United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-4292.
Immacula ANTENOR, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Ysnel OSNEL, Plaintiff,
v.
D & S FARMS; Iori Farms, Inc.; Virgil S. Gil Turke, a/k/a
Virgil Banciu; AG-Tech Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
July 19, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 90-868-CIV-DLG), Donald L. Graham, Judge.
Before CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and DYER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Immacula Antenor and 610 other seasonal agricultural workers
("farmworkers" or "pickers") appeal from a summary judgment in
favor of D & S Farms and Iori Farms, Inc. ("growers") on their
claims under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
1
Protection Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district
court granted the judgment after concluding that the farmworkers
presented insufficient evidence that they were "employed" by the
growers under these statutes. Upon de novo review of the record,
we find substantial evidence that the growers, along with a labor
contractor, were "joint employers" of the farmworkers.
Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1
See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (1994); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to the existence of an employment
relationship between the growers and pickers can be summarized as
follows.2 In the mid-1980s, the growers began producing snap beans
for fresh market sale. In search of a steady supply of labor to
pick the beans, the growers turned to Virgil Turke, owner and
operator of Ag-Tech Services, Inc. ("Ag-Tech"), a labor contracting
business. The growers and Turke agreed that he would assume
responsibility for hiring, furnishing and paying the pickers, and
that he would be paid $3.90 per box of beans. The farmworkers were
among the people hired by Turke to pick the growers' crops between
1986 and 1989.
Based on planting schedules and market demand, the growers
decided when to harvest a particular bean field. After selecting
a field, they told Turke its location and the number of workers
needed. Turke then arranged for subcontractors to recruit and hire
pickers. After arriving at a field, the pickers were assigned rows
by Turke and his subcontractors. They could not begin picking,
however, until the growers and their onsite foremen gave the
command to start work, because it was essential, for commercial
reasons, that picking not begin until the morning dew had lifted
from the beans. The pickers filled the boxes that were brought to
the field by the growers and distributed by Turke and the
subcontractors. As the pickers filled the initial allotment of
2
Because we are reviewing a summary judgment in the growers'
favor, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the farmworkers. Parks
v. City of Warner Robins, GA, 43 F.3d 609, 612-13 (11th
Cir.1995).
boxes, they walked to the growers' field trucks, where one of the
growers' employees gave them additional boxes.
Two sets of supervisors, also known as "field walkers,"
oversaw the pickers' work. One set was hired by Turke and the
other set was hired by the growers. Both sets of field walkers
passed through the rows of beans, checking the work of individual
pickers and, when work was found to be deficient, spoke directly to
the picker to ensure that corrective steps were taken; the
growers' field walkers also complained about deficient work to
Turke and his subcontractors.
The subcontractors' assistants carried full boxes to the
growers' trucks, where they were weighed and closed by the
subcontractors or their assistants. The growers' field walkers
then loaded the boxes on trucks and drove them to the growers'
packing facility. As the day progressed, more and more of the
growers' field walkers' time was absorbed in stacking and loading
boxes, with a corresponding decrease in the time devoted to
supervision of individual bean pickers.
Work normally concluded when the pickers completed the rows
assigned to Turke by the growers. On some occasions, however, the
growers decided the crew would work longer or shorter hours,
depending on their harvest needs. If the growers decided, for
example, to halt picking to avoid overloading their packing and
storage facilities, their field walkers went to the field and
removed the picking buckets from the pickers' hands.
The growers' payment to Turke was based on the number of boxes
of beans delivered to the packinghouse. Although the price was to
be $3.90 per box, the actual payment was less. Because Turke was
financially unable to purchase worker's compensation insurance for
the farmworkers, the growers withheld 11¢ per box from his
compensation to purchase a worker's compensation policy, which
named the growers as the insured parties and employers of the
farmworkers. The growers also computed social security taxes due
on the workers and issued Turke two checks—one for the taxes and
another for the agreed upon price per box less the social security
taxes and the 11¢ per box for worker's compensation insurance.
From his payment, Turke paid the subcontractors a set amount for
each box picked by their workers, which varied depending on whether
the subcontractor provided transportation to the farmworkers. The
subcontractors then paid the farmworkers their wages.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The farmworkers filed suit against the growers, Turke and Ag-
Tech under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (1994) ("AWPA"), and the Fair Labor
3
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994) ("FLSA"). Their
complaint alleged that the growers, Turke and Ag-Tech violated the
AWPA by failing to keep hourly records, to pay unemployment
compensation and social security taxes, and to pay wages promptly
when due, id. §§ 1831(c)(1), (2) & 1832(a), (c). The farmworkers
alleged that the growers also violated the AWPA by using labor
3
We use the abbreviation "AWPA" to refer to the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. The Act is also
occasionally referred to as the "MSPA" or the "MSAWPA." We
employ "AWPA" because it is the acronym utilized by the United
States Supreme Court in its only opinion interpreting the Act.
Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 640, 110 S.Ct.
1384, 1386, 108 L.Ed.2d 585 (1990).
contractors to recruit and transport them without reasonably
ensuring that the contractors were registered and insured, id. §§
1841(b)(1)(C) & 1842. The farmworkers claimed that defendants
violated the FLSA by failing to keep hourly records and pay minimum
wage, id. §§ 206(a), 211(c). Defaults were entered against Turke
and Ag-Tech for failure to file responsive pleadings.
Following discovery, the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment on the growers' liability under the FLSA and the
AWPA. The farmworkers argued that the growers were liable because
they, along with Turke and Ag-Tech, were "joint employers" of the
farmworkers. The growers contended that they were not liable
because Turke was the farmworkers' sole employer. The district
court granted summary judgment to the growers and denied summary
judgment to the farmworkers, finding that there were no genuine
issues of material fact and that the growers were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Antenor v. D & S Farms, Inc., 866
F.Supp. 1389 (S.D.Fla.1994).
III. DISCUSSION
A determination of employment status under the FLSA and the
AWPA is a question of law subject to our de novo review. Aimable
v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434, 440 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 351, 130 L.Ed.2d 306 (1994).
Because we are reviewing a summary judgment in favor of the
growers, we must determine whether there are genuine issues of
material fact and, if not, whether the growers are entitled to
judgment on the question of joint employment as a matter of law;
stated differently, we must determine whether the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable
to the pickers, support a reasonable conclusion that they were
employed by the growers for purposes of the AWPA and the FLSA. See
Parks v. City of Warner Robins, GA, 43 F.3d 609, 612-13 (11th
Cir.1995). To do this, we initially consider the statutory
definition of "employ" under the FLSA and AWPA and their
legislative history.
A. Statutory Background
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 in order to eliminate "labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being
of workers...." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a), (b). It requires that
employers, among other things, keep payroll records and pay
employees a minimum hourly wage and overtime. Id. §§ 201-11. The
AWPA, enacted in 1983, was intended "to assure necessary
protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers...." Id.
§ 1801. Among its provisions, the AWPA requires agricultural
employers to register with the government, maintain employment
records for workers, and comply with various compensation, housing
and transportation provisions. Id. §§ 1811-44.
The growers' liability under the FLSA and the AWPA depends on
whether they "employed" the farmworkers furnished by Turke. See
id. § 203(d), (e)(1); id. § 1802(2). Both statutes utilize the
same definition of "employ," so if the growers employed the
farmworkers under one statute, they necessarily employed them under
the other. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 440. In defining "employment"
under both statutes, Congress expressly rejected the common-law
definition of employment, which is based on limiting concepts of
control and supervision. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330
U.S. 148, 150-51, 67 S.Ct. 639, 640-41, 91 L.Ed. 809 (1947);
Aimable, 20 F.3d at 439.4 Rather, an entity "employs" a person
under the FLSA and the AWPA if it "suffers or permits" the
5
individual to work. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g); id. § 1802(5). An
entity "suffers or permits" an individual to work if, as a matter
of economic reality, the individual is dependent on the entity.
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81
S.Ct. 933, 936-37, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961); Aimable, 20 F.3d at 439.
To assure protection for workers, both statutory schemes make
it clear that a worker can be economically dependent on, and thus
jointly employed by, more than one entity at the same time. See 29
C.F.R. § 791.2; id. § 500.20(h)(4). Thus, the AWPA and the FLSA
specifically cover "joint employment" relationships. The AWPA
regulations define "joint employment" as follows:
The term joint employment means a condition in which a single
individual stands in the relation of an employee to two or
more persons at the same time. A determination of whether the
4
See also H.R.Rep. No. 97-885, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
6-8 reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4552-54 (declaring
intent that terms "employee," "employer" and "independent
contractor" used in AWPA "not be construed in their limited
common law sense").
5
The "suffer or permit to work" standard derives from state
child-labor laws designed to reach businesses that used middlemen
to illegally hire and supervise children. Rutherford Food Corp.
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 n. 7, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 1476 n. 7, 91
L.Ed. 1772 (1947); People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-
Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 121 N.E. 474, 476 (1918). It
has been called " "the broadest definition [of employee] that has
ever been included in one act.' " United States v. Rosenwasser,
323 U.S. 360, 363 n. 3, 65 S.Ct. 295, 297 n. 3, 89 L.Ed. 301
(1945) (quoting 81 Cong.Rec. 7,657 (1938) (statement of Sen. Hugo
Black)).
employment is to be considered joint employment depends upon
all the facts in the particular case. If the facts establish
that two or more persons are completely disassociated with
respect to the employment of a particular employee, a joint
employment situation does not exist.
