United States v. Anthony H. Lindsey

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-11273 March 27, 2007
_____________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-80023 CR-DTKH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY H. LINDSEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________________________

(March 27, 2007)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.

EDMONDSON, Chief Judge:

Anthony H. Lindsey (“Defendant”) appeals his conviction and sentence of

300 months’ imprisonment for (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm, and (2)
being a felon in possession of one or more rounds of ammunition, both in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

Defendant claims several violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment

rights for alleged errors at trial and sentencing. Because no reversible error has

been shown, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 2004, authorities received a 911 call from a person identifying

himself as “Davis” and reporting that four black males were loading guns and

putting them in a large white SUV. The SUV was parked behind a Mobil gas

station across from a branch of Wachovia Bank. Detective Jason O. Houston

(“Houston”) and other members of the West Palm Beach Police Department had

been investigating a recent series of armed bank robberies in the area. The

robberies involved three to four black males who had entered banks with assault-

type weapons and who drove large SUV-type vehicles. The police also had

knowledge of two robberies committed by two black males using handguns in the

parking lot of this very same branch of Wachovia Bank.

2
 Believing that another robbery was imminent, several officers -- including

Houston and Sergeant Martin Tierney (“Tierney”) -- responded to the 911 call.

Tierney, the first officer on the scene, observed a white Ford Excursion (a large

SUV) parked behind the gas station. As Tierney pulled into and circled the

station, he observed the SUV pull out of its parked location. Tierney then radioed

the other officers that the vehicle was on the move. But instead of leaving the gas

station, the SUV pulled around to a gas pump and stopped. Then, four black men,

including Defendant, exited the vehicle. Three of the men walked toward the

station’s convenience store, and the fourth opened the hood of the vehicle.

Sergeant Tierney then exited his vehicle and drew his shotgun while yelling

at the men to get on the ground. Other officers converged on the gas station and

secured the scene. Turning his attention to Defendant, who had reached the door

of the convenience store, Tierney ordered Defendant to lay down, to which

Defendant responded, “What did I do?” After five to eight seconds, Defendant

submitted to Tierney’s request. Officers then handcuffed each of the four men and

placed them in police vehicles. Then, officers observed an armored vehicle

pulling up to the bank and guards leaving the bank carrying satchels of money.

According to Tierney, employees of the gas station told officers that the SUV had

been parked behind the building for two hours.

3
 Police then examined the SUV to ensure that no armed persons were inside.

After identifying each of the men and checking their backgrounds, the officers

learned that all four were convicted felons. Three of the men, however, had no

outstanding warrants and were released at the scene. Police also discovered that

Defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle. Because Defendant was on

parole for armed bank robbery and because the police suspected the vehicle

contained weapons, Detective Houston decided to detain Defendant to determine

whether he had violated his parole.1 After Defendant twice refused his consent for

officers to search the SUV, Houston looked through the tinted windows of the

SUV and saw a pair of binoculars and a black canvass bag that he “believe[d] was

a rifle bag.”

The SUV, which had expired registration tags, was towed to the police

station to inventory its contents. Officers then sought a search warrant before

searching the vehicle. Detective Houston and another officer prepared a warrant

affidavit based on information they received from other officers and from the 911

operator. After a state judge issued the warrant, officers searched the SUV and

discovered a .38-caliber revolver with two rounds of ammunition. The officers

1
Two conditions of Defendant’s parole were (1) that he not possess a firearm and (2) that he not
associate knowingly with convicted felons.

4
also retrieved the binoculars and learned that what they thought was a rifle bag

was actually an empty portable-chair holder.

Meanwhile, because the police suspected Defendant of being a felon in

possession of a firearm, the officers had arrested Defendant and brought him to the

police station for questioning. After hearing his Miranda rights and signing a

waiver, Defendant admitted that the SUV and the items found inside the SUV

belonged to him. During this unrecorded interview, Defendant specifically

admitted that he had purchased the gun found in the SUV, that he knew the gun

contained two rounds of ammunition, and that he had placed the gun in the center

console of the vehicle.

Investigators also conducted an investigation of the items found in the

vehicle, including the gun. One crime scene technician attempted to collect latent

fingerprints from the gun but was only able to obtain certain “ridge detail” prints.

