NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4551-19
PAUL G. GREENSTEIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARINA A. GREENSTEIN,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Argued February 9, 2022 – Decided March 18, 2022
Before Judges Hoffman, Whipple and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-4677-18.
Howard N. Sobel argued the cause for appellant (Law
Offices of Howard N. Sobel, PA, attorneys; Howard N.
Sobel and Margaret D. Nikolis, on the briefs).
Alexander Fishbeyn argued the cause for respondent
(Law Offices of Peter E. Briskin, PC, attorneys;
Alexander Fishbeyn, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint filed in the Law
Division because neither party registered their judgment of divorce and
settlement agreement in New Jersey as required for either party to enforce its
provisions under N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133 of the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA). Plaintiff, Paul G. Greenstein, and defendant, Marina A.
Greenstein, married on April 6, 1994, and had a son. While married, the parties
maintained a stock account with TD Ameritrade (TD account) as joint tenants,
and this account was designated as the son's college fund.
The marriage was terminated in March 2010 by a New York judgment of
divorce, which included provisions for parenting and child support. The parties
signed a stipulation of settlement. The stipulation was dated November 23,
2009, subsequently amended twice, and incorporated by reference, but not
merged, into an amended judgment of divorce.
On March 29, 2011, the parties entered a modification of the stipulation.
The modification included provisions for, among other things, defendant
providing copies of the TD account bank statements. Around the times of both
the stipulation and of the modification, there were approximately $140,000 in
the TD account.
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The son started college in September 2012 and graduated in June 2017,
with approximately $55,389 remaining in the TD account. Neither the
stipulation nor the modification stated how excess funds would be distributed.
On December 18, 2017, plaintiff proposed dissolving the TD account by the end
of the year and equally splitting the balance between the parties by defendant
taking her share then removing her name from the account. The parties emailed
back and forth over a couple weeks but could not agree about how to equitably
distribute the remaining funds in the account.
On June 25, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in the Law
Division in Bergen County, alleging breaches of the modification and stipulation
incorporated by reference into the amended judgment of divorce. Defendant's
counterclaim alleged that plaintiff withdrew funds from the TD account for his
personal benefit and owed defendant reimbursement pursuant to the agreements.
Discovery ensued as did motion practice attendant to discovery. On
November 19, 2019, the court entered a Case Management Order extending the
discovery end date and compelling defendant to produce a certificate of
completeness, pursuant to Rule 4:18-1(c), and to provide the TD account
statements for years 2014 to 2016. On February 14, 2020, plaintiff moved for
summary judgment against defendant, seeking $34,891.12 plus counsel fees and
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costs, to dismiss defendant's counterclaim, and to amend the caption with
defendant's correct legal name. Defendant cross-moved.
During a conference on March 9, 2020, the court raised the issues of
personal and subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte and adjourned the motions
for summary judgment to March 23, and then to April 9, so the parties could
brief the jurisdictional issues. On April 9, 2020, the court heard the parties on
jurisdiction before it would consider oral argument on the motions for summary
judgment.
The court announced that regardless of where the parties now live, the
judgment of divorce is still valid in New York, and neither party registered it in
New Jersey.
This Judgment of Divorce was not conformed or
registered in the State of New Jersey. If it was, perhaps
the Family Division could address some of the relief
that [plaintiff requested] in this Law Division. But
there is no conformed [j]udgment here for purposes of
enforcement.
Why is that significant? It's significant because
the respective Stipulations of Settlement are
incorporated by reference in those agreements. The
merger issue for this -- for purposes of this [c]ourt's
analysis is insignificant. Of course it would not merge.
Those covenants have to survive the entry of the
Judgment of Divorce.
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The issue is those Stipulations of Settlement
including the provisions related to the TD Bank
Ameritrade account, including the $140,000, were not
only subject to the New York Courts for purposes of
evaluation of entering the Stipulation of Settlement for
the Judgment of Divorce, but also the Judgment of
Divorce. It is part and parcel of the Judgment of
Divorce. The enforcement mechanism is behind the
Judgment of Divorce entered in the State of New York,
not New Jersey.
The court concluded, under Rule 4:6-7, the court must dismiss unless it
can act otherwise under Rule 1:13-4.
Given the fact that the [c]ourt does not possess
jurisdiction in this matter, as the respective Stipulations
of Settlement are governed by New York law and
subjected to the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, County of New York, this
[c]ourt denies the respective motions for summary
judgment filed in the Law Division of Bergen County
as they are improperly filed, and also the request for
leave to amend the caption of the filed complaint.
To that end, since the [c]ourt lacks the requisite
jurisdiction in this matter, the [c]ourt will be entering
an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice in
order to permit the plaintiff an opportunity to file the
appropriate action seeking relief to conform or register
the Judgment of Divorce in the Superior Court of the
State of New Jersey in the Family Division or in the
alternative, seek the appropriate relief as previously
undertaken in the Supreme Court of the State of New
York, County of New York. Likewise, the
counterclaim will be dismissed without prejudice as
well.
