United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-3072.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CRIMINAL SHERIFF, The PARISH OF ORLEANS, and Criminal Sheriff's
Office, Parish of Orleans, Defendants-Appellants.
April 25, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE,* District
Judge.
LITTLE, District Judge:
By consent of the parties litigant, a magistrate adjudicated
this dispute, which is predicated on Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. It is the contention of the Orleans Parish Criminal
Sheriff that the magistrate's determination exceeded the issues
surrendered to her by stipulation of the parties. That being so,
the Sheriff seeks to have the magistrate's judgment pared to only
those issues that were contained in the stipulation. Finding merit
in the Sheriff's position, we recast the judgment by reversing in
part.
I.
In its petition, the government alleges that the Orleans
Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office and its Sheriff, Charles C. Foti,
Jr., violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
*
District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana,
sitting by designation.
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2000e-5(f) and 6(b). Specifically, the government asserts that the
Sheriff engaged in discriminatory policies and practices that
prevented women from attaining deputy sheriff positions on the male
inmate residential tiers of the Orleans Parish confinement
facilities.
The magistrate first considered the issue of liability and
then, if necessary, the issue of relief. As to liability, the
parties submitted a stipulation whereby the Sheriff agreed not to
contest the government's assertion that the Sheriff's department's
hiring and promotional opportunities, as they pertained to male
residential tiers, were not gender neutral. The stipulation stated
in pertinent part:
The United States contends that Defendant's policy and
practice of not assigning female deputy sheriffs to posts
located on its male inmate residential tiers denied females
assignment, hiring, and promotional opportunities and terms
and conditions of employment equal to those accorded to male
deputies and that this is a pattern and practice violative of
Title VII, except to the extent that such policy and practice
was justified as a BFOQ [bona fide occupational qualification]
as defined in this Stipulation. Defendant denies this
contention. However, for purposes of this suit only Defendant
does not contest this contention.
With the liability issue at rest, the magistrate moved toward
rendering relief, which came in the form of an injunction.
II.
We note at this juncture the appellant's suggestion that the
magistrate erred as a matter of law in issuing an injunction
without first affording a hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65. We disagree. Rule 65(a)(1) provides that "[n]o
preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the
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adverse party." This circuit has stated that the purpose of the
rule "is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the
court's ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits."
Meis v. Sanitas Service Corp., 511 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir.1975).
In this case, the parties stipulated to the merits of the liability
claim, thereby enabling the court to determine and impose a final
remedy. On 30 December 1992, the magistrate issued a permanent
injunction, to which Rule 65 does not apply. As such, there is no
merit to the appellant's contention that he was entitled to a
hearing prior to the issuance of the injunction.
III.
Next, the appellant maintains that the court abused its
discretion by issuing an injunction that exceeded the scope of the
stipulation. In formulating relief in employment discrimination
cases, the court has broad discretion to fashion remedies as the
equities of a particular case compel. LeBlanc v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 990, 93 S.Ct. 320, 54 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972). We will not
intervene absent a showing of clear abuse. Harper v. Thiokol Chem.
Corp., 619 F.2d 489, 494 (5th Cir.1980); Local 53 v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (5th Cir.1969).
At issue are paragraphs two, four and five of the injunction.
Paragraph two enjoins the Sheriff from "[f]ailing or refusing to
hire females in the position of Deputy Sheriff, other than
according to the same criterion applied in the hiring of males, at
all facilities of the Orleans Parish Prison complex unless a bona
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fide occupational qualification ... exists." Paragraph four
enjoins the Sheriff from "[f]ailing or refusing to promote female
deputies into rank or supervisory positions at the Orleans Parish
Prison jail facilities other than on an equal basis with male
deputies unless a bona fide occupational qualification exists...."
Paragraph five enjoins the Sheriff from "[f]ailing or refusing to
adopt and implement a program to inform women of equal employment
opportunities available at the Orleans Parish Prison facilities and
to attract qualified women to become Deputy Sheriffs in numbers
reflecting their interest and availability in the relevant labor
market."
