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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
27-MAY-2022
08:03 AM
Dkt. 67 MO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMISON T. CROWE, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
WAILUKU DIVISION
(CASE NO. 2DTC-19-691397)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Jamison Crowe (Crowe) appeals from
a Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment (Judgment) filed in
the District Court of the Second Circuit (District Court)1 on
November 13, 2019, in which he was convicted of violating Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-62(a).2 The Judgment was entered
pursuant to a no contest plea in which Crowe reserved the right
to appeal the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence.
On appeal, Crowe contends the District Court erred when
it denied his suppression motion and concluded that:
1
The Honorable Kirstin M. Hamman presided.
2
§ 291E-62(a) (2020) provides, in part: "No person whose license and
privilege to operate a vehicle have been revoked, suspended, or otherwise
restricted pursuant to . . . section 291E-61 . . . shall operate or assume
actual physical control of any vehicle[.]"
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(1) § 13-102-06(i) of the County of Maui Police
Department's Rules of Practice and Procedure Relating to
Intoxicant Control Roadblock Program (Document Check Rule)3
(effective 2004) complies with HRS §§ 291E-19 (2020)4 and 291E-20
(2020)5 (Authorizing Statutes); and
3
Rules of Practice and Procedure Relating to Intoxicant Control
Roadblock Program § 13-102-06(i) provides: "The police officer shall conduct a
document check by requesting or demanding that the operator of the vehicle
produce a valid driver's license, and a current motor vehicle or liability
insurance identification card as required by sections 286-116 and 431:10C-107,
HRS."
4
HRS § 291E-19 (2020) provides in pertinent part:
The police departments of the respective counties may
establish and implement intoxicant control roadblock
programs in accordance with the minimum standards and
guidelines provided in section 291E-20. The chief of
police in any county establishing an intoxicant
control roadblock program pursuant to this section
shall specify the procedures to be followed in
carrying out the program in rules adopted under
chapter 91; provided that the procedures shall be in
conformity with and not more intrusive than the
standards and guidelines described in section 291E-20.
5
HRS § 291E-20 (2020) provides:
(a) Every intoxicant control roadblock program shall:
(1) Require that all vehicles approaching roadblocks
be stopped or that certain vehicles be stopped by
selecting vehicles in a specified numerical sequence
or pattern;
(2) Require that roadblocks be located at fixed
locations for a maximum three-hour period;
(3) Provide for the following minimum safety
precautions at every roadblock:
(A) Proper illumination;
(B) Off-road or otherwise safe and secure
holding areas for vehicles involved in any
roadblock stop;
(c)) Uniformed law enforcement officers
carrying proper identification;
(D) Adequate advance warning of the fact
and purpose of the roadblocks, either by
sign posts, flares, or other alternative
methods;
(E) Termination of roadblocks at the
discretion of the law enforcement officer
in charge where traffic congestion would
otherwise result; and
(4) Provide for a sufficient quantity and visibility
of uniformed officers and official vehicles to ensure
speedy compliance with the purpose of the roadblocks
and to move traffic with a minimum of inconvenience.
(continued...)
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(2) a police officer's demand for Crowe's driver's
license was within the constitutional scope of an intoxication
roadblock.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the District
Court's denial of Crowe's suppression motion, and thus, also
affirm the Judgment.
I. Background
On March 8, 2019, Maui Police Department (MPD) Officer
James Burkett (Officer Burkett) stopped Crowe at an intoxication
roadblock. Officer Burkett asked Crowe for his license and
insurance information. Crowe responded that he did not have a
license. Officer Burkett asked Crowe why he did not have one,
and Crowe responded that it was possibly suspended. Officer
Burkett checked Crowe's driver's license status, and determined
it was suspended for operating a vehicle under the influence of
an intoxicant (OVUII). Officer Burkett cited Crowe for violating
HRS § 291E-62(a).
On March 19, 2019, Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai#i
(State) filed an Amended Complaint charging Crowe with: Count I,
Operating a Vehicle after License and Privilege Have Been
Suspended or Revoked for OVUII, in violation of HRS § 291E-62;
Count II, Driving While License Suspended or Revoked in violation
of HRS § 286-132; and Count III, Driving Without a License in
violation of HRS § 286-102.
Crowe filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence related
to Officer Burkett's request for Crowe's license, arguing that
the request violated Crowe's rights under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution6 and article I, section 7 of the
5
(...continued)
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the establishment of
procedures to make roadblock programs less intrusive than required
by the minimum standards provided in this section.
