NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-10189
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos.
1:08-cr-00715-DKW-1
v. 1:08-cr-00715-DKW
LESLIE MINORU UEKI,
MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 7, 2022**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Leslie Ueki appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We review the district
court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We affirm.
1. Ueki argues that the district court should have granted his motion because
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 as amended by the First Step Act, Ueki would be subject to
only a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence, rather than the 20-year mandatory
minimum that existed at the time he was sentenced. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
However, that lower mandatory minimum sentence does not apply retroactively.
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(c), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222
(2018). Assuming a court may consider a non-retroactive reduction in a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence part of the “extraordinary and compelling”
circumstances justifying a sentence reduction, the court is not required to do so.
The district court was within its discretion not to consider the reduction at issue
here an extraordinary and compelling circumstance meriting a sentence reduction.
Ueki also asserts that he lost the benefit of his plea bargain because if the
government were negotiating today, it would not be able to threaten him with a life
sentence. But the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
sentence it previously imposed on Ueki nonetheless remained appropriate.
Ueki contends that the district court did not adequately explain its reasons
for rejecting his arguments on the amended mandatory minimum sentence and the
loss of his plea deal. But the court’s explanation, while brief, was sufficient under
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the circumstances of this case and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See
Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965-68 (2018).
2. Ueki also argues that the district court should have granted his motion
because his health conditions placed him at high risk of serious illness from
COVID-19. The district court considered Ueki’s ongoing health conditions as well
as his vaccination status and the low rate of COVID-19 at his place of
imprisonment. The court found that Ueki’s health conditions did not put him at a
higher than usual risk from COVID-19, and that his vaccination and the low rate of
COVID-19 at his place of imprisonment further reduced his risk. The court
properly considered the totality of the circumstances and was within its discretion
to find Ueki’s health conditions not an extraordinary and compelling circumstance
meriting compassionate release.
3. Finally, Ueki argues that the district court misapplied the Aruda standard
in denying his motion. We held in Aruda that while U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 was not
binding, it could still inform a court’s decision. 993 F.3d at 802. While it seems
from the record that the district court did not in fact rely on § 1B1.13, even if it did,
taking § 1B1.13 into account as an advisory source would not be contrary to
Aruda. The district court thus correctly applied the Aruda standard.
AFFIRMED.
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