IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF No. 84453
ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, BAR NO.
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APR 2 9 2022
ORDER OF REFERRAL TO DISCIPLINARY BOARD
This is a petition filed by bar counsel under SCR 111(4) to
inform this court that Nevada-licensed attorney Zachary B. Coughlin has
been convicted of multiple felony offenses in California. The petition
includes certified copies of documents proving the convictions. The crimes
set forth in those documents qualify as "serious crime[s]" under SCR 111(6)
because they are felonies under California law.
When an attorney has been convicted of a "serious crime," we
generally are required to do two things under SCR 111. First, we must
enter an order suspending the attorney.. . . pending final disposition of a
disciplinary proceeding." SCR 111(7). Second, we must "refer the matter
to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a hearing before
a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
of the discipline to be imposed." SCR 111(8). But when the "attorney
convicted of a crime is at that time prohibited from practicing due to
a . . . transfer to disability inactive status under Rule 117," SCR 111(11)
provides that we may "enter an appropriate order directing how the
conviction shall be addressed."
71- 131412
This court transferred Coughlin to disability inactive status in
2015 after determining that he was incapable of continuing the practice of
law. In re Coughlin, Docket No. 60975 (Order Transferring Attorney to
Disability Inactive Status, June 18, 2015); see also SCR 117(2) ("If, upon
due consideration, the court concludes that the attorney is incapacitated for
the purpose of practicing law, it shall enter an order transferring him or her
to disability inactive status."). Because that status means that Coughlin
cannot engage in the practice of law in Nevada unless and until he is
reinstated to active status, see SCR 117(4), we conclude that a temporary
suspension under SCR 111 serves no purpose. But, we conclude that
referral to a disciplinary board is warranted, particularly because the
conduct underlying the convictions at issue was not the subject of any
grievance filed against Coughlin before he was transferred to disability
inactive status and does not appear to be relevant to the disability that led
to his change in status under SCR 117. Although SCR 117(2) provides that
when an attorney has been transferred to disability inactive status la]ny
pending disciplinary proceeding or investigation against the attorney shall
be suspended," the provision is not as clear about disciplinary proceedings
that arise after the attorney is transferred to disability inactive status and
that are unrelated to the circumstances surrounding that change in status.
And, as noted above, SCR 111(11) provides that we may "enter an
'This court has denied three petitions for reinstatement filed by
Coughlin since his transfer to disability inactive status. In re Reinstatement
of Coughlin, No. 77764, 2019 WL 5260071 (Nev. Sept. 20, 2019) (Order
Denying Reinstatement); In re Reinstatement of Coughlin, No. 74438, 2019
WL 295641 (Nev. May 25, 2018) (Order Denying Reinstatement); In re
Reinstaternent of Coughlin, No. 69723, 2016 WL 6662276 (Nev. Nov. 10,
2016) (Order Denying Reinstatement).
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appropriate ordee when considering a petition under that rule involving an
attorney who has been transferred to disability inactive status. Given these
circumstances, we conclude that a hearing may proceed to address the
extent of any discipline to be imposed based on the convictions set forth in
this petition.2
It is so ORDERED.3
Parraguirre
, J.
Cadish
cc: Chair, Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board
Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada
Zachary Barker Coughlin
2 We note in this respect that Coughlin's transfer to disability inactive
status was not based on a judicial declaration of incompetency or
commitment under SCR 117(1) or a determination under SCR 117(3) that
he lacked competency to defend against a disciplinary proceeding.
3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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