Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed August 3, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-2075
Lower Tribunal No. F93-30334
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Tyrone Jordan,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William Altfield, Judge.
Tyrone Jordan, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, LOGUE, and MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Tyrone Jordan, challenges the denial of his petition for writ
of habeas corpus or, alternatively, motion to correct illegal sentence. After
Jordan was convicted of burglary with an assault or battery and robbery in
violation of sections 810.02(2)(a) and 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993),
the lower tribunal vacated his original sentence and then, acting under the
erroneous assumption it was obligated to impose a life sentence for the
burglary count, resentenced him, in his absence, to concurrent terms of life
and thirty years, respectively, as a habitual violent felony offender. 1 Jordan
has previously unsuccessfully assailed the newly-imposed sentence through
direct appeal and collateral attacks, and, ordinarily, under the law of the case
doctrine, this would foreclose any avenue for relief. See Jordan v. State, 225
So. 3d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); Jordan v. State, 319 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2020); see also Swain v. State, 911 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
(quoting State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003)) (“The law of the
case doctrine requires that ‘questions of law actually decided on appeal must
govern the case in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent
stages of the proceedings.’”). Appellate courts, however, possess “the
power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings [made in earlier appeals]
in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision
1
The count for robbery further carried a ten-year minimum mandatory.
2
would result in manifest injustice.” State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261, 268 (Fla.
2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Muehleman v. State, 3 So. 3d 1149,
1165 (Fla. 2009)). Here, the record reflects the trial court believed that, once
it determined Jordan qualified as a habitual violent felony offender, the
imposition of a life sentence for burglary was mandatory rather than
permissive. See § 775.084(4)(b), Fla. Stat. This was incorrect, and requiring
Jordan to serve a life sentence without due consideration of viable
alternatives implicates manifest injustice. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for reconsideration of the sentence. Jordan is entitled to be present
and represented by counsel at the resentencing hearing. 2 See Jordan v.
State, 143 So. 3d 335, 338 (Fla. 2014) (“Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.180(a)(9) requires the defendant’s presence ‘at the pronouncement of
judgment and the imposition of sentence.’ We have extended this right to
resentencing hearings as well.”); see also Walker v. State, 389 So. 2d 312,
313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (vacating an impermissible general sentence and
stating defendant has right to be present at resentencing hearing).
Petition granted.
2
Having examined the verdict form, we reject Jordan’s further contention
that his Apprendi-related claim was denied in error. See Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3