UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JORDAN JAY GLOGAU,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-470 (JEB)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this suit seeking to have the Court throw out the 2016 Presidential election, pro se
Plaintiff Jordan Glogau minces no words. His introductory sentence sets the tone: “Never in the
history of the United States has one person come so close to destroying this nation and its
institutions.” ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at ECF p. 2. He asks in his Prayer for Relief for the Court to
“[a]nnul the 2016 Presidential Election. Void all laws, appointments, treaties, regulations,
executive orders of the Trump Administration. Everything done during the Trump
administration was fraudulent, simply clear the deck.” Id. at ECF p. 6. While this suit against
the United States does not lack for ambition, its author does lack standing. The Court,
accordingly, must grant the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. Legal Standard
Defendant here contends that the Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction, thus
warranting dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). To survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear his claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
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(1992); U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A court
has an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional
authority.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13
(D.D.C. 2001). For this reason, “‘the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will
bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim.” Id. at 13-14 (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed.
Practice & Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987)) (alteration in original).
II. Analysis
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the resolution of
“Cases” and “Controversies.” Because “standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, finding that a plaintiff has
standing is a necessary “predicate to any exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction.” Florida
Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (discussing case-or-controversy requirement).
The doctrine of standing “requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that ‘the plaintiff
has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant [his] invocation
of federal-court jurisdiction.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975)). “To establish Article III standing, an injury
must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398,
409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
While Plaintiff’s pleadings — which include the Complaint, his “Supplemental
Memorandum,” and both Oppositions to the Motion to Dismiss, see ECF Nos. 1, 4, 8, 10 — fail
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to establish standing for multiple reasons, the Court need only mention one: they allege no
injury. To demonstrate his standing here, Glogau must contend that he suffered a distinct harm
that can be traced to Donald Trump’s win in the 2016 election. See Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
That he simply has not done. While he may contend that the country has been grievously
damaged, he never alleges how he himself was injured. Indeed, he appears to acknowledge as
much when he says, “It is hoped that the court will permit other individuals and organizations to
join this suit, in the spirit of a class action suit, for the purpose of providing lawful standing.”
Compl. at ECF p. 2. Even if he had alleged some injury, he would not satisfy the redressability
prong of standing because this Court would be powerless to order the type of relief he seeks.
III. Conclusion
Because Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a cognizable injury, the Court will issue a
contemporaneous Order dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: May 20, 2022
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