6
U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
(continued...)
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Hawai#i Constitution.7 Specifically, Crowe argued that MPD's
Document Check Rule violated the Authorizing Statutes and Crowe's
constitutional protections. The District Court denied the Motion
to Suppress, entering its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Order Denying
Motion to Suppress).
Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, Crowe
pleaded no contest to Count I, maintained his right to appeal the
Order Denying Motion to Suppress, and the State dismissed Counts
II and III with prejudice. The District Court entered Judgment
on November 13, 2019.
II. Discussion
A. The Document Check Rule does not invalidate MPD's
roadblock intoxication program
A lower court's ruling on a motion to suppress is
reviewed on appeal de novo to determine whether the ruling was
right or wrong. State v. Rodgers, 99 Hawai#i 70, 72, 53 P.3d
209, 211 (2002).
The District Court's Order Denying Motion to Suppress
made the following relevant findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On March 8, 2019, officers of the Maui
Police Department ("MPD") conducted an intoxication
control roadblock near the intersection of Piilani
Highway and Kulanihakoi Street.
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(...continued)
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
7
Article I, section 7 of the Hawai#i Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures and invasions of privacy shall not
be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized or the
communications sought to be intercepted.
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2. At 9:10 p.m., Defendant was stopped at the
intoxication control roadblock without an arrest or
search warrant.
3. Officer James Burkett made contact with
Defendant.
4. Officer Burkett did not observe any
irregularities in Defendant's driving when Defendant
stopped his vehicle at the intoxication control
roadblock.
5. Upon contact with Defendant, Officer
Burkett did not observe any physical signs indicating
the Defendant was under the influence of an
intoxicant. Defendant did not exhibit red, watery
eyes, flushed, oily facial features, slurred speech,
and Officer Burkett did not detect the odor of liquor.
6. After explaining the purpose of the stop
and observing Defendant, Officer Burkett demanded that
Defendant provide his license and proof of insurance.
7. Sergeant Greg Rowe was the assigned
supervisor for the intoxication control roadblock
conducted on March 8, 2019.
8. Sergeant Rowe testified that officers at
the intoxication control roadblock are required to
demand license and insurance information from motorist
stopped at the intoxication control roadblock.
9. Such a demand is made pursuant to the
Rules and Practice and Procedure Relating to
Intoxicant Control Roadblock Program ("Intoxication
Roadblock Rules"), specifically § 13-102-06(i)
("Document Check Rule") and is based on the
requirement in HRS §286-116 to ask for a driver
license and proof of insurance.
10. When Defendant could not provide proof of
a valid license, Officer Burkett ordered Defendant to
proceed to the intoxication control roadblock holding
area.
11. In the holding area, Officer Burkett
issued Defendant a citation related to his inability
to provide a valid license.
12. Officer Burkett issued this citation at
9:19 p.m., nine minutes after Defendant's initial
seizure.
. . . .
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
. . . .
10. The roadblock in this case was
constitutionally valid under [Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)] balancing test
because it complied with the minimum standards for
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roadblock procedures established in HRS 291E-20 and
Maui's less intrusive roadblock rules established
pursuant to HRS 291E-19 and Chapter 91.
. . . .
15. In State v. Aguinaldo, 71 Hawai#i 57, 782
P.2d 1225 (1989), the Defendant challenged her
detention at a roadblock and demand for her driver's
license and insurance card as a warrantless search.
The Defendant in Aguinaldo argued that the statutes
authorizing the police to establish intoxication
roadblocks did not expressly authorize police officers
to enforce other traffic laws at the time of the
roadblock stop.
16. The Aguinaldo court noted that while the
statutes authorizing intoxication roadblocks "do not
expressly authorize enforcement of other traffic laws,
they also do not prohibit it." Id. 71 Hawai#i at 58,
782 P.2d at 1226.
17. The Aguinaldo court reasoned that because
Hawaii Revised Statutes §286-116 requires police
officers when stopping a vehicle for any reason to
demand that the driver or owner display the driver's
or owners driver's license and insurance
identification card, officers are "statutorily
authorized to enforce the laws requiring drivers to
have with them a valid driver's license and a no-fault
insurance card by demanding that the same be produced
when a stop is validly made." Id. 71 Hawai#i at 61,
782 P.2d at 1228.
18. The Aguinaldo court also ruled, "Hawai#i
law requires possession of no-fault insurance
identification card in addition to a driver's license
for the operation of a motor vehicle. We, therefore,
hold that the police has the power and authority to
demand from the driver of a vehicle the production of
both whenever the vehicle is validly stopped." Id. at
71 Hawai#i at 64, 782 P.2d at 1229.
19. The Defendant argues that when Aguinaldo
was decided, HRS §291E-19 was codified as HRS
§286-162.5, and HRS §291-20 was codified as §286-162.6
and, therefore, is inapplicable to this case.
