IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1290
Filed May 11, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF Z.R.,
Minor Child,
K.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Clinton R.
Boddicker, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.
AFFIRMED.
Edward G. Harvey, Fairfield, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Kendra Abfalter of State Public Defender’s Office, Burlington, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.
2
BADDING, Judge.
A mother who is in the depths of an addiction to methamphetamine appeals
the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in 2018, under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(h) (2021).1 We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This twenty-seven-year-old mother has a long history of trauma and
substance abuse. She began using marijuana at age thirteen, and then
methamphetamine at age nineteen. The Iowa Department of Human Services
became involved with the family in May 2020 when it was reported that the mother
and her boyfriend were using drugs and alcohol while caring for the child. The
mother and child were living in a hotel with the boyfriend, who also has issues with
drugs and alcohol. The mother was found passed out in bed with the child present.
She later tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and THC. The
child tested positive for the latter two substances. The State sought and obtained
an order for temporary removal, which was confirmed following a formal removal
hearing. The child was adjudicated in need of assistance under Iowa Code
section 232.2(6)(b), (n), (o), and (p) (2020).
In June, the mother obtained housing for a short time and underwent a
substance-abuse evaluation. Although the evaluation recommended extended
outpatient treatment, the mother decided to enter inpatient treatment in August.
While there, she had the child in her care every other week. She graduated from
the program in mid-October and went to live with her boyfriend’s mother. But by
1 The child’s father is deceased.
3
the end of October—and just before a visit with her child—the mother relapsed on
alcohol. The visit was canceled, and the mother refused to comply with a sweat
patch test. Her boyfriend’s mother kicked her out of the house a few days later. A
caseworker from the department encouraged her to go to a sober living house; the
mother instead moved in with her grandfather, who also used methamphetamine.
At the end of November, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine
and stopped attending substance-abuse treatment. Around the same time, the
mother became pregnant with a second child. She completed a negative urinalysis
in early January 2021, but the testing lab reported signs that her sample was
tampered with. The same day as the tampered drug screen, the mother refused
a hair-stat test. In late January, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine
through her substance-abuse provider. The mother admitted to her counselor that
she had been using the substance with her boyfriend. As a result, the counselor
recommended that the mother return to inpatient treatment. In late January, the
State initiated termination proceedings.
The mother’s life became even more chaotic in February when she was
pulled over in Illinois for a traffic violation and charged with possession of
methamphetamine. In March, Illinois probation and parole personnel reported that
the mother arrived to a pretrial appointment under the influence of alcohol and
methamphetamine. The mother submitted to a drug test, which was positive for
methamphetamine. She was arrested and held in jail in Illinois for several weeks.
To avoid more jail time, the mother agreed to go to inpatient treatment again. But
she arrived at treatment several hours late and under the influence of alcohol. The
mother completed the program toward the end of April. She was again
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encouraged to go to a sober living house upon leaving treatment. Instead, she
decided to stay with her boyfriend and live out of their car and hotels.
The first day of the permanency and termination hearing started about a
week after the mother was released from her second inpatient program. At the
hearing, the mother touted her recent completion of treatment, attendance at group
substance-abuse meetings, and negative drug screens through her prenatal
appointments. Yet she testified that she intended to continue what providers called
her “co-dependent” relationship with her boyfriend—one where if he used drugs,
she did too. She was hopeful his mother would buy them a house to live in and
asked for permanency to be deferred for six months so that she could secure this
house. By the second day of the hearing in May, the mother had come up with a
new plan to secure housing through the Salvation Army in Illinois, which had
helped them find a hotel room to live in temporarily. She agreed that living situation
was not suitable for the child. But other than remedying her lack of appropriate
housing, the mother did not believe she needed to accomplish anything else in
order to have the child returned to her care.
Ultimately, the juvenile court found the child could not be returned to the
mother’s care because of her “lack of safe and stable housing, her serious, long-
standing and ongoing addiction to methamphetamine and alcohol, and her
turbulent and violent relationship with” her boyfriend. The court accordingly
terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 223.116(1)(h)
(2021). The mother appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the ground for termination. She also argues termination is contrary to
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the child’s best interests, highlights the strength of the parent-child bond, and
requests more time to work toward reunification.2
II. Analysis
We apply a three-step analysis in conducting our de novo review of
terminations of parental rights, asking whether (1) a statutory ground for
termination is satisfied, (2) the child’s best interests are served by termination, and
(3) a statutory exception applies and should be exercised to preclude termination.
See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022) (noting that in conducting our de
novo review, we “give weight to the [court’s] factual findings but are not bound by
them”); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(1)–(3). If all three steps support
termination, we consider the ancillary issue of whether a parent should be granted
additional time. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b).
A. Ground for Termination
As to the statutory ground for termination, the mother only appears to
challenge the State’s establishment of the final element—that the child could not
2 The mother also passively suggests she was not provided reasonable efforts at
reunification, but she does not offer an opinion on what additional services should
have been provided. In any event, our review of the record discloses this complaint
is being raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, error was not preserved. See In
re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).
