[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 23, 2005
_____________
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
No. 03-15264
_____________
D.C. Docket No. 99-03137-CV-C-E
LILLY M. LEDBETTER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GOODYEAR TIRE AND
RUBBER COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
Northern District of Alabama
__________________________
(August 23, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves a claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19641 by a former salaried employee of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
(“Goodyear”). The employee, Lilly Ledbetter, claims that Goodyear paid her a
smaller salary than it paid her male co-workers at Goodyear’s Gadsden, Alabama,
tire plant because of her sex. Goodyear’s position, in addition to denying that sex
played any role in the setting of her salary, is that Ledbetter may prevail only if
she can prove that unlawful discrimination tainted an annual review of her salary
made within 180 days of her filling a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
The question we must decide, therefore, is how Title VII’s timely-filing
requirement applies in this specie of disparate pay cases—that is, cases involving
an employer that annually reviews and re-establishes employee salary levels.
We decline to adopt Goodyear’s position definitively, because we need not
do so to determine whether Goodyear is entitled to the judgment as a matter of
law. All we need to do is examine the last salary decision Goodyear made that
affected Ledbetter’s pay during the limitations period. We have done that and
conclude that no reasonable jury could find that the decision was discrimanitorily
motivated. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court denying
Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (as amended).
2
I. Background and the Proceedings in the District Court
A. Background
1. The Gadsden Plant
During the relevant time period, Goodyear’s Gadsden plant was divided into
several discrete units, called “business centers,” each of which was responsible for
one of the several stages of the tire production process. The plant included at least
four business centers, each managed by a “Business Center Manager” (“BCM”):
(1) Rubber Mixing (a.k.a. “Banbury” or the “Mixing Area”), where the rubber was
prepared; (2) Component Preparation (a.k.a. “Stock Prep”), where the components
for the tires were made; (3) Tire Assembly (a.k.a. the “Tire Room”), where
machines were used to press the components into “green,” or unfinished, tires; and
(4) Curing/Final Finish, where the green tires were cured, painted, trimmed, and
inspected before shipment.
These business centers were in some cases further divided into discrete
“sections” or “rooms.” Tire Assembly, for example, at one point included at least
four sections, including the Radial Light Truck section (“RLT”), which assembled
larger tires for sport-utility vehicles and light trucks, and the “ARF Room,” which
assembled smaller radial tires for passenger cars. Within any one section or room,
there were normally three or four rotating shifts of floor-level workers and their
3
supervisors.
The machines used in the tire-production process were operated directly by
“tire builders”—unionized, hourly workers. The tire builders were then
supervised by salaried, nonunion, floor-level managers called “Area Managers.”
Each Area Manager supervised one shift of tire builders, such that if a section
were running four shifts, it would have four Area Managers, one for each shift.
These “production teams”—the tire builders and their Area Managers—were
supported by unionized maintenance and electrical workers, as well as by various
salaried managerial officers and specialists, including “Production Specialists” and
“Production Auditors.” Directly above the Area Managers in the corporate
hierarchy were the BCMs, who were responsible for everyone in their business
center, including the tire builders, the maintenance and electrical workers, the
Area Managers, and the salaried managerial support staff. Supervision of the
entire plant, including at least the four production-oriented business centers
described above and a Human Resources Department, fell to a single Plant
Manager.
2. The Merit Compensation System
Beginning in the early 1980s, managerial employees’ salaries at the
Gadsden plant were determined primarily based on a system of annual merit-based
4
raises. The exact details of the system do not warrant extended discussion.
Suffice it to say that in the early months of each year, each BCM was charged with
recommending2 salary increases for the salaried employees under his or her
supervision, including the Area Managers. These recommendations were based
primarily on each employee’s performance in relation to that of other salaried
employees in the business center during the previous year (the “performance
year”). Business-center-wide performance rankings were calculated based on
individual “performance appraisals” that had been completed for, and reviewed
with, each employee at the end of the performance year or early in the year
following. Using the performance rankings and certain Goodyear guidelines on
the size and frequency of merit-based raises, the BCM would complete a merit
increase plan, a worksheet detailing the merit increases the BCM recommended
for that year. These plans included, for each salaried employee, his or her
performance ranking, present salary, and salary range; the date of his or her last
increase; the recommended increase for the coming year (in dollars and as a
2
The BCMs’ recommendations were subject to the approval of higher management. The
merit increase planning forms, for example, asked the BCM to state the increase he “proposed”
for each employee. Indeed, two of the four planning forms admitted into evidence were signed
and dated by individuals who served as Plant Manager, and a third was signed by an individual
who served as Human Resources Manager. Goodyear’s compensation guidelines for 1996 state
that merit increases (for that year) had to be “approved by the head of the division prior to any
increase being granted.”
5
percentage increase over present salary); and the date that the increase would
become effective. These plans were then submitted to higher level management
for approval. See supra note 1. Thus, each salaried employee at the Gadsden
plant had his or her salary reviewed at least once annually by plant management,
when the time came for the awarding of merit-based raises.
3. Lilly Ledbetter
Lilly Ledbetter hired in to the Gadsden plaint as a “Supervisor,” the
precursor to the Area Manager position, on February 5, 1979, at forty years of age.
The record discloses very little about the first dozen years of Ledbetter’s career.
She worked as an Area Manager in several different business centers under several
different BCMs. Twice, in 1986 and again in 1989, she was included in general
layoffs, one lasting fifteen months. The record does not disclose who, prior to
1992, the other Area Managers in Ledbetter’s immediate areas of the plant were,
how Ledbetter fared against them in end-of-year performance rankings, or how her
salary or the merit-based raises she received compared to theirs.
In early 1992, Ledbetter was selected to be part of the start-up team for the
new RLT section of the Tire Assembly business center, which would produce
large radial tires for sport utility vehicles and light trucks. From the summer of
1992 until the beginning of 1996, Ledbetter was supervised in RLT by Mike
6
Tucker, who was at first “Team Leader” for the RLT section and, after 1995, BCM
for the entire Tire Assembly area. Four Area Managers worked together under
Tucker in RLT from 1992 until 1996: Ledbetter, Bill Miller, Jimmy Todd, and
Jerry Thompson.
With the sole exception of performance year 1994, Tucker consistently
ranked Ledbetter at or near the bottom of her co-workers in terms of performance.
In 1993, he ranked her third out of the four Area Managers, and fifth out of six
salaried employees, based on her 1992 performance. Tucker suggested, and she
received, a 5.28% increase over her existing salary, the largest percentage increase
given to any Area Manager, though the smallest in absolute dollars. Jimmy Todd,
who was ranked last, received no merit increase.
In planning for the merit increases for 1994, Tucker ranked Ledbetter last
among the four RLT Area Managers, and last among the six salaried employees.
