[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 22, 2008
No. 08-10600 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00155-CR-WS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARTHUR LEON DIXON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(October 22, 2008)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Arthur Leon Dixon appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A),
which provides an additional prison sentence of at least five years for a defendant
who knowingly uses, carries, or possesses a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug
trafficking crime. Dixon argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
for a reasonable jury to convict him of the charge. After carefully reviewing the
parties’ briefs, we affirm Dixon’s conviction.
“We review the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial de novo. The
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, with all
inferences and credibility choices drawn in the government’s favor.” United States
v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 924 (11th Cir. 2006). “It is not necessary that the
evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly
inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier
of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the government must show that a defendant
used or carried a firearm “in relation to” a drug trafficking crime, or possessed a
firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. “The ‘in furtherance’ element
requires proof that ‘the firearm helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced the drug
trafficking.’” United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2002)). Thus,
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there must be a showing of some nexus between the
firearm and the drug selling operation. The nexus
between the gun and the drug operation can be
established by the type of drug activity that is being
conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of the
weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the
possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is
loaded, proximity to the drugs or drug profits, and the
time and circumstances under which the gun is found.
Timmons, 283 F.3d at 1253 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At trial, the government presented evidence that the gun was in the room
with Dixon and the drugs; that Dixon had sold drugs on multiple occasions from
the room where the police found the gun; that the quantity of drugs found in that
room are inconsistent with personal use; and that drug dealers are known to keep
guns nearby to protect against attempted theft. Dixon focuses in this appeal on
what the government did not prove, such as whether his possession of the gun was
legitimate or illegal, or whether anyone witnessed him with a gun during a drug
deal. He argues that the evidence presented at trial established only that he was in
the same room with the gun and drugs, not that the gun furthered any drug
trafficking.
But “the evidence [need not] exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence . . . .” Young, 906 F.2d at 618 (citation omitted). Dixon has
acknowledged that the government did prove some factors that weigh against him.
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He admits that the easily accessible loaded gun, the extra ammunition clip, the
digital scale, and the drugs were all found in the same room. Thus, the evidence
supports an inference that the room was used for drug trafficking. Cf. United
States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 830 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that “the proximity
of the firearm to the drugs[] [and] digital scales . . . established a sufficient nexus
between the firearm and the drug trafficking crime”).
We conclude that a reasonable jury could have found, based on the evidence
presented at trial, that Dixon possessed a handgun to protect his drugs and drug
profits. The evidence sufficiently established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
on the charge of using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Accordingly, we affirm Dixon’s
conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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