Another fingerprint examiner determined that because the prints had less than six

comparison points, they were of no value in making an identification. The

examiner, therefore, disposed of the fingerprint card.

At trial, James Jackson (“Jackson”), a jailhouse acquaintance of Defendant,

testified that Defendant had made several admissions during their conversations at

the Palm Beach County Jail. According to Jackson, Defendant boasted that, on the

5
day police arrested him, he had been “casing a Wachovia bank from a gas station”

with binoculars. Defendant also said he was surprised the police had not found his

fingerprints on his gun. In addition, Defendant told Jackson that another friend

“was supposed to be in on their deal” but was likely the one who had placed the

911 call.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Behavior

Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression

motions for evidence discovered in the SUV because the police engaged in an

unlawful search and seizure. He specifically maintains that the police lacked

reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before stopping and detaining Defendant

and failed to make reasonable inquiries to determine whether criminal activity was

afoot. For background, see Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Defendant also

argues that, under Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000), the police failed to

verify information from an “anonymous” tip before acting on the information. We

review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence as a mixed

6
question of law and fact, with rulings of law reviewed de novo and findings of fact

reviewed for clear error, in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in

district court. United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1105 (11th Cir. 2003).

To have reasonable suspicion, an officer conducting a stop must “have a

reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts that the person has

engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity.” United States v. Powell,

222 F.3d 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2000) “The ‘reasonable suspicion’ must be more

than ‘an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’” Id. (quoting Terry v.

Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968)). “While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less

demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less

than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a

minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow,

120 S.Ct. 673, 675-76 (2000). Also, “[a] reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

may be formed by observing exclusively legal activity,” United States v. Gordon,

231 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2000), even if such activity is “seemingly innocuous

to the ordinary citizen.” United States v. Smith, 201 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir.

2000).

We examine “the totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the

police had “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”

7
United States v. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750 (2002) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). We also recognize that the police may “draw on their own

experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about

the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained

person.” Id. at 750-51 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To have

reasonable suspicion based on an anonymous tip, the tip must “be reliable in its

assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.”

J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379. “The issue is whether the tip, as corroborated by

independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide

reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.” Alabama v. White, 110 S.

Ct. 2412, 2414 (1990).

The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates that the police

had more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion” based on an

“anonymous” tip.2 The tip was consistent with specific facts already discovered

during the ongoing investigation into several bank robberies in the area involving

three to four black males driving large SUVs. The police also knew of two armed

robberies of patrons committed by two black males outside the very branch of

2
The 911 caller identified himself as “Davis” and informed police that he would be at the scene
when police arrived. Officers never spoke with or found any caller at the scene.

8
Wachovia Bank that was across from the location of Defendant’s SUV. This

independent knowledge corroborated the 911 caller’s assertion that the men in the

SUV were loading guns into the vehicle across from the bank. In addition, when

Officer Tierney’s vehicle came into view at the gas station, the SUV’s sudden

movement from its parked location over to a gas pump gave rise to further

suspicion. Thus, rather than reacting to a mere “hunch,” the officers engaged in “a

method of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions

quickly, and with a minimum of interference,” as dictated by a potentially

dangerous situation.3 United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000)

(quoting United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 1988)).

B. Probable Cause for Defendant’s Arrest

3
Extra facts in this case cause it to differ significantly from the bare-boned-tip situation in Florida
v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). The Court in J.L. concluded that “an anonymous tip that a person
is carrying a gun is, without more, [in]sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that
person.” Id. at 1377 (emphasis added). In this case, the total circumstances, including the 911
caller’s tip combined with a location close-by a bank and combined with the fact of an ongoing
independent police investigation of recent unsolved armed robberies of banks -- robberies which
involved persons of the same sex, race, and number described by the tip and a vehicle of the same
general kind as described by the tip -- provided “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable
suspicion to make the investigatory stop.” Id. at 1378 (quoting White, 110 S. Ct. at 2414).

9
 Defendant next argues that the officers arrested him without probable cause

and that the district court, therefore, should have suppressed his post-arrest

statements. We disagree. Although probable cause involves a greater certainty of

criminal behavior than reasonable suspicion, probable cause does not require the

same “standard of conclusiveness and probability as the facts necessary to support

a conviction.” United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 873 (11th Cir. 2003)). Probable cause to

arrest exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances support “a reasonable

belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime.” Gordon, 231

F.3d at 758 (citation omitted).