He proposed that she receive a 5% merit increase, the smallest he proposed.
In 1995, Tucker awarded Ledbetter a substantial increase of 7.85%, to
become effective December 1, 1995, based on her performance in 1994. The
record does not reflect her exact performance ranking, but the raise she received
included a 4% increase styled as an “individual performance award” and a 3.85%
increase styled as a “top performance award.” According to the compensation
7
guidelines in effect at the time, top performance awards were to be given “[f]or
only the highest level of individual performance and contribution in an
organization,” and to “not more than 30% of the number of salaried associates in an
organization.” (Id.). Dual individual performance/top performance awards of the
type Ledbetter received were “intended to be used to reward and recognize the
uppermost level of top performer.”3 (Id. at 5).
Ledbetter was ineligible for a merit increase in 1996 because her 1995 raise
became effective December 1, 1995, and the minimum time interval between raises
was then thirteen months, meaning that she would not be eligible for another merit
increase until January 1, 1997. She was nevertheless ranked against the twenty-
three other salaried employees in Tire Assembly, which had been unified under a
single BCM, Tucker, in 1995. Tucker ranked Ledbetter twenty-third out of twenty-
four salaried employees, and fifteenth out of sixteen Area Managers. Jimmy Todd
was ranked twenty-fourth, and both he and the person ranked twenty-second were
denied raises
3
Neither Ledbetter’s performance appraisal for 1994 nor the merit increase planning
form Tucker completed in 1995 were produced at trial, so there is no documentary record of how
Ledbetter actually ranked against her colleagues. Some evidence suggests that Tucker
recommended such a large increase for Ledbetter, not because she was truly a “top performer,”
but simply because he wanted to raise her salary and thought he could only do so significantly by
giving her a “top performance award,” which allowed him to exceed a 4% cap on “individual
performance” awards. We credit the evidence favoring Ledbetter, however, and grant her the
inference that she was truly among the best performing employees in RLT in 1994.
8
In March 1996, around the time that Tucker recommended raises for 1995's
performance, Ledbetter was transferred to the “ARF room,” a section of Tire
Assembly that made smaller radial tires for passenger vehicles. Jerry Jones, who
replaced Tucker as Tire Assembly’s BCM in the summer of 1996, told her that she
had been transferred because of her sub-standard performance in RLT.
At the end of 1996, as Jones was completing the performance appraisals for
that year, Pete Buchanan, the Human Resources Manager, instructed him not to
evaluate Ledbetter’s or Todd’s performance because, based on their 1995
performance rankings, both were slated to be included in the plant’s upcoming
layoffs. Jones, in turn, informed Ledbetter that she would be laid off along with
Jimmy Todd and a “long list” of people in departments all over the plant.
The next day, however, Jones told Ledbetter that she was to continue
working, as a substitute for other Area Managers who were or would be out on
extended medical leave. Ledbetter worked in that capacity through 1997, and
received the same monthly salary she had been paid since her last merit increase, in
December 1995. Thus, at the end of 1997, she was still earning $3727 per month,
less than all fifteen of the other Area Managers in Tire Assembly. The lowest paid
male Area Manager was making $4286, roughly 15% more than Ledbetter; the
9
highest paid was making $5236, roughly 40% more than Ledbetter.4
Throughout 1997, Ledbetter and Jones had several conversations in which he
expressed concerns about her performance. At one such meeting, in August, Jones
strongly recommended that she apply for a non-supervisory Technology Engineer
position that was open in the Final Finish area. He reminded her that she was still
slated for layoff, and he implied that she would be laid off unless she transferred to
an area not effected by the reduction in force.5 He thought the Technology Engineer
position would be good for her. Ledbetter interviewed for the position the same day
and was accepted, although she continued working as an Area Manager in the ARF
room for the remainder 1997.
In October, Jones transferred to another Goodyear facility and was replaced
by Kelly Owen as BCM of Tire Assembly. On January 5, 1998, Ledbetter began
working as a Technology Engineer—at the same salary she received in 1997. She
was replaced in the ARF room by Jerry Thompson, who in turn was replaced in
4
The salaries these male Area Managers were receiving included the raises they received
for 1997. As stated in the text supra, Ledbetter received no raise for that year because she was
slated for layoff.
5
Jones told her that other Area Managers were to be laid off, “going to be cut,” as he put
it.
10
RLT by Brent Payne, a former tire builder Ledbetter had once supervised.6
Though Ledbetter was no longer working in Tire Assembly, Kelly Owen
reviewed her performance, and that of the other salaried employees in the unit, for
1997. Owen ranked her twenty-third out of twenty-four salaried employees and
fifteenth out of sixteen Area Managers. He ranked one male Area Manager, Dean
Nance, below her. Nance, Ledbetter, and the two other lowest ranking Area
Managers were all denied raises. Because Ledbetter was denied a raise for 1998, as
she had been for 1997 and 1996, she remained at the same monthly salary ($3727)
she had been paid since her December 1, 1995 raise.
On March 25, 1998, Ledbetter filed a questionnaire with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that she had been forced
into the Technology Engineer position and was being subjected to disparate
treatment in her new department on account of her sex. In July, she filed a formal
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. This time she alleged, in addition to her
earlier complaints, that she had received a discriminatorily low salary as an Area
Manager because of her sex.
In August, Goodyear announced that it was going to downsize the Gadsden
6
Although the record is not explicit, the inescapable inference is that Thompson and
Payne continued what Ledbetter had been doing—that is, standing in for the Area Managers who
were on medical leave.
11
plant and that those who were likely be laid off would have the option of choosing
early retirement. Ledbetter applied, was accepted, and retired effective November
1, 1998.
In February 1999, Goodyear announced that the Gadsden plant would close.
The plant never completely shut down, however, but large-scale layoffs were made,
and several Area Managers were either laid off or given the opportunity to transfer
to other plants. At the height of the layoffs and transfers, the number of Area
Managers in Tire Assembly—where Ledbetter had worked from 1992 to 1998—fell
to from a high of sixteen to a low of four.
B. The Proceedings in the District Court
Ledbetter filed this lawsuit on November 24, 1999.7 After a wide-ranging
jury trial that included evidence spanning the entirety of Ledbetter’s nineteen-year
career, four claims were submitted to the jury: a claim that Ledbetter had been the
victim of gender-disparate pay as an Area Manager, in violation of Title VII, and
7
Ledbetter’s complaint presented multiple claims of age discrimination, sex
discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (as
amended), the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Other than her disparate pay claim brought
under Title VII, and her age-, sex-, and retaliation-based claims relating to her transfer to the
Final Finish area as a Technology Engineer, each of Ledbetter’s claims was abandoned or
dismissed by the district court though summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in favor
of Goodyear. Because the jury found in Goodyear’s favor on the transfer-related claims as we
relate in the next paragraph of the text, the only claim at issue in this appeal is the Title VII
disparate pay claim.
