[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 2, 2009
No. 09-10593 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 99-00432-CR-PAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALFREDO MEZA,
Digno Mesa-Arana,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 2, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alfredo Meza, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to reduce sentence, filed pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 668. For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.
I.
In 1999, a federal grand jury charged Meza with conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 1903(j); and possession
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. A jury found Meza guilty of both counts.
According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Meza was
accountable for 4,609 kilograms of cocaine, and his base offense level was set at
38, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(3) and (c)(1). Meza’s total offense level was
42. His total offense level of 42 combined with criminal history category I to yield
a guideline imprisonment range of 360 months to life. The district court adopted
the factual findings and guideline calculations contained in the PSI and sentenced
Meza to 360 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised release.
Meza appealed his convictions and sentence and we affirmed. See United States v.
Rincon-Hernandez, 32 Fed.Appx. 533 (11th Cir. 2002).
In July 2008, Meza filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence, pursuant to
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18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), arguing that Amendment 668 reduced his base offense
level from 38 to 30. Meza also argued that the district court should resentence him
under an advisory guideline scheme, pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The district court denied Meza’s
motion, stating that Meza based his motion on Amendment 706. It found that
Amendment 706 did not apply to Meza, because the two counts of which he was
convicted involved powder cocaine rather than crack cocaine. Meza filed a motion
to reconsider, noting that his § 3582(c)(2) motion was based on Amendment 668,
rather than Amendment 706. He acknowledged that Amendment 668 was not
listed in the Guidelines as a retroactive amendment, but asked the court to apply it
retroactively because it was a clarifying amendment. The district court denied
Meza’s motion for reconsideration and Meza appealed. Meza’s notice of appeal
stated that he wished to appeal only the district court’s order denying his motion
for reconsideration.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider.
United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). We review de
novo a district court’s conclusions regarding the scope of its legal authority under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. James, 548 F.3d 983, 984 (11th Cir.
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2008). A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a
defendant who was sentenced based on a sentencing range that subsequently has
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Any
reduction, however, must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. A reduction is not consistent with the
Commission’s policy statements unless it is made pursuant to an amendment that
the Commission has made retroactive through its inclusion in § 1B1.10(c). See
U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.10(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A).
III.
Amendment 668 is not listed in § 1B1.10(c) as a retroactive amendment;
therefore, a district court would violate Commission policy by granting a
§ 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction based on this amendment. See U.S.S.G. §§
1B1.10(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), and (c). Furthermore, even if Amendment 668 was
considered to be a clarifying amendment, clarifying amendments may be applied
retroactively only on direct appeal of a sentence or under a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion to vacate sentence. See United States v. Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905, 908-09
(11th Cir. 2003) (determining that classification as a clarifying amendment “bears
no relevance to determining retroactivity under § 3582(c)(2)”). Although the
district court, in the denial of the motion to reconsider, did not address Meza’s
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argument that his § 3582(c)(2) was based on Amendment 668 rather than
Amendment 706, any failure to address Amendment 668 was harmless, because
the court lacked discretion to contravene Commission policy and grant a
§ 3582(c)(2) reduction. See United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11th
Cir. 2009) (holding that “Booker . . . do[es] not prohibit the limitations on a
judge’s discretion . . . imposed by § 3582(c)(2) and the applicable policy
statement[s]”). Finally, Booker did not grant the district court authority to
disregard the policy statements set forth in § 1B1.10(a). See id. (holding that
Booker does not apply at resentencing proceedings under § 3582(c)(2)).
Accordingly, Meza’s claim that Amendment 668 may serve as a basis for relief
under § 3582(c)(2) lacks merit and we affirm the denial of Meza’s motion to
reconsider.
AFFIRMED.
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