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On June 1, 2020, plaintiff moved for reconsideration because the court
failed to transfer the matter to the Chancery Division Family Part un der Rule
1:13-4 and erred by raising the issue of personal jurisdiction because defendant
waived such. Plaintiff requested oral argument if opposed and an August 7,
2020, return date. The court scheduled the motion for June 19, 2020, then
rescheduled to July 10, 2020. On June 29, counsel again requested an August 7
return date, which the court denied and informed plaintiff on July 2 that it would
decide the motion on the papers and not hear oral argument.
The court denied the motion for reconsideration with a written statement
of reasons. On August 27, 2020, the court filed an amplification pursuant to
Rule 2:5-1(b), explaining the denial of oral argument was because of the lack of
new information for reconsideration. The court had heard arguments on
jurisdiction and had found under Rule 1:13-4 that it could not transfer because
the unregistered support order meant neither the Family nor Law Division had
jurisdiction. This appeal followed.
We agree with the motion court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The interpretation and application of a complex statutory scheme, such as
UIFSA, is plainly a question of law for the trial court, subject to de novo review
on appeal. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.
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366, 378 (1995). While not specifically analyzing the statute, the court clearly
considered UIFSA filing requirements in concluding it did not have jurisdiction
to either hear or transfer the case within New Jersey.
UIFSA "resolves potential jurisdictional conflicts regarding the
enforcement of child support orders across state lines by designating one order
as the controlling child support order and provides for interstate jurisdiction to
modify child support orders when parents and the children do not all reside in
the same state." Lall v. Shivani, 448 N.J. Super. 38, 45 (App. Div. 2016).
Critical to the jurisdictional uniformity intended under
the [UIFSA]'s interstate system of modifying and
enforcing child support orders is identification of the
controlling child support order and the tribunal
authorized to exercise "controlling exclusive
jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.133. In short, a court
that enters an order establishing child support retains
continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order,
and that court's orders remain the controlling child
support orders for purposes of enforcement, until
continuing exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on
another state's tribunal by operation of the [UIFSA].
[Id. at 46.]
In many cases, the first step in a UIFSA matter is for one party to "register"
an out-of-state child support order in the current home state of the child for
enforcement purposes. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.168. A party begins the
registration process in New Jersey by filing a request to register the out-of-state
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order with our Family Part. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.169. Registration is effective
upon filing the order in New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.170. New Jersey "may
modify a child support order issued in another state which is registered in this
State" when certain residency and jurisdictional exceptions are met, see N.J.S.A.
2A-30.178 (emphasis added), but plaintiff has not provided support that he does
not need to register before using such exceptions for modification. Presumably,
many child support agreements include provisions that would otherwise read as
contractual terms; plaintiff has not shown that these do not need to be registered
to review the order. The court repeatedly noted the lack of registration.
This Judgment of Divorce was not conformed or
registered in the State of New Jersey. If it was, perhaps
the Family Division could address some of the relief
that [plaintiff requested] in this Law Division. But
there is no conformed [j]udgment here for purposes of
enforcement.
The court examined the provisions in the judgment of divorce, settlement,
and modifications. The court noted New York's retained jurisdiction; the
previous modification in New York; the agreements provisions for the college
account, support, and pro rata share of health, educational, and other costs; and
the parties' failure to register the judgment or amended judgment of divorce in
New Jersey. Plaintiff received legal advice to pursue this in New Jersey as to
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the TD accounts, and defendant did object to jurisdiction and legal bars to
recovery.
Given these circumstances, the court properly found that New Jersey
courts could not have jurisdiction before registering the orders. The court
clearly understood plaintiff's claims to include parts of the agreement not
exclusively related to a breach on the TD account. Plaintiff repeatedly alleged
issues with the provisions as to the marital residence and to how the TD account
should not have been used for amounts that would otherwise only be paid by his
child support payments.
Further, as to Rule 1:13-4(a), a court "without jurisdiction of the subject
matter of an action or issue therein . . . shall, on motion or on its own initiative,
order the action, with the record and all papers on file, transferred to the proper
court or administrative agency, if any, in the State." (emphases added). For the
jurisdictional reasons above, this rule did not apply because there was no proper
court in New Jersey to address the complaint without a registered order.
Plaintiff also asserts that the court erred by not providing sufficient
reasons for denying oral argument on the motion to reconsider. Reviewing
courts require a record to "independently evaluate the sufficiency of [the motion
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judge's] reason for refusing" oral argument on a substantive motion. Raspantini
v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 531-32 (App. Div. 2003).
After reviewing the record and the court's findings, we determine that the
court provided sufficient reasons as to why it would not hear oral argument on
the motion to reconsider. The court considered whether it overlooked competent
or probative evidence, referencing its statements from the April 9 transcript, and
concluded "because it is a threshold determination, any issues regarding subject
matter jurisdiction must be addressed before considering the substantive merits
of the matter."
For the reasons we found no error in either the denial of oral argument or
the determination of lack of jurisdiction, we also find no abuse of the court's
discretion under Rule 4:49-2 in its denial of the motion to reconsider these
issues. See Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J.
Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).
Affirmed.
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