IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 1, 2009
No. 08-30542
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
BOBBY J WEATHERTON
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Bobby J. Weatherton appeals the sentence imposed by the district court
following the revocation of his probation. He argues that the district court
plainly erred in imposing special conditions of supervised release which require
him to undergo psychosexual evaluation and potential treatment and which
restrict his possession of sexually explicit materials. We affirm.
I.
In April 2006, Bobby J. Weatherton pleaded guilty to making a false claim
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) following Hurricane
Katrina. According to the presentence report (PSR), Weatherton was convicted
of forcible rape and aggravated burglary in 1979 and was sentenced to 35 years’
imprisonment. He was released from imprisonment in 2002. Weatherton was
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sentenced to three years of probation for FEMA fraud. This probation was
subject to several conditions including, inter alia, that he not commit another
federal, state, or local crime; that he report to the probation officer; and that he
notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or
employment. In August 2007, the probation office petitioned the district court
for a warrant for Weatherton’s arrest, alleging that Weatherton had violated the
conditions of his probation. The petition alleged that (1) a warrant for
Weatherton’s arrest had been issued for attempted first degree murder,
aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated rape; (2) Weatherton failed to report to
his probation officer and that his whereabouts were unknown; and (3)
Weatherton failed to notify his probation officer of his current address.
At a probation revocation hearing, Weatherton stipulated to the second
and third violations. The first violation, which involved a pending state charge,
was dismissed from the petition. The district court revoked Weatherton’s
probation and sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment and two years of
supervised release. The court further ordered that Weatherton comply with
numerous conditions of supervised release, including that he register as a sex
offender, undergo a psychosexual evaluation and any necessary treatment, and
that he not possess any sexually explicit materials as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2256(2). Weatherton offered no objection to the district court’s sentence.
Weatherton timely appealed.
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II.
Pursuant to Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007), “this court
must ensure the district court committed no significant procedural error. If the
imposition of the imprisonment term is procedurally sound, this court then
considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 411–12
(5th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). Weatherton does not challenge the
sentencing procedure. Generally, the “the appropriate standard by which to
review conditions of supervised release, which are part of the sentencing decision
is a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, pursuant to Gall.” Id. at 412.
However, because Weatherton did not object to the imposition of the special
conditions in the district court, we review for plain error only. See United States
v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 52(b)
(“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the court’s attention.”). As the Supreme Court recently
reiterated, there are four steps, or prongs, to “plain-error review” under Rule
52(b):
First, there must be an error or defect – some sort of deviation from
a legal rule – that has not been intentionally relinquished or
abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the
legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he
must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are
satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error
– discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Meeting all four prongs is difficult, as it should be.
Puckett v. United States, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266, 275 (2009) (quotations omitted).
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III.
Weatherton first argues that the district court plainly erred in requiring,
as special conditions of his supervised release, that Weatherton undergo
psychosexual evaluation and any necessary treatment and not possess sexually
explicit materials. A district court may impose any condition of supervised
release “it considers to be appropriate” so long as certain requirements are met.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). First, the condition must be “reasonably related” to one of
four factors:1 (1) the nature and characteristics of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant, (2) the deterrence of criminal conduct, (3) the
protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant, and (4) the
provision of needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment to the defendant. Id. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D). Second, the condition cannot impose any “greater deprivation
of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to advance deterrence, protect the public
from the defendant, and advance the defendant’s correctional needs. See id.
§§ 3583(d)(2), 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D). Finally, the condition must be
consistent with the policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id.
§ 3583(d)(3).
Weatherton contends that the conditions in question are not reasonably
related to his FEMA fraud conviction, that his 1979 rape conviction is
insufficient to support the need for the conditions, and that his 2007 arrest
warrant cannot provide a basis for the conditions because it is an
unsubstantiated allegation which the government abandoned as a basis for
revocation. Because district courts must consider the defendant’s history and
characteristics, they may take into account “a defendant’s prior conviction for a
1
See United States v. Jimenez, 275 F. App’x 433, 442 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that
“[e]very circuit court reaching the issue” has interpreted section 3583(d) “only to require a
reasonable relationship with any of the four factors[,] not necessarily all of them” and
collecting cases); see also United States v. Love, 431 F.3d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that
a special condition must be “related to a punitive goal”).