Id. § 500.20(h)(4)(i); see also id. § 791.2.6
The AWPA's adoption of the FLSA definition of employment "was
6
The regulations also provide a means for the Secretary of
Labor to determine whether a joint employment relationship
exists:
Questions will often arise under the Act as to
whether individuals employed by a farm labor contractor
are also jointly employed by another person engaged in
agriculture (including any person defined in the Act as
an agricultural employer or an agricultural
association). Such joint employment relationships are
common in agriculture and have often been addressed by
the Federal courts. See ... Hodgson v. Griffin and
Brand, 471 F.2d 235 [ (5th Cir.1973) ], ... Rutherford
Food Corporation v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct.
1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 [ (1947) ], ... and Usery v.
Pilgrim Equipment Company, Inc., 527 F.2d 1308 [ (5th
Cir.1976) ]. In determining whether such a joint
employment relation exists the courts have cited the
broad definition of employ in the [FLSA] which includes
to suffer or permit to work. The factors considered
significant by the courts in these cases and to be used
as guidance by the Secretary, include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(A) The nature and degree of control of the
workers;
(B) The degree of supervision, direct or indirect,
of the work;
(C) The power to determine the pay rates or the
methods of payment of the workers;
(D) The right, directly or indirectly, to hire,
fire, or modify the employment conditions of the
workers;
(E) Preparation of payroll and the payment of
wages.
29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii); see also id. § 791.2 (1992)
(defining "joint employment" under FLSA).
deliberate and done with the clear intent of adopting the "joint
employer' doctrine as a central foundation of this new statute; it
is the indivisible hinge between certain important duties imposed
for the protection of migrant and seasonal workers and those liable
for any breach of these duties." H.R.Rep. No. 97-885, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982) 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4552
("House Report"). Previous legislative efforts to protect
farmworkers had focused on regulating the crewleaders who
recruited, managed and paid the farmworkers. Id. at 4547-48.
Those efforts, however, had failed to "reverse the historical
pattern of abuse of migrant and seasonal farmworkers," id. at 4549,
primarily because crew leaders were transient and often insolvent,
id. at 4548. Thus, in designing the AWPA, Congress took "a
completely new approach," id. at 4549, making agricultural entities
directly responsible for farmworkers who, as a matter of economic
reality, depended upon them, even if the workers were hired or
employed by a middleman or independent contractor, id. at 4553-54.
Although the AWPA places responsibilities on farm labor contractors
as well as on agricultural employers, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1811-44,
"Congress' plain intent was to protect migrant and seasonal workers
from abuse and exploitation, and to hold "agricultural employers'
fully accountable as joint employers whenever the facts suggest
that liability is fairly imposed." Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F.Supp.
483, 489 (D.N.J.1986).
B. Applicable Caselaw
In addition to the legislation, we are guided by a Supreme
Court case and three Eleventh Circuit cases that have addressed the
statutory definition of employment based upon economic dependence.
In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91
L.Ed. 1772 (1947), the Secretary of Labor sued a slaughterhouse
operator for FLSA violations arising from its treatment of
"boners," who deboned meat. Id. at 723-24, 67 S.Ct. at 1473-74.
The operator asserted that it did not "employ" the boners because
they were recruited, hired and supervised by a labor contractor
who, according to a contract with the operator, was to have
"complete control" over the boners. Id. at 724-25, 67 S.Ct. at
1474. The Supreme Court held that the "determination of the
relationship does not depend on such isolated factors but rather
upon the circumstances of the whole activity." Id. at 730, 67
S.Ct. at 1477. In determining whether the operator suffered or
permitted the boners to work, the Court emphasized that the boners
were "part of the integrated unit of production," id. at 729, 67
S.Ct. at 1476, because the deboning occurred in the middle of the
process of slaughtering the cattle, preparing the meat for
deboning, packing it and shipping it, all of which was performed by
slaughterhouse employees, id. at 726, 67 S.Ct. at 1475. The Court
also noted that the slaughterhouse, and not the contractor, owned
the premises and deboning equipment, and that the work, though
skilled, "was more like piecework." Id. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477.
"Upon the whole," the Court determined that the slaughterhouse
employed the deboners for purposes of the FLSA. Id. at 730, 67
S.Ct. at 1477.
A year later the former Fifth Circuit7 decided Fahs v. Tree-
Gold Co-operative Growers of Florida, Inc., 166 F.2d 40 (5th
Cir.1948).8 A citrus-packinghouse operator employed labor
contractors to furnish workers to assemble, label, close and load
the boxes in which the citrus fruit was packed. Id. at 42-43. The
labor contractors were responsible for hiring, firing and
supervising their crew members, and establishing their hours and
wages. Id. at 43. The contractors, who were paid based on the
number of boxes handled by their workers, paid their own crew
workers. Id. The packinghouse operator maintained worker's
compensation insurance to cover the workers. Id. at 42. The court
concluded that the crew workers, as well as the contractors, were
sufficiently dependent on the packinghouse to be considered its
employees. Id. at 43-45. Looking beyond the formalities of who
paid and supervised the workers, the court emphasized that the
contractors and crewmembers' services "constituted a part of an
integrated economic unit" controlled by the packinghouse operator;
that the premises and all significant investment in tools and
facilities were provided by the packinghouse; and that although
the packinghouse did not directly control the workers, it asserted
control whenever its interests were involved. Id. at 44-45.
In Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235
7
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir.1981), we held that all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down before October 1, 1981, are binding in this court.
8
Although Fahs was a social security case, it is relevant
because it was decided at a time when employment relationships
for social security purposes were analyzed under the same legal
test as the FLSA. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130,
67 S.Ct. 1547, 1549-50, 91 L.Ed. 1947 (1947).
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819, 94 S.Ct. 43, 38 L.Ed.2d 51
(1973), the Secretary of Labor sued a grower for FLSA violations
related to its use of harvest workers supplied by labor
contractors. Id. at 235-36. The growers argued that the labor
contractors were the harvest workers' sole employers. Id. at 237.
The evidence showed that the contractors hired the pickers, drove
them to the fields, directly supervised them and paid them their
earnings. Id. at 236-37. The evidence also showed, however, that
the work occurred on the grower's premises and that the grower's
foreman decided daily starting times, made field assignments,
oversaw the work, told contractors of problems with the workers'
performances and what to pay the workers, and assisted the labor
contractors in paying social security taxes. Id. at 236-37.
Whether the grower was a joint employer of harvest workers, the
court explained, "does not depend on technical or isolated factors"
or on "the form of the relationship," id. at 237 (quotation
omitted); instead, "it depends ... on the economic reality" of the
"circumstances of the whole activity," id. Given the "total work
arrangement," the court determined that the grower, along with the
contractors, jointly employed the workers and thus was subject to
the FLSA. Id. at 238. In enacting the AWPA, Congress expressly
recognized that Griffin & Brand "summarizes the proper approach and
the appropriate criteria to be used in making [joint employer]
determinations." See House Report at 4553.
We most recently considered agricultural joint employment
relationships in Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 351, 130
L.Ed.2d 306 (1994), which involved claims under both the AWPA and
the FLSA. A group of migrant and seasonal agricultural workers
sued a farm labor contractor and the grower on whose fields they
worked, claiming that the two jointly employed them. Id. at 437.
Unlike in Griffin & Brand, virtually all direct supervision of the
workers in Aimable was performed by the contractor, who also had
the sole power to hire or fire the harvest workers and "exercised
absolute, unfettered, and sole control over [the workers] and their
employment." Aimable, 20 F.3d at 440-41. The labor contractor in
Aimable also handled all payroll responsibilities, determined the
crew's wage rates, and "made significant investments in equipment
and facilities." Id. at 440-43. Under these circumstances, we
concluded that the farmworkers were not economically dependent on
and therefore were not "employed" by the grower. Id. at 445.
C. Determining Joint Employment Status
In Aimable, this court recognized at least eight factors that
can be analyzed to determine whether a farmworker furnished by a
labor contractor was economically dependent on, and therefore
jointly employed by, a grower: (1) the nature and degree of the
grower's control of the farmworkers; (2) the degree of the
grower's supervision, direct or indirect, of the farmworkers' work;
(3) the grower's right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or
modify the farmworkers' employment conditions; (4) the grower's
power to determine the workers' pay rates or methods of payment;
(5) the grower's preparation of payroll and payment of the workers'
wages; (6) the grower's ownership of the facilities where the work
occurred; (7) the farmworkers' performance of a line-job integral
to the harvesting and production of salable vegetables; and (8)
the grower's and labor contractor's relative investment in
equipment and facilities. Id. at 440-46.9
In applying these factors, we are guided by several
principles. First, the question in "joint employment" cases is not
whether the worker is more economically dependent on the
independent contractor or the grower, with the winner avoiding
responsibility as an employer. As the term "joint employment"
suggests, the AWPA "envisions situations where a single employee
may have the necessary employment relationship with not only one
employer but simultaneously such a relationship with an employer
and an independent contractor." House Report at 4553. Thus,
rather than comparing the employment relationships in order to
exclude one, "[t]he focus of each inquiry ... must be on each
employment relationship as it exists between the worker and the
party asserted to be a joint employer." Id. at 4553-54.
Second, no one factor is determinative. Rutherford Food
Corp., 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477. As we explained in
Aimable, the existence of a joint employment relationship depends
on "the "economic reality' of all the circumstances." Aimable, 20
F.3d at 439 (emphasis added); see 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(i)
9
The first five factors come from DOL regulations. See
supra note 6. The sixth, seventh and eighth factors come from
caselaw. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 443-45. In Aimable, the court
acknowledged that three additional factors—the farmworker's
opportunity for profit and loss, the permanency and exclusivity
of the employment, and the degree of skill required to perform
the farmworker's job—ordinarily are relevant only where the
question is whether the workers are independent contractors or
employees, and not where the question is whether the farmworkers
are employed solely by the contractor or jointly by the
contractor and the farmer. Id.