In addition to the circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of

illegal behavior to support the initial stop, several facts establish that the police

had probable cause to arrest Defendant for being a felon in possession of a

firearm.4 The 911 call provided specific information that the men were loading

weapons and placing them into the SUV, which was parked across from the

4
Defendant challenges the magistrate judge’s determination that the police had probable cause
to arrest Defendant for loitering under Florida law. He claims that if the police truly had probable
cause to arrest him for loitering or another crime such as conspiracy to commit bank robbery, the
police would not have released the other men that were in the SUV. How the other men were
treated, however, is not determinative of whether Defendant was treated lawfully. And even if the
police lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant for these other crimes, the police had probable
cause to arrest Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm at the point they discovered
Defendant was a felon and reasonably believed that Defendant’s vehicle contained a firearm.

10
Wachovia Bank. After the police had detained the four men, the officers observed

an armored car pulling up to the bank and guards loading money into the armored

car. The police also discovered that all four men were convicted felons and that

the registered owner of the vehicle, Defendant, had a past conviction for armed

bank robbery. Peering through the tinted windows of the SUV, officers saw

binoculars and what they “believe[d] was a rifle bag.”5 Viewing these events in

the light of the ongoing investigation into several armed bank robberies in the area

and two specific armed robberies in the parking lot of the same branch of

Wachovia Bank, the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that the

police had probable cause to arrest Defendant. Thus, the post-arrest statements

made by Defendant after receiving his Miranda warnings were admissible.

5
After police had confronted Defendant with this evidence, he twice refused his consent to search
his vehicle. Defendant claims that the police considered his refusal to consent in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. We recognize “that a refusal to cooperate [with police], without more,
does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick,
111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991) (emphasis added). That the arresting officers subjectively considered
Defendant’s refusal to consent, however, is not determinative of a court’s legal conclusion of
whether probable cause existed to justify the arrest. “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
We have “explicitly rejected the idea that the subjective belief of the arresting officer is relevant to
the determination of whether probable cause exists.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1433 (11th
Cir. 1998). “Instead, an arrest will be upheld if the objective circumstances justify the arrest.”
United States v. Jones, 377 F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004). Based on the totality of the facts and
circumstances in this case -- apart from the Defendant’s failure to consent to a search -- we conclude
that probable cause existed to justify Defendant’s arrest. Although we do not consider the refusal
to consent, we do not decide today whether the fact of and manner of a refusal to consent to a search
can ever count in the “totality of the circumstances” analysis that a court must bear in mind when
deciding whether probable cause for a seizure does exist.

11
 C. Validity of the Search Warrant

Defendant also contends that the police illegally obtained a warrant to

search his SUV because the warrant was not supported by probable cause and

because the search warrant affidavit contained several material misstatements that

were made knowingly and intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth.

Defendant argues, therefore, that the district court should have suppressed the

evidence retrieved from his vehicle.

We do not reach the issue of whether the search warrant in this case was

valid. We conclude that a warrant was unnecessary to search Defendant’s vehicle

under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The automobile

exception allows the police to conduct a search of a vehicle if (1) the vehicle is

readily mobile; and (2) the police have probable cause for the search. United

States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003). The requirement of

12
mobility is satisfied merely if “the automobile is operational.” Id.6 In addition,

“[t]here is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur

contemporaneously with its lawful seizure” or that other “exigent circumstances”

exist. United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881, 885 (1985).7 The key issue here is

whether the police had probable cause for the search and seizure of the vehicle.

“Probable cause, in turn, exists when under the totality of the circumstances, there

is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the

vehicle.” United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

The police had probable cause to search the vehicle: they knew Defendant

was a felon and that he owned the SUV; and, given the events at the gas station, a

fair probability existed that the vehicle contained a firearm based on the totality of

the circumstances. Because the requirements of the automobile exception are met,

6
Although the original justification for the automobile exception was the exigency of the
circumstances, we have “made it clear that the requirement of exigent circumstances is satisfied by
the ‘ready mobility’ inherent in all automobiles that reasonably appear to be capable of functioning.”
Watts, 329 F.3d at 1286 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
7
In Johns, the Supreme Court applied the automobile exception to evidence found in two pick-up
trucks that were searched three days after DEA officers arrested the occupants and impounded the
trucks. Johns, 105 S. Ct. at 884-86. The Court stated that “the justification to conduct such a
warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized. A vehicle lawfully in police
custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, and
there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.” Id. at 885 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).

