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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ARMANDO VASQUEZ-REYES, A/K/A No. 80293
ARMANDO VASQUIEZREYES,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a
jury verdict, of two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of 14 and
eight counts of sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14.1 Eighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge. The district
court sentenced appellant Armando Vasquez-Reyes to an aggregate
sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 45 years and required him
to register as a sex offender upon release. Vasquez-Reyes raises numerous
issues on appeal.
Sufficiency of the evidence
Vasquez-Reyes summarily argues that the State did not
present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. We disagree. The
State presented testimony from the victims that supported each of Vasquez-
Reyes’ convictions. Both victims testified with particularity about the
crimes, including when and where in the household the sexual abuse
occurred. That testimony alone is sufficient to support the convictions. See
Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 648, 119 P.3d 1225, 1232 (2005) (explaining
that “the uncorroborated testimony of a victim, without more, is sufficient
to uphold a rape conviction”). Moreover, Vasquez-Reyes confessed to
1Pursuant to NRAP 34()(1), we conclude that oral argument is not
warranted.
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touching one of the victims (G.A.) on multiple occasions, including on her
breast and legs, and to sexually penetrating her. Therefore, we conclude
that a rational juror could find the essential elements of the crimes beyond
a reasonable doubt. See NRS 200.364(9) (defining “sexual penetration”);
NRS 200.366(1)(b) (sexual assault with a minor); NRS 201.230 (ewdness
with a minor); see also Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d
1378, 1380 (1998) (holding that, in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence
challenges, the relevant inquiry is “whether, after reviewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”
(quoting Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245, 250, 681 P.2d 44, 47 (1984))); McNair
v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992) (providing that “it is the
jury’s function, not that of the court, to assess the weight of the evidence
and determine the credibility of the witnesses”).
Prosecutorial misconduct
Vasquez-Reyes also argues that the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct.” In resolving claims of prosecutorial misconduct,
we first determine whether misconduct occurred and then decide whether
any misconduct denied the defendant a fair trial. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev.
1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). As relevant here, with respect to the
second step, we “will not reverse a conviction based on prosecutorial
misconduct if it was harmless error,” and where the error is not of
constitutional dimensions, we “will reverse only if the error substantially
affects the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 1188-89, 196 P.3d at 476.
2Vasquez-Reyes objected below to each alleged instance of
prosecutorial misconduct addressed in this order.
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