2022 IL App (1st) 200957
SIXTH DIVISION
March 31, 2022
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
No. 1-20-0957
ALEC PINKSTON, Individually and on Behalf of Others )
Similarly Situated, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 19 CH 12364
)
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ) Honorable
) Caroline K. Moreland,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Harris concurred with the judgment and opinion.
Justice Oden Johnson dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff Alec Pinkston filed a class action complaint alleging that the City of Chicago
(City) has an ongoing practice of improperly issuing central business district metered parking
tickets. Mr. Pinkston alleged that the City routinely issues these tickets, for which there is a higher
penalty than ordinary metered parking tickets, outside of the boundaries of the central business
district established by the Chicago Municipal Code (Municipal Code). On behalf of himself and a
class of similarly situated individuals, Mr. Pinkston sought a declaration that the tickets were void,
an injunction to halt the practice, and the disgorgement of parking fees and the interest charged on
those fees as a remedy for the City’s unjust enrichment. The City successfully moved to dismiss
No. 1-20-0957
the complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-619 (West 2018)), on the grounds that Mr. Pinkston had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with the City’s Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) before initiating this
action in the circuit court.
¶2 On appeal, Mr. Pinkston maintains that several exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine apply
and should have prevented dismissal of his claims. He argues that (1) the ticket he received was
void, both because the City lacked statutory authority to issue it and because it was invalid on its
face; (2) it would have been futile to challenge his ticket with DOAH; (3) resolution of his claims
required no fact finding or agency expertise; (4) availing himself of the administrative process
would have resulted in irreparable injury; and (5) DOAH could not have provided him the
“ultimate relief” he sought.
¶3 Although we agree with the City that the first four of these exceptions do not apply, we are
persuaded that the last one does. We accept, for purposes of this motion to dismiss, Mr. Pinkston’s
argument that DOAH, which is tasked by the Municipal Code with establishing liability or
nonliability for individual parking violations, cannot provide him with the core relief he seeks—
injunctive and monetary relief to prospectively and retroactively redress the deleterious effects of
the City’s purportedly widespread practice of issuing erroneous central business district tickets.
We reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of Mr. Pinkston’s complaint and remand for further
proceedings on his claims.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 The City of Chicago regulates metered parking spaces within its boundaries. A failure to
comply with parking meter regulations outside the central business district results in a $50 fine.
Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-190(a) (amended Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code 9-
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100-020(b) (amended Apr. 21, 2021). Within the central business district, the same violation
resulted—at the time Mr. Pinkston’s ticket was issued—in a $65 fine. Chicago Municipal Code
§ 9-64-190(b) (amended Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b) (amended at
Chi. City Clerk J. Proc. 38042 (Nov. 16, 2016)). That penalty has since been raised to $70, with
no corresponding increase for violations outside of the district. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-
020(b) (amended April 21, 2021)).
¶6 As defined in section 9-4-010 of the Municipal Code, the central business district is the
area
“beginning at the easternmost point of Division Street extended to Lake Michigan; then
west on Division Street to LaSalle Street; then south on LaSalle Street to Chicago Avenue;
then west on Chicago Avenue to Halsted Street; then south on Halsted Street to Roosevelt
Road; then east on Roosevelt Road to its easternmost point extended to Lake Michigan”
and includes parking spaces on both sides of the above-mentioned streets. Chicago Municipal
Code § 9-4-010 (amended July 21, 2021).
¶7 In his class action complaint, Mr. Pinkston alleged that on May 21, 2019, he parked his
vehicle in a parking meter zone located at or near 1216 South Wabash Avenue in Chicago. Mr.
Pinkston returned to his vehicle to find that he had received a ticket, purporting to be pursuant to
section 9-64-190(b) of the Municipal Code, for having an expired parking meter within the central
business district. The ticket stated that Mr. Pinkston’s vehicle was parked at 1202 South Wabash
Avenue. Both 1216 South Wabash Avenue and 1202 South Wabash Avenue are located south of
Roosevelt Road and thus outside the southernmost boundary of the central business district. Mr.
Pinkston alleged that he paid the $65 fine associated with his ticket “under duress.”
¶8 Citing a May 14, 2019, news article analyzing data concerning parking tickets issued by
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the City, Mr. Pinkston alleged that over a five-year period the City had issued more than 30,000
central business district tickets for vehicles, like his, that were parked outside of the central
business district. Mr. Pinkston alleged that the City was thus engaged in a “routine practice” of
erroneously issuing such tickets.
¶9 On behalf of himself and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals, Mr. Pinkston
asserted three counts against the City, seeking (1) a declaration that the improperly issued tickets
were facially invalid, void, and unenforceable; (2) an injunction to prevent the City from
continuing to issue central business district tickets to vehicles parked outside the district; and (3) as
a remedy for unjust enrichment, the repayment of fines, penalties, and interest the City had unjustly
received and retained at the expense of class members.
¶ 10 The City moved to dismiss Mr. Pinkston’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Civil
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)), arguing that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because Mr. Pinkston had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
suit. According to the City, the parking ticket issued to Mr. Pinkston was subject to administrative
review by DOAH and, under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West
2018)), he was required to seek a finding of no liability by first challenging the ticket with DOAH
and then filing a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court if DOAH rejected his
challenge. Because Mr. Pinkston filed his complaint outside of this administrative review process,
the City maintained that his claims were barred by the administrative exhaustion of remedies
doctrine. The City argued in the alternative that Mr. Pinkston’s claims were barred by the voluntary
payment doctrine, as he had also elected to pay his ticket before contesting it.