13
the police could have searched Defendant’s vehicle lawfully without a warrant.

Therefore, the validity of the search warrant is not important; and the evidence

obtained from the SUV was properly admitted.

D. Destruction of Fingerprint Card and Brady Error

Defendant next alleges that destruction of the fingerprint card with

incomplete prints constitutes reversible error under Brady v. Maryland, 83 S. Ct.

1194 (1963).8 When a defendant does not raise a Brady objection in his motion

for a new trial, we need only conduct a plain error review. United States v.

Kersey, 130 F.3d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1996). To make a valid claim that the

government improperly withheld or destroyed possibly exculpatory evidence

under Brady, a defendant also must demonstrate that the government acted in bad

faith. Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 336-37 (1998).

Defendant’s claim that the fingerprint card could have been exculpatory is

both highly speculative and insufficient to rise to the level of Brady error.

8
Defendant claims that the fingerprint card may have provided some exculpatory evidence for
the jury to conclude that someone other than Defendant placed the gun in the vehicle.

14
Defendant admitted that he owned the gun and that he placed it inside the SUV.

Furthermore, Defendant has produced no evidence that the fingerprint examiner

acted in bad faith in destroying the fingerprint card. The district court did not

plainly err by relying on the government’s evidence that this act was pursuant to a

routine procedure of throwing out fingerprint cards containing no valuable

information to make an identification. Thus, Defendant has shown no Brady

error.

E. Evidence of Uncharged Criminal Activity

At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that Defendant was planning a

bank robbery, including the testimony of a jailhouse acquaintance that Defendant

had admitted the plan. Defendant now claims that this evidence was improperly

introduced as evidence of bad character. We review a district court’s decision to

admit evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) for a clear abuse of discretion. United

States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1291 (11th Cir. 1996).

In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

evidence of Defendant’s plan to commit an armed robbery in or around the bank.

This evidence was admissible to establish that Defendant knowingly possessed the

15
weapon and ammunition and that he had a motive for doing so. Also, evidence of

a plan to rob a bank was inextricably intertwined with possession of the firearm

and was necessary to complete the story of the crime. Admission of this evidence

for these purposes is valid under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

F. Sentencing Errors

Defendant claims that the district court improperly sentenced him as an

armed career criminal because his prior convictions and alleged conspiracy to

commit bank robbery were neither charged in the indictment nor proved to a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt.9 Defendant also argues that a sentence of 300 months’

imprisonment was unreasonable under Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738

(2005). We review a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de

novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Wilks, 464 F.3d 1240,

1242 (11th Cir. 2006).

9
Defendant also contends that classifying his prior convictions as either a violent felony or a
serious drug offense must be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury. But, the nature and fact
of a prior conviction are for the district court’s determination. United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d
1267, 1274-76 (11th Cir. 2006). Because Defendant never objected to the fact of his prior
convictions or their classification as violent felonies in the PSI, he is deemed to have admitted these
findings. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005).

16
 Defendant’s claims of error during sentencing must fail. Nothing in Booker

disturbed the Supreme Court’s holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), that a district court may rely on prior convictions to

enhance a defendant’s sentence even if not alleged in the indictment or proved to a

jury. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005).

Furthermore, in calculating the appropriate advisory guideline range, Booker does

not forbid a district court from considering criminal acts for which a defendant has

not been charged or has been acquitted as long as those acts are proved by a

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1347

(2006). In this case, the district court complied with Booker by treating the

sentencing guidelines as advisory and examining the section 3553(a) factors to

determine a proper sentence. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in considering Defendant’s prior convictions and an alleged

conspiracy to commit bank robbery. We also conclude that Defendant’s sentence

of 300 months’ imprisonment was reasonable.

AFFIRMED.