12
three claims, brought under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”), relating to her transfer to the Final Finish area as a Technology
Engineer. These claims were that the transfer had been involuntarily forced upon
her because of her sex or her age, or in retaliation for her having made complaints of
sex discrimination.
After the district court denied Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law,8 the jury found for Goodyear on the transfer-related claims but returned a
verdict in favor of Ledbetter on the Title VII pay claim, finding, in a special
verdict,9 that it was “more likely than not that Defendant paid Plaintiff an unequal
salary because of her sex.” The jury recommended $223,776 in backpay, awarded
$4,662 for mental anguish, and awarded $3,285,979 in punitive damages.
Goodyear thereafter renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on
Ledbetter’s disparate pay claim and, alternatively, moved the court to grant it either
a new trial or a remittitur.10 Goodyear contended, as it had throughout the litigation,
that Ledbetter’s pay claim—or, more accurately, the way she had been permitted to
prove her pay claim—was barred by Title VII’s requirement that the conduct
8
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
9
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
10
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
13
complained of in a Title VII action must have been the focus of an EEOC charge
filed within 180 days of the occurrence of the conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1). Addressing its motion for judgment as a matter of law, Goodyear argued
that “no reasonable fact finder could conclude that [Ledbetter’s] sex was a
motivating factor in a salary decision made during the period covered by [the]
EEOC charge.” Assuming for sake of argument that Ledbetter had made out a case
for the jury, Goodyear contended that it was entitled to a new trial because the court
had erred in permitting Ledbetter to challenge every annual review of her salary,
from 1979 on, all but one of which fell outside the 180-day period created by her
EEOC charge.
The district court denied Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
but remitted the entire award to $360,000, including the statutory maximum of
$300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and $60,000 in backpay. Of
Goodyear’s arguments on the 180-day issue and the sufficiency of the evidence, the
court said simply that
[t]he jury’s finding that Plaintiff was subjected to a gender disparate
salary is abundantly supported by the evidence. . . .
The jury could reasonably have found that Terry Amberson is
an appropriate comparator.11 Apparently, both he and the Plaintiff
11
Terry Amberson was the highest paid of five male Area Managers Ledbetter had used
as comparators. Each had worked in Tire Assembly—though not necessarily in her section or
14
were paid the same salary on April 1, 1979, and again on April 16,
1979. Plaintiff’s Exhibit (“PX”) 201. The jury could reasonably have
concluded that but for the gender discrimination, their salaries would
have been the same up to November 1, 1998. It could have found that
in the 1996-1998 period, Plaintiff’s base annual salary was $44,724;
and that Amberson’s base salary was $59,028. (footnote omitted).
The court remitted the punitive damages to $295,338, the amount which,
when combined with the $4,662 mental anguish award, reached the $300,000 cap on
compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII actions against employers with
more than 500 employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (limiting damages
awarded under Title VII to $300,000 “in the case of a respondent who has more than
500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year”). Ledbetter accepted the remittitur. Judgment was therefore entered
for $360,000, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. Goodyear timely appealed.12
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
applying the same standard as the district court. E.g., Russell v. N. Broward Hosp.,
346 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate
when “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient
room—during Ledbetter’s final years as an Area Manager.
12
Ledbetter did not cross-appeal; accordingly, she does not challenge any of the district
court’s rulings.
15
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50(a)(1). When the merits of the motion turn on the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review the entire record, examining all evidence, by whomever
presented, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. See Russell, 346 F.3d at 1343;
Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1154 (11th Cir. 2002); Lambert v.
Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 594 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, we do not
assume the jury’s role of weighing conflicting evidence or inferences, or of
assessing the credibility of witnesses. Brochu, 304 F.3d at 1154-55 (quoting
Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th
Cir.2001)).
Thus, although [we must] review the record as a whole, [we] must
disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury [was]
not required to believe. That is, [we] give credence to the evidence
favoring the nonmovant as well as that “evidence supporting the
moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the
extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S. Ct. 2097,
2110, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000) (quoting 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2529, at 299-300 (2d ed.1995)).
At the end of this review, we will reverse the denial of judgment as a matter
16
of law only if “the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of [the
movant], such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Miller
v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Combs
v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir.1997)). “It bears repeating,”
however, “that a mere scintilla of evidence does not create a jury question.
[Judgment as a matter of law] need not be reserved for situations where there is a
complete absence of facts to support a jury verdict. Rather, there must be a
substantial conflict in [the] evidence,” Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d
1208, 1230 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581
(11th Cir. 1989)), enough such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.
III. Analysis
Goodyear’s argument regarding Ledbetter’s pay claim is two-pronged. First,
Goodyear argues that Title VII’s timely-filing requirement limited Ledbetter to
challenging the one affirmative decision directly affecting her pay that was made
within the 180-day limitations period created by her EEOC charge: Kelly Owen’s
February 1998 decision not to increase her salary for that year. Second, Goodyear
argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no reasonable jury
could find that decision to have been improperly motived by gender discrimination.
17
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Part III.A., we consider how Title VII’s
timely-filing requirement applies to this specie of disparate pay claims—that is,
those in which the salary or pay level being challenged was periodically reviewed
and re-established by the defendant-employer. We conclude that in the search for
an improperly motivated, affirmative decision directly affecting the employee’s pay,
the employee may reach outside the limitations period created by her EEOC charge
no further that the last such decision immediately preceding the start of the
limitations period. We do not hold that an employee may reach back even that far;
what we hold is that she may reach no further. In Part III.B., we apply this holding
to Ledbetter’s claim. We conclude that no reasonable juror could find intentional
discrimination in either of the two decisions setting Ledbetter’s salary as it existed
during the limitations period.
A. The Timely-Filing Requirement
Under § 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), only those “unlawful
employment practice[s]” that are complained of in a timely-filed charge of
discrimination to the EEOC can form the basis for Title VII liability. See, e.g., City
of Hialeah v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1102 (11th Cir. 2002) (“If the victim of an
employer’s unlawful employment practice does not file a timely complaint, the
unlawful practice ceases to have legal significance, and the employer is entitled to
18
treat the unlawful practice as if it were lawful.”). For claims arising in so-called
“non-deferral” states, such as Alabama, to be timely, the applicable charge must
have been filed within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.” § 2000e-5(e)(1).13 Therefore, only those “practice[s]” that “occurred”
within 180 days of the operative EEOC charge can form the basis for Title VII
liability.