¶ 11 In response to the City’s motion, Mr. Pinkston argued that “many exceptions” to the
exhaustion doctrine applied. He maintained that he had no obligation to pursue administrative
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remedies, for example, before challenging a facially invalid and therefore void ticket that the City
was not statutorily authorized to issue. Mr. Pinkston further argued that administrative proceedings
could not have provided him with adequate relief because only a court can issue an injunction
against the City’s continued issuance of erroneous central business district metered parking tickets.
Mr. Pinkston also insisted that administrative proceedings would have been futile because the
City’s failure to withdraw his erroneous ticket of its own accord indicated that any challenge made
to the ticket “would certainly be denied by [a DOAH] hearing officer.” Finally, Mr. Pinkston
argued that no fact-finding was required because the location of his vehicle relative to the
boundaries of the central business district was not disputed and there was thus “no need for the
expertise of the City’s DOAH in this matter.” Mr. Pinkston maintained, consistent with his
allegations, that he had not voluntarily paid the $65 penalty associated with his ticket but had been
compelled to do so to avoid late fees, immobilization of his vehicle, suspension of his driver’s
license, and other potential consequences.
¶ 12 The circuit court granted the City’s motion in its entirety and dismissed Mr. Pinkston’s
claims with prejudice, concluding that Mr. Pinkston had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and that none of the enumerated exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied. The court
rejected Mr. Pinkston’s argument that the City lacked authority or jurisdiction to issue the ticket
he received and that the ticket was thus void ab initio. The court explained that although the ticket
may have been “issued for a violation that could not factually be proven,” it was not void because
the City was authorized to issue tickets for parking violations. The court noted that Mr. Pinkston
had failed to plead any facts showing it would have been futile to contest his ticket with DOAH.
And the court rejected “the notion that all parties who receive parking tickets in the city of Chicago
can avoid administrative review because no agency expertise is involved.” Accepting that
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proposition, in the court’s view, “would eviscerate the concept of administrative hearings and
administrative review for truly trivial matters and bombard the Court with litigation over parking
and other related fines.”
¶ 13 Finding that “a factual question remained as to whether [Mr. Pinkston’s] payment of the
parking ticket was truly voluntary,” the court did not base its dismissal on application of the
voluntary payment doctrine.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 16 The circuit court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Mr. Pinkston’s complaint with
prejudice on September 4, 2020, and Mr. Pinkston filed a timely notice of appeal from that order
on September 9, 2020. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb.
1, 1994) and Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final judgments entered by the
circuit court in civil cases.
¶ 17 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 The circuit court dismissed Mr. Pinkston’s complaint under section 2–619(a) of the Civil
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (West 2018)). A motion brought pursuant to this section “admits the
legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim but asserts certain defects or defenses outside the pleadings
which defeat the claim.” Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 55. The question on appeal is
“whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or,
absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law.” Kedzie & 103rd
Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993). Our review of the grant or
denial of such a motion is de novo. Id. at 116.
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¶ 19 A. The Exhaustion Doctrine
¶ 20 The circuit court agreed with the City that Mr. Pinkston’s claims were barred because he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The exhaustion doctrine provides that a party
aggrieved by actions that are subject to review by an administrative agency generally cannot seek
review in the courts outside of the administrative review process, which assigns courts the limited
role of reviewing final agency decisions. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill. 2d
304, 308 (1989). Reasons for this requirement include allowing the administrative agency to fully
develop and consider the facts surrounding matters presented to it and to apply agency expertise
to such matters, as well as the possibility that the complaining party might succeed before the
agency, thus obviating the need for judicial review and conserving valuable judicial resources. Id.
¶ 21 Although strict compliance is generally required, our supreme court has recognized a
number of exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, including when (1) “a statute, ordinance, or rule
is attacked as unconstitutional on its face”; (2) “multiple administrative remedies exist and at least
one is exhausted”; (3) “the agency cannot provide an adequate remedy”; (4) “it is patently futile
to seek relief before the agency”; (5) “no issues of fact are presented or agency expertise is not
involved”; (6) “irreparable harm will result from further pursuit of administrative remedies”; or
(7) “the agency’s jurisdiction is attacked because it is not authorized by statute.” Id. at 308-09.
¶ 22 Mr. Pinkston contends that several of these exceptions apply to his claims. He argues that
(1) the ticket he received was void, both because the City lacked statutory authority to issue it and
because it was invalid on its face, (2) it would have been futile to challenge his ticket with DOAH,
(3) resolution of his claims required no factfinding or agency expertise, (4) availing himself of the
administrative process would have resulted in irreparable injury, and (5) DOAH could not provide
Mr. Pinkston with an injunction, the “ultimate relief” he sought.
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¶ 23 As noted above, we agree with Mr. Pinkston that the last of these exceptions applies.
However, because our view that this exception applies is dependent on Mr. Pinkston’s ability to
prove his allegation of a “routine practice” of issuing central business district tickets for vehicles,
like his, that were parked outside of the central business district, we also want to make clear that
none of the other exceptions that he cites are applicable. We address each of these exceptions in
turn.
