NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 8 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDGARDO ESCOBAR, AKA Edgardo A. No. 19-70778
Hernandez, AKA Edgardo A. Serdenec,
Agency No. A094-300-023
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 1, 2022**
Before: FRIEDLAND, SANCHEZ, and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Edgardo Escobar, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the legal
question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the extent
that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and
regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We
review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Id. at 1241.
The agency did not err in concluding that Escobar did not establish
membership in a cognizable particular social group consisting of individuals
returning from the United States who are perceived as being wealthy. See Reyes v.
Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership
in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is
(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic,
(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in
question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Escobar
otherwise failed to establish that he would be persecuted on account of a protected
ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An
[applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or
random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).
In light of its finding that Escobar failed to demonstrate any nexus to a
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protected ground, the agency did not err in evaluating Escobar’s application under
the different standards applicable to asylum and withholding of removal claims.
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017). The BIA likewise
did not err in electing not to reach whether changed circumstances in Honduras
excused Escobar’s untimely application for asylum. Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371
F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not
required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the
results they reach.” (quoting INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976))). Thus,
Escobar’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection
because Escobar failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or
with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Honduras. See
Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
The stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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