[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-11124 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 92-01076-CR-CDL-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES REYNALDO CAMERON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 30, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BIRCH and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Charles Reynaldo Cameron, through counsel, appeals the 328-
month sentence imposed by the district court following its grant of his pro se
motion for a reduced sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Cameron’s
§ 3582(c)(2) motion was based on Amendment 706 to the Guidelines, which
reduced base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine. On appeal, Cameron
argues that the district court erred (1) by not sentencing him at the low end of his
amended guideline range, and (2) by failing to articulate adequately its reasons for
refusing to sentence him at the low end of his revised range, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c).
I.
“In a proceeding to modify a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), we
review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its
authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. White, 305 F.3d
1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002). We review for an abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Id.
A district court may modify a term of imprisonment “in the case of a
defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). When considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion, a district court
must engage in a two-part analysis. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780
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(11th Cir. 2000). “Initially, the court must recalculate the sentence under the
amended guidelines, first determining a new base level by substituting the
amended guideline range for the originally applied guideline range, and then using
that new base level to determine what ultimate sentence it would have imposed.”
Id. Next, the court must decide, in light of the § 3553(a) factors and in its
discretion, whether it will impose the newly calculated sentence or retain the
original sentence. Id. at 781.
Because the district court was not obligated to sentence Cameron to the low
end of his amended guideline range, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion
by sentencing Cameron to the middle of his amended guideline range.
II.
If the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the first part of the
two-step analysis, the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors under the
second part of the analysis, regardless of whether it ultimately denies or grants
§ 3582(c)(2) relief. United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (11th Cir.
2009). “While the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors, it commits no
reversible error by failing to articulate specifically the applicability – if any – of
each of the section 3553(a) factors, as long as the record demonstrates that the
pertinent factors were taken into account by the district court.” United States v.
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Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 927 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, the only time this Court has vacated a district
court’s order granting a defendant’s 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduced sentence for a failure
to properly consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
occurred when the record contained no evidence that the
district court had considered, or the defendant had even
raised, the applicability of any of the § 3553(a) factors.
Id. at 928 (citing Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256-57).
The district court must also comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), which
requires “[t]he court, at the time of sentencing, [to] state in open court the reasons
for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence . . . range exceeds
24 months, the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the
range” advised by the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). When evaluating
the sentencing court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence, we focus
“exclusively on the sufficiency of the court’s conduct at sentencing” and whether
the court “tailor[ed] its comments to show that the sentence imposed is
appropriate.” United States v. Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (petition for cert. filed) (U.S. June 29, 2009)
(No. 09-5135). We have explained that sentencing courts “must adequately
explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to
promote the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d
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1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 128 S.
Ct. 586, 597, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007)). The length and amount of judicial
reasoning required depends on the circumstances. Id.
Because the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and stated that it had
considered the nature of the underlying offense, Cameron’s criminal history
category, and Cameron’s conduct while in prison, the district court adequately
articulated its reasons for imposing its mid-range sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review, and did not violate § 3553(c). Accordingly, we affirm
Cameron’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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