. The second approach required only that
there be extrinsic evidence of a corroborative nature establishing the
credibility of the admission. The Supreme Court opted for the second
approach in Opper.
Thus, “[t]he corroboration need not be sufficient, independent of the [accused’s]
statements, to establish the corpus delicti.” United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455,
476 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Opper).3
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“[T]he phrase ‘corpus delicti’ includes but two elements: first, the fact of an injury or
loss; and secondly, the fact of somebody’s criminality as the cause of the injury or loss.”
Roberts v. United States, 416 F.2d 1216, 1222 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Still, when the government relies on an accused’s statement to support a
conviction, independent evidence must corroborate the statement by establishing
its “truth, trustworthiness and reliability.” Micieli, 594 F.2d at 109. If independent
evidence corroborates the statement in this way, the corroborated statement alone
may prove the elements of the offense that are not proven by other evidence. Id.
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient evidence to support Jones’s
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Jones stipulated to the second and third
elements of the offense; hence, only the first element, possession, is at issue in this
appeal.
First, evidence showed that Jones possessed all the ammunition charged in
the indictment. He admitted to law enforcement officers on multiple occasions that
he owned the ammunition, and the jury was entitled to infer that element on the
basis of his denial of possession at trial. His corpus delicti argument must fail
because independent evidence sufficiently corroborated the truthfulness of his
admissions, and such evidence was not required to prove the corpus delicti.
Second, sufficient evidence demonstrated that Jones constructively
possessed the firearm found at the house where he was staying. The firearm was
found next to a utility bill for the house in his name, and he admitted to law
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enforcement officials that he owned other items found in the room where the
firearm was located. Finally, the jury was entitled to infer Jones’s knowing
possession of the firearm based on his blanket denial before the jury of knowledge
or possession of the firearm.
AFFIRMED.
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