[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-15645 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 20, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-20226-CR-MGC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
UBALDO ENRIQUE NIEBLA NARVAEZ,
a.k.a. Ubaldo E. Niebla-Narvaez,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 20, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ubaldo Enrique Niebla Narvaez ("Narvaez") appeals his 210-month
sentence imposed upon remand from this Court. See United States v. Narvaez, 285
F. App’x 720 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Narvaez I”). After review, we affirm.
Narvaez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to
United States jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a), (g), (j) (2006)
and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B); and one count of the underlying substantive offense,
in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a), (g) (2006) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B).1
At Narvaez’s initial sentencing, the district court imposed a 210-month sentence, at
the low end of the advisory guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment.
In Narvaez I, we affirmed Narvaez’s convictions and sentence, but remanded for
the limited purpose of permitting the district court to comply with 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c)(1) and give an explanation in open court for the 210-month sentence. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (providing that, if the court imposes a sentence within the
applicable guidelines range that is greater than 24 months, it must state “the reason
for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range”).
At resentencing, the district court explained that it found the advisory
guidelines range “adequately reflect[ed]” the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,
1
After Narvaez's indictment, Congress recodifed 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a), (g), and (j) at
46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a) and 70506(a) and (b), respectively. See Act of Oct. 6, 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-304, § 10(2), 120 Stat. 1485, 1683-88 (revising the code sections for the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act).
2
“particularly the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of this defendant.” The district court further stated that Narvaez:
was a Captain of a ship. This was significant amounts of drugs that
were found on this boat. I believe the quantity of the narcotics, his
leadership role in this, all are contained in the nature of the offense
which is 3553, which is why I sentenced the defendant to the 210
month sentence.
Given that the district court sentenced Narvaez within the advisory
guidelines range, its explanation for Narvaez’s sentence was sufficient to comply
with § 3553(c)(1).2 See United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.
2005) (explaining that a simple statement by the court explicitly acknowledging
the factors set forth in § 3553(a) is sufficient); see also Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (“[W]hen a judge decides simply to
apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require
lengthy explanation.”). The district court referenced the § 3553(a) factors and
explained that Narvaez’s “leadership role” and the “quantity of the narcotics”
formed the basis for his particular sentence. Thus, the district court tailored its
comments to show the particular sentence imposed was appropriate in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors. See Bonilla, 463 F.3d at 1181.
AFFIRMED.
2
We review de novo whether a district court complied with § 3553(c)(1). United States
v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2006)
3