¶ 24 1. Lack of Agency Authority/Jurisdiction
¶ 25 Mr. Pinkston first argues that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies
because he was challenging the City’s authority to issue that ticket and thus he was alleging that
the ticket was void. It is true that “[a]n administrative agency’s powers are limited to those granted
by the legislature and any action taken by an agency must be authorized specifically by statute.”
Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2015 IL 117443, ¶ 16. “Because agency action for
which there is no statutory authority is void, it is subject to attack at any time in any court, either
directly or collaterally.” Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 160, 166 (2002). Although “the
term ‘jurisdiction’ is not strictly applicable” in this context, “the rules concerning the authority of
an administrative agency and the validity of its orders have been held to be analogous to those
governing courts of limited jurisdiction.” In re Abandonment of Wells Located in Illinois by
Leavell, 343 Ill. App. 3d 303, 306 (2003). Mr. Pinkston’s position is that, because no statute
specifically authorizes the City to issue central business district parking tickets outside of the
central business district, each instance of the City erroneously doing so is a void act for which the
City lacked statutory authority.
¶ 26 The City maintains that this exception is inapplicable because Mr. Pinkston’s argument
goes to the authority of the City, not the authority of DOAH, and the City is “neither an
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administrative agency nor a creature of statute,” but is rather a home rule municipality with broad
police powers. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a) (providing that a home rule municipality may
“exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs”). Mr.
Pinkston’s response to this is that “in issuing and enforcing parking tickets, the City acts in an
administrative capacity, and, for all intents and purposes applicable to this case, is an
administrative agency.”
¶ 27 We agree with the City on this point. Although the validity of parking tickets must be raised
with DOAH, an administrative agency that was created by the City to adjudicate administrative
hearings, the tickets are issued by the City itself, in the exercise of its police power.
¶ 28 Even if we were persuaded by Mr. Pinkston’s contention that the City functions as an
administrative agency when it issues parking tickets, however, his argument that the City acted
outside of its statutory authority would fail. Section 11-208 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, titled
“Powers of local authorities,” provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, that local
authorities may, as part of “the reasonable exercise of [their] police power[,] *** [r]egulat[e] the
standing or parking of vehicles.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208(a)(1) (West 2020). Section 9-64-220(b) of
the Municipal Code further provides that a police officer or other designated representative of the
City who observes a parking violation “may issue a parking violation notice and serve the notice
on the owner of the vehicle by handing it to the operator of the vehicle, if he is present, or by
affixing it to the vehicle in a conspicuous place.” Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-220(b)
(amended Nov. 16, 2016).
¶ 29 As even the authorities Mr. Pinkston relies on make clear, “[a]n administrative agency ***
has authority to act if it has the following: (1) personal jurisdiction over the parties ***, (2) subject
matter jurisdiction over the general class of cases to which the particular case belongs, and (3) the
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inherent statutory authority to make or enter the particular order involved.” In re Abandonment of
Wells Located in Illinois, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 306. When it issued Mr. Pinkston’s ticket, the City
clearly had personal jurisdiction over him as an individual who parked his vehicle within city
boundaries; the City had subject matter jurisdiction over parking violations; the general class of
cases to which this particular case belongs; and the City also had the inherent statutory authority
to issue tickets for expired parking meter violations, whether those violations occurred within the
central business district or not. Thus, even if it was issued in error—and even, as Mr. Pinkston
argues, if that error was obvious from the face of the ticket because it purported to be for a parking
violation within the central business district while at the same time providing an address outside
of the district—the City plainly had authority to issue the ticket. In other words, the ticket was not
“void” but merely “voidable.”
¶ 30 We discussed the difference between actions that are void and voidable in Board of
Education of the City of Chicago v. Board of Trustees of the Public Schools Teachers’ Pension &
Retirement Fund of Chicago, 395 Ill. App. 3d 735 (2009). We acknowledged in that case that,
“theoretically, anytime an agency makes an erroneous decision, it acts without statutory authority
because the legislature and the statutes do not give an agency the power to make erroneous
decisions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 740. But we went on to explain that a rule
finding a lack of agency authority in such cases would “disregard the distinction between agency
orders which are void and subject to collateral attack, and those which are merely voidable and
subject to attack only through the applicable administrative and judicial review proceedings.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 741. The agency action at issue in Board of Education,
the erroneous calculation of teacher pensions, was voidable, not void, because the agency did
indeed have statutory authority to calculate pensions. Id. The same is true here, where the City
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undoubtedly has the authority to issue tickets for expired parking meter violations.
¶ 31 Other cases Mr. Pinkston relies on do not convince us otherwise. In 1550 MP Road LLC v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 700, 2019 IL 123046, ¶ 28, our supreme court held that a contract
entered into by a labor union was unenforceable where the union had failed, as a condition of its
authority, to obtain its members’ approval prior to entering into the agreement. Mr. Pinkston points
to no similar condition that must be satisfied before the City is authorized to issue parking tickets.
