[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 9, 2008
No. 08-12310 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-01555-CV-TWT-1
MICHAEL ANTHONY CAMPBELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DALE HERDON,
in his official capacity as Warden of Walker State
Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 9, 2008)
Before BLACK, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Anthony Campbell, a Georgia prisoner serving a ten-year sentence
for child molestation, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The certificate of appealability
(COA) in the present appeal concerns whether Campbell’s trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to inadmissible hearsay by an officer and school
guidance counselor, as well as a video of the victim’s interview with law
enforcement. On appeal, Campbell argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the testimonial hearsay statements and video.
We review de novo both the denial of a § 2254 petition, and claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Shere v. Sec., Florida Dep’t of Corr., 537 F.3d
1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). We review factual findings for clear error.
Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 2430 (2007). Our review of a district court’s decision regarding a § 2254
petition is limited to the issues specified in the COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A);
Id.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
a § 2254 petition only may be granted when the state court’s decision was
(1) “‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
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(2) . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Shere, 537 F.3d at 1309
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (alteration in original). A state court decision
contradicts clearly established federal law if it either (1) applied a rule that
contradicts governing Supreme Court case law, or (2) arrived at a result different
than a result reached by the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.
Grossman, 466 F.3d at 1336. An unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law occurs if the state court identifies the correct Supreme Court case law
to apply, but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the case. Id. A state court’s
factual findings are entitled to substantial deference. Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1)).
To make a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064 (1984). A court need not address both prongs if a defendant fails to establish
one of the prongs. Id. at 2069. To establish prejudice, the defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness,
the result of the case would have been different, and “[a] reasonable probability is
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a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the conviction.” Id. at 2068. A
strong presumption exists that counsel provided adequate assistance. Id. at 2065.
In Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004), the Supreme
Court held, under the Confrontation Clause, testimonial hearsay is inadmissible
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. The Court clarified, however, that the Confrontation Clause
does not prohibit the use of prior testimonial statements when the declarant is
available for cross-examination at trial. Id. at 1369 n.9 .
Here, the victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.
Additionally, contrary to Campbell’s argument, the Supreme Court did not limit its
holding in Crawford to prior inconsistent statements. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369
n.9. Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals’ (GCA) application of Strickland
to Campbell’s ineffective assistance claim regarding the video of the victim’s
police interview was not objectively unreasonable. Although the GCA did not
address Campbell’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the guidance counselor’s and officer’s testimony, the district court did not
err in finding Campbell failed to establish ineffective representation by not
objecting to such testimony, as an objection would have been meritless because the
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victim testified at trial. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9; Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at
2064. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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