[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-4676
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. FGJ-96-02
IN RE: Grand Jury Subpoena dated April 9, 1996,
(FGJ 96-02),
versus
JOAN SMITH,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
(June 21, 1996)
Before KRAVITCH, EDMONDSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
Appellant has been held in civil contempt for refusing to
testify before a grand jury on the ground that her testimony would
incriminate her in violation of her rights under the Fifth
Amendment. We reverse.
I.
Appellant was served with two grand jury subpoenas. One was
directed to her in her personal capacity, and the other was
directed to the custodian of records for a corporation of which she
is the sole officer and director. Appellant filed a motion to
quash the latter subpoena. In that motion, she stated that she did
not have the specified records in her possession and that if she
were questioned before the grand jury as to their location, she
would invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate herself.
When appellant was called before the grand jury, she testified that
she did not have the records, and then, when asked where the
records sought in the subpoena were located, she refused to answer.
After a hearing, the district court denied appellant's motion
to quash the subpoena and ordered her to testify. When appellant
refused to comply, the court held her in civil contempt and ordered
her detention until she complied with the court's order or until
the expiration of the grand jury's term. The order of contempt was
entered on May 10, 1996. The district court stayed its contempt
2
order until July 1, 1996, in order to allow this court to hear an
appeal.1
II.
The issue before us is whether a custodian of corporate
records who is not in possession of the records may be compelled to
testify regarding their location. We conclude that she may not.
The Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being
compelled to provide testimony that might be self-incriminating.
U.S. Const. amend. V. Testimony is not limited to oral
declarations, but may include, inter alia, the production of
documents. E.g., United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984);
Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976). In Fisher, the
Court recognized that "[t]he act of producing evidence in response
to a subpoena . . . has communicative aspects of its own . . . ."
96 S. Ct. at 1581. The production of documents conveys the fact
that the documents exist, that they were in the possession of the
witness, and that they were the documents subject to the subpoena.
Id. Where these communicative acts of production have
"testimonial" value and incriminate the witness, the Fifth
Amendment privilege may be invoked. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1244
(holding that Fifth Amendment protects a sole proprietor from
1
Section U.S.C. § 1826(b) provides that "[a]ny appeal from an order of confinement
under this section shall be disposed of . . . not later than 30 days from the filing of such
an appeal." June 10, 1996 was the thirtieth day after this appeal was filed. This court
has held, however, that 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) "does not apply when . . . the recalcitrant
witness is at liberty pending appeal." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 946 F.2d 746, 749
n.3. Because the appellant has been at liberty during the pendency of this appeal, 28
U.S.C. § 1826(b) does not apply.
3
producing business records when the act of production itself
constituted testimonial incrimination); Fisher, 96 S. Ct. at 1581
(suggesting that where an act of production is testimonial the
Fifth Amendment is applicable, but holding that the act of
production was not privileged because the existence of the
documents in that case was "a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer
adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's
information by conceding that he in fact has the papers").
Although the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from
compelled, incriminating testimony, it does not do the same for
corporations; an agent of a "collective entity" may not refuse to
produce documents even when those documents will incriminate that
entity. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporation has no
Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 64 S. Ct. 1248
(1944) (labor union unprotected by Fifth Amendment). Moreover, an
agent of a corporation may not refuse to turn over corporate
records even when the content of those records may incriminate the
subpoenaed agent herself. United States v. White , 64 S. Ct. at
1250 (custodian must produce labor union's documents where contents
incriminate custodian); Wilson v. United States, 31 S. Ct. 538, 546
(1911) (custodian must produce corporate documents even where
contents are self-incriminating). Denying agents immunity is
justified by the fact that an agent is not compelled to prepare the
documents over which she had temporary control, nor is there a
necessary relation between the person producing the documents and
the documents themselves. See Braswell v. United States, 108 S.
4
Ct. 2284, 2298 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Although it has
long been clear that a custodian of corporate records may not claim
a Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid producing documents even
though the contents of the documents would incriminate her, it was
unclear until recently whether that privilege applied when the act
of production itself constituted self-incriminating testimony.
In Braswell v. United States, the Supreme Court answered this
question, holding that a custodian of corporate records must comply
with a subpoena ordering the production of those records even when
the act of production constitutes testimonial self-incrimination.
