[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 1, 2009
No. 08-13908 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00404-CR-1-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAURICE LAMAR PRICE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 1, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Laurice Lamar Price appeals his 188-month sentence for drug offenses, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
On appeal, Price argues that his sentence substantively is unreasonable
because it is greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of
sentencing. He contends that the district court focused too heavily on the
guidelines range and Price’s criminal history and failed to explain why it rejected
the mitigating factors offered by Price in support of a lower sentence.
We evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
The party challenging the reasonableness of the sentence bears the burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both the record and the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.
2005). Briefly stated, under section 3553(a), a district court should consider,
among other things, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence to provide adequate
deterrence, respect for the law, and protection of the public, policy statements of
the Sentencing Commission, provision for the medical and educational needs of the
defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).
2
We conclude that Price’s 188-month sentence -- at the low end of the
guidelines range -- is reasonable. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 788 (noting that
“ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
reasonable”). Price’s sentence is below the 20 and 40-year statutory maximum
sentences he faced. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), (C); United States v. Winingear,
422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005) (comparing, as one indication of
reasonableness, the actual prison term imposed against the statutory maximum).
And the district court considered the nature of Price’s offense and his history and
characteristics -- including that he sold drugs to support his own drug addiction and
that he had a steady and extensive criminal history -- in determining that a
guidelines sentence was appropriate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court also
stressed a guidelines sentence (1) would serve as a deterrent, given Price’s many
previous lenient sentences in state court, probation violations, and continued drug
dealing and addiction; (2) would serve to protect the community; and (3) would
allow Price to get the necessary drug treatment and job training so that he would
not have to sell drugs when he got out of prison. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D).
These reasons are supported by the record. Price had over 10 arrests in state
court in the 10 years before the instant offense, for which he received lenient
sentences and repeatedly failed to conform to the terms of his probation. While his
3
drug arrests involved small amounts of drugs and were usually only for possession,
he also had several arrests for eluding police officers, giving a false name to
officers, and resisting arrest, including an incident where he drove recklessly and
endangered others. And Price admitted that he sold drugs to support his drug
addiction. Thus, Price’s behavior reflected the need for his sentence to deter him,
to protect the public, and to provide him with the opportunity to obtain treatment.
Contrary to Price’s arguments on appeal, the record plainly demonstrates
that the district court considered the mitigating factors Price offered in support of a
lower sentence. The court considered Price’s arguments set forth at sentencing and
noted that it was “troubling” that Price was subjected to such a high guidelines
range based on the relatively small amounts of drugs involved in both the instant
offense and in Price’s prior drug convictions that qualified him as a career offender
(and caused his guidelines range to increase dramatically). But the court thought
that, despite the harsh result of the career offender designation, Price’s extensive
criminal history, previous opportunities to pursue drug treatment and failure to do
so, and the need to protect the community from Price’s behavior did not warrant a
sentence below the guidelines. The court clearly considered the section 3553(a)
factors and did not focus solely on the guidelines range or Price’s criminal history
in sentencing Price.
4
Based on the factors outlined in section 3553(a) and our review of the
record, we conclude that Price has not carried his burden of showing that his
sentence is unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
5