[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 1, 2008
No. 08-10622 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00026-CR-BAE-6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BOB AARON MIKELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 1, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Bob Aaron Mikell appeals his 192-month sentence imposed after
pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and 18
U.S.C. § 2. The district court arrived at this sentence after departing downward
under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 based on Mikell’s substantial assistance to the
government. Both parties agree on appeal that the district court’s starting point
before the departure was within Mikell’s applicable guideline range.
On appeal, Mikells argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
in light of: (1) his underlying criminal history score before the district court applied
the career offender enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; (2) the nature of one of his
prior, qualifying drug convictions; and (3) his self-improvement efforts. After
reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we discern no reversible error.
We review a defendant’s sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. __, __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591,
594, 597, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190
(11th Cir. 2008). “[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever
sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a
party.” Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 596. The factors in § 3553(a) that the
court must consider are:
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(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)). It is sufficient for the district court to acknowledge that it has
considered the § 3553(a) factors, but it need not explicitly discuss each of them.
United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). After considering the
§ 3553(a) factors, the court “must make an individualized assessment based on the
facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 597. We have recognized that
“there is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may
choose.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
The Supreme Court has held that, in reviewing sentences for reasonableness
under § 3553(a), a federal appellate court may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence imposed within the guideline range.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. __, __,127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203
(2007). However, we have declined to adopt such a presumption. United States v.
Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d
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1180, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, although it is not reasonable per se,
a within-range sentence may ordinarily be expected to be reasonable. Talley, 431
F.3d at 786-88.
In this case, we conclude that Mikell has not met his burden of
demonstrating that the district court’s sentence within the applicable guideline
range was unreasonable, as the court considered the pre-sentence investigation
report, the § 3553(a) factors, arguments presented in mitigation, Mikell’s prior
drug convictions, and his self-improvement efforts. Mikell’s reliance on his un-
enhanced criminal history score is misplaced because he concedes that he was
properly classified as a career offender. Accordingly, we affirm Mikell’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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