In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-21-00303-CV
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IN RE COMMITMENT OF LONNIE KADE WELSH
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 15-01-00659-CV
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OPINION
The Texas statute authorizing the State to civilly commit sexually
violent predators (the SVP statute) gives individuals committed to
treatment the right to file an unauthorized petition for release “on a
person’s commitment and annually after that commitment.” 1 Yet
1Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.122 (“On a person’s
commitment and annually after that commitment, the office shall
provide the person with written notice of the person’s right to file with
the court and without the office’s authorization a petition for release.”).
1
Subchapter G of the SVP statue, which includes the provisions of the
statute addressing unauthorized petitions for release, is silent on
whether a party may appeal from a ruling made by a lower court on an
unauthorized petition for release filed under Subchapter G, Chapter
841. 2 Sitting en banc, we must decide whether we have jurisdiction over
Welsh’s appeal. And to resolve that question, we must decide (1) whether
the trial court’s order denying Welsh’s petition is final or otherwise
appealable and (2) whether an opinion this Court issued seven years ago
holding that an order denying an unauthorized petition for release is
appealable should be overruled. 3
Background
In 2015, the trial court signed a final judgment and order
committing Lonnie Kade Welsh to treatment and supervision as a
sexually violent predator. 4 Around five years after the trial court
committed Welsh for treatment, Welsh filed an unauthorized petition for
2Id. §§ 841.121-.124 (Subchapter G, Petition for Release).
3In re Commitment of Keen, 462 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2015, no pet.).
4See In re Commitment of Welsh, No. 09-15-00498-CV, 2016 WL
4483165 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 25, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.);
see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.153.
2
release. In response to Welsh’s unauthorized petition, the State argued
that the records relevant to Welsh’s treatment show that he had not yet
progressed to the point that his behavioral abnormality had changed
such that he was no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual
violence. In July 2021, the trial court denied Welsh’s unauthorized
petition for release. 5 The order the trial court signed recites that based
on the pleadings and evidence in the file, the trial court found Welsh’s
petition frivolous. The order also states that probable cause does not exist
to believe that Welsh’s behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent
that he is no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.
After the trial court signed the order, Welsh filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, the State argues this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction
over Welsh’s appeal for two reasons: (1) the order denying Welsh’s
petition is not a final judgment from which an appeal is authorized by
law; and (2) nothing in the SVP statute authorizes appellate courts to
5See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.123(c) (The judge shall
deny without a hearing a petition for release filed without the
authorization of the Texas Civil Commitment Office “if the petition is
frivolous” or “the petitioner’s behavioral abnormality has not changed to
the extent that the petition is no longer likely to engage in a predatory
act of sexual violence.”).
3
entertain interlocutory appeals from rulings by trial courts in
proceedings conducted under Subchapter G, Chapter 841, the subchapter
that addresses unauthorized petitions for release. Welsh responds by
pointing to this Court’s ruling seven years ago in In re Commitment of
Keen holding that rulings on unauthorized petitions for release are
appealable. Welsh argues this Court is bound by its holding in Keen. 6
Analysis
In civil cases, the legislature limits an appellate court’s general
jurisdiction to appeals from final judgments of the district and county
courts in the appellate court’s district. 7 Otherwise, appellate review of a
trial court’s interlocutory order must be authorized by a specific statute.8
“Most post-judgment orders made to carry into effect or enforce a
judgment are not appealable because these orders are not themselves a
final judgment or an order for which an appeal is statutorily authorized.”9
6Keen, 462 S.W.3d at 526.
7See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 51.012.
8See Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d
725, 729 (Tex. 2019); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014.
9Sunnyland Dev., Inc. v. Shawn Ibrahim, Inc., 597 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).
4
Courts apply an exception to the one final judgment rule for probate
and guardianship cases because multiple final judgments may be
rendered on discrete issues in the proceedings that are considered as final
for purposes of whether appellate jurisdiction exists over the judgment
in the appeal. 10 The exception exists because probate proceedings consist
of a continuing series of events and intermediate decisions may harm
later phases of the proceedings.11 Thus, an order disposing of all issues
and all parties in a particular phase of the proceeding is final and
appealable even when the proceeding remains pending on other issues.12
An appeal may be taken if there is an express statute allowing an appeal
or upon the conclusion of a discrete phase of the proceeding. 13
Welsh points to Keen, an appeal the Court decided in 2015, to
support his argument that we have jurisdiction over his appeal from an
order denying his unauthorized petition for release. 14 In Keen, a
psychologist had prepared a report in which he concluded that Keen no
10Inre Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex. 2021).
