IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KATHRYN AMOROSO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N20C-10-001 FWW
)
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY, )
OF PHILADELPHIA, LLC, d/b/a )
ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR, a foreign )
Corporation, YALE AVENUE )
ASSOCIATES, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
)
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY )
OF PHILADELPHIA, LLC, )
)
Third-Party Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
YALE AVENUE ASSOCIATES, LLC, )
and JOHN DOE, )
)
Third-Party Defendants. )
)
Submitted: February 2, 2022
Decided: April 13, 2022
Upon Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia LLC’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Against Yale Avenue Associates, LLC,
DENIED.
ORDER
Philip M. Finestrauss, Esquire, PHILIP A. FINESTRAUSS P.A., 1404 N. King
Street, Wilmington, DE 19899; Attorney for Plaintiff Kathryn Amoroso.
R. Stokes Nolte, Esquire, WILKS LAW, 4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 200,
Wilmington, DE 19805; Attorney for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Enterprise
Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC.
Krista E. Shevlin, Esquire, WEBER GALLAGHER SIMPSON STAPLETON
FIRES & NEWBY, LLP, 2 Penns Way, Suite 300, New Castle, DE 19720; Attorney
for Defendant/Third-Party Defendant Yale Avenue Associates, LLC.
WHARTON, J.
2
This 13th day of April 2022, upon consideration of Enterprise Leasing
Company of Philadelphia, LLC’s (“Enterprise”) Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment against Yale Avenue Associates, LLC (“Motion”),1 and Yale Avenue
Associates, LLC’s (“Yale”) Opposition,2 it appears to the Court that:
1. On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff Kathryn Amoroso (“Amoroso”) brought
her original complaint against Enterprise.3 In it she alleged that she was injured
when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice at Enterprise’s Philadelphia Pike
location.4 She claimed Enterprise was negligent in that it: (1) failed to conduct
reasonable safety inspection [sic] to discover dangerous conditions; (2) failed to take
reasonable steps to correct dangerous conditions; (3) failed to warn of dangerous
conditions; and (4) allowed business invitees to walk in dangerous areas.5
2. During an unsuccessful attempt to remove the matter to federal court,
Enterprise brought a third-party complaint against Yale.6 Amoroso then amended
1
Mot. for Part. Summ. J., D.I. 13.
2
Opp. to Mot. for Part. Summ. J., D. I. 16.
3
Compl., D.I. 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Remand Order (attaching U.S. District Court District of Delaware Civil Docket
for Case #: 1:20-cv-01518 MAK (D.I. 8)), D.I. 7.
3
her complaint in district court to add Yale as a defendant.7 Now back in this Court,
Enterprise moves for partial summary judgment on its third-party complaint against
Yale.8 The third-party complaint alleges breach of contract by Yale, as Enterprise’s
landlord, for failing to abide by its lease agreement with Enterprise to obtain liability
insurance listing Enterprise as an additional insured and to defend and indemnify
Enterprise for liability for damages arising from the use or maintenance of the
property.9 The Motion alleges that it is factually undisputed that, pursuant to the
lease Yale maintained exclusive control of the entire parking lot, and the area where
Amoroso fell was not in the area designated for Enterprise’s exclusive use.10 The
Motion further alleges that it is factually undisputed that the insurance policy Yale
obtained for the property did not include Enterprise as an additional insured, nor is
Yale defending Enterprise against Amoroso’s complaint.11 Therefore, according to
Enterprise, it is entitled to partial summary judgment against Yale.
3. Yale opposes the Motion. It argues that the facts as developed through
discovery could lead a jury to conclude that Enterprise could be liable to Amoroso
independent of the language of the lease agreement because it caused standing water
to freeze in the parking lot and voluntarily assumed a duty to remove ice from in
7
Id. (District Court Civil Docket at D.I. 32).
8
Mot. for Part. Summ. J., D.I. 13.
9
Id., at ⁋⁋ 2-4.
10
Id., at ⁋ 7.
11
Id., at ⁋⁋ 8-10.
4
front of the premises.12 Specifically, Yale cites the deposition testimony of Daniel
Amoroso, Amoroso’s son, that an Enterprise employee told him that the ice was
from washing cars the previous night and that he observed the same employee salting
the ice after his mother fell.13 Yale cites Section 10.2 of the of the lease agreement
which it contends only requires it to provide insurance for injuries “arising out of or
related to its activities on or ownership, management maintenance or repair of the
Property.”14 It argues that the Amoroso’s theory of liability – that Enterprise created
the hazard – falls outside that language and make the insurance requirement
inapplicable.15 Similarly, it argues that Section 10.7 of the lease agreement, which
exempts “damage or injury caused by the willful or negligent act or omission of
[Enterprise], its agents or employees” from Yale’s obligation to defend Enterprise
forecloses any such obligation where, as Amoroso alleges here, Enterprise’s own
negligence caused her injury.16
4. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is
appropriate if, when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”17 The moving party
12
Opp. to Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at ⁋ 6-7, D.I. 16.
13
Id., Ex. A, at 13-14.
14
Id., at ⁋ 10.
15
Id., at ⁋⁋ 11-12.
16
Id., at ⁋⁋ 13-14.
17
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d 845,
847 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015), aff'd, 140 A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Moore v.
5
initially bears the burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its
claims or defenses.18 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to show that there are material issues of fact to be resolved by the
ultimate fact-finder.19 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the
Court’s function is to examine the record, including “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,” in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether
genuine issues of material fact exist “but not to decide such issues.”20 Summary
judgment will only be appropriate if the Court finds there is no genuine issue of
material fact. When material facts are in dispute, or “it seems desirable to inquire
more thoroughly into the facts, to clarify the application of the law to the
circumstances,” summary judgment will not be appropriate.”21 However, when the
facts permit a reasonable person to draw but one inference, the question becomes
one for decision as a matter of law.22
5. Here, Amoroso alleges that Enterprise acted negligently. She offers
Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del.1979).
18
Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681.
19
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
20
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del.
1992).
21
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-60, (Del. 1962) (citing Knapp v.
Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957)).
22
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
6
evidence that the ice upon which she slipped was caused by Enterprise washing its
cars the previous night. She also offers evidence that an Enterprise employee
engaged in voluntarily removing ice from the lot by applying salt to it. Additionally,
Amoroso alleges that Enterprise was negligent directly in failing to inspect the
parking lot, warn its customers about the hazard it created, and direct those
customers away from that hazard. Under these facts, the Court finds that a
reasonable jury could find that Enterprise’s negligence was the proximate cause of
Amoroso’s injury. Such a finding of negligence on Enterprise’s part would negate
Yale’s obligation to defend and indemnify Enterprise under Section 10.7 of the lease
agreement. It would also call into question Yale’s obligation to provide liability
insurance for Enterprise under Section 10.2. Thus, the Court finds there are genuine
issues of material fact precluding partial summary judgment in favor of Enterprise
and against Yale on Enterprise’s third-party complaint.
THEREFORE, Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia LLC’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Against Yale Avenue Associates LLC is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
7