17
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent because I believe that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to

seize Anthony Lindsey at gunpoint, and that his extended, handcuffed detention

thus amounted to an unlawful search and seizure.

Officers conducting “stop and frisk” seizures must “have a reasonable,

articulable suspicion based on objective facts that the person has engaged in, or is

about to engage in, criminal activity.” United States v. Powell, 222 F.3d 913, 917

(11th Cir. 2000). To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify a

stop, we must look only to the information that the police had at the moment of

detention, not that which was discovered after the fact.

In this case, there was no “reasonable, articulable suspicion based on

objective facts” that Anthony Lindsey had engaged in, or was about to engage in,

criminal activity when he was stopped. The purported reasonable suspicion arose

solely from a tip delivered by an anonymous caller, who, although he said his

name was “Davis,” was completely unknown to the police. The anonymous tipster

reported that four black men were loading guns into a white SUV in the parking

lot of a Mobil gas station across the street from a Wachovia bank. This tip was

virtually identical to the tip which the Supreme Court found to be insufficient to

support a Terry stop in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). See Terry v. Ohio,

18
391 U.S. 1 (1968). In J.L., an unidentified tipster reported that a young black man

wearing a plaid shirt was sitting at a bus stop and was carrying a gun. The Court

explicitly found that a stop and frisk based on this tip was illegal because the

officers’ suspicion “arose not from any observations of their own,” id. at 270, but

rather from the anonymous tip. The Court made its holding unmistakably clear:

“The question presented in this case is whether an anonymous tip that a person is

carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and

frisk of that person. We hold that it is not.” Id. at 268.

The Court held that such a tip was insufficient to permit even a Terry

investigatory stop because it was not reliable. The requisite reliability of a tip

sufficient to support suspicion that a crime is about to be committed has to be

satisfied in one of two ways. Either the tip must come from a “known informant

whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her

allegations turn out to be fabricated.” Id. at 270 (emphasis added) (quotation and

citation omitted). Or the content of the tip must include accurate predictive

information which is verified by the subsequent observations of the detaining

officer. Id. at 271. That is, the tip itself must show that the tipster has sufficient

familiarity with the fact that criminal activity “may be afoot,” in that the tipster is

able to relate the future movements or actions of the prospective detainee that are

19
not easily predictable, and which the police verify through independent

observation before the stop. In either case, police must have some way to assess

whether the information given in the tip is sufficiently reliable for constitutional

purposes to justify a police seizure.

In the first instance, if an informant is “known,” police can be reasonably

satisfied that the tip is reliable based on the informant’s past delivery of accurate

information. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (sustaining a

Terry stop undertaken on the basis of a tip given in person by a known informant

who had provided accurate information in the past); see also Alabama v. White,

496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990) (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47). Moreover,

informants with known identities can be held accountable if the information they

provide is false or intentionally misleading, J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, giving them

incentive to be honest.

In this case there was no “known” informant. Giving himself a name does

not transform a tipster into a “known informant whose reputation can be assessed

and who can be held responsible if [his] allegations turn out to be fabricated.” J.L.,

529 U.S. at 270 (citation omitted). Self-identification by name alone is

meaningless when no information is available to verify whether the self-

identification is true or false. The police did not know “Davis,” had never dealt

20
with “Davis” before, and did not even know if “Davis” was a real name. They

never looked for the caller, and never received any additional information from or

about him. The police thus had no basis on which to assess the caller’s reputation

or information, and no way to hold him accountable if his allegations turned out to

be fabricated.1

In the second instance, if a tip comes from an unknown person, reliability

may be based on the fact that the tipster shows inside knowledge of criminal

activity by accurately predicting the subject’s behavior, which is then verified by

police observation. Simply describing a subject is not enough. As the Court made

clear in J.L., requiring either that the informant be known and reliable from past

dealings, or that the tipster, if anonymous, provide predictive future behavior,

guards against the unwitting misuse of the police power. A vindictive person, or

merely a mistaken person, should not be able to effectuate the seizure of another

by simply calling the police, describing the object of their malice or their mistake,

and conclusorily stating that a crime is being, or going to be, committed by him.