The other cases Mr. Pinkston relies on, Space Station 2001, Inc. v. Moses, 118 Ill. App. 3d 658,
663 (1983), and Ganley v. City of Chicago, 18 Ill. App. 3d 248, 254 (1974), both involved the
illegal issuance of building permits by a ministerial officer. The question in those cases was
whether the agencies the employees worked for were equitably estopped from relying on the
illegality of the permits to later revoke them. We held that they were not. Space Station 2001, 118
Ill. App. 3d at 663; Ganley, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 254. Although we remarked in those cases that a
building permit granted in violation of the terms of a zoning ordinance is a “nullity” (Space Station
2001, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 663; Ganley, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 254), Mr. Pinkston reads too much into
this use of the word. As our supreme court has noted, the terms “void” and “nullity” have
sometimes been used too loosely, causing the court to repeatedly clarify the important distinction
between void decisions and decisions that are merely voidable because they are incorrect. See,
e.g., People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 1, 14, 19 (abolishing the “void sentence rule” and
explaining that criminal sentences that do not conform to statutory requirements are not void but
merely voidable); In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998) (noting that the “question
whether a judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the court entering the challenged order
possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter”).
¶ 32 As an apparent corollary to his voidness argument, Mr. Pinkston argues that he was denied
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due process. The City contends that he has forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time
on appeal. See Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st) 111464, ¶ 15 (noting that “[g]enerally,
arguments not raised before the circuit court are forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal”). Forfeiture aside, however, this argument also fails. “In the context of administrative
hearings, due process of law specifically requires a definite charge, adequate notice, and a full and
impartial hearing.” Stone Street Partners, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative
Hearings, 2017 IL 117720, ¶ 34. Mr. Pinkston insists that his ticket failed “to specify the particular
act and violation allegedly committed.” As discussed above, however, the ticket plainly stated that
it was for an expired meter within the central business district. That the violation as stated may
have been unsupported by the facts provided a reason to challenge the ticket. But Mr. Pinkston
was certainly put on notice of the particular violation the City alleged he had committed.
¶ 33 Because the issuance of tickets by the City falls within its police powers and is not the
action of an administrative agency and because Mr. Pinkston’s allegations, if true, would establish
that his parking ticket was voidable but not void, the exception to the exhaustion doctrine for
challenges to void orders issued without agency authority does not apply.
¶ 34 2. Futility of Engaging in Agency Proceedings
¶ 35 Mr. Pinkston also argues that it would have been futile for him to challenge his ticket
administratively. In support of this argument, he cites section 9-100-030(c) of the Municipal Code,
which states that the City “shall withdraw a violation notice when said notice fails to establish a
prima facie case” of a parking, standing, or compliance violation. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-
100-030(c) (amended Apr. 24, 2020). A prima facie case of a violation is established when the
parking ticket specifies, as required by section 11-208.3(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code, “the date, time,
and place” of the violation; “the particular regulation violated; any requirement to complete a
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traffic education program; the fine and any penalty that may be assessed ***; the vehicle make or
a photograph of the vehicle; the state registration number of the vehicle; and the identification
number of the person issuing the notice.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(b)(2) (West 2020). The accuracy
of these facts must also be certified by the signature of the ticketing agent. Id. § 11-208.3(b)(3).
¶1 Mr. Pinkston argues the ticket he was issued did not establish a prima facie case of a
parking violation because the facts stated on the ticket (an address outside the central business
district) were in conflict with the violation asserted (an expired parking meter within the district).
His position is that, under section 9-100-030(c) of the Municipal Code, the City is required to
evaluate its tickets and—whether or not the vehicle owner has taken any action to formally
challenge the ticket on this basis—to sua sponte withdraw a ticket if it contains such a discrepancy.
The fact that the City did not independently withdraw his ticket in this manner, Mr. Pinkston
insists, demonstrates that “the City maintains that [his ticket] was proper” and that there is thus
“substantial reason to believe that any administrative challenge to [the ticket] would have been
denied.” While it is true that we do not require a party to exhaust his administrative remedies when
it would be patently useless to do so, Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 378 (2003), this
exception is wholly inapplicable here.
¶ 36 We agree with the City that neither the City nor the DOAH hearing officers had any
obligation to sua sponte withdraw or dismiss a ticket because the address on the ticket was not
within the central business district. Mr. Pinkston never raised this defense and there is no reason
for assuming that, if he had, it would have been rejected.
¶ 37 The single case Mr. Pinkston cites in support of his futility argument, Oak Park Trust &
Savings Bank v. Village of Palos Park, 106 Ill. App. 3d 394 (1982), is readily distinguishable. We
held that the plaintiff in that case was not required to resubmit a building plan with a new sewage
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treatment system for approval before filing suit where the village’s mayor had made clear that the
problem the new system was designed to resolve was “ ‘peripheral’ ” and the chairman of the
village’s planning commission “would remain opposed to the plan even if engineering problems
were solved.” Id. at 407. Here, Mr. Pinkston points to no statement by the City or DOAH indicating
that the results of challenges to erroneously issued central business district tickets brought before
DOAH are similarly preordained.
¶ 38 Notably, Mr. Pinkston revealed in his reply brief, based on documents obtained after the
complaint was filed, that he did in fact challenge his central business district parking ticket with
DOAH. We granted his unopposed motion to take judicial notice of certain documents relating to
those proceedings. These documents indicate that Mr. Pinkston contested his ticket solely on the
basis that he paid the meter via the ParkChicago payment app and that somehow his payment
became associated with a Minnesota license plate rather than with the Illinois license plate affixed
to his vehicle. Noting that Mr. Pinkston had submitted no evidence explaining why a Minnesota
license plate appeared on his receipt, DOAH ultimately determined that he was liable for the $65
fine associated with the ticket. Mr. Pinkston’s position is apparently that when a ticket is brought
to DOAH’s attention for any reason, DOAH’s finding of liability should be taken as evidence that
the agency considered and rejected all possible challenges that were or could have been brought
to the ticket’s issuance. We disagree. The fact that Mr. Pinkston unsuccessfully challenged his
ticket on wholly unrelated grounds is no indication that the process would have been futile as a
means of challenging the location of his parking violation, had he deigned to make that specific
argument. If anything, it demonstrates that the appropriate mechanism for such a challenge was
known and accessible to Mr. Pinkston. He simply chose not to avail himself of it.