According to Defendant, the Aguinaldo court "did not
consider the issue in this case-whether the adoption
of a rule requiring a document check is permissible
under the Authorization Statutes express prohibition
on more intrusive intoxication roadblock measures."
Def. Mot. To Supp. at page 11. However, the express
prohibition on more intrusive intoxication roadblock
measures is the same express prohibition that was
contained in HRS §286-162.5 when Aguinaldo was
decided. Although the Aguinaldo court was analyzing
HRS §286-116 and not a rule promulgated by the police
department, the Document Check Rule is based on HRS
§286-116. Aguinaldo is applicable to this case.
. . . .
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22. In this case, Defendant was validly
stopped at an intoxication roadblock. It is required
under HRS §286-116 for officers to ask for a driver's
license and insurance card when conducting a vehicle
stop. HRS §286-116 serves as the basis for the
Document Check Rule promulgated by the police
department. Officer Burkett issued the Defendant a
citation nine minutes after the initial seizure.
Detaining the Defendant while writing the citation did
not expand the scope of the initial stop as it did in
[State v. Iona, 144 Hawai#i 412, 443 P.3d 104 (2019)].
Requesting the Defendant's driver's license and
insurance card is reasonably related to the initial
stop unlike the warrant check in Iona.
. . . .
25. The initial stop was valid and the request
for Defendant's license and insurance card was
reasonably related in scope to the initial stop.
The focus in this case is Officer Burkett's request to
Crowe to produce his driver's license during the intoxication
roadblock stop. In our view, the Hawai#i Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. 57, 782 P.2d 1225 (1989)
is dispositive. The facts in Aguinaldo were summarized as
follows:
On July 26, 1988, Maui police set up an intoxication
control roadblock at Firebreak Road and Haleakala
Highway. Defendant–Appellee Lynn Aguinaldo was
driving a vehicle which was routinely stopped for a
check. When the police officer had an opportunity to
observe Aguinaldo, it was apparent that she was not
intoxicated. The police officer, as a matter of
routine, then asked Aguinaldo to produce her driver's
license and no-fault insurance card. When Aguinaldo
was unable to do so, the police officer cited her for
failure to produce a current driver's license and
proof of car insurance.
Id. at 58, 782 P.2d at 1226 (emphases added). Aguinaldo moved to
suppress the citation. Id. The trial court granted the motion
on the following grounds:
(1) the highway safety statutes relating to
intoxication control roadblock programs do not
authorize police officers to enforce any other laws
than those relating to driving under the influence of
intoxicating substances (DUI) at an intoxication
roadblock, and (2) the police had no probable cause to
detain and question Aguinaldo once it was determined
that she was not violating any DUI laws.
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Id. at 58-59, 782 P.2d at 1226. The State appealed. Id. at 59,
782 P.2d at 1226. The Hawai#i Supreme Court reversed, reasoning
that:
While the roadblock statutes do not expressly
authorize police to enforce other traffic laws at DUI
roadblock stops, neither do they prohibit it.
A separate section of the highway safety laws, HRS § 286–116
(1985), authorizes "[e]very police officer or law
enforcement officer when stopping a vehicle or inspecting a
vehicle for any reason [to] demand that the driver or owner
display the driver's or owner's driver's license and
insurance identification card." (Emphasis added.)
"Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter,
shall be construed with reference to each other. What is
clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is
doubtful in another." HRS § 1–16 (1985); see also Zator v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 70 Haw. 594, ––––, 752 P.2d
1073, 1075 (1988).
Both the roadblock statutes and HRS § 286–116 pertain to
police powers in ensuring highway safety. HRS § 286–116
authorizes the police to demand the production of a driver's
license and no-fault insurance card whenever the police stop
a vehicle for any reason.
We interpret "for any reason" to mean stopping vehicles for
any valid reason. . . .
When the roadblock statutes are read in conjunction
with § 286–116, it is clear that the police are
statutorily authorized to enforce the laws requiring
drivers to have with them a valid driver's license and
a no-fault insurance card by demanding that the same
be produced when a stop is validly made.
Id. at 60-61, 782 P.2d at 1227-28 (emphasis added) (footnote and
citation omitted).