108 S. Ct. at 2296. The Court held that the "collective entity"
doctrine prohibited the agent's reliance on the Fifth Amendment
when called upon to produce documents belonging to the principal.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the "agency
rationale undergirding the collective entity decisions." Braswell
at 2291. The Court stated that a custodian of records acts in a
representative capacity and not a personal capacity. Id. As an
agent of the corporation, the custodian is bound by the same
obligation to produce records that belongs to the corporation
itself. Id. "[T]he custodian's act of production is not deemed a
personal act, but rather an act of the corporation," irrespective
of whether the agent's act is testimonial and incriminating. Id.
The Braswell Court distinguished Curcio v. United States, 77
S. Ct. 1145 (1957), which reversed a contempt citation that was
issued to the secretary-treasurer of a union who refused to answer
questions pertaining to the whereabouts of union records. In
5
Curcio, the Court rejected the government's argument "that the
representative duty which required the production of union records
in the White case requires the giving of oral testimony by the
custodian . . . ." Id. at 1149. The Court explained that
forcing the custodian to testify orally as to the
whereabouts of nonproduced records requires him to
disclose the contents of his own mind. He might be
compelled to convict himself out of his own mouth. That
is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth
Amendment.
Id. at 1151-52. The difference between Curcio and Braswell,
according to the Court, is that "with respect to a custodian of a
collective entity's records, the line drawn was between oral
2
testimony and other forms of incrimination." Braswell, 108 S.
Ct. at 2293.
In drawing a line between acts of production and oral
testimony, the Court appears to have relied on one fact that
distinguishes these two types of testimony: the corporation owns
the documents. In contrast, to the extent that one's thoughts and
statements can be said to "belong" to anyone, they belong to the
witness herself. A custodian has no personal right to retain
corporate books. Because the documents belong to the corporation,
the state may exercise its right to review the records. Wilson, 31
S. Ct. at 546 (The State's "visitorial power which exists with
respect to the corporation of necessity reaches the corporate
books, without regard to the conduct of the custodian.") (quoted in
2
Only "incriminating" oral testimony is protected. In Curcio, the Court stated that a
witness could be compelled to identify documents that had already been produced
because in such a case "[t]he custodian is subject to little, if any, further danger of
incrimination." 77 S. Ct. 1150.
6
Braswell, 108 S. Ct. at 2289). For Fifth Amendment analysis, oral
statements are different. The government has no right to compel a
person to speak the contents of her mind when doing so would
incriminate that person; to do so would be "contrary to the spirit
and letter of the Fifth Amendment." Curcio 77 S. Ct. at 1151-52.
Appellant in this case is not refusing to produce corporate
documents; she claims not to possess them. As in Curcio, she is
refusing to provide oral testimony regarding the location of the
documents. Curcio appears, therefore, to be on all fours with this
case. Nevertheless, the government argues, and the district court
held, that Curcio does not apply.
The district court distinguished Curcio on the ground that the
witness in that case was called before the grand jury pursuant to
a personal subpoena and not in his capacity as the records
custodian, noting that the Court made clear that "[t]his conviction
related solely to petitioner's failure to answer questions asked
pursuant to the personal subpoena ad testificandum." Curcio, 77 S.
Ct. at 1148. The reason for this language, however, was not to
limit the analysis only to personal subpoenas, but merely to
indicate that the Court was not addressing Curcio's obligation "to
produce the books and records demanded in the subpoena duces
tecum." Id. (first emphasis added).
Had the Court intended to rely on the distinction between
types of subpoenas, it would have been unnecessary to analyze
Curcio's rights under the Fifth Amendment; rather, the Court could
simply have held that the Fifth Amendment bars the production of
7
testimonial evidence under a personal subpoena. Furthermore, were
Curcio limited to personal subpoenas, the Court would not have
found it necessary to consider that case in Braswell, where the
witness was served in his capacity as president of a corporation
and the subpoena did not require his testimony. 108 S. Ct. at
2286. We see no basis, therefore, for distinguishing
Curcio on the
ground that Curcio involved a personal subpoena.
