IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. )
) I.D. No. 30206697DI
JONATHAN M. WONNUM, )
)
Defendant. )
Submitted: February 22, 2022
Decided: March 8, 2022
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
This 8th day of March, 2022, upon consideration of Defendant’s Third Motion
for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Jonathan M. Wonnum (“Defendant”) has filed this Third Motion
for Postconviction Relief based on the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Reed v. State,1 alleging that he was denied his “constitutional right to have effective
assistance of counsel to enter a motion to withdraw a plea bargain.”2 As such,
Defendant requests that this Court grant him the right to withdraw his guilty plea
and follow what the Defendant alleges are newly established constitutional
procedures set forth in Reed.
2. Defendant’s first trial for First Degree Murder and Possession of a Deadly
Weapon During the Commission of a Felony ended in a mistrial on the murder
1
258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021).
2
Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3.
1
charge. The jury convicted Defendant on the weapon charge but deadlocked eleven
to one in favor of conviction as to the murder.3
3. On August 8, 1993, the morning of Defendant’s retrial, Defendant pled guilty
to First Degree Murder. As a result of the plea, the State set aside the verdict on the
weapon charge.4 The Court conducted a thorough plea colloquy and was satisfied
that the guilty plea was “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently offered.”5
4. Before his sentencing, Defendant submitted a pro se letter asking to withdraw
his guilty plea. He claimed he was “forced” into taking the plea.6 After considering
the letter as a Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea and a thorough review of the
record, which included a conference with counsel, this Court denied the motion.7 It
held that “Defendant’s request to withdraw guilty plea amounts merely to a change
of mind of Defendant and does not demonstrate that the plea was involuntary or that
Defendant was otherwise mistaken about his legal rights.”8 Defendant was sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole the next day and did not appeal.9
3
Wonnum v. State, 1997 WL 588855, at *1 (Del. Sep. 16, 1997) (ORDER).
4
Id.
5
State v. Wonnum, No. IN92-09-0496, 0496 , 0497 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 1993 (TRANSCRIPT) (hereinafter “Plea
Transcr.”).
6
Id.
7
State v. Wonnum, Docket #22, at 2 (Del. Super. Sep. 14, 1993) (ORDER).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 6. This Court’s Order on his Motion to withdraw discusses, at length, several passages from Defendant’s plea
colloquy where he had the opportunity to alert the court to any coercion or misunderstanding in regards to his plea.
Additionally, a fresh review of the transcript reveals several instances where the Court requested clarification from
trial counsel, or further answers from Defendant to confirm the voluntariness of his plea. Plea Transcr. at 5, 9
2
5. Defendant, pro se, filed his First Motion for Postconviction Relief in 1997. In
it, he again claimed issues with his guilty plea. He also claimed he was denied access
to transcripts of his first trial.10 This Court denied his Motion as previously
adjudicated as to the guilty plea and found his transcript arguments “completely
conclusory.”11 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s denial on
appeal.12
6. Defendant, pro se, filed his Second Motion for Postconviction Relief in
2014.13 He again claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relating to his guilty plea.
Defendant’s second ground requested counsel and claimed the absence of counsel
during his first motion establishes its own ineffective assistance claim.14 This Court
denied his Motion as procedurally barred.15 This Court also concluded that there was
no merit to Defendant’s substantive allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This decision was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court.16
10
Wonnum, 1997 WL 588855, at *1.
11
Defendant’s First Motion for Postconviction Relief, Docket #30 (Aug. 26, 1996).
12
State v. Wonnum, Docket #34 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 1997) (ORDER).
13
Wonnum, 1997 WL 588855.
14
Defendant first filed his Second Motion for Postconviction Relief on March 20, 2013 and an Order of Briefing was
issued. Or. of Briefing, Docket # 43 (Apr. 24, 2013). Trial counsel submitted his affidavit, to which Defendant replied.
Def.'s Reply to Aff., Docket # 48 (July 31, 2013). Defendant then filed a Motion for Default, as the State failed to file
their Response by the August deadline. Def.'s Mot. for Default, Docket # 50 (Sep. 26, 2013). This Court denied that
motion in a letter issued October 9, 2013 citing personnel changes at the Department of Justice and extended the
State's deadline to November 29, 2013. Ltr. dated Oct. 9, 2013 from the Court to Mr. Grubb and Mr. Wonnum, Docket
# 52 (Oct. 10, 2013). In that same letter, the Court further explained its denial of Defendant's request for counsel based
on recently amended Rule 61, stating the new procedure only applies to first postconviction motions filed after the
effective date of May 6, 2013. Id. Defendant also filed a subsequent Motion for Expansion of Record that was
DENIED and a Motion for Expansion of Time that was GRANTED. Or., Docket # 57 (Dec. 24, 2013); Order, Docket
# 59 (Jan. 13, 2014).
15
2014 WL 3058464 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 3, 2014).
16
Wonnum v. State, 2015 WL 3456633 (Del. May 28, 2015).