The Sheriff argues that the provisions of the stipulation
apply only to facts surrounding the assignment of female deputy
sheriffs to posts located on male inmate residential tiers. In
contrast, the three quoted paragraphs of the injunction go far
afield from the stipulation and seek to regulate the Sheriff's
hiring and promotional conduct in areas other than just the male
inmate tiers of the Orleans Parish jail system.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the
injunction was properly worded and that the magistrate did not
exceed the scope of the stipulation. We disagree. As we stated
previously, courts have broad discretion to fashion equitable
remedies in Title VII cases. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 763-64, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1263-64, 47 L.Ed.2d 424 (1976);
Harper, 619 F.2d at 494. But the underlying objective to be
achieved in an injunctive matter is the fashioning of an order that
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restores the injured party to the status he would have occupied
were it not for the defendant's discriminatory behavior. Franks,
424 U.S. at 764, 96 S.Ct. at 1264; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 418-19, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975).
IV.
This case has as its center point the policy employed by the
Orleans Parish Sheriff in assigning deputy sheriffs to duties on
all male populated tiers of the Orleans Parish jail. There is no
proof, however, by stipulation or otherwise, that either side
considered any other issue. The sheriff admitted to endorsing and
enforcing a policy concerning deputy sheriff supervision on the
male inmate residential tiers. No more was admitted. To regulate
conduct not at issue is beyond the scope of the magistrate's
authority. A succinct summary of the powers and limitations of the
trial court was expressed in NLRB v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S.
426, 435-36, 61 S.Ct. 693, 699, 85 L.Ed. 930 (1941), in which the
Supreme Court stated:
A Federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of
the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has
found to have been committed or whose commission in the
future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the
defendant's conduct in the past. But the mere fact that a
court has found that a defendant has committed an act in
violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly
to obey the statute and thus subject the defendant to contempt
proceedings if he shall at any time in the future commit some
new violation unlike and unrelated to that with which he was
originally charged. This Court will strike from an injunction
decree restraints upon the commission of unlawful acts which
are thus disassociated from those which a defendant has
committed.
In this case, paragraphs two, four and five apply to employment and
assignment practices within the entire Orleans Parish prison
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system. Yet, the prefatory language of the injunction itself
recites a dependence on the stipulation: "In consideration of the
Stipulation entered into by the plaintiff, United States of
America, and the Parish of Orleans Criminal Sheriff in his official
capacity, and the Parish of Orleans Criminal Sheriff's Office
herein collectively referred to as defendant and executed by the
Court on September 8, 1992, the Court ORDERS as follows with
respect to affirmative injunctive relief."1
This Circuit has previously ruled that a trial court's
discretion when fashioning injunctive relief is limited to
targeting the specific acts of discrimination. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir.1987) (district court
erred in enjoining the defendant-appellant from requiring employees
to sign waivers or releases of claims of employment discrimination,
rather than merely enjoining waivers of the right to file a charge
of discrimination); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554
F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir.1977) (district court erred in issuing a
nationwide injunction based on findings limited to an isolated
event of discrimination). To reiterate, the injunction used as its
base the stipulation. The magistrate's ruling exceeded the scope
of the stipulation, which was limited to correcting the
disproportionate ratio of male to female deputy sheriff service on
1
Paragraphs one and three of the injunction are not imbued
with the same excessiveness as found in paragraphs two, four and
five and are not opposed by the appellant in this appeal. The
appellant's restraint is well taken. Both paragraph one and
paragraph three are limited in scope to correcting the absence of
female deputy sheriffs on male only residential tiers.
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all male tiers in the parish prison system. Paragraphs two, four
and five of the injunction, by contrast, addressed hiring and
promotional practices in all other areas of the parish prison
system. Those other areas were neither addressed in the
stipulation, nor was any evidence introduced to support the
judgmental portion of the injunction in paragraphs two, four and
five. Thus, the sum of the parts exceeds the whole. Pythagoras
would be offended. So are we.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE paragraphs two, four, and
five of the injunction of 29 December 1992 and AFFIRM the
remainder.
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