11In re Estate of Davidson, 153 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).
12Jones, 629 S.W.3d at 925.
13Id.; Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995).
14Keen, 462 S.W.3d at 524.
5
longer suffered from a behavioral abnormality that made him likely to
engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Yet the agency then in
charge of administering SVP commitments, the Office of Violent Sex
Offender Management, asked the trial court to require Keen to remain
in the civil commitment program and continue in the program under his
existing restrictions. 15 Even though Keen filed a report from an expert to
support his petition who suggested that Keen no longer represented a
significant risk of reoffending, the trial court denied Keen’s petition
without conducting an evidentiary hearing, finding Keen’s petition
frivolous. 16 In deciding that Keen could appeal, we noted the general rule
that appeals are available only from final judgments, but we reasoned
that the trial court’s order on Keen’s petition ended a discrete phase of
the SVP proceeding—the unauthorized petition for release phase—
because it disposed of the claims raised in his petition for release. 17
To be sure, when Keen was initially committed in May 2002 as a
sexually violent predator, Keen could have appealed from the judgment
15Id. at 527.
16Id.
17Id. at 526.
6
committing him as a sexually violent predator, but did not do so. 18 And
when Keen later filed an unauthorized petition and appealed from the
trial court’s ruling denying his unauthorized petition for release, the law
was unclear about whether the legislature intended rulings on
unauthorized petitions to function as final judgments as to the issues the
petitioners raised in their unauthorized petitions. Although raised in a
case involving the enforcement of a judgment in a dispute addressing the
division of some property, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the effect of
post-judgment orders on earlier judgments in a decision it issued in
2018. 19 In that opinion, McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, the
Texas Supreme Court explained that “when a final judgment exists, a
subsequent order that has no effect except to enforce provisions of the
judgment does not qualify as another final judgment subject to appeal.”20
In SVP cases, an order denying a petitioner’s unauthorized petition
for release imposes no obligation beyond the obligations the trial court
18Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.012 (allowing a person to
appeal from a final judgment); Keen, 462 S.W.3d at 525.
19McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 281, 284
(Tex. 2018).
20Id. at 284.
7
imposed on the petitioner in its original judgment and order of civil
commitment. In an unauthorized petition for release, the petitioner is
seeking his or her release from the obligations imposed by a final
judgment, a final judgment that controls the conditions that apply to the
individual’s civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. And when
the trial court considered Keen’s petition for release, it determined
probable cause did not exist to show that his behavioral abnormality had
changed, decisions that left the final judgment and order of civil
commitment the trial court signed in 2002 in Keen’s case intact. Now
with the benefit of McFadin, we can see that Keen’s unauthorized
petition for release had no effect on the trial court’s earlier final
judgment, so the order denying the unauthorized petition did not “qualify
as another final judgment subject to appeal.” 21
Considering anew whether an order denying an unauthorized
petition for release is a final and appealable judgment, we conclude we
exercised appellate jurisdiction over Keen’s appeal in error. In
contemplating whether Keen should be overruled or followed under
21Id.
8
principles of stare decisis, we consider whether doing so would serve the
purposes of legitimacy, efficiency, and fairness. As applied here, that
means serving what the legislature likely intended in the SVP statute,
providing stability in precedent about what is appealable under the SVP
statute, and whether the interpretation we have placed on the provision
is fair based on statutory principles of construction. 22
Turning first to the question of legitimacy, we look to the text of the
SVP statute and the section addressing unauthorized petitions for
release. We note the section addressing unauthorized petitions does not
include an appeal from the ruling the trial court makes on the petition.23
And while the legislature did provide for appeals for around fifteen types
of interlocutory orders, the provisions that create appellate jurisdiction
over these interlocutory orders have no application to orders signed by
trial courts under Chapter 841. 24
22Mitschke v. Borromeo, No. 21-0326, 2022 WL 1510317, at *9-12
(Tex. May 13, 2022) (not yet reported).
23See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.124.
24Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (authorizing appeals
from fifteen separate types of interlocutory orders).
9
Turning next to the issue of efficiency, the opinion we issued in Keen
has created a split in the intermediate courts of appeal on the question of
whether rulings by trial courts on Chapter 841 petitions for release are
appealable. 25 In 2019, the First Court of Appeals held that the ruling was
interlocutory and since it was not a ruling from a final judgment was
unappealable. 26 In 2022, the Sixth Court of Appeals agreed with
Dunsmore and concluded the trial court’s ruling denying the petitioner’s
“unauthorized petition for release is an unappealable, interlocutory
order.” 27 Thus, rather than create certainty, invoking stare decisis and
continuing to follow Keen would perpetuate a split of authority among
the Courts of Appeals and would not promote efficiency or legitimacy.