The parties both assume for purposes of this appeal that the operative
“charge” in this case is the EEOC questionnaire Ledbetter filed on March 25, 1998,
and that her pay claim—which was included in her formal charge filed in July 1998,
but not the questionnaire—should relate back to the date of the questionnaire.14
Measuring from March 25, 1998, the 180-day period began to run on September 26,
1997. The question, therefore, is whether Ledbetter made out a claim for disparate
treatment in pay based on conduct occurring after September 26, 1997.
1. The Morgan Decision.
The Supreme Court substantially clarified the operation of Title VII’s timely-
filing requirement in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
13
In “deferral” states—those states that have an EEOC-like state administrative
agency—a charge of discrimination must first be filed with the state agency, and the filing period
is extended to 300 days.
14
We do not pass on the correctness of these assumptions.
19
122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), so we begin our analysis there. In
Morgan, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider “whether, and under what
circumstances, a Title VII plaintiff may file suit on events that fall outside [the
timely-filing] period.” Id. at 105, 122 S. Ct. at 2068. On that question, the Court
reached two different answers, one for each of the two types of claims at issue in the
case: (1) disparate treatment and retaliation claims challenging “discrete
discriminatory or retaliatory acts,” and (2) a claim alleging a hostile work
environment. See id.
The Court held that the timely-filing requirement erects an absolute bar on
recovery for “discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts” occurring outside the
limitations period. In doing so, it rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “serial violations”
doctrine, eschewing the notion “that so long as one act falls within the charge filing
period, [time-barred] discriminatory and retaliatory acts that are plausibly or
sufficiently related to that act may also be considered for purposes of liability.” Id.
at 114, 122 S. Ct. at 2072-73. The Court reasoned that “discrete acts of
discrimination” such as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or
refusal to hire” are easy to identify, and each “constitutes a separate actionable
‘unlawful employment practice.’” Id. at 114, 122 S. Ct. at 2073. Because each is an
identifiable violation of Title VII, “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new
20
clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Id. at 113, 122 S. Ct. at 2072. In such
cases, there is no issue about when, in the language of the statute, the “alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). It “occurred”
on the day that it “happened.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109, 122 S. Ct. 2070. A party,
therefore, must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the date of a discrete
discriminatory or retaliatory act or lose the ability to recover for it, id. at 113, 122
S. Ct. at 2072, regardless of whether the time-barred acts are closely related to acts
alleged in a timely-filed charge. Pre-limitations acts can be used, where relevant,
“as background evidence in support of [the] timely claim,” Id. at 113, 122 S. Ct. at
2072, but they cannot themselves form the basis for liability.
The Court distinguished claims in which the plaintiff alleges that he or she
was subjected to a hostile work environment. For those claims, the Court held,
“consideration of the entire scope of [the] claim, including behavior alleged outside
the statutory time period, is permissible for the purposes of assessing liability, so
long as an act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the
statutory time period.” Id. at 105, 122 S. Ct. at 2068. The Court reasoned that
[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.
Their very nature involves repeated conduct. The “unlawful
employment practice” therefore cannot be said to occur on any
particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in
direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be
21
actionable on its own. Such claims are based on the cumulative effect
of individual acts.
Id. at 115, 122 S. Ct. at 2073 (citations omitted). “Given,” the Court said, “that the
incidents constituting a hostile work environment are part of one unlawful
employment practice, the employer may be liable for all acts that are part of this
single claim.” Id. at 118, 122 S. Ct. at 2075.
We think it clear that pay claims of the type Ledbetter asserts are governed
by that part of the Morgan decision addressing claims alleging “discrete acts of
discrimination.” It is fundamental that for a Title VII plaintiff to prevail on any type
disparate treatment claim, he or she must point to some specific, conscious conduct
that was tainted by the alleged improper consideration (be it “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). In a case in which the plaintiff
complains of discriminatory pay, there are only two possible sources of such
conduct: the decisions setting the plaintiff’s salary level or pay rate, and the
issuance of paychecks reflecting those decisions. Whether it is a pay-setting
decision or the issuance of a confirming paycheck that is viewed as the operative act
of discrimination, the act is, like “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer,
or refusal to hire,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S. Ct. at 2073, discrete in time,
easy to identify, and—if done with the requisite intent—independently actionable.
22
If an employee is denied a raise, given a pay cut, or hired at a deflated pay grade
because of a prohibited consideration, the statute is violated and the employee can
file suit the moment the decision is made. The decision would be no less unlawful
if the employee were to quit the next day in exasperation and never receive a
paycheck reflecting her unlawful pay rate; proving damages might be problematic,
but establishing liability would not. Similarly, if the act complained of is the
issuance of a discrete discriminatory paycheck (or paychecks), then the issuance of
the challenged paycheck completes the “alleged unlawful employment practice” for
purposes of the timely-filing requirement. Pay claims do not, therefore, have those
characteristics that led the Court to devise a separate rule governing the timing of
hostile work environment claims: The “unlawful employment practice” can be said
to occur on a particular day (though it may be repeated on multiple days), and a
single discriminatory act is actionable on its own. The alleged discriminatory
behaviors need not accumulate to some critical mass to become actionable.15
15
The Seventh Circuit has reached the same conclusion. See Reese v. Ice Cream
Specialties, Inc., 347 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that “it is relatively easy to
rule out” the possibility that disparate pay claims should be treated like hostile environment
claims after Morgan); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir.
2003) (“Using Morgan as our guide . . . we must conclude that each of Dr. Hildebrandt’s
paychecks that included discriminatory pay was a discrete discriminatory act, not subject to the
continuing violation doctrine. Therefore, Dr. Hildebrandt may only recover for the
discriminatory pay received within the statute of limitations period.”) (footnote omitted); cf.
Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding in a pre-
Morgan Equal Pay Act case that “a claim of discriminatory pay is fundamentally unlike other
23
Under Morgan, therefore, Ledbetter can state a timely cause of action for
disparate pay only to the extent that the “discrete acts of discrimination” of which
she complains occurred within the limitations period created by her EEOC
questionnaire. Any acts of discrimination affecting her salary occurring before then
are time-barred.
2. Ledbetter’s Claim.16
It is undisputed that Ledbetter’s claim is not entirely time barred. In February
1998, after Ledbetter had transferred to the Final Finish area to assume the
Technology Engineer position, her pay level was reviewed by Kelly Owen, who
decided not to recommend that she receive any raise. That decision was affirmed by
higher level management at the plant. Because an affirmative decision directly
affecting Ledbetter’s pay was made within the limitations period (i.e., after
September 26, 1997), she may at least challenge that decision as discriminatory.
The claim is identical in form to the raise-denial claims courts routinely consider.
claims of ongoing discriminatory treatment because it involves a series of discrete, individual
wrongs rather than a single and indivisible course of wrongful action”).