In Aguinaldo, the defendant stipulated that the stop of
her vehicle pursuant to the intoxication roadblock was
constitutionally valid, thus the supreme court did not address
the propriety of requesting a driver's license pursuant to HRS
§ 286-116 (2020)8 where no such stipulation was made. Id. at 62,
782 P.2d at 1228. However, the Hawai#i Supreme Court did address
8
We note that the pertinent language in HRS § 286-116(a) is identical
to the version applicable in Aguinaldo. See HRS § 286-116(a); Aguinaldo, 71
Haw. at 60 n.2, 782 P.2d at 1227 n.2. HRS § 286-116(a) (2020) provides, in
relevant part: "Every police officer or law enforcement officer when stopping
a vehicle or inspecting a vehicle for any reason shall demand that the driver
or owner display the driver's or owner's driver's license and insurance
identification card." (Emphasis added.)
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an asserted lack of connection between the stop and the license
inquiry, adopting the following rationale from an Oregon case:
Although the officer's request for identification or a
driver's license did not directly relate to the
purpose of the roadblock, it certainly related to the
defendant's status as the driver of the car. We hold
that if an automobile is validly stopped by a law
enforcement officer, the officer may request the
operator's driver's license.
Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. at 63, 782 P.2d at 1228 (quoting State v.
Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 435 (Or. 1980)). Based on the
foregoing rationale, the Hawai#i Supreme Court concluded:
Hawaii law requires possession of [a] no-fault
insurance identification card in addition to a
driver's license for the operation of a motor vehicle.
We, therefore, hold that the police has [sic] the
power and authority to demand from the driver of a
vehicle the production of both whenever the vehicle is
validly stopped. In this case, Aguinaldo stipulated
that the roadblock stop was constitutionally valid,
therefore, the demand for production of her driver's
license and proof of no-fault insurance was also
constitutionally permissible.
Id., 71 Haw. at 63, 782 P.2d at 1229 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
Here, Crowe seeks to distinguish Aguinaldo by asserting
that his stop was not valid because the MPD's intoxication
roadblock program is designed in an invalid manner due to
inclusion of the Document Check Rule. In short, Crowe argues
that, even if Officer Burkett had the authority to demand his
driver's license, the Authorization Statutes were violated by
designing the MPD's intoxication roadblock program to mandate
such action.
We conclude Crowe's argument is unavailing. The
Document Check Rule expressly cites to HRS § 286-116 as authority
for the driver to produce a driver's license. See § 13-102-06(i)
of the County of Maui Police Department's Rules of Practice and
Procedure Relating to Intoxicant Control Roadblock Program. We
decline to rule that the entire MPD intoxication roadblock
program is invalid because the MPD rules also incorporate a
provision that is correct under HRS § 286-116. As the Hawai#i
Supreme Court recognized in Aguinaldo, HRS § 286-116 and the
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Authorizing Statutes are laws in pari materia. 71 Haw. at 60-61,
782 P.2d at 1227. Further, Crowe does not challenge any other
part of the intoxication roadblock program or assert that any
other conduct by police was improper or invalid. Thus, we
conclude the intoxication roadblock was valid and, as in
Aguinaldo, Officer Burkett was authorized under HRS § 286-116 to
demand that Crowe produce his driver's license. Crowe's argument
seeking to distinguish Aguinaldo lacks merit.
We thus reject Crowe's first point of error.
B. The District Court did not err in concluding that the
demand for Crowe's license was within the
constitutional scope of the intoxication roadblock
With regard to Crowe's second point of error, he
appears to challenge the following conclusions in the District
Court's Order Denying Motion to Suppress:
20. Defendant also asserts that Aguinaldo is
inapplicable to this case because Aguinaldo was
decided before State v. Perez, 111 Hawai#i 392, 141
P.3d 1039 (2006), and State v. Iona, 144 Hawai#i 412,
443 P.3d 104 (2019). In Perez, the court held that an
investigative stop must be (1) justified at its
inception and (2) reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place. Perez, 111 Hawai#i at 397, 141 P.3d at
1044. Defendant argues that the Document Check Rule
impermissibly expands the scope of the intoxication
roadblock stop. Def. Mot. To Supp. at page 7.
21. Perez and Iona are distinguishable from
this case. In Iona the defendant was stopped for
riding a bicycle with an expired tax decal. Iona 144
Hawai#i at 414, 443 P.3d at 106. The officers
detained the defendant longer than it would have taken
to write a citation in order to do a warrant check.