The line drawn between the act of production and oral
testimony may be a purely formal one, but it is the line that the
Supreme Court has drawn. The refusal to provide testimony
pertaining to the location of documents not in appellant's
possession falls squarely on the side of the line that the Supreme
Court has held is subject to Fifth Amendment protection. Absent an
adequate grant of immunity, the appellant may not be compelled to
testify as to the location of documents not in her possession when
that testimony would be self-incriminating.3
3
The instant case is distinguishable from United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct. 1548
(1983), in which the Court held that where a claim of lack of possession is raised for the
first time at a contempt hearing for failure to produce documents, the witness has the
burden of proving a present inability to comply, even where this requires providing oral
testimony. Id. at 1554. In that case, after Rylander refused to comply with an IRS
summons, the district court issued an order to show cause why the order should not be
enforced. Id. at 1551. Rylander failed to file a responsive pleading, did not appear for
the show cause hearing, and did no more than send an unsworn letter to the court
stating that he was not the president of the corporation and that he did not possess the
records. Id. The court found that he possessed the documents and ordered the
summons enforced. Id. at 1554 n.3. Rylander did not seek reconsideration, neither did
he appeal. Id. at 1551.
Having never raised a claim of inability to comply with the summons (and the
court having found to the contrary), the only issue before the court at the contempt
hearing was whether Rylander had the present ability to comply with the order -- he was
not permitted to raise his original inability to comply with the original summons. Id. at
1552 ("[A] contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual
basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed . . . .") (quoting Maggio v. Zeitz, 68 S.
Ct. 401, 408 (1948)). At the contempt hearing, where there was a presumption of
8
III.
The government next argues that by stating to the grand jury
that she did not possess the records, the witness has waived her
Fifth Amendment privilege. Rogers v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 438,
442 (1951). We disagree. Because a custodian of corporate records
is required to produce corporate documents sought pursuant to a
subpoena, her statement at an enforcement hearing that she is not
in possession of those documents does not constitute a waiver of
her Fifth Amendment rights.
The case before us is distinguishable from United States v.
Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir.), clarified, 581 F.2d 431 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1218 (1979), where the Former
Fifth Circuit refused to permit a defendant at a contempt hearing
to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to testify about the
present location of documents that he had been previously ordered
to produce.4
continued possession of the documents, Rylander had the burden of demonstrating his
present inability to comply. Id. The Rylander Court held, therefore, that in defending
a contempt charge where the defendant had not previously challenged his inability to
comply with a summons to produce documents (and where the court had already found
that the defendant had possessed the documents), a defendant may raise only the
defense of a present inability to comply. The Court further held that in making such a
defense, the burden of proving that inability is on the defendant, even if doing so
requires testimony that may be self-incriminating. The Court did not address the
question of whether a defendant could be forced to provide self-incriminating oral
testimony in a subpoena enforcement proceeding or in support of a motion to quash a
subpoena. See White Collar Crime: Survey of Law -- 1983 Update, 21 Am.Crim.L.Rev.
179, 181-82 (1983) ("Rylander leaves open the question of whether resort to the privilege
against self-incrimination in a subpoena enforcement proceeding will shift the burden
of proving availability to the government."). As our opinion makes clear, a defendant
may not be forced to testify under these circumstances. Inability to comply, however,
may possibly be provable by means other than defendant's own testimony.
4
Decisions of the Fifth Circuit decided prior to the close of business on September
30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under Bonner v. City of Pritchard,
9
Hankins had refused to turn over partnership records to the
IRS on the ground that the records themselves would incriminate
him. 565 F.2d at 1348. The district court properly rejected this
claim and ordered the records produced. Id. at 1351. When all the
documents were not produced, upon petition by the government, the
court issued an order to show cause why Hankins should not be held
in contempt. Id. Because Hankins failed to produce evidence that
he could not comply with the enforcement order, he was held in
contempt.
On appeal, "Hankins argue[d] that the District Court erred in
holding him in contempt because he had informed the Court at the
enforcement hearing . . . that he did not have all the records
summoned by the government." Id. (emphasis added). The Fifth
Circuit found this contention "totally devoid of merit. No
evidence on inability to produce was presented by Hankins during
the enforcement hearing in response to the government's evidence
that the books and records were in his hands." Id. In fact, the
district court explicitly had found that Hankins had "acknowledged
to the Court that he had in his possession, in whatever capacity,
the summoned records." Id. at 1351 n.3.
