[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 30, 2008
No. 07-15668 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00076-CV-1-MMP-AK
DEBRA S. CLIFTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 30, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Debra Clifton appeals a decision that affirmed the denial of her application
for supplemental security income from the Social Security Administration. 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g). Clifton challenges the ruling on two grounds. First, Clifton
argues that the administrative law judge erred in finding that Clifton had
substantial medical improvement. Second, Clifton argues that the administrative
law judge erred in finding that Clifton could perform work that existed in the
national economy without consulting a vocational expert. We affirm.
We review the decision by the Commissioner “to determine if it is supported
by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v.
Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence consists of
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. The burden rests with the claimant to prove that she is
disabled and entitled to Social Security benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a);
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
Substantial evidence supports the finding by the administrative law judge
that Clifton experienced substantial medical improvement. An individual is
eligible for disability benefits for chronic pulmonary disease when her capacity to
expel carbon monoxide is less than 40 percent. Although Clifton qualified for
benefits in 1999 when her diffusion capacity was between 37 and 41 percent, she
had improved considerably by 2002, when her diffusion capacity was 97 percent.
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Because Clifton no longer qualified as disabled, she was not entitled to further
benefits. See Vaughn v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 1040, 1043 (11th Cir. 1984) (benefits
can be terminated once “there is substantial evidence of actual improvement to the
point of no disability”).
The record supports the decision by the administrative law judge to rely on
the medical vocational guidelines to determine that Clifton could resume work.
Clifton does not challenge the finding that she had the functional capacity to
perform a full range of light work. The judge accounted for Clifton’s mild mental
limitations and found that she could understand and execute “simple two step
instructions” and interact appropriately with coworkers. The “unskilled work”
limitation fully accounts for the limitations posed by Clifton’s mental impairments.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a) (“Unskilled work is work which needs little or no
judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of
time.”).
The denial of Clifton’s application for benefits is AFFIRMED.
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