[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 15, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 08-14531 CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00208-CR-CAP-7-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GARWORH WILLIAMS,
ANTHONY M. WILLIAMS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
(December 15, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this multi-defendant criminal appeal, Garworh Williams (“G. Williams”)
and Anthony Williams (“A. Williams”) appeal their convictions and sentences. G.
Williams was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1349, and the district court imposed a below-guideline sentence of 44
months’ imprisonment. A. Williams was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank
fraud and 19 counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349. The
district court sentenced A. Williams to 37 months’ imprisonment, which is at the
bottom of the guideline range.
The issues presented on appeal are:
(1) Whether the district court erred in denying G. Williams’s motion for
judgment of acquittal;
(2) Whether the district court erred in denying G. Williams’s motion for a
new trial based on alleged Brady/Giglio1 violations;
(3) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the
defendants’ request for a continuance; and
(4) Whether the defendants’ sentences were substantively reasonable.2
1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972).
2
G. Williams appeals issues 1, 2 and 3. A. Williams appeals issues 3 and 4. However, G.
Williams also states in his brief, “Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 28(i), Appellant Garworh Williams adopts
by reference all portions of the brief of Appellant Anthony Williams that is not inconsistent with the
2
The court reviews de novo the sufficiency of the evidence claims, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the guilty verdict. United States v. Anderson,
289 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). The court will affirm the jury’s verdict
unless under no reasonable construction of the evidence could the jury have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Camargo-
Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 1995).
The court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based
on a Brady violation for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kersey, 130 F.3d
1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1997). If a defendant does not articulate a Brady violation
in his motion for a new trial, the court need only conduct a plain error review. Id.
The court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for continuance only
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2008).
The court reviews a sentence for reasonableness under a “deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586,
591 (2007). In reviewing the ultimate sentence imposed by the district court for
reasonableness, the court considers the final sentence in its entirety in light of the
facts and arguments in Appellant Garworh Williams’s brief.” (G. Williams’s Blue Brief at vii).
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factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a). United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d
1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006).
We first conclude from the record that the district court did not err in
denying G. Williams’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the government
proved that G. Williams conspired to commit bank fraud by putting on evidence in
the form of Hoff’s testimony implicating G. Williams and connecting him to other
conspirators, and the fact that G. Williams’s conduct matched the actions of all the
other conspirators in the scheme. Also, the jury was free to analyze G. Williams’s
credibility when he testified in his own defense and to disbelieve his testimony in
whole or in part. See United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995).
Second, we conclude that the district court correctly denied G. Williams’s
motion for a new trial based on alleged Brady/Giglio violations. The undisclosed
statements were not sufficiently exculpatory of G. Williams to be material under
Brady, and their limited impeachment value would have been merely cumulative,
as Hoff had already been impeached through cross-examination and by Norman
and Frasier’s plea colloquies. The statements also were not exculpatory simply
because they omitted reference to G. Williams’s criminal conduct. Finally, we
agree with the district court that there was no reasonable probability that the
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outcome of the proceedings would have been different had the statements been
disclosed.
Third, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defendants’ requests for a continuance. The defendants moved for a
continuance to obtain the live testimony of Norman and Frasier; however, their
plea colloquies were read into evidence at trial, so the jury had the opportunity to
review their versions of the events at issue.
Finally, we affirm A. Williams’s 37-month within-guideline sentence
because his argument that it is substantively unreasonable is meritless. We need
not review G. Williams’s sentence because his attempt to adopt by reference A.
Williams’s sentencing reasonableness argument fails for lack of specificity. Even
if, however, we reviewed G. Williams’s sentence on the merits, we would
conclude that it too was substantively reasonable.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm defendants’ convictions and
sentences.
AFFIRMED.
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