In the same vein, the mother states her general disagreement with a
number of the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. We confine
our consideration to the claims for which she provides a minimally sufficient
argument to facilitate our review. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The petition
on appeal shall substantially comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401.”); 6.1401–Form 5
(“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district court made with
which you disagree and why. . . . General conclusions, such as ‘the trial court’s
ruling is not supported by law or the facts’ are not acceptable.”); see also In re
C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all encompassing argument is
insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo review.”).
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be returned to her care at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(h)(4) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot
be returned to the custody of the child’s parents . . . at the present time”); In re
D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting the statutory language “at
the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). On this point,
the mother argues there was “no evidence that the child was ever harmed in [her]
care” and the “State failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the child
. . . would suffer imminent harm or be in danger if placed with [her].” She also
points out she “has been engaged in substance abuse treatment,” while
acknowledging her addiction will be an ongoing issue.
To establish the challenged element, the State was only required to prove
that the child could not safely be returned to the mother’s care at the time of the
termination hearing. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). At the
second day of the termination hearing, the mother agreed the child could not yet
be returned to her care due to her housing instability. The mother’s concession
“amounts to clear and convincing evidence that the child[] could not be returned to
her care at the time of the termination hearing.” In re A.A., No. 21-1972, 2022 WL
946503, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022). Concession aside, the remaining
record supports the court’s conclusion. The mother has a long history of substance
abuse, including methamphetamine. While she has participated in treatment
during these proceedings, she has continued to relapse and test positive for the
substance. Outside of her time in residential treatment, the mother had no
significant periods of sobriety during this case, even after she learned she was
pregnant with her second child. The mother’s continued use presents an ongoing
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risk of adjudicatory harm and amounts to clear and convincing evidence that the
child cannot be returned to her care at present. See In re K.S., No. 21-1755, 2022
WL 951034, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (collecting cases). We agree the
State met its burden for termination under section 232.116(1)(h).3
B. Best Interests
To the extent that the mother argues termination is contrary to the child’s
best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the
physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). The defining elements of a child’s best interests are safety and need
for a permanent home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).
This child has been removed from parental care for roughly a year. During
that time, the mother has continued to use methamphetamine despite two stints at
inpatient treatment. Rather than moving to a sober living house, she chose to
remain homeless with her boyfriend. She has been unemployed since 2017 with
no concrete plans for that to change in the future. Though she consistently
participated in visits, she never progressed beyond fully supervised visitation. And
even then, providers were concerned about her ability to care for the child for more
than two hours at a time. She has been unable to provide stability and permanency
for herself, let alone her child. Though the child has been in his current pre-
3 In her petition on appeal, the mother refers to evidence that she has “given birth
to another child who remains in her care and custody,” which she contends
“contravene[s] any assertion that the child in interest in this action could not be
returned to [her] care.” This evidence is not in the record before us because at the
time of the termination hearing, the mother was still pregnant with her second child.
We will not speculate about what has occurred since.
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adoptive foster home for a short time, he has a good relationship with his foster
parents; he is integrated into the home; and the placement has continued to foster
his growth, condition, and needs. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). We agree with
the district court that termination is in the child’s best interests.
C. Statutory Exception
Throughout her petition on appeal, the mother often highlights the bond
between herself and the child. We interpret this as a request for application of the
statutory exception to termination in Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c), which
grants the juvenile court discretion to forgo termination when “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the
time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.”
We first note the application of a statutory exception to termination, if an
exception exists, is “permissive, not mandatory.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225
(Iowa 2016) (quoting A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113). While we acknowledge a bond
between the mother and child, we conclude she failed to show “that the termination
would be detrimental to the child . . . due to the closeness of the parent-child
relationship,” especially given the child’s young age. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c); see also In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018) (“[T]he
parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an exception to
termination . . . .”). The mother presented no evidence the child would suffer
physical, mental, or emotional detriment if her rights were terminated. As a result,
we conclude this exception to termination does not apply.
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D. Additional Time
The mother’s primary argument appears to be her request for a deferral of
permanency to allow her to continue to work toward reunification. See Iowa Code
§§ 232.117(5) (stating that if the juvenile court does not terminate parental rights,
it may enter an order under section 232.104(2)(b)), .104(2)(b) (allowing the juvenile
court to continue placement of a child for an additional six months). A six-month
extension is appropriate if the parent can establish that “the need for removal . . .
will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Id. §
232.104(2)(b); accord In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021).
The only change the mother testified would occur if given more time was
rectification of her housing instability. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (requiring
enumeration of “the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes”
showing the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the period). But
she has been unable to accomplish continuous housing stability despite a year of
services and treatment. And the mother’s housing instability is not the only
circumstance needing rectification before removal could cease. Given the
mother’s track record, we cannot agree that giving her more time would lead to a
different result. See In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]
good prediction of the future conduct of a parent is to look at the past conduct.”).
We conclude additional time is not warranted in this case.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.