¶ 39 The exception to the exhaustion doctrine for challenges that would be patently useless to
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pursue before an administrative agency also has no application here.
¶ 40 3. Lack of Any Question of Fact or Issue Calling For Agency Expertise
¶ 41 Mr. Pinkston next argues that the policy considerations underlying the exhaustion doctrine
do not apply here, where resolution of his claims turns on a purely legal question of statutory
interpretation and not on questions of fact or matters calling for agency expertise. In support of
this argument, he relies on this court’s decision in Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st)
150520, ¶ 1. The plaintiff in that case received an automated speed enforcement (ASE) ticket for
speeding in the vicinity of a school. Although by statute the City could utilize ASE cameras to
issue tickets only on school days, the court concluded that a weekday during the summer qualified
as such because special needs students attended the school year-round. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Because this
was a legal question of statutory and case law interpretation, the court concluded that no agency
expertise was required, and the exhaustion doctrine therefore did not apply. Id. ¶ 48.
¶ 42 Mr. Pinkston argues that the same can be said here, where the boundaries of the central
business district are established by the Municipal Code. The difference between this case and
Maschek, however, is that the plaintiff in Maschek did not challenge the traffic violation stated on
his ticket. He contested neither that he was speeding in a school zone nor the amount of the fine
for that violation. Id. ¶ 46. His dispute was solely with the means of enforcement the City
employed and whether it had the authority to issue his ticket in the manner it did. Id. Here, by
contrast, to the extent that Mr. Pinkston challenges the violation itself, asserting that, contrary to
what was alleged on his ticket, he was not parked in the central business district on May 21, 2019,
we agree with the City that DOAH routinely adjudicates questions like this and that the exception
to the requirement of administrative exhaustion for situations where there are no factual questions
or need for agency expertise is inapplicable.
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¶ 43 4. Irreparable Injury
¶ 44 Mr. Pinkston also insists that being “subjected to the rigors of the City’s administrative
process” would constitute irreparable harm in this case because he should not have to “incur the
costs and expenses associated with challenging a parking ticket that never should have been issued
in the first place” or “face the inherent risk of being found liable for such a ticket, even in spite of
the fact that the ticket is invalid.” The cases he relies on, though they state the irreparable-harm
exception without actually applying it, still make clear that the exception is only implicated where
a plaintiff must pursue “lengthy administrative procedures that fail to provide interim relief” before
filing suit. Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 499 (2008); Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill.
2d 311, 321 (2004).
¶ 45 The process for administratively challenging a parking ticket issued by the City is in fact
relatively simple. The Municipal Code provides that a vehicle owner who believes a ticket was
issued in error may contest the violation by requesting an in-person hearing before an
administrative law officer appointed by the traffic compliance administrator. Chicago Municipal
Code § 9-100-050(a) (amended Oct. 27, 2021). The individual may alternatively initiate an
“administrative correspondence hearing” and contest the violation by mail. Chicago Municipal
Code § 9-100-070 (amended Oct. 28, 2015). In either case, the administrative law officer’s finding
of liability or no liability is a final determination subject to review under the Administrative
Review Law. Chicago Municipal Code §§ 9-100-050(d) (amended Oct. 28, 2015), Chicago
Municipal Code § 9-100-090(a) (amended Oct. 28, 2015).
¶ 46 As noted above, Mr. Pinkston availed himself of these procedures to challenge his ticket—
on the basis that he paid the meter, but his payment became associated with a license plate for
some other vehicle. The ticket was issued on May 21, 2019. Six days later, Mr. Pinkston challenged
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the ticket by mail, submitting a half-page explanation of his argument and attaching a receipt
showing that a metered parking fee payment was made on the day in question for a vehicle with a
Minnesota license plate. The records indicate that DOAH was in receipt of that correspondence by
June 1, 2019, and issued Mr. Pinkston a finding of liability and a brief explanation of its
determination one month later. Mr. Pinkston could have sought review of that determination in the
circuit court within 35 days but elected instead to pay the ticket. Nothing about this process is
suggestive of a lengthy and onerous administrative proceeding.
¶ 47 Neither Gold v. Ziff Communications Co., 196 Ill. App. 3d 425, 435 (1989), which Mr.
Pinkston cites for the proposition that “irreparable harm does not have to be devastating harm,”
nor In re Marriage of Sheaffer, 2013 IL App (2d) 121049, ¶¶ 14-15, in which we held that
unnecessary costs associated with relitigating a matter may constitute irreparable harm, involved
administrative agency proceedings or the exception to the exhaustion doctrine that Mr. Pinkston
invokes. And the irreparable harm alleged in Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d
540, 549 (1977), flowed not from the burdensomeness of engaging in an administrative review
process, but from the purportedly erroneous agency determination itself—the plaintiff’s wrongful
suspension from the Medicaid program. These cases do not support Mr. Pinkston’s argument that
administrative review before DOAH would cause him irreparable harm.