Because “Davis” was not a known informant, the information the police

received from him could not justify a Terry stop unless the tip made

1
Indeed, in this case, the tipster’s information was false. No “guns” appear to have been loaded
into this SUV—the only gun found was a handgun in the console, which provided the basis of the
charges against Lindsey.

21
predictions—not merely descriptions— which could be tested by subsequent

police investigation. In discussing Alabama v. White, the Supreme Court in J.L.

explained its jurisprudence on this point:

In White, the police received an anonymous tip asserting that a
woman was carrying cocaine and predicting that she would
leave an apartment building at a specified time, get into a car
matching a particular description, and drive to a named motel.
Standing alone, the tip would not have justified a Terry stop.
Only after police observation showed that the informant had
accurately predicted the woman’s movements, we explained,
did it become reasonable to think the tipster had inside
knowledge about the suspect and therefore to credit his
assertion about the cocaine. Although the Court held that the
suspicion in White became reasonable after police surveillance,
we regarded the case as borderline. Knowledge about a
person’s future movements indicates some familiarity with that
person’s affairs, but having such knowledge does not
necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular,
whether that person is carrying hidden contraband. We
accordingly classified White as a “close case.”

J.L., 529 U.S. at 270-71 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Court

then took great pains to clarify that the relevant question is not whether the

tipster’s description of what he or she is seeing is accurate, but rather whether

there are accompanying predictions of future actions which are then found to be

accurate through subsequent police surveillance or investigation so as to make the

tip reliable. The tip in J.L. “lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in

22
White and essential to the Court’s decision in that case” because it “provided no

predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the

informant’s knowledge or credibility.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. Similarly, in Illinois

v. Gates, another tip case, the Court pointed to the fact that “the anonymous [tip]

contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions

existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not

easily predicted.” 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983) (emphasis added). See also White, 496

U.S. at 332 (pointing to “independent corroboration by the police of significant

aspects of the informer’s predictions [which] imparted some degree of reliability

to the other allegations made by the caller”) (emphasis added).

Thus, the “reliability” of the tip does not relate to whether the tip accurately

describes a particular person. The relevant inquiry is whether the tip is reliable in

its ability to describe criminal activity. As the Court noted in J.L.:

An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable
location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited
sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom
the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show
that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.
The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be
reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to
identify a determinate person.

529 U.S. at 272 (emphasis added).

23
 Nor does it make a difference that the description includes the presence of a

firearm. There is no firearm exception to the reliability requirement. When the

argument was made in J.L. that a tip alleging an illegal gun should justify a stop

and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing,

the Supreme Court plainly stated: “We decline to adopt this position.” Id.

Because the tip which formed the basis of the seizure here was not

reliable—that is, it did not come from a known informant, nor did it provide

predictive information which could be verified by police investigation—it cannot,

under J.L., be used to support reasonable suspicion. Both tips came from sources

unknown to the police and described a person’s race, location, alleged possession

of a firearm and an additional purported identifying characteristic—a plaid shirt in

J.L. and a white SUV here. Neither tip demonstrated a “knowledge of concealed

criminal activity.” If the tip in J.L. could not support reasonable suspicion, the tip

in this case cannot do so either.

The majority attempts to avoid the reach of J.L. by saying that the police

relied on more than the anonymous tip. Specifically, the majority says that “the

911 caller’s tip combined with independent police investigation of recent bank

robberies provided sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion

to make the investigatory stop.” First, a continuing “investigation” of an unsolved

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crime has nothing to do with the investigation required by J.L. in order to permit

reliance on a tip. The investigation required by J.L. is an investigation of the tip

itself. That is, the police must conduct investigation to verify that the predicted

suspicious activity relayed in the tip does in fact occur. The fact that the police

department had ongoing open investigations of unsolved crimes is irrelevant here.

The only things connecting these men to the unsolved crimes were their race and

gender, and the fact that they were in a large vehicle. This is surely a common

occurrence in West Palm Beach.

Moreover, the fact that the City of West Palm Beach had unsolved bank

robberies which were still under investigation adds absolutely nothing to warrant

reasonable suspicion that these four black men had anything to do with them.