(providing that "determination of whether the employment is to be
considered joint employment depends upon all the facts in the
particular case") (emphasis added).
Third, the factors are used because they are indicators of
economic dependence. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 439. They are
"aids-tools to be used to gauge the degree of dependence of alleged
employees on the business to which they are connected. It is
dependence that indicates employee status. Each [factor] must be
applied with that ultimate notion in mind." Usery v. Pilgrim
Equipment Co., Inc., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 826, 97 S.Ct. 82, 50 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976). Thus, the weight
of each factor depends on the light it sheds on the farmworkers'
economic dependence (or lack thereof) on the alleged employer,
which in turn depends on the facts of the case, see Aimable, 20
F.3d at 440.
Fourth, a joint employment relationship is not determined by
a mathematical formula. "[T]he absence of evidence on any one or
more of the criteria listed does not preclude a finding that an ...
agricultural employer was a joint employer along with the
crewleader." House Report at 4553. The purpose of weighing the
factors is not to place each in either the contractor or the
grower's column, but to view them qualitatively to assess the
evidence of economic dependence, which may point to both. See
Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311 (explaining that "the collective answers to
all of the inquiries [cannot] produce a resolution which submerges
consideration of the dominant factor—economic dependence").
Fifth, in considering a joint-employment relationship, we
must not allow common-law concepts of employment to district our
focus from economic dependency. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 439;
House Report at 4553. Indeed, the "suffer or permit to work"
standard was developed to assign responsibility to businesses that
did not directly supervise putative employees. See Rutherford Food
Corp., 331 U.S. at 728 & n. 7, 67 S.Ct. at 1476 & n. 7; People ex
rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 121
N.E. 474, 476 (1918). Thus, our inquiry looks "not to the common
law definitions of [employer and employee] (for instance, to tests
measuring the amount of control an ostensible employer exercised
over a putative employee), but rather to the "economic reality' of
all the circumstances concerning whether the putative employee is
economically dependent upon the alleged employer." Aimable, 20
F.3d at 439.10
Finally, because the FLSA and AWPA are remedial statutes, we
must construe them broadly. See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling,
324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 808, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945)
(recognizing that FLSA must be interpreted broadly to effectuate
its "humanitarian and remedial" purpose); Caro-Galvan v. Curtis
Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11th Cir.1993) (stating that
10
Thus, courts have found economic dependence under a
multitude of circumstances where the alleged employer exercised
little or no control or supervision over the putative employees.
See, e.g., Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir.)
(finding dependence where grower visited farm only three or four
times per week), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850, 104 S.Ct. 160, 78
L.Ed.2d 147 (1983); Usery, 527 F.2d at 1312 (finding dependence
where putative employer had "neither the right to hire employees
nor the right to set hours"); Fahs, 166 F.2d at 43 (finding
dependence where business had no right to control number of
employees, wages or hours); Alviso-Medrano v. Harloff, 868
F.Supp. 1367, 1372 (M.D.Fla.1994) (finding employment
relationship where no direct oversight by grower).
"[b]road construction of the [AWPA] comports with [its]
humanitarian purpose to protect all those hired by middlemen to
toil in our nation's fields, vineyards and orchards") (quotation
omitted).
D. Application of Factors to this Case
With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence in
this case. Although we initially consider the factors separately,
we ultimately weigh them collectively and qualitatively to
determine whether the pickers, notwithstanding any employment
relationship with the contractor,11 were economically dependent on,
and therefore jointly employed by, the growers under the FLSA and
AWPA.
1. Nature and degree of control of workers
The first indicia of joint employment status concerns the
"nature and degree of [the growers'] control of the workers." 29
C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(A). Such control arises when a grower
determines, for example, the number of workers hired for a job,
when work should begin on a particular day, which workers should be
assigned to specific tasks, and whether a worker should be
disciplined or retained. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441. As noted
earlier, the suffer or permit to work/economic dependence standard
defines employment in a way that does not depend on the common-law
understanding of employment, which was based on limiting concepts
of control. See id. at 439. Nevertheless, a grower's control of
farmworkers does shed some light on economic dependence.
11
The parties do not dispute that Turke and Ag-Tech were
employers of the farmworkers.