3
7. Now, before the Court is Defendant’s Third Motion for Postconviction Relief
where he again alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective during his plea
negotiations. As such, Rule 61(d)(2) pertaining to successive motions is applicable.
“[I]f a defendant files more than one Rule 61 Motion, every second or subsequent
motion shall be summarily dismissed, unless the Motion meets one or both
exceptions under Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (ii)."17 “Summary dismissal means that the
Court rejects the motion without ruling on the merits of the claims raised within.”18
For this Court to consider Defendant’s successive postconviction motions, the
motion must either:
(i) plead [] with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a
strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts
underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or (ii) plead [] with
particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law was made
retroactive … applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction
… invalid.19
8. The argument presently raised by the Defendant falls under Rule 61(d)(2)(ii).
Defendant alleges that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. State
established a constitutional right to have effective assistance of counsel to enter a
guilty plea withdrawal motion, and that he was denied that right when this Court
17
State v. Purnell, 2020 WL 837148 at *9 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2020).
18
Id.
19
State v. Wright, 2018 WL 1129004, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2018) (citing Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R.
61(d)(2)(i)(ii).
4
denied his motion and request for new counsel.20 However, Defendant’s
interpretation of Reed is misplaced, and thus, his argument fails.
9. In Reed, the Defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea but his counsel
refused to file the motion believing there were no justifiable grounds to so.21
Defendant then filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea but the Court
refused to consider it because he was represented by counsel.22 This led the Supreme
Court to its holding that “a criminal defendant’s control of the objectives of the
representation prior to sentencing requires that counsel either obey an instruction to
file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, or seek leave to withdraw so that the
defendant can file the motion with other counsel or pro se.”23 The Court then
engaged in an analysis applying the Strickland two-prong test. As to the first prong,
the Court concluded that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for not filing a
motion to withdraw the Defendant’s plea prior to sentencing.24 However, as to the
second prong – the prejudice prong – this was a matter of first impression in
Delaware. The Court explained, however, that its “inquiry is limited to whether Reed
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to try to develop facts that would support his
Rule 61 claims.”25 Ultimately, finding that certain critical facts had not yet been
20
Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3.
21
Reed, 258 A.3d at 812.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 827-29.
25
Id. at 830-31.
5
developed, the Court concluded that it was not presently in a position to evaluate the
merit of Reed’s ineffective assistance claim as it related to his withdrawal challenge,
and reversed and remanded the case back to this Court.26
10. In the case at bar, Defendant filed his motion to withdrawal his guilty plea
and request for new counsel pro se. In response, the Court conducted an immediate
review of the matter which included a conference with counsel. Thus, unlike in Reed,
Defendant is not “stuck in a Catch 22” where his trial counsel refused to file the
withdrawal motion and the Court refused to consider his pro se motion because he
was represented by counsel.27 Unlike the situation in Reed, the Court with the
assistance of counsel reviewed the matter and considered the substance of
Defendant’s argument relating to his desire to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant’s
case is further distinguishable from Reed because he cannot satisfy the first prong of
the Strickland test, and thus, whether or not he can satisfy the second prong is
irrelevant. This Court has addressed the effectiveness of Defendant’s trial counsel
on two separate occasions and the Court has not faltered in its findings – trial
counsel’s conduct did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable. These
26
Id. at 831.
27
Reed, 258 A.3d at 812.
6
28
rulings were later upheld by the Supreme Court. In so finding, this Court
explained:
Similarly Defendant’s request for a new attorney does not mandate the
withdrawal of the Defendant’s guilty plea and the appointment of
counsel. Defendant makes only a conclusory accusation of “inadequate
performance” and alleges nothing more than the fact that his counsel
had “only” consulted with him “4 to 8 times” in the preceding year and
that counsel for Defendant had otherwise recommended to him that he
enter the plea.
….
Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea makes no specific
concrete showing of either unreasonable attorney conduct or prejudice
… Such lack of showing requires rejection of the motion to withdraw
guilty plea … Defendant’s request for new counsel must be summarily
denied. 29
11. Accordingly, as Defendant has failed to overcome the procedural bars to
successive motions for postconviction relief, Defendant’s Third Motion for
Postconviction Relief is summarily dismissed, as required by Rule 61(d)(2). Even if
Defendant were to overcome the procedural bar, this Court has already addressed
the issues surrounding the Court’s denial of Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, and the Supreme Court affirmed those rulings. Moreover, Reed establishes no
new constitutional right and to the extent that it does, the facts of this case make
Reed inapplicable to it.
28
See State v. Wonnum, 1993 WL 13826941 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 1993); Wonnum v. State, 1997 WL 588855
(Del. Sept. 16,1997); State v. Wonnum, 2014 WL 3058464 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 3, 2014); Wonnum v. State, 2015
WL 3456633 (Del. May 28, 2015).
29
State v. Wonnum, 1993 WL 13826951, at *2-3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 1993).
7
Therefore, Defendant’s Third Motion for Postconviction Relief is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge
8