16
We note that neither party has argued that equitable considerations require deviation
from straight-forward application of the 180-day filing period. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121-22,
122 S. Ct. at 2076-77 (reaffirming that the timely-filing requirement is subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling, and holding that defendants may avail themselves of the defense
of laches). We therefore have no occasion to consider, for example, the timing and extent of
Ledbetter’s awareness of the disparity between her salary and those of her co-workers.
24
The rub is that Ledbetter did not want to stop at the 1998 raise decision
because doing so would have (1) limited the damages she could have recovered, (2)
rendered useless evidence relevant only to other persons in the plant upon which she
wanted the jury to rely, and (3) forced her to prove that Owen acted with
discriminatory intent. Instead, what Ledbetter did—what the district court allowed
her to do—was to point to the substantial disparity between her salary and those of
the male Area Managers in Tire Assembly at the end of her career, put on
circumstantial evidence that persons having control over her pay earlier in her
career had discriminatory animus toward women, show that other female Area
Managers in the plant were paid less than their male co-workers, and then put the
onus on Goodyear to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for every
dollar of difference between her salary and her male co-workers’ salaries. This
necessarily put at issue every salary-related decision made during Ledbetter’s
nineteen-year career.
To support her argument that she was entitled to prove her claim in this way,
Ledbetter cites a series of pre-Morgan cases that, attempting to follow the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L. Ed. 2d
315 (1986), essentially carved out a doctrine for applying the timely-filing
requirement to disparate pay claims. Though the circuits took slightly different
25
approaches, many held prior to Morgan that a Title VII claim challenging an
employee’s pay was not time-barred so long as the plaintiff received within the
limitations period at least one paycheck implementing the pay rate the employee
challenged as unlawful.17
17
This included at least the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits. See Calloway v. Partners National Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993)
(relying on Bazemore in holding that a plaintiff could challenge her initial wage rate as unlawful,
even though it had been established outside the limitations period, because she continued to
receive paychecks within the limitations period); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 258 (3d Cir.
2001) (“in a Title VII case claiming discriminatory pay, the receipt of each paycheck is a
continuing violation”); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 346 (4th Cir. 1994)
(“[I]n a compensation discrimination case, the issuance of each diminished paycheck constitutes
a discriminatory act”); Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397, 398 (6th Cir.1982) (“[T]he
discrimination [against the plaintiff] was continuing in nature. [She] suffered a denial of equal
pay with every check she received.”); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164,
168 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc) (“Ashley’s Title VII pay claim is timely because she received
allegedly discriminatory paychecks within 300 days prior to the filing of her administrative
charge.”) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Morgan, 536 U.S. at 101, 122 S. Ct.
at 2061; Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“As each plaintiff in the instant action filed charges with the EEOC within 180 days
of a [wage] payment, we conclude that plaintiffs’ action is not time-barred.”); Goodwin v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Bazemore . . . has taught a crucial
distinction with respect to discriminatory disparities in pay, establishing that a discriminatory
salary is not merely a lingering effect of past discrimination—instead it is itself a continually
recurring violation.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 941, 123 S. Ct. 340, 154 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2002);
Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335-37 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that under Bazemore, the
continued application of a discriminatory compensation scheme is itself an actionable violation,
and that the plaintiffs could therefore “be made whole for those paychecks received during” the
applicable limitations period).
Some circuits relied on the so-called “continuing violations” doctrine, variously defined,
e.g., Calloway, 986 F.2d at 448-49; Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 258, while others expressly rejected
that label, e.g., Gandy v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 24 F.3d 861, 864-65 (6th Cir. 1994) (EPA
claim). Some restricted the damages recoverable to the pay lost as a result of paychecks received
within the timely-filing period, e.g., Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 346, n.22; Ashley, 66 F.3d at
167-68, while others at least in certain circumstances allowed the plaintiff to recover for the full
two-year backpay period specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), e.g., Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1011
(misreading Ashley as agreeing with this result), Anderson, 180 F.3d at 335-37.
The Second Circuit never addressed the issue in the context of Title VII, but pre-Morgan
26
Assuming that these cases survive Morgan, they do not stand for the broad
proposition Ledbetter urges. It is one thing to say that a claim is not entirely time
barred because the discriminatory decision being challenged continued to be
periodically implemented through paychecks issued within the limitations period. It
is quite another to say that the bare issuance of a lower-than-wished-for paycheck
within the limitations period opens the door for a full inquiry into the motivations of
every person who ever made a decision contributing to the plaintiff’s pay level as it
existed during the limitations period. In other words, the cases on which Ledbetter
relies hold simply that pay claims are not time-barred if (allegedly) unlawful
paychecks were issued within the limitations period; they do not speak to how far
back in time the plaintiff may reach in looking for the intentionally discriminatory
act that is the central, requisite element of every successful disparate treatment
claim. E.g., Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“Disparate treatment claims require proof of discriminatory intent[,] either through
decisions under other statutes suggest it would have adopted the majority position. See Connolly
v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on Bazemore in holding in a § 1983 case that
“application of a discriminatory policy” within the limitations period preserves a claim against
that policy, even if the policy was instituted outside the limitations period); Pollis v. New School
for Social Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Equal Pay Act claims re-
accrue with the receipt of each challenged paycheck); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int’l, Inc., 159 F.3d 1347
(2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (holding in a § 1981 case that “under Bazemore, each
discriminatory paycheck constituted a new violation for which suit could be brought within the
statute of limitations period beginning with its occurrence”).
27
direct or circumstantial evidence.”)
Of course, the necessary implication of these cases is that a plaintiff whose
claim is preserved by the continued issuance of improperly low paychecks can look
some distance back in time for the underlying, intentionally discriminatory decision.
Unless there is a claim that the person—or, more likely today, the computer—who
actually issued the paychecks in question did so with intent to discriminate, the
operative act of discrimination will always be, not the act of issuing paychecks, but
the act of making the underlying decision about what the plaintiff should be paid.
Thus, if a claim is timely only because of the continued receipt of paychecks within
the limitations period, it must be that the plaintiff can point to a decision outside the
limitations period as the offending act.
There must, however, be some limit on how far back the plaintiff can reach.
If it were otherwise, the timely-filing requirement would be completely illusory in
many pay-related Title VII cases. So long as the plaintiff received one paycheck
within the limitations period that was based on the pay level he or she objects to, the
plaintiff could effectively call into question every decision made contributing to his
or her being paid at that level. This result would be directly contrary to the central
purposes of the time-filing requirement: to “encourag[e] prompt resolution of
employment disputes,” Hill v. Ga. Power Co., 786 F.2d 1071, 1076 n.9 (11th Cir.
28
1986), and “to protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from
employment decisions that are long past,” Del. State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 256-57, 101 S. Ct. 498, 503, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1980).