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sex offense when imposing sex-offender-related special conditions when the
underlying conviction is for a non-sexual offense.” United States v. Deleon, 280
F. App’x 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2008); see United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 344
(2d Cir. 2008) (upholding sex-offender related special conditions as part of
sentence for securities fraud where they were reasonably related to defendant’s
“history and characteristics as a sex offender, his need for treatment, and the
public’s need for protection from him”); see also United States v. Prochner, 417
F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he fact that the special condition of sex offender
treatment is not related to the crime of conviction does not, by itself, render the
condition invalid.”).2 Moreover, we have previously held in an unpublished
opinion that a sentencing court may consider charged criminal behavior of the
defendant even in the absence of a conviction if the defendant admitted the
behavior or the information was derived from a reliable source. See Deleon, 280
F. App’x at 351 (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly
err in considering defendant’s indictment for aggravated sexual assault of a child
where the information was contained in the PSR and the defendant failed to
state that he did not commit the offense); see also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (“In
resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing
determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy.”); Rodriguez, 558 F.3d at 412 (“Title 18 of the United States Code,
section 3661 . . . provides ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.’”); United States v. Kingsley, 241
2
Although an unpublished opinion issued after January 1, 1996 is not controlling
precedent, it may be considered as persuasive authority. Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401
and n.7 (5th Cir. 2006).
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F.3d 828, 833 n.7 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[P]rior criminal behavior by the defendant,
which, as in the case sub judice, the defendant did not deny during his
sentencing proceeding, and/or which was supported by information derived from
a reliable source, is relevant to sentencing, even if that prior criminal conduct
did not lead to a criminal conviction.”).
The record shows that the district court was aware of both Weatherton’s
“lengthy history” and the state warrant for Weatherton’s arrest. Although
Weatherton describes the warrant for his arrest as an “unsubstantiated
allegation,” the petition for revocation contains a reasonably detailed account of
the alleged crime,3 and in light of Weatherton’s apparent flight and his failure
to deny having committed the crime either before the district court or on appeal,
we cannot say that the warrant plainly lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Cf.
Rodriguez, 558 F.3d at 414 (“Notably, Rodriguez does not deny he sexually
assaulted the fifteen-year-old girl. He merely points out the procedural posture
of the pending charge, and offers nothing more than conclusory assertions to
rebut the reliability of the PSR. Thus, he has not met his burden of
demonstrating the information in the PSR was unreliable or untrue, and
therefore has not shown the district court erred in considering information in the
PSR.”). Because Weatherton does not otherwise contest the relationship
between the conditions at issue and the statutory factors, he has not established
plain error.4
3
The petition for revocation states:
The offense details indicate the defendant took a female to a[n] open field where
he beat, strangled, and raped her. After she pled for her life, he left her bound
at the ankles and wrists and unclothed from the waist down. The victim
managed to get only her feet untied and she ran to a nearby chemical plant,
where workers discovered her walking with her hands bound and unclothed
from the waist down.