Id. When it was discovered the defendant had an
outstanding warrant, a pat-down revealed defendant was
in possession of drugs. Id. The Iona Court held that
because the warrant check came back after the span of
time necessary for the police to obtain Iona's
identifying information from him and to write and
issue the citation, Iona's arrest was illegal.
22. In this case, Defendant was validly
stopped at an intoxication roadblock. It is required
under HRS §286-116 for officers to ask for a driver's
license and insurance card when conducting a vehicle
stop. HRS §286-116 serves as the basis for the
Document Check Rule promulgated by the police
department. Officer Burkett issued the Defendant a
citation nine minutes after the initial seizure.
Detaining the Defendant while writing the citation did
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not expand the scope of the initial stop as it did in
Iona. Requesting the Defendant's driver's license and
insurance card is reasonably related to the initial
stop unlike the warrant check in Iona.
23. In Perez, police arrested the defendant
for shoplifting. During a pat down search of the
defendant, police found a coin purse. Suspecting the
coin purse may have drugs, the police detained Perez
beyond the period necessary to process Perez on the
shoplifting charge in order to get a canine narcotics
screening of the coin purse. The Perez Court held
that the delay to conduct the search of the coin purse
"was not reasonably related either in time or to the
circumstances which might have justified it (i.e., the
shoplifting arrest and a search for evidence of that
offense) in the first place, and it cannot
retroactively be sanitized under the umbrella of the
earlier arrest". Perez 111 Hawai#i at 398, 141 P.3d
at 1045.
24. Unlike Perez, Officer Burkett's request
for the Defendant's license and insurance card
pursuant to the Document Check Rule was reasonably
related in time and to the circumstances which
justified it in the first place (i.e., the
intoxication roadblock stop).
25. The initial stop was valid and the request
for Defendant's license and insurance card was
reasonably related in scope to the initial stop.
Crowe argues the District Court erroneously concluded
that "a demand to produce information for the purpose of
investigating separate, unrelated offenses was reasonably related
to the purpose of the intoxication roadblock seizure and did not
expand the scope of this seizure." In short, Crowe seems to
assert that where the purpose of the intoxication roadblock was
to address impaired driving, it was beyond the constitutional
scope of that purpose to also investigate his license status.
Given the circumstances of this case, we reject Crowe's argument
and conclude the District Court correctly determined that the
demand for Crowe's license was proper and reasonably related in
scope to the intoxication roadblock stop.
In addressing this point, it is important to
distinguish between the analysis underlying the constitutionality
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of a Terry stop9 and an intoxication roadblock stop. A Terry
stop is a "temporary investigative detention of an individual by
the police without a warrant," which is "strictly tied to and
justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." State v. Iona, 144 Hawai#i 412, 416, 443 P.3d 104,
108 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Terry, 392
U.S. at 19).
In contrast, an intoxication roadblock stop is
"justified on the premise that systematic and non-discriminatory
seizures minimally intrude upon an individual's privacy" and
advance the public interest against drunk driving. State v.
Heapy, 113 Hawai#i 283, 300, 151 P.3d 764, 781 (2007). Davis v.
Kansas Dep't of Revenue, 843 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1992), provides a
helpful explanation of this distinction:
Sitz recognized a distinction between a Terry stop and
a systematic roadside checkpoint stop. Such a
checkpoint stop was found to be constitutional and
falls outside the Terry analysis. Sitz rests on a
branch of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in which the
Court employs a balancing test to evaluate the
constitutionality of various police stop situations.
Id. at 262 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Sitz
jurisprudence is applicable here. See Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint program).
Sitz adopted a balancing test set forth in United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) and Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), to determine the constitutionality of
an intoxication roadblock. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450. The test
involves a "weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served
by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty." Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.
Here, except for the arguments based on the Document
Check Rule, which we rejected above, Crowe does not assert that
9
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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the intoxication roadblock was invalid. Therefore, under the
circumstances of this case, and given our determination that the
intoxication roadblock was valid, Officer Burkett's request for
Crowe's license was constitutionally permissible. See Aguinaldo,
71 Haw. at 63, 782 P.2d at 1229 (holding that the "roadblock stop
was constitutionally valid, therefore, the demand for production
of her driver's license and proof of no-fault insurance was also
constitutionally permissible.").
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment and
Notice of Entry of Judgment filed in the District Court of the
Second Circuit on November 13, 2019, is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, May 27, 2022.
On the briefs: /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Chief Judge
Bradley J. Sova,
Office of the Public Defender, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Defendant-Appellant Associate Judge
Gerald K. Enriques, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee
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