Limits on how far into the past the plaintiff can look for an intentionally
discriminatory decision are most obviously warranted where, as here, the
employee’s pay level was subjected to periodic re-assessment through regularly
scheduled raise decisions. In such cases, the timing of the employer’s compensation
system creates one, obviously preferable opportunity for an employee to make any
pay-related complaints: the point at which the employee’s salary is reviewed and he
or she is dissatisfied with the result. We think, therefore, that at least in cases in
which the employer has a system for periodically reviewing and re-establishing
employee pay, an employee seeking to establish that his or her pay level was
unlawfully depressed may look no further into the past than the last affirmative
decision directly affecting the employee’s pay immediately preceding the start of the
limitations period. Other, earlier decisions may be relevant, but only to the extent
they shed light on the motivations of the persons who last reviewed the employee’s
pay, at the time the review was conducted. See, e.g., Downey v. So. Nat. Gas Co.,
649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Although Downey’s claims relating to the 1974
demotion and failure to transfer are time barred, these actions should be allowed as
29
evidence on the question of whether Downey was constructively discharged. We
observe that “(w)hile some or most of this evidence may concern time-barred
conduct, it is relevant, and may be used to illuminate current practices which,
viewed in isolation, may not indicate discriminatory motives.” (quoting Crawford v.
Western Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1314 (5th Cir. 1980))).18
Despite Ledbetter’s contentions, our decision in Calloway v. Partners
National Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993), is not to the contrary. In
Calloway, the plaintiff, a black woman, had accepted a secretarial position at a
salary lower than her equally or less qualified white predecessor had been offered
18
Moreover, the employee is limited to recovering for those paychecks received within
the limitations period. This is the necessary consequence of Morgan’s holding that the timely-
filing requirement “precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur
outside the [filing] period,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105, 122 S. Ct. at 2068. Obviously, “the timely
filing provision was not meant to serve as a specific limitation . . . on damages.” Id. at 119, 122
S. Ct. at 2075. But for claims based on discrete acts of discrimination, the “obvious
consequence” of the strict limitation on liability is a correspondingly strict limitation on
damages. Id. at 126, 122 S.Ct. at 2079 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The other circuits to address this issue after Morgan have all reached the same conclusion. See
Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Any
paycheck given within the statute of limitations period [is] actionable, even if based on a
discriminatory pay scale set up outside of the statutory period. But, a claimant [can] only recover
damages related to those paychecks actually delivered during the statute of limitations period.”);
Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Morgan dooms any hope Shea entertained
that his current (and allegedly discriminatory) paychecks can resurrect his otherwise untimely
challenges to the paychecks he received before January 12, 2001—or 180 days before he filed his
grievance”); Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1028 (“Using Morgan as our guide . . . we must conclude
that each of Dr. Hildebrandt’s paychecks that included discriminatory pay was a discrete
discriminatory act, not subject to the continuing violation doctrine. Therefore, Dr. Hildebrandt
may only recover for the discriminatory pay received within the statute of limitations period. ”
(footnote omitted)).
30
nine months prior. In addition, when the plaintiff left the company, the defendant
replaced her with another white woman of equal or lesser qualifications whom it
paid more than it had the plaintiff. The limitations period created by the EEOC
charge supporting the plaintiff’s claim did not reach back to the date she was hired.
The defendant therefore argued that the claim was barred because the only conduct
that occurred within the limitations period—the issuance of paychecks
implementing the plaintiff’s disparate pay rate—was simply “the present
consequence” of a time-barred act of discrimination: hiring the plaintiff at a
discriminatory initial wage rate. Id. at 448; see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). The district court
found that the plaintiff had proven intentional discrimination in her initial wage
assignment, but it agreed with the defendant that the claim was time-barred.
A panel of this court reversed. Relying on Bazemore and on our own version
of the “continuing violations” doctrine, the panel reasoned that “[w]hen the claim is
one for discriminatory wages, the violation exists every single day the employee
works [for the wages she challenges as unlawful].” Calloway, 986 F.2d at 448-49
(citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 396, n.6; 106 S.Ct. at 3006, n.6.). Thus, the
defendant “discriminated against [the plaintiff] not only on the day that it offered
her less than her white predecessor, but also on every day of her employment.” Id.
31
(citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395, 106 S. Ct. at 3006 (“Each week’s paycheck that
delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under
Title VII . . . .”)).
Ledbetter argues that because the plaintiff in Calloway was allowed to prove
her claim based on the intentional discrimination reflected in her initial wage
assignment, she should be allowed to do the same; if she can prove intentional
discrimination in any pay decision during her career, even the setting of her initial
salary, she can effectively borrow that intent and impute it to the paychecks she
received during the limitations period. Calloway, however, did not involve, as this
case does, an employee whose pay had been reviewed and re-established over a
dozen times. There is no indication in the opinions of the district court or the panel
in Calloway that the employer had in place any sort of system like Goodyear’s,
giving the plaintiff regular opportunities to complain of improperly deflated pay and
to seek a raise. Indeed, there is no indication that any decisions were made about
the Calloway plaintiff’s pay rate between the initial date of hire and the start of the
limitations period. In such cases, if a claim is allowed to go forward only because
paychecks were received within the limitations period, then of course any
intentional discrimination will have to be located in the initial wage assignment. In
short, we believe that Calloway belongs in a different category of pay-related cases
32
and is fully consistent with the rule we announce today.
We think Morgan may indicate that the paycheck-as-discriminatory-act
cases, including Calloway, read Bazemore too broadly and that it therefore remains
an open question whether a disparate-pay plaintiff, in contrast to a pattern-and-
practice pay plaintiff, should be able to challenge any decision made outside the
limitations period.19 We need not address that question today, however. Even if we
assume that the paychecks Ledbetter received within the limitations period allowed
her to attack as discriminatory the last affirmative decision affecting her pay before
the beginning of the period, that decision—the Gadsden plant administrators’
decision not to allow Jerry Jones to consider her for a raise in 1997—is not one that
any reasonable jury could find discriminatory.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We conclude, as we must, that Ledbetter was permitted to challenge the one
raise decision that was made within the limitations period: Kelly Owen’s decision to
recommend that she not receive any raise in 1998. Further, we assume that, to
19
But see Reese v. Ice Cream Specialities, 347 F.3d 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
Court has left a . . . narrow channel for Title VII plaintiffs who wish to complain that their
paychecks, in compensation for work they have presently performed and completed in pay
periods within the limitations period, are discriminatorily low because of an earlier act that
occurred outside the limitations period.”); accord Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance
Service, 409 F.3d 565, 572-73 (2d Cir. 2005); Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 453-54 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1027.
33
establish that intentional discrimination tainted the paychecks she received within
the limitations period but before Owen’s decision, Ledbetter could attack as
discriminatory the plant administrators’ decision not to allow Jerry Jones to consider
her for a raise in 1997. The question therefore becomes whether Ledbetter
presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that either of these
decisions violated Title VII.