The evidence indicates that the growers exercised control over
the farmworkers in several ways. First, the growers told Turke how
many farmworkers to bring each day.12 Second, the growers' foremen,
rather than Turke, determined the precise moment when picking would
commence each day. Third, the growers were free to directly delay
or stop the workers from continuing their work. For example, when
new immigration laws that required increased worker documentation
went into effect, the growers stopped the harvest to verify that
Turke and his workers were in compliance with the laws, and they
did not allow work to resume until Turke demonstrated their
compliance the following day.13 Finally, the growers had the
12
Turke testified in deposition as follows:
Q. And during the '85-'86 harvest season, again
isolating on D & S Farms, you learned of the harvest
needs through telephone contact from [D & S Farms'
manager]?
A. Correct. He would call.
Q. He would call?
A. Right. He would tell me how many rows. He
would tell me where the field was and how many people
he'd like to have.
13
Turke testified as follows about the incident:
A. [O]ne morning I went to the field and I was
told that I had to get my pickers out of the field
because they had no ID cards.
Q. Who told you that?
A. This came down from one of the people that
worked for both farms. We were picking for both farms
that day, I remember that much, and we were stopped and
our people were told to leave the field because we
didn't have IDs.
Q. And you were told by some representative of
each of the farms that your crew was to stop working?
ability indirectly to assign work to specific workers. During the
1986-87 season, for example, they moved the pickers from one row to
another and from one plot to another by assigning their own
tomato-picking crews to pick plots and rows that were being picked
by the farmworkers. Compare Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 237-38
(finding that farmer exercised a "degree of apparent on-the-job
control" over workers by "tell[ing] the crewleaders at what hour to
A. To stop working because they had no ID cards
from the South Florida Vegetable Association.
Q. And so did your crew, in fact, stop work?
A. They did, and they went down there, lined up to
try and get ID cards so they could come back and finish
the job.
In the meantime, I went to my office and brought
back a copy of the law that said the ID card was not
necessary and they could not force the people to have
an ID card, because they wanted to charge the people
$7.50, I believe, for the ID cards.
And I told [the growers]. I said, "Look," I said,
"I'm making ID cards for free for these guys." I said,
"I'm charging three dollars, but it takes me three
dollars just to get an ID card done." I said, "I'm not
trying to make a nickel out of this thing." I said,
"These guys are just in it trying to make some money."
And then I showed them the law and I showed them
my card and I showed them the—you know, the
documentation that we had behind our cards and, you
know, basically the same thing that [the South Florida
Vegetable Association representative] had. Now, ours
were not as elaborate as his, but they did the job.
Q. Right. And so you had this conversation with
[the growers]?
A. Right, and I showed them the law.
Q. And what did they say after you spoke with
them?
A. Told me to put my people back to work.
begin work") with Aimable, 20 F.3d at 440-41 (concluding that
contractor had "absolute, unfettered, and sole control" over
farmworkers).
2. Degree of supervision of the work
The second factor bearing on joint-employment status is the
"degree of supervision [by the grower], direct or indirect, of the
work." 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(B). Somewhat similar to the
previous factor, such supervision includes overseeing the pickers'
work and providing direction. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441. This
factor, like the growers' control over the workers, has more to do
with common-law employment concepts of control than with economic
dependence. Indeed, the "suffer or permit to work" standard was
developed in large part to assign responsibility to businesses
which did not directly supervise the activities of putative
employees. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 728 & n. 7, 67 S.Ct.
at 1476 & n. 7; Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. at
476. Nevertheless, a grower's supervision of farmworkers, like a
grower's control of them, provides some guidance to our inquiry.
In considering this factor, "special aspects of agricultural
employment [must] be kept in mind." House Report at 4554. When
unskilled labor is utilized in an agricultural setting, for
example, the grower is not expected to look over the shoulder of
each farmworker every hour of every day. Thus, "[i]t is well
settled that supervision is present whether orders are communicated
directly to the laborer or indirectly through the contractor."
Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441 (citing Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238).
In this case the evidence reflects that the growers supervised
the pickers in substantial ways. In addition to telling them when
picking could begin and distributing the boxes, the growers' field
workers directly oversaw and intervened in the pickers' work, both
directly and indirectly, on a daily basis. Turke testified to the
growers' oversight and direct intervention as follows:
Q. And what would these D & S Farms people do?
A. They would walk around and make sure the baskets were
full, make sure the quality control was there, no trash in the
baskets. If there was a problem, they'd bring it to our
attention.
Q. Did you ever see the D & S Farms employees talk
directly to the workers or try to show them what they were
doing wrong?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Did that happen very often?
A. Day to day. They couldn't hardly be out there without
it.
Turke also testified that the growers would complain to him "that
the job was not going fast enough."
We find this supervision more substantial than the "infrequent
assertions of minimal oversight" by the grower in Aimable, 20 F.3d
at 441, where the grower's employees, "except on rare occasions,
left supervision and oversight of [the farmworkers] entirely to
[the contractor] and his crew" and "rarely provided any direction
to [the farmworkers'] work," id. In contrast to this "de minimis"
supervision, id., the growers in the present case oversaw and
directly intervened in the pickers' work on a daily basis. See
Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238 (finding joint employment where
farmer's field supervisors regularly gave instructions to crew
leaders who passed them on to workers); Haywood v. Barnes, 109
F.R.D. 568, 590 (E.D.N.C.1986) (finding joint employment based in
part on regular supervision).