¶ 48 Mr. Pinkston has failed to convince us that the irreparable-injury exception to the
exhaustion doctrine applies in this case.
¶ 49 5. Agency’s Inability to Provide Adequate Relief
¶ 50 We are convinced, however, that if as Mr. Pinkston alleges, there is a systemic failure on
the part of the City to confine central business district tickets to violations that occur within the
established boundaries of that district, DOAH is simply not equipped to provide Mr. Pinkston or
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the class with the relief sought in this case and that the administrative exhaustion doctrine is thus
inapplicable. It is well settled that administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the
reviewing agency is incapable of providing an adequate remedy. Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309.
Indeed, it is apparent from the complaint that the gist of the action complained of is not the action
of DOAH in adjudicating these tickets but the action of the City in issuing them.
¶ 51 Mr. Pinkston has alleged not just a single erroneous parking ticket or even an unconnected
group of such tickets. He instead maintains that the City is engaged in a “routine practice” of
issuing central business district metered parking tickets for cars parked outside of the district. He
seeks a declaration that the tickets issued in accordance with this practice are invalid, an injunction
to halt the practice, and restitution for those harmed by the practice. We fail to see how the DOAH,
which is tasked merely with making a finding of liability or no liability with respect to each
individual ticket that comes before it (see Chicago Municipal Code §§ 9-100-070(d), 9-100-090(a)
(amended Oct. 28, 2015)), could provide Mr. Pinkston with any of this relief.
¶ 52 Some cases have addressed this exception to the exhaustion doctrine in terms of whether
administrative review is even applicable. On this point, Board of Education, 395 Ill. App. 3d 735
(2009), discussed above, is instructive. The plaintiff in that case was denied leave to file an
amended complaint alleging that an agency had miscalculated teacher pensions, on the basis that
the claim was one within the purview of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et
seq. (West 2006)) and, not having been challenged in the circuit court within 35 days of the
agency’s final decision, was untimely under section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law (735
ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2006)). Board of Education, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 741-43. We disagreed with
this ruling on appeal. We pointed out that the plaintiff had not alleged individualized pension
miscalculations in the proposed amendment but rather a “systemic miscalculation.” Id. at 744. The
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challenge was thus not to an “ ‘[a]dministrative decision,’ ” which is defined in the Administrative
Review Law as a “decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a
particular case.” Id. at 744 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2006)). Because only a challenge to
an administrative decision must be brought within 35 days, the plaintiff’s challenge to the agency’s
broader policy or practice of calculating pensions in the manner it did was not governed by the
Administrative Review Law and was thus not untimely. Id. at 744.
¶ 53 Here, section 11-208.3(d) of the Vehicle Code states that “final determinations of parking,
standing, compliance, automated speed enforcement system, or automated traffic law violations
*** shall be subject to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(d)
(West 2020). As in Board of Education, however, Mr. Pinkston is not seeking any such
individualized determination. He is asking for a court to determine if the City is engaged in the
routine practice he alleges and, if so, for the court to condemn the practice, forbid it going forward,
and redress the harm the practice has already caused. As in Board of Education, the judicial
determinations sought in this case fall outside of the scope of the Administrative Review Law. The
exhaustion doctrine simply does not apply to claims that the City has a widespread policy or is
engaged in the routine or systemic practice of issuing central business district metered parking
tickets outside of the district’s established boundaries. We conclude that dismissal on this basis
was not proper.
¶ 54 The cases relied on by the City are quite different. The plaintiff in Calderwood Corp. v.
Mahin, 57 Ill. 2d 216, 219 (1974), rather than seeking review of a tax imposed by the Director of
Revenue through the Administrative Review Act, filed a suit for an injunction to stop the collection
of the tax. Our supreme court explained: “The issues sought to be raised by [the plaintiff] could
have been raised in administrative proceedings before the Department, and its determination could
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have been challenged under the Administrative Review Act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. at 221. There was no question that the administrative review process would have addressed the
very issues and allowed for the very relief that the plaintiff in that case raised in its claim for an
injunction.
¶ 55 In Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 312, 313, 317
(1996), an employer sought relief from IDES’s practice of what it claimed was retroactively
assessing unemployment taxes. While that case, like this one, involved a widespread practice, the
problem there was that the agency had already ruled that the practice was authorized and
appropriate, the circuit court had upheld that determination on administrative review, and the
plaintiff had failed to appeal that decision. Id. at 314-15.
¶ 56 The plaintiff in Midland Hotel then attempted to collaterally attack that holding by filing a
class action complaint in the chancery division of the circuit court. Id. at 316. It was in this context
that we affirmed the dismissal of the chancery complaint on grounds of res judicata and collateral
estoppel and noted that “[a]n administrative review judgment cannot be avoided by bringing a
subsequent class action.” Id. at 316, 321. The bars of res judicata and collateral estoppel that
dictated dismissal in Midland Hotel are simply not present here. There has been no finding by
DOAH that it was proper for the City to engage in the practice that is alleged in this case.