4
We note that at least two of our sister circuits have vacated similar prohibitions
against possessing adult pornography and remanded for resentencing where the district court
failed to adequately explain and the court of appeals could not ascertain a viable basis for the
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Weatherton also argues that the challenged conditions are obviously a
greater deprivation of Weatherton’s liberty than is reasonably necessary to
achieve the goals of deterrence and public safety because he was already
required to register a sex offender under state law as a result of his 1979
aggravated rape conviction. The challenged conditions, however, are clearly
aimed, at least in part, at Weatherton’s therapeutic needs. Moreover, given that
Weatherton is alleged to have committed another rape despite being registered
as a sex offender, we cannot say that it would be plain error to conclude that sex
offender registration, by itself, was insufficient to protect the public from
imposition of the condition in the record. See United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65,
75–79 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that district court plainly erred in imposing a “ban on the
possession of adult pornography as a condition of supervised release, without any explanation
and without any apparent basis in the record for the condition”); United States v. Voelker, 489
F.3d 139, 150–153 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding on review for abuse of discretion that “[t]he district
court] ignored our caution “that ‘the deprivation of liberty can be no greater than necessary
to meet the goals [of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)] . . . . [and] failed to provide an analysis or
explanation to support this broad restriction”). But see United States v. Daniels, 927–28 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that district court “did not plainly err in limiting [defendant’s] possession
of materials depicting sexually explicit conduct because the condition furthered the goals of
rehabilitating him and protecting the public where defendant was convicted of possession of
child pornography and could “slip into old habits of amassing child pornography”); United
States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding similar condition on plain error
review); United States v. Carpenter, 280 F. App’x 866, 869 (11th Cir. 2008) (“With regard to
the ban on possessing sexually explicit materials, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court
have held a lifetime condition prohibiting a similarly situated sex offender from possessing any
sexually explicit materials is overly broad. Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err
in prohibiting [defendant convicted of sex trafficking of a minor and enticing a minor to engage
in prostitution] from possessing sexually explicit materials.”).
As discussed elsewhere in this opinion, Weatherton argues only that (1) “[g]iven the age
of his previous sex offense and the paucity of information in the record regarding the
circumstances of the issuance of the 2007 arrest warrant, this record does not support, without
more, that he has a propensity to commit future sexual offenses” such that the challenged
conditions have a reasonable relationship to the relevant goals; and (2) the challenged
conditions are a greater deprivation of his liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the
goals of deterrence and public safety because he is already required to register a sex offender
under state law. Thus, Weatherton does not argue the prohibition against the possession of
sexually explicit materials is not generally reasonably related to sex offenses and offenders,
nor does he make any argument specifically regarding his liberty interest in possessing
sexually explicit materials. We express no opinion on the merits of these waived arguments.
See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9) (requiring that the argument contain the “appellant’s contentions
and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which
the appellant relies”).
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Weatherton’s future crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Therefore, Weatherton has
not established plain error.5
Finally, Weatherton argues for the first time on appeal that he was given
no notice that his revocation sentence would include the above outlined special
conditions. As we recently stated in United States v. Ybarra:
Ybarra contends that the sex offender conditions must be vacated
because the district court did not give him notice that it was
contemplating the imposition of such conditions, thereby violating
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h). Rule 32(h) states that
“[b]efore the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range
on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence
report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the
parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure.”
[Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h).] Rule 32 promotes “focused, adversarial
resolution of the legal and factual issues relevant to fixing
Guidelines sentences.” [Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137
(1991).]
In United States v. Coenen, we held that courts are required to give
“reasonable pre-sentence notice” that sexual offender registration
provisions are "under consideration.” [135 F.3d 938, 943 (5th Cir.
1998).] In Coenen, we recognized that “invasive” sex offender
notification provisions were analogous to upward departures from
the Sentencing Guidelines and thus could not be categorized as
simple “occupational restriction[s] . . . which do[] not require . . .
notice.” [Id.] But Coenen was decided before United States v.
Booker, which invalidated the mandatory features of the Guidelines.
[543 U.S. 220 (2005).] Whether, post Booker, sex offender conditions
require notice, or even whether there is a notice requirement at all
for any conditions in the context of supervised release, is unclear.
289 F. App’x. 726, 733–34 (5th Cir. 2008) (footnotes omitted). The government
argues that, based on Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2202–04 (2008),
in which the Supreme Court held that in an original sentencing proceeding, a
defendant is not entitled to advance notice of the imposition of a non-guideline
sentence, special conditions of supervised release also do not require advance
5
See supra note 5.
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notice. We need not decide this issue, however. Because it is not clear whether
Weatherton was entitled to notice, the district court did not plainly err in not
providing it. Puckett, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 275.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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