IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KATHRYN AMOROSO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. N20C-10-001 FWW
)
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY, )
OF PHILADELPHIA, LLC, d/b/a )
ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR, a foreign )
Corporation, YALE AVENUE )
ASSOCIATES, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
)
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY )
OF PHILADELPHIA, LLC, )
)
Third-Party Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
YALE AVENUE ASSOCIATES, LLC, )
and JOHN DOE, )
)
Third-Party Defendants. )
)
Submitted: February 16, 2022
Decided: April 13, 2022
Upon Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia LLC’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff,
DENIED
ORDER
Philip M. Finestrauss, Esquire, PHILIP A. FINESTRAUSS P.A., 1404 N. King
Street, Wilmington, DE 19899; Attorney for Plaintiff Kathryn Amoroso.
R. Stokes Nolte, Esquire, WILKS LAW, 4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 200,
Wilmington, DE 19805; Attorney for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Enterprise
Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC.
Krista E. Shevlin, Esquire, WEBER GALLAGHER SIMPSON STAPLETON
FIRES 7 NEWBY, LLP, 2 Penns Way, Suite 300, New Castle, DE 19720; Attorney
for Defendant/Third-Party Defendant Yale Avenue Associates, LLC.
WHARTON, J.
2
This 13th day of April 2022, upon consideration of Enterprise Leasing
Company of Philadelphia’s (“Enterprise”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against Plaintiff (“Motion”)1 and Plaintiff’s Opposition,2 it appears to the Court that:
1. On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff Kathryn Amoroso (“Amoroso”) brought
her original complaint against Enterprise.3 In it she alleged that she was injured
when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice at Enterprise’s Philadelphia Pike
location.4 She claimed Enterprise was negligent in that it: (1) failed to conduct
reasonable safety inspection [sic] to discover dangerous conditions; (2) failed to take
reasonable steps to correct dangerous conditions; (3) failed to warn of dangerous
conditions; and (4) allowed business invitees to walk in dangerous areas.5
2. During an unsuccessful attempt to remove the matter to federal court,
Enterprise brought a third-party complaint against its landlord, Yale Avenue
Associates, LLC (“Yale”).6 Amoroso then amended her complaint in district court
to add Yale as a defendant.7 Now back in this Court, Enterprise moves for partial
summary judgment against Amoroso.8 The Motion argues that there is no factual
1
Mot. for Part. Summ. J., D.I. 12.
2
Opp. to Mot. for Part. Summ. J., D. I. 18.
3
Compl., D.I. 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Remand Order (attaching U.S. District Court District of Delaware Civil Docket
for Case #: 1:20-cv-01518 MAK (D.I. 8)), D.I. 7.
7
Id. (District Court Civil Docket at D.I. 32).
8
Mot. for Part. Summ. J., D.I. 12. Enterprise also has moved for partial summary
3
dispute that Enterprise, as a commercial tenant of Yale, did not have possession or
control of the parking lot generally, or specifically where Amoroso fell, pursuant to
the lease agreement, and therefore, was not responsible for any of the maintenance
failures alleged by Amoroso.9 Enterprise does not dispute that Amoroso may bring
a direct claim against it for the negligence of its employees in causing ice to be
present.10 But, without a showing that Enterprise had possession or control of the
parking lot, she may not maintain a claim that Enterprise breached a duty to maintain
the lot.11
3. Amoroso disagrees with Enterprise’s characterization of her amended
complaint as alleging that Enterprise was negligent in failing to “maintain” the
parking lot.12 Instead, she alleges that Enterprise failed to conduct reasonable
inspections and to cure or warn customers of dangerous conditions.13 She also
disputes that Enterprise can contractually escape its duty to keep its property safe for
its business invitees.14 Moreover, Amoroso points out the impracticality of assigning
judgment against Yale. D.I. 13
9
Id., at ⁋ 2.
10
Id., at ⁋ 8.
11
Id.
12
Opp. to Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at ⁋ 2, D.I. 18.
13
Id., at ⁋ 8.
14
Id., at ⁋⁋ 3, 7.
4
liability to an absentee landlord for negligently maintaining the parking lot where
that landlord had no notice of the hazardous condition Enterprise had created.15
4. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is
appropriate if, when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”16 The moving party
initially bears the burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support its
claims or defenses.17 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to show that there are material issues of fact to be resolved by the
ultimate fact-finder.18 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the
Court’s function is to examine the record, including “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,” in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether
genuine issues of material fact exist “but not to decide such issues.”19 Summary
judgment will only be appropriate if the Court finds there is no genuine issue of
material fact. When material facts are in dispute, or “it seems desirable to inquire
15
Id., at ⁋⁋ 4, 7.
16
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Buckley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 A.3d 845,
847 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015), aff'd, 140 A.3d 431 (Del. 2016) (quoting Moore v.
Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del.1979).
17
Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681.
18
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
19
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del.
1992).
5
more thoroughly into the facts, to clarify the application of the law to the
circumstances,” summary judgment will not be appropriate.”20 However, when the
facts permit a reasonable person to draw but one inference, the question becomes
one for decision as a matter of law.21
5. No doubt the language of the amended complaint could have been
worded better to allege more directly that Enterprise was negligent in creating the
hazard. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Amoroso has alleged that Enterprise was
negligent directly in failing to inspect the parking lot, warn its customers about a
hazard it created, and direct those customers away from that hazard. Those
allegations of negligence are separate and apart from any duty to “maintain” the lot
the possessor of the lot may have had. On those issues of direct negligence, the
Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact requiring resolution by a
jury.
THEREFORE, Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Plaintiff is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.
20
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-60, (Del. 1962) (citing Knapp v.
Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957)).
21
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238, 239 (Del. 1967).
6