3. Right to hire, fire, or modify employment conditions
The third indicia of joint employment is the growers' "right,
directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the employment
conditions of the workers." 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(D). In
this case, the evidence indicates that the growers had the power to
"veto" Turke's hiring decisions and to modify employment conditions
such as the hours the pickers worked. For example, the growers
themselves monitored the workers' job qualifications rather than
relying on Turke to do so when they stopped work until they could
verify compliance with the new immigration laws.
Additionally, as discussed above, the growers dictated the
workers' hours, a condition of employment, by deciding when the
work was to begin, by forcing the pickers to stop picking when
prices were bad, and, during the '86-'87 season, by sending their
own tomato-picking crews into fields assigned to the farmworkers,
causing them to run out of work by noon. Compare Aimable, 20 F.3d
at 442 (finding no dependence where grower never dictated hours
employees could work) with Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 237
(finding dependence where business decided daily starting times).
4. Power to determine pay rates or methods of payment
The next factor is the degree to which the putative employer
has the "[p]ower to determine the pay rates or the methods of
payments of the workers," 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(C). In this
case, Turke and the growers agreed to the payment of $3.90 per box.
However, pay rate refers not only to the amount of compensation to
be paid, but includes benefits such as worker's compensation
insurance and social security, as well as how these various
payments are allocated. Method of payment refers to the basis upon
which a worker is paid, for example, by the hour or by the piece.
See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 442; Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238.
The growers' power to exercise some control over the workers'
pay in this case is evidenced by their deduction of money from
their payments to Turke. First, rather than paying Turke the full
$3.90 per box of beans harvested, they deducted 11¢ per box to
purchase worker's compensation insurance, decided which insurance
to buy, and named themselves as the policy holders. Thus, Turke
did not solely and independently establish wage rates and other
benefits for the workers. Indeed, Turke could not purchase
insurance to cover the workers because he lacked the economic
wherewithal; in his own words, "[he] didn't have the money to fork
up for workman's comp right then and there." Thus, the farmworkers
were dependent on the growers to obtain financial compensation for
job-related injuries. See Fahs, 166 F.2d at 42 (finding dependence
where employee covered by business' worker's compensation
insurance); Hamilton v. Shell Oil Co., 215 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1968) (holding that "relationship of employer-employee is
essential to liability for workmen's compensation benefits"); cf.
Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 236 (finding dependence where business
deducted social security payments from check given to crew leader).
The evidence shows that the growers also deducted money from
the negotiated box price to cover social security taxes, giving
Turke a separate check for the employer and employees' shares of
these taxes. The growers segregated the payments to ensure that
Turke properly reported and paid the taxes on the farmworkers'
labor. Cf. Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 236 (observing that crew
leader was "totally incapable of seeing that social security [wa]s
paid in behalf of the harvesting crews"). Like the deduction for
worker's compensation insurance, the growers' segregation of the
social security payments limited Turke's freedom to allocate the
money he received for his services. And just as the workers
depended on the growers for worker's compensation coverage, they
relied on them to see that the social security payments were made
as well. Cf. id. (stating that "[t]he fact that [the business] ...
handled the social security contributions for the harvest workers
also tend[s] to indicate an employment relationship").14
5. Preparation of payroll and payment of wages
The next factor, which in this case is interrelated to the
determination of pay rates, is the putative employer's involvement
in the "[p]reparation of payroll and the payment of wages" to the
workers. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(E). This factor is
probative of joint employment because of the likelihood that when
a business undertakes to help an independent contractor prepare its
payroll and pay its wages, it is likely that the contractor lacks
economic substance on which the workers can solely depend.
Here, as noted earlier, the growers computed and segregated
social security taxes and purchased worker's compensation to cover
the workers. These actions certainly do not demonstrate that Turke
14
After these deductions were made, Turke took his profit
and paid the balance to the subcontractors, who deducted their
pay and paid the pickers.
was a truly independent employer. On the contrary, they indicate
another way in which the farmworkers were economically dependent on
the growers. See Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 236 (finding
dependence where contractors "totally incapable of seeing that
social security is paid in behalf of the harvesting crews").
6. Ownership of facilities where work occurred
The first non-regulatory factor indicative of an employment
relationship in this case is the putative employer's ownership of
the facilities where the work occurred. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at
444; see also Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at
1477; Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238. This element is probative
of joint-employment status for the obvious reason that without the
land, the worker might not have work, and because a business that
owns or controls the worksite will likely be able to prevent labor
law violations, even if it delegates hiring and supervisory
responsibilities to labor contractors, see Gulf King Shrimp Co. v.
Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 513-14 (5th Cir.1969). We need not dwell on
this factor because there is no question that the growers owned the
land where all the work was performed.
7. Performance of a line-job integral to business
Another non-regulatory indicia of an employment relationship
between workers and a grower is the workers' performance of "a
line-job integral to the harvesting and production of salable
vegetables." Aimable, 20 F.3d at 444. This factor is probative of
joint employment because a worker who performs a routine task that
is a normal and integral phase of the grower's production is likely
to be dependent on the grower's overall production process. See
Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477; Fahs,
166 F.2d at 43-44.
The evidence in this case indicates that the pickers performed
a routine line-job integral to the growers' business of growing,
harvesting and packing snap beans for fresh market sale. Turke and
his crew were but one part of an "integrated economic unit"
operated by the growers. Because the farmworkers performed a
routine task that was a normal and integral part of the growers'
bean production process, they were analogous to employees working
at a particular position on a larger production line. They were
dependent on the growers' overall production process, of which they
were one small but indispensable part. See Rutherford Food Corp.,
331 U.S. at 729-30, 67 S.Ct. at 1476-77; Fahs, 166 F.2d at 43-44.
8. Investment in equipment and facilities
Finally, one must consider the relative degree of investment
in equipment and facilities by the independent contractor on the
one hand, and the putative employer on the other. See Rutherford
Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477; Ricketts v. Vann,
32 F.3d 71, 74 (4th Cir.1994). This factor is probative because of
the workers' economic dependence on the person who supplies the
equipment or facilities.15
15
The growers argue that this factor is irrelevant to our
inquiry. According to the growers, Aimable held that a disparity
between the farmer's and the independent contractor's investment
in equipment and facilities is relevant only if the issue is
whether the contractor is an independent contractor or an alleged
employee. We disagree for two reasons. First, although the
Aimable court noted that relative investment helps determine
whether workers are employees or independent contractors,
Aimable, 20 F.3d at 443, the court stopped short of holding that
it never is relevant in joint employment cases. In fact, the
court noted that the factor did not aid its joint employment
In this case the growers owned virtually all the equipment and
facilities used by the farmworkers: the picking boxes, the lids
and wire used to close them, the pallets on which the boxes were
placed, and the trucks used to transport the boxes to the
packinghouse. Unlike the contractor in Aimable, who "made
significant investments in equipment and facilities," including
trucks, tools and a labor camp, Aimable, 20 F.3d at 443, Turke had
no equipment or vehicles of his own. Thus, his role was more like
that of the contractor in Rutherford Food Corp., who provided no
equipment and had no real business organization. Rutherford Food
Corp., 331 U.S. at 731, 67 S.Ct. at 1477. Just as the workers in
Rutherford Food Corp. could not realistically depend on their crew
leaders for other work if the slaughterhouse shut down, id., the
farmworkers here could not depend on Turke alone for their economic
livelihood.
9. Consideration of All Factors
When we consider the preceding factors collectively and
qualitatively, we conclude that the evidence before the district
court indicated that the farmworkers were jointly employed by Turke
and the growers under the AWPA and the FLSA. To be sure, many
aspects of the relationship demonstrate that the pickers were
economically dependent on Turke. Turke hired and assigned pickers
inquiry because both the grower and the labor contractor there
had substantial investment in equipment and facilities. See id.
(recognizing labor contractor's "significant investments in
equipment and facilities," including trucks, tools and labor
camp). Second, the Supreme Court has recognized that this factor
is relevant to a worker's dependence on a putative employer. See
Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 731, 67 S.Ct. at 1477; see
also Ricketts, 32 F.3d at 74. We therefore consider it.
to particular fields; he directly supervised their work; he
negotiated the price per box; he fired and disciplined workers;
and he paid the workers' wages. At the same time, however,
significant aspects of the relationship evidence the pickers'
economic dependence on the growers as well. The growers exercised
a measure of control in terms of the numbers of pickers needed and
the specific hours of work. They exercised a measure of
supervision and directly intervened in their work process. They
involved themselves in the payroll process and in making provision
for social security and workers compensation insurance when the
labor contractor was too financially unstable to do so. The
growers owned the facilities and controlled the overall production
scheme in which the pickers performed an integral line job; and
the growers, unlike Turke, had substantial investment in equipment
and facilities that were necessary for the pickers' work.
The totality of the evidence before the district court at
summary judgment demonstrates the economic dependence of the
pickers on both Turke and the growers. Such joint economic
dependence was expressly contemplated by Congress when it adopted
the "joint employer" doctrine as the best means to ensure that the
remedial purposes of the AWPA would be fulfilled. Thus, the
district court erred in concluding that the farmworkers were not
employees of the growers for purposes of the FLSA and the AWPA.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the judgment granting summary
judgment to the growers is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
* * * * * *