¶ 57 At oral argument, counsel for the City relied on Midland Hotel to make a different
argument—that a determination by DOAH that Mr. Pinkston’s individual ticket was improper was
a necessary “springboard” for him to then to seek injunctive relief in the circuit court. The Midland
Hotel court did note that if the plaintiff in that case managed to “successfully challenge an [agency]
order by using the administrative review procedure,” it could then use that determination to seek
an injunction in a separate action. Id. at 321. As the court recognized in Midland Hotel, there was
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a legal issue as to whether the IDES practice was correct and the proper way to raise that issue was
through administrative review.
¶ 58 Here, however, there is no question that central business district parking tickets must be
issued only for parking meter violations within the central business district. Thus, there is simply
no legal or factual issue that must be addressed through administrative procedures. Here, Mr.
Pinkston’s complaint is not about how DOAH adjudicates these tickets—it is about the way that
the City issues them. Mr. Pinkston seeks an injunction that will stop the City from routinely issuing
these erroneous tickets so that they and the class they seek to represent will not have to defend
themselves on tickets that impose fines in excess of what is authorized by the Municipal Code. No
finding by DOAH, or on administrative review of a DOAH decision, is a necessary springboard
for this action.
¶ 59 It bears noting how our supreme court has explained the exhaustion doctrine:
“Where the Administrative Review Law is applicable and provides a remedy, a circuit
court may not redress a party’s grievance through any other type of action. The court’s
power to resolve factual and legal issues arising from an agency’s decision must be
exercised within its review of the agency’s decision and not in a separate proceeding.”
(Emphases added.) County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546,
551-52 (1999).
Here, the factual and legal issues that must be resolved do not “arise from” an agency decision. Id.
And, as discussed above, the Administrative Review Law does not provide the remedy Mr.
Pinkston seeks.
¶ 60 To be clear, if on remand the evidence fails to support a finding that the City is engaged in
the “routine practice” Mr. Pinkston has alleged, then the exhaustion doctrine will indeed apply to
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any attempts through this litigation to adjudicate parking tickets on an individualized basis or to
review administrative decisions outside the strictures of the Administrative Review Law. At this
stage, however, the allegations must be taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Mr.
Pinkston and the proposed class. Turner v. Memorial Medical Center, 233 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (2009).
Mr. Pinkston has articulated claims that, depending on how one prefers to view them, either fall
within an established exception to the exhaustion doctrine or are simply not subject to the
provisions of the Administrative Review Law and thus not subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
¶ 61 B. The Voluntary Payment Doctrine
¶ 62 The City argues in the alternative that because Mr. Pinkston elected to pay his ticket before
he initiated this lawsuit, dismissal was proper under the voluntary payment doctrine, which
generally provides that “money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment and with
knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the ground
that the claim was illegal.” McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., 2019 IL 123626, ¶ 22.
Although the circuit court declined to dismiss on this basis, the City reminds us that we may affirm
a dismissal for any reason supported by the record. Kumar v. Bornstein, 354 Ill. App. 3d 159, 165
(2004).
¶ 63 We agree with the circuit court, however, that questions of fact remain precluding dismissal
on this basis. It is unclear, for example, whether Mr. Pinkston in fact knew that his vehicle had not
been parked within the boundaries of the central business district when, at the conclusion of his
administrative challenge on unrelated grounds, he elected to pay the ticket rather than challenge it
further. If he did not, it could hardly be said that he paid the ticket “with knowledge of the facts.”
See Dreyfus v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 933, 938 (1998) (noting
that a payment is involuntary if “the payor lacked knowledge of the facts upon which to protest
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the payment at the time of payment”). Mr. Pinkston also alleged that he paid the ticket under
duress, to avoid late fees, interest, the immobilization of his vehicle, the suspension of his driver’s
license, and other consequences. Whether these consequences were a true threat to Mr. Pinkston
and whether their imposition was likely to deprive him of a necessary good or service are
determinations that also involve questions of fact.
¶ 64 Finally, neither party has addressed how, if at all, the voluntary payment doctrine applies
in this context of a potential class action challenge to an allegedly broad practice of issuing tickets
contrary to the provisions of the Municipal Code.
¶ 65 Given these unresolved questions of fact and law, we cannot affirm the circuit court’s
dismissal of Mr. Pinkston’s complaint on the basis that his claims were barred by the voluntary
payment doctrine.
¶ 66 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 67 For the above reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the class action complaint
in this matter and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 68 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 69 JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON, dissenting:
¶ 70 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that plaintiff did not have to exhaust
his administrative remedies prior to filing an action in equity.
¶ 71 A motion for involuntary dismissal under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code admits the legal
sufficiency of the complaint, accepts all well-pleaded facts, and asserts an affirmative matter
outside of the complaint that bars or defeats the cause of action. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West
2018); Gajda v. Steel Solutions Firm, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 142219, ¶ 29. The defendant has the
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No. 1-20-0957
initial burden of establishing that there is an affirmative matter that defeats the claim. Gajda, 2015
IL App (1st) 142219, ¶ 29. If the defendant successfully asserts an affirmative matter, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defense is unfounded or requires the resolution of a
material fact. Id. If the plaintiff fails to meet the shifted burden, the motion may be granted and
the complaint dismissed. Id. An affirmative matter for a 2-619(a)(9) motion cannot merely refute
well-pleaded facts- it must assert a completely new matter not present in the complaint. Id. ¶ 30.
We review the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) de novo. Smith v.
Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111, 115 (2008).