Prior commission of bank robberies in West Palm Beach by black men surely

cannot be sufficient to justify the detention of any group of black men in large

vehicles at gas stations located near banks. Such a view essentially justifies the

immediate seizure of any citizen accurately described by an unknown tipster of

indeterminate reliability, so long as that description also happens to match the race

and gender of suspects from unsolved crimes. Under this test, “[a]nybody with

enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of a prank, or to

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harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip” which could

result in an improper seizure. See White, 496 U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Nor did the officers observe Lindsey and his companions engage in any

suspicious activity. When Sergeant Tierney first saw Lindsey, he was in a white

SUV which was simply pulling up to a gas pump from a parked position at a gas

station. At this point, Tierney, who was aware that bank robberies had been

committed in the city,2 knew only that an anonymous caller had reported that four

black men were loading guns into a white SUV in the parking lot of a Mobil gas

station across the street from a Wachovia bank. There had been no description of

what these men were wearing nor of any of their physical characteristics beyond

that they were black and were in a white SUV. Tierney saw a white SUV pulling

out of a parking space in the gas station up to the gas pump and four black males

2
Sergeant Tierney, the first officer on the scene, testified that he was concerned about the
possibility of weapons “where the caller had indicated that they were loading weapons in the car,”
and “[t]he proximity to the bank and with the history we had had as far as the bank takeovers.”
Tierney did not testify as to the details of any of these bank robberies, and there is no evidence in the
record that he knew anything about the robberies—including even the race and gender of the
robbers—other than that they had occurred.
Detective Jason Houston, who arrived on the scene at least ten minutes after Sergeant Tierney
had detained the four men at gunpoint, testified that there had been four bank robberies in West Palm
Beach between October and December of 2003, though none had occurred between December and
February 2004, the date of Lindsey’s arrest. The bank robberies were conducted by three or four
black men who would enter the bank masked and armed with long guns. Although, “larger” vehicles
were used, no white SUV was ever described as being used in one of these robberies, In addition,
Houston testified that a Wachovia customer was robbed in the parking lot of the bank by two black
men using a handgun in September 2003.

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exit the car. While one of the men opened the hood and began looking inside,

Lindsey and the other two men walked toward the convenience store. Neither

Tierney nor anyone else observed anything suspicious or out of the ordinary in

their actions, nor saw any bulges or other indicia that the men were carrying

weapons. Nonetheless, without stopping to ask any questions or waiting to

observe any of the men’s actions or behavior, Tierney jumped out of his car with

his shotgun drawn, yelling at the men to get down on the ground. At the same

time, seven other officers in five or six separate vehicles surrounded the men,

likewise yelling at them to get down with their weapons drawn and pointed.

Ultimately, eight officers drew their weapons and detained Lindsey and his

companions in handcuffs for approximately 45 minutes3 before “formally”4

3
It appears from the record that Sergeant Tierney drew his weapon and forced the men to the
ground at approximately 10:40 a.m., and that the other three men were released at approximately
11:30, so his detention lasted in the range of 45 minutes to one hour.
4
The Supreme Court told us quite clearly in Terry that we must determine “whether [the] search
and seizure of petitioner were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted.” 329 U.S. at 27-
28. The manner in which this seizure was effectuated—where seven or eight officers brandishing
guns forced Lindsey and his companions to prostrate themselves on the ground and immediately
handcuffed them, despite the fact that none of the officers had observed any suspicious behavior or
possible weapons—exceeded the bounds of Terry and constituted an arrest requiring probable cause.
A Terry stop “cannot continue for an excessive period of time . . . or resemble a traditional arrest.”
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (citations omitted); see also Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (“This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly,
the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.”).

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arresting Lindsey and releasing the other three men. This is not the kind of

“investigation” contemplated by the Supreme Court in White and Terry. The

officers’ actions made clear that the putative Terry stop was not designed to

quickly confirm their suspicions of Lindsey’s dangerousness. To the contrary, the

officers had already reached that conclusion based merely on the anonymous and

completely unreliable tip.

In this case, neither the tip nor the fact that there were open investigations

of bank robberies provided reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify any seizure. It

is certainly possible that if the officers had investigated the tip further, they might

have personally observed suspicious behavior giving rise to the reasonable

suspicion needed for a Terry stop, which might then have led to the probable cause

needed for an arrest. They did not, however, and we cannot retroactively find

reasonable suspicion where none existed.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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