And as to stability, no courts have followed Keen.
Turning last to the question of fairness, we note that Welsh could
seek mandamus relief if he filed and proved in a petition for mandamus
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his unauthorized
25In re Commitment of Renshaw, No. 06-22-00034-CV, 2022 WL
2069224, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 9, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem.
op.); In re Commitment of Dunsmore, No. 01-18-00183-CV, 2019 WL
2180446, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 21, 2019, no pet.).
26In re Commitment of Dunsmore, 2019 WL 2180446, at *2.
27In re Commitment of Renshaw, 2022 WL 2069224, at *2.
10
petition by finding it frivolous. 28 But the case before us here is an appeal
and not a petition for mandamus, so the question we must decide is
whether we have appellate jurisdiction over Welsh’s appeal since he is
not seeking mandamus relief. In addressing fairness, we also note that
among the procedural remedies the legislature provided individuals who
have been committed for treatment, the civil commitment statute
requires courts to conduct a biennial review of sexually violent predator
commitment cases under the procedures in Subchapter F, Chapter 841.29
The biennial review procedure in Subchapter F requires that a trial court
set a hearing on an individual’s case should the trial court determine in
the biennial review hearing one of two things: (1) the requirements that
have been imposed on the person who has been committed to treatment
should be modified; or (2) “probable cause exists to believe that the
28See generally CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452–54 (Tex.
2011) (holding that under appropriate circumstances, an interlocutory
trial court order may be reviewed by mandamus); In re Richards, No. 09-
14-00243-CV, 2014 WL 3697027, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 24,
2014, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.) (considering
mandamus challenge to an order denying an evidentiary hearing in a
Subchapter F biennial review proceeding).
29See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.101-.103 (Subchapter
F, requiring the review of the individual’s commitment as a sexually
violent predator on a biennial basis.).
11
person’s behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent the person is
no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” 30
Finally, we have rejected the right of an SVP to file successive
appeals beyond the initial appeal available from the judgment of
commitment when deciding whether the Court could exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the trial court’s order denying the SVP’s request for a
hearing in a post-judgment procedure known as a biennial review.31 In
deciding we did not have jurisdiction to hear that appeal, we observed
the SVP statute provides several avenues for judicial review
where a sexually violent predator has been committed to long-
term supervision and treatment. The right of appeal is
expressly granted in section 841.062(a) following the original
determination of predator status; in addition, the
constitutional protections that apply to the initial
commitment proceeding attach if the trial court finds probable
cause and conducts an adversarial hearing contemplated by
section 841.103(c). 32
Simply put, individuals committed to treatment as sexually violent
predators have several avenues of procedural due process, and that
30Id. § 841.102(c).
31In re Commitment of Richards, 395 S.W.3d 905, 910 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2013, pet. denied).
32Id. (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.062(a),
841.103(c)).
12
process includes judicial oversight regarding the necessity and terms of
their respective commitments. While the legislature chose not to make
each decision of district judges at each stage of these proceedings
reviewable in direct appeals, that does not mean the decisions trial
court’s make in these post-judgment proceedings are beyond review by
mandamus. After this Court decided Richards, other Courts of Appeals
followed Richards, agreeing that orders resulting from biennial review
hearings are not appealable. 33
Conclusion
No statute specifically authorizes a party to appeal from a trial
court’s ruling denying an unauthorized petition for release. Given our
conclusion that the trial court’s order denying Welsh’s petition does not
function as a final judgment, we conclude we lack appellate jurisdiction
over Welsh’s appeal. And because our conclusion in Welsh that appellate
jurisdiction does exist conflicts with our ruling in Keen, we overrule In re
Commitment of Keen so the law in the Ninth Appellate District aligns
33In re Commitment of Dunsmore, No. 01-21-00151-CV, 2022 WL
904441, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2022, no pet.); In
re Commitment of Black, 594 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2019, no pet.).
13
with the other Appellate Districts in Texas. 34 For the reasons explained
above, Welsh’s appeal is dismissed without reference to the merits of the
appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Per Curiam
Submitted on July 8, 2022
Opinion Delivered July 28, 2022
En banc
34See Keen, 462 S.W.3d at 525.
14