In a clarifying opinion, the Fifth Circuit explained that it
would not permit Hankins to relitigate the district court's earlier
finding that he had possessed the records at the time the court
ordered the summons enforced. 581 F.2d at 437 n.8. (citing Maggio
v. Zeitz, 68 S. Ct. 401, 408 (1948)). Had Hankins "appeared before
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
10
the Internal Revenue Agent as ordered by the District Court and
testified under oath" that he did not possess all the documents,
the burden would not have shifted to Hankins to prove that he never
had the documents. 565 F.2d at 1352 (distinguishing United States
v. Silvo, 333 F.Supp. 264 (W.D.Mo. 1971)). The issue before the
court at the contempt hearing was only Hankins's present inability
to comply.
In a subsequent habeas proceeding, Hankins v. Civiletti, 614
F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1980), Hankins submitted affidavits attesting to
his inability to comply with the summons when initially served and
at any time thereafter. Id. at 954. The district judge rejected
this proffer as insufficient to purge Hankins of his contempt or to
comply with earlier mandates of the court. Id. Hankins then took
the stand and testified that he had complied to the best of his
ability. Upon cross-examination, he refused on Fifth Amendment
grounds to explain what he knew about the missing papers. On
appeal, the court held that Hankins's testimony on direct
examination constituted a waiver "of his Fifth Amendment privilege
with regard to matters relevant to his direct testimony." Id. at
955.
In contrast to the present case, Hankins involved an attempt
to relitigate an issue during a contempt hearing that was never
raised at the initial enforcement hearing. Because the defendant
failed to raise the claim of inability to produce records at the
time the summons was enforced, the burden shifted to the defendant
to prove a present inability to comply at the time of the contempt
11
hearing, even when doing so would result in self-incrimination. See
United States v. Rylander, 103 S. Ct. at 1554, discussed infra at
n.3. Once Hankins testified at the contempt hearing that he was
unable presently to comply, however, the government was entitled to
cross-examine him. Accordingly, his testimony on direct
examination constituted a waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege
with regard to that testimony.
In this case, unlike Hankins, appellant raised her claim of
inability to comply at the time of the enforcement proceeding. Had
appellant been in possession of the records, she would have been
required to turn them over pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum.
See Braswell, 108 S. Ct. 2284. Had she remained silent at the
enforcement proceeding, the inference would have been that she was
refusing to comply with the order to produce corporate records; it
would not have been that she was unwilling to state that she did
not possess them. This is precisely what happened to Hankins. See
United States v. Meeks, 642 F.2d 733, 735 (5th Cir. Unit A, April
1981) ("Hankins never made clear that his claim of privilege was
directed solely against explaining what role he might have played
in the fact that records were no longer available rather than a
general claim that the records within themselves might incriminate
him.").
Thus, for the Court to treat appellant's statement as a waiver
would create an intolerable result, placing appellant in the
position of remaining silent and being held in contempt for failing
to produce the records that she did not have, or saying that she
12
did not have the records and then being ordered to testify. In
other words, the appellant would have had to chose between
testifying and being held in contempt. Her Fifth Amendment right
would have slipped between the cracks. We hold, therefore, that
appellant did not waive her rights under the Fifth Amendment.
The government also relies on Rogers to argue that any
statement appellant might have made concerning possession of the
records would not be self-incriminating. When a witness invokes a
claim of privilege, there must be a "substantial and `real' fear"
of self-incrimination. Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697,
705 (1968); United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1384 (11th Cir.
1990) ("A witness may properly invoke the privilege when he
`reasonably apprehends a risk of self-incrimination . . . .'")
(quoting In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, 620 F.2d
1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980)). In Rogers, the witness refused to
testify out of a desire to protect the person who possessed the
records. 71 S. Ct. at 439. After considering what information the
testimony would reveal about the witness, the Court determined that
on the facts of that case it would not have been incriminating.
Id. Whether testimony is self-incriminating is, however, a factual
question. Doe at 1243. Thus, we leave to the district court the
question of whether testimony by the appellant as to who possessed
the records sought by the subpoena would constitute incriminating
evidence.
IV.
13
The district court's order of contempt is REVERSED. This case
is REMANDED to the district court for a determination of whether
appellant has demonstrated a substantial risk of self-
incrimination.
14