Title VII, in pertinent part, makes it unlawful for an employer to
“discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of
such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In this circuit, individual
disparate-pay claims brought under Title VII are governed by the familiar burden-
shifting framework set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207
(1981), and their progeny. See Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d
1518, 1528 (11th Cir.1992) (adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework for
disparate pay claims). Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach,
a female Title VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sex
discrimination by showing that she occupies a job similar to that of
higher paid males. Once a prima facie case is established, the
defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the pay disparity. This burden is “exceedingly light”; the defendant
34
must merely proffer non-gender based reasons, not prove them. Once
such a justification is advanced, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer had a discriminatory
intent. In other words, the plaintiff must show that a discriminatory
reason more likely than not motivated [the employer] to pay her less.
Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
This burden-shifting framework does not relieve the plaintiff of her burden
of persuasion; she ultimately bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that she was paid at a disparate rate out of intent to discriminate on the
basis of sex. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1089 (“The ultimate burden
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”). Instead, the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine approach simply switches temporarily the burden of production,
forcing the defendant (after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case) to
produce a target at which the plaintiff can aim her proof—the “legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons” it offers for the pay disparity. “[R]ejection of the
defendant’s proffered reasons” does not compel judgment for the plaintiff as a
matter of law, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749, but in the usual case,20
20
It is not always the case that “the plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, [will] permit the trier of fact to
conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at
35
rejection of the reasons offered by the defendant, combined with the evidence
supporting the prima facie case, “will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination.” Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2109, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)
(“[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the
employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.”).
If, therefore, the plaintiff comes forward with sufficient evidence to establish
that “she occupies a job similar to that of higher paid males,” Meeks, 15 F.3d at
1019, and the defendant in response articulates legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the pay disparity, the sufficiency of the evidence on the ultimate issue of
intentional discrimination generally turns on whether a reasonable jury could find
that the defendant’s justification for the disparity is pretextual. The question
becomes whether “the plaintiff has demonstrated ‘such weaknesses, implausibilities,
2109.
Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s
explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a
matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of
fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and
uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.
Id.
36
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them
unworthy of credence.’” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061,
1072 (3d Cir. 1996)). “[T]he risk of nonpersuasion always remains with the
plaintiff.” Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1019. “If the evidence is in equipoise on the issue of
whether a salary differential is based on a factor other than sex, . . . the employer
prevails . . . .” Id.
In this case, Ledbetter does not dispute that Goodyear came forward with
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Ledbetter’s being passed over for raises in
1997 and 1998. The sole issue, therefore is whether a reasonable jury could have
found those reasons to be pretexts for intentional sex discrimination. The answer is
a clear “no.”
1. The 1998 Decision.
There simply was no evidence produced at trial impugning Kelly Owen’s
motives in recommending, in February 1998, that Ledbetter receive no raise in
1998. Ledbetter was ranked twenty-third out of twenty-four employees in Tire
Assembly, and fifteenth out of the sixteen Area Managers, based on her
performance in 1997. That ranking was the same in both the raw performance
37
scores taken directly from the 1997 performance appraisals and in the weighted
scores Owen used to create the business-center-wide rankings. One male Area
Manager, Dean Nance, was ranked below Ledbetter, and he and the two males
ranked directly above Ledbetter were all denied raises, just as Ledbetter was.
There was no evidence that Owen purposefully underrated Ledbetter’s
performance for 1997. There was no evidence that he bore any ill will towards
Ledbetter or toward women generally. Moreover, Owen told Ledbetter that she
would not be receiving a raise when he met with her to discuss her performance
appraisal, and she made no complaint about being discriminated against. She also
neglected to make any such complaint when she went to EEOC a month later about
her alleged mistreatment in the Technology Engineer position. In short, Ledbetter
failed to produce a scintilla of evidence from which a reasonable jury could have
found that Owen’s decision was in any way affected by her sex.21
2. The 1997 Decision.
21
Ledbetter did produce some evidence tending to undermine her 1997 performance
appraisal. She testified that some of the audits upon which Owen would have relied in
completing her performance appraisal were purposefully falsified by Mike Maudsley, the
business center’s Production Auditor. This, however, is relevant only to the accuracy of Owen’s
rankings, not to his intent. It is not discriminatory to honestly rely on inaccurate information, see
Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001); Alexander v. Fulton
County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000); Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d
1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Papp Clinic, P.A., 808 F.2d 1449, 1452-53 (11th Cir.
1987), and there was no evidence that Owen acted any way but in good-faith reliance on the
information he was using.
38
The same is true of Goodyear’s decision not to consider Ledbetter for a raise
in 1997. The evidence uniformly confirmed that Ledbetter and others were selected
in 1996 to be included in layoffs that were expected in 1997, and that Ledbetter
avoided actually being out of work during 1997 only because one or more other
Area Managers were out on extended medical leave and she was able to work as a
substitute. The only reasonable inference is that these layoffs were instituted as the
first step in the production cutbacks that ultimately led to the plant’s being all but
completely shut down. Just a year and half after Jones first informed Ledbetter that
she was slated for layoff, Goodyear announced in August 1998 the reduction-in-
force that Ledbetter volunteered to be included in. And it was only two years later,
in February 1999, that Goodyear announced that the entire plant would close. Many
layoffs and transfers were made, and the number of Area Managers in the Tire
Assembly area dwindled from sixteen, when Ledbetter was there, to as low as four.
The uncontradicted evidence also established that Ledbetter’s impending
layoff was the reason for her being denied a raise in 1997. Jones’s testimony to this
effect went unimpeached and uncontradicted, and there is no suggestion in the
record that Ledbetter properly should have been considered for a raise
39
notwithstanding her impending layoff.22 Moreover, common sense suggests that
scarce raise dollars would not normally be awarded an employee whose supervisors
considered her departure to be imminent.
Because it was clear that Ledbetter was scheduled for layoff and was
therefore ineligible for a raise in 1997, her only avenue for undermining the
decision not to award her a raise was to attempt to raise the inference that she was
improperly selected for the layoff. Her theory, in sum, was that she was on the
“layoff list” “so they wouldn’t have to give me a raise.” Ledbetter pointed to two
threads of evidence that could conceivably support this theory: (1) evidence that
Jerry Jones and a Plant Manager, Richard O’Dell, bore resentment against her or
against women generally; and (2) evidence intended to show that she performed too
well in 1995 for the company’s decision to be credible.