¶ 72 In the circuit court, the City argued that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because
it was an improper collateral attack on an administrative decision and that the court therefore did
not have jurisdiction as plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In response, plaintiff
argued that no administrative proceeding was necessary, and the exhaustion of remedies doctrine
did not apply because the ticket was void. The circuit court found, and the majority agrees, that
the parking ticket issued to plaintiff was not void but voidable, that the City had jurisdiction to
issue the ticket, that whether or not plaintiff’s administrative challenge to the ticket was futile did
not justify skipping the administrative process, and further that the administrative process could
be avoided because no agency expertise was involved. The circuit court concluded that none of
the exceptions to the exhaustion remedy applied and that plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. My colleagues have concluded differently, on the basis that DOAH could
not have provided plaintiff with the “ultimate relief” sought.
¶ 73 Parties aggrieved by the action of administrative agency ordinarily cannot seek review in
the courts without first pursuing all administrative remedies available to them. Castaneda v.
Illinois Human Rights Commission, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308 (1989). Requiring the exhaustion of
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remedies allows the administrative agency to fully develop and consider the facts of the cause
before it; it allows the agency to utilize its expertise; and it allows the aggrieved party to ultimately
succeed before the agency, making judicial review unnecessary. Id. Our supreme court has
recognized several exceptions to this rule: an aggrieved party may seek judicial review of an
administrative decision without complying with the exhaustion of remedies doctrine where (1) a
statute, ordinance or rule is attacked as unconstitutional on its face; (2) multiple administrative
remedies exist and at least one is exhausted; (3) the agency cannot provide an adequate remedy or
it is patently futile to seek relief before the agency; (4) no issues of fact are presented or agency
expertise is not involved; (5) irreparable harm will result from further pursuit of administrative
remedies; or (6) the agency’s jurisdiction is attacked because it is not authorized by statute. Id. at
309.
¶ 74 Under the Chicago Municipal Code, if a ticket recipient challenges a parking ticket, an
administrative hearing officer will consider the evidence, make factual findings, apply the law to
those findings, and determine whether the ticket recipient is liable for violating the ordinance. See
Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 305 Ill. App. 3d 972, 974-75; 978 (1999). The ordinance
specifically provides that all findings of liability made by the hearing officers are reviewable by
the circuit court under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2018)).
Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-070(d), 090(a) (amended Oct. 28, 2015).
¶ 75 A review of plaintiff’s complaint reveals the following prayers for relief: (1) a declaration
that “all such improperly issued Central Business District Tickets are invalid,” void and
unenforceable, and (2) “recovery of the amounts they paid to the City in connection with these
invalid Central Business District Tickets;” and (3) “injunctive relief that would prevent the City
from improperly issuing Central Business District Tickets to vehicles parked outside of the City’s
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No. 1-20-0957
Central Business District.”
¶ 76 The majority properly disposed of plaintiff’s first requested relief – a declaration that all
such improperly issued Central Business District Tickets are invalid, void, and unenforceable by
finding that such tickets are voidable, and that the City has the authority to issue such tickets.
Regarding plaintiff’s second prayer for relief, recovery of the amounts paid to the City in
connection with the parking ticket, I find that such relief is governed by an administrative challenge
to the ticket, which plaintiff failed to do. Before determining whether plaintiff or other members
of the proposed class are entitled to a refund, however, there must be a factual determination as to
whether plaintiff’s ticket was issued outside of the Central Business District, which is the province
of the DOAH. See O’Brien v. Musfeldt, 345 Ill. App. 12, 22 (1951); Wuebbles v. Shea, 294 Ill.
App. 157, 162 (1938). This same determination is applicable to plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive
relief to keep the City from improperly issuing such tickets; there must first be a finding that the
tickets are improper.
¶ 77 To the extent that plaintiff seeks review of the propriety of the ticketing and assessment of
related fines and fees, the circuit court has no jurisdiction to review those matters as a result of
plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and those claims were properly dismissed
under section 2-619(a). It is well established that where administrative remedies are available to a
litigant, the litigant must exhaust them before seeking review by the trial court. 735 ILCS 5/3-102
(West 2016); Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 531-32 (2004). As noted above, the City provides
for administrative adjudication of disputed parking tickets. Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff
did not seek administrative review of the propriety of his parking ticket or the resulting fine or fee
on the bases raised in his complaint or on this appeal. The circuit court has no statutory authority
to entertain independent causes of action regarding the agency’s actions. Arvia, 209 Ill. 2d at 532.
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Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies leaves the circuit court without authority
to address plaintiff’s claims regarding the propriety of the ticketing or imposition of the fee. I
disagree with the majority’s holding that plaintiff meets an exception to the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine, namely that the DOAH could not provide him with the ultimate relief he sought. Such
relief is premised on the factual finding of whether such ticket for illegally parking within the
Central Business District was proper, which is squarely within the authority of the DOAH and not
the circuit court. Additionally, until such factual determination is made, I do not believe that we
can reach the issue of whether the City’s alleged practice is systemic or not. I would therefore
conclude that plaintiff fails to meet any of the exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine
and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
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No. 1-20-0957
Cite as: Pinkston v. City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 200957
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19 CH
12364, the Hon. Caroline K. Moreland, Judge Presiding.
Attorneys Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr. and Matthew C. De Re, of
for Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Celia Meza, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago
for (Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Chief Assistant Corporation
Appellee: Counsel, and Justin A. Houppert, Senior Counsel, of counsel),
for appellee.
28