Ledbetter’s attempt to suggest that she performed too well in 1995 to be
selected for layoff failed completely.23 Mike Tucker ranked Ledbetter twenty-third
22
On appeal, Ledbetter argues for the first time that the layoff planned in late 1996 does
not explain her being denied a raise in 1997 because it was clear by the time Jones recommended
merit increases for 1997 that she would never be laid off. The evidence Ledbetter relies upon in
making this argument—including evidence regarding the merit increases that were awarded by
Jones in 1997—was not made part of the record of this case. Moreover, Ledbetter’s own
testimony supports the conclusion that she was still slated for layoff at least as late as August,
1997, well after the merit-increase planning for 1997 would have been done. She testified that
Jones told her in August that she was still slated for layoff.
23
There is no basis for questioning Goodyear’s evidence that the layoff selections were
based on 1995 performance appraisals. Jones testified that he was told by Pete Buchanan that
40
out of the twenty-four employees in Tire Assembly for the 1995 performance year.
24
Jimmy Todd, who was also included in the layoff, was ranked last. Thus, the
two lowest performing Area Managers in Tire Assembly in 1995—the last year for
which there were completed performance appraisals—were selected for the layoff.
This makes inherent sense; that is, that the managers of a plant in dire financial
straits (as the Gadsden plant undisputedly was) would choose for layoff those
managers with the poorest recent performance history.
Ledbetter produced no evidence undermining Tucker’s evaluation of her
performance or suggesting that he had improper motives. Moreover, Ledbetter’s
next-to-last ranking in 1995 is consistent with her last-place ranking for 1993 and
her next-to-last rankings for 1992 and 1997. There simply was no reasonable,
performance-based reason for questioning Ledbetter’s selection for layoff.25
The same is true of Ledbetter’s attempt to impugn the motivations of Jones
Ledbetter and Todd had been selected layoff based on their 1995 performance. Ledbetter
testified that Jones told her what Buchanan had said. And Mike Tucker testified that he was
aware at the time that the selections were being made based on 1995 performance appraisals, and
that it was “common knowledge” in the plant that both Ledbetter and Todd had been selected.
24
There is absolutely no evidence to support Ledbetter’s repeated suggestion, at trial and
on appeal, that her “top performance award” was based on her performance in 1995, rather than
1994. See supra note 3.
25
We must credit the evidence that Ledbetter was among the best-performers in the RLT
section of Tire Assembly in 1994. However, Ledbetter’s solid performance in 1994 does not
permit the inference, over direct evidence to the contrary, that she continued to be a top
performer in 1995, especially given her otherwise consistently low ratings in other years.
41
and O’Dell, because Ledbetter produced no evidence that either of these men played
any role in selecting her for the layoff. Goodyear’s evidence that the layoff
decision was made at a level of authority above Jerry Jones went uncontradicted and
unimpeached; nothing in the record indicates that Jones had any role in this decision
other than delivering the bad new to Ledbetter. Ledbetter’s attempt to suggest that
Jones bore ill will towards her because of her sex26 therefore casts no light on the
1997 decision. The same is true of Ledbetter’s testimony regarding sexist
comments allegedly made by Richard O’Dell, who Ledbetter testified was Plant
Manager at some unidentified point “toward[] the end of [her] career.”27 If O’Dell
26
Ledbetter attempted to establish that Jones treated her poorly in various ways
throughout 1997. She claimed to have been ignored in meetings and denied information she
needed to perform her job; she pointed to a memoranda in which Jones insensitively addressed
his Area Managers as “boys” and then, after she complained, as “Boys and Lady”; and she
testified that Jones had retaliated against her in the early 1980s when he was a Human Resources
officer and she complained of sexual harassment by her co-workers.
Other evidence introduced by Ledbetter herself suggests that Jones treated her fairly. He
was her BCM from 1985 until her temporary layoff in May 1986, and Ledbetter testified that she
could recall no problems with him during this time. She also produced a note that Jones had sent
her when she was selected to be part of the start-up team for the new RLT section of Tire
Assembly in 1992. In it, Jones congratulated Ledbetter on her new assignment, saying that she
had “worked very hard,” had “made a lot of improvement in the last few years,” and “deserve[d]
the opportunity.” She testified that she considered this a sincere compliment from Jones.
27
According to Ledbetter, O’Dell told her “that [the] plant did not need women, that we
didn’t help it, we caused problems.” Piling hearsay upon hearsay, she also testified (over
Goodyear’s objection) that one of her former supervisors (she did not specify who) told her that
O’Dell asked Jerry Jones “[w]hen [he was] going to get rid of the drunk and the damn woman.”
The only other mention of O’Dell in the record is his unauthenticated signature on the merit
increase plan for Tire Assembly for 1998, which was completed by Kelly Owen. As to the
timing of O’Dell’s alleged comments, the records suggests only that they were made after Jones
became her BCM and “toward[] the end of [her] career.”
42
was Plant Manager when Ledbetter was slated for layoff or when she was denied a
raise in 1997, or if he had any role in these decisions, Ledbetter produced no
evidence of it. His comments were therefore alone insufficient to support an
inference of discrimination. Cf. Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“In several age discrimination cases . . . this court has explained that
comments by non-decisionmakers do not raise an inference of discrimination . . . .”).
Moreover, the jury’s rejection of Ledbetter’s claims related to her transfer to
the Final Finish room, to the Technology Engineer position, cannot be squared with
its accepting Ledbetter’s far-flung theory that her layoff was manufactured by Jones
or others to avoid raising her salary. Ledbetter advanced two theories to support her
transfer claims: (1) that she was deceived into voluntarily applying for the transfer
by Jones’s falsely telling her she would be laid off if she stayed in her Area
Manager position; and (2) that she was effectively forced her into transferring by,
among other things, Jones’s constantly (correctly) threatening her with layoff. That
the jury rejected these theories suggests that it accepted Goodyear’s evidence that
Jones did not mistreat Ledbetter, that he correctly told her she would be laid off if
she remained an Area Manager, and that he arranged an interview for her for the
Technology Engineer position as a gratuitous kindness, in an effort to keep her
working until she would be eligible for full retirement. In short, if the jury had
43
credited Ledbetter’s testimony regarding Jones, it almost surely would have found
in her favor on one or more of the transfer claims; that it found against her on those
claims suggests it did not credit her testimony.
Given Ledbetter’s failure to come forward with a scintilla of probative
evidence casting doubt on Goodyear’s explanation for denying her a raise in 1997,
no reasonable factfinder could find that the decision was motivated by Ledbetter’s
sex.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, because Goodyear had a system for periodically reviewing
employee salaries, Ledbetter could recover on her disparate pay claim only to the
extent she proved intentional discrimination in the one decision affecting her pay
made within the limitations period created by her EEOC charge, or, at most, the last
such decision made immediately preceding the limitations period. Because she
failed to carry her burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to find that either of those decisions was a pretext for sexual
discrimination, the district court should have granted Goodyear judgment as a
matter of law. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and instruct
the court to dismiss Ledbetter’s complaint with prejudice.
44
SO ORDERED
45