In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1124
D WAINE K. H ICKS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
F OREST P RESERVE D ISTRICT OF C OOK C OUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 CV 00261—Edmond E. Chang, Judge.
A RGUED N OVEMBER 30, 2011—D ECIDED A PRIL 18, 2012
Before M ANION, W ILLIAMS, and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
M ANION, Circuit Judge. Dwaine K. Hicks worked as a
mechanic for two years at the Forest Preserve District
(the “FPD”) of Cook County’s Central Garage, where
he primarily repaired trucks. During his time there, he
Prior to his retirement on December 31, 2010, Judge David H.
Coar issued several rulings in this case, including the decision
to give the challenged instruction.
2 No. 11-1124
received twenty-eight disciplinary action forms from
his supervisor. Hicks, who is black, participated in an
investigation of discrimination leveled against his super-
visor, and later filed his own discrimination com-
plaint against the supervisor. Eventually the FPD offered
Hicks a choice: either accept a demotion to a non-mechanic
position and take a significant pay cut, or face further
disciplinary action up to and including termination. On
the advice of his union representative, Hicks took the
demotion, but then brought suit against the FPD for
retaliation. Hicks’s case survived a summary judgment
motion, and at trial the jury found in favor of Hicks.
Hicks was awarded $30,000 and was reinstated to his
former position as a mechanic. The FPD moved for judg-
ment as a matter of law, but the district court denied its
motion. It now appeals, arguing that the evidence pre-
sented at trial was insufficient to support a retalia-
tion claim, that the district court erred by improperly
instructing the jury, and that the district court erred
when it reinstated Hicks to his former position. For
the reasons below, we affirm the district court’s order.
I.
Dwaine Hicks began working as a maintenance
mechanic for the FPD on September 1, 2006. The Central
Garage supervisor who oversaw Hicks’s work was
Thomas Thompson. While working under Thompson,
over the course of two years Hicks received a total of
twenty-eight “disciplinary action forms” either directly
from Thompson or with Thompson’s approval, because
No. 11-1124 3
Thompson believed that Hicks was an unqualified me-
chanic who took too long to complete tasks, failed to
repair vehicles correctly, and doctored timekeeping
records. However, Hicks, who is black, consistently
complained that Thompson treated him differently
than the other non-minority mechanics, discriminating
against him by not allowing him to order his own parts
for vehicles, only allowing him to work on trucks (and
only on old trucks in poor repair), and then disciplining
him for taking too long to repair the vehicles. Hicks
believed that Thompson created false disciplinary action
forms to force Hicks out of his job.
In November 2006, a few months after Hicks began
working in the Central Garage, a fellow mechanic who
is Hispanic, Gronimo Hernandez, filed an internal com-
plaint alleging racial discrimination by Thompson. In
February 2007, Hernandez filed a complaint against
the FPD with the Cook County Commission on Human
Rights, once again alleging racial discrimination and
retaliation based on Thompson’s behavior. The Com-
mission initiated an investigation into Thompson’s
alleged discrimination, in which Hicks participated on
Hernandez’s behalf. In November 2007, Hicks filed
his own complaint with the Commission, alleging that
Thompson retaliated against him for participating in
the Hernandez investigation. Hicks also filed a com-
plaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment Com-
mission (“EEOC”) against the FPD, likewise alleging
retaliation and racial discrimination.
The situation came to a head in August 2008 after
4 No. 11-1124
Thompson cited Hicks for three infractions in one day:
for falsification of employment records for Hicks’s
alleged failure to accurately report the time he worked on
a vehicle; for “negligence in performance of duties”; and
for performing “at less than a satisfactory level.” Hicks’s
union representative, Jack Hurley, received copies of
these disciplinary action forms and contacted the
director of the FPD’s human resources department
to ask if anything could be done for Hicks short of ter-
mination; the director, Carmen Sanchez-Bass, said she
would look into it. On September 9, 2008, the FPD held
a meeting to determine Hicks’s future. Hicks, Hurley,
Sanchez-Bass, Keino Robinson (an attorney for the
FPD), Leroy Taylor (a maintenance superintendent),
Frank Mole (an assistant maintenance superintendent),
and William Helm (the executive assistant to the super-
intendent) were in attendance. Robinson told Hicks
that the FPD had reviewed his job performance record
(which consisted of the twenty-eight disciplinary action
forms created or authorized by Thompson) and had
found his performance unsatisfactory. Robinson then
informed Hicks that management believed he should be
in a “serviceman II” position, an unskilled position
that paid $9 less per hour than his former position as
a mechanic (which paid $29.621 per hour).
Robinson explained that Hicks could either accept
the demotion and the FPD would ignore the last few
citations by Thompson, or Hicks could challenge the
citations at a different hearing, at which time the
FPD would pursue further disciplinary action against
Hicks up to and including termination. Hurley spoke to
No. 11-1124 5
Hicks privately and stated his opinion that the FPD was
not trying to fire Hicks but rather to offer him a way out.
The FPD then gave Hicks one day to respond, during
which Hicks discussed the situation with his wife. The
next day, Hicks told the FPD that the offer was “an
insult,” but he accepted the demotion, noting the bad
state of the economy and the need to keep his insurance.
Hicks signed a letter authored by the Human Resources
Director acknowledging his demotion to serviceman II,
with a new pay rate of $20.426 per hour. His new duties
included cutting grass, removing snow, and other land-
scaping work, quite different from his former duties
as mechanic.
Hicks filed a complaint with the EEOC almost immedi-
ately after his demotion. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue
letter in October 2008, and this lawsuit followed shortly
thereafter. At the close of discovery, the FPD moved for
summary judgment, but the district court denied
the motion, largely on the strength of an affidavit by
Joseph Hruska, the intermediate supervisor between
Hicks and Thompson. In his affidavit, Hruska stated
that as soon as he began working at the Central Garage,
Thompson told him that there were two employees—
Hicks and Hernandez—who “needed to be fired”
because they had filed charges of discrimination against
Thompson. Hruska further stated that two management-
level employees—Richard Wagner (the superintendent)
and Richard Bono (a manager)—also told him, on
multiple occasions, that the FPD wanted to “get rid of”
Hicks and Hernandez for filing charges against the FPD.
At trial, Hruska reiterated what he said in his affidavit,
6 No. 11-1124
testifying that Thompson and Bono told him that Hicks
and Hernandez “needed to be gotten rid of” because
they had filed charges of discrimination against Thomp-
son. Hruska added that he understood the phrase “gotten
rid of” to mean “terminated.” Hruska testified that he
understood that the FPD had hired him to ensure that
Hernandez and Hicks “were gotten rid of.” He also
testified that Thompson directed him to “write up
Dwaine Hicks any time, all the time, every time basi-
cally. Anything he did that was incorrect or if he
ordered a part incorrectly or if he worked too long on
a project to write him up.”
At the close of Hicks’s case, the FPD moved for
judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim,
but the district court denied that motion. The jury
found for Hicks and awarded him $30,000 and the
district court ordered the FPD to reinstate Hicks to
his former position. The FPD renewed its motion for
judgment as a matter of law, but this was again denied.
On appeal, the FPD now argues that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because Hicks failed to
present sufficient evidence that he suffered an adverse
employment action. Alternatively, the FPD seeks a new
trial on the grounds that the district court improperly
instructed the jury. Finally, the FPD argues that the
district court erred when it reinstated Hicks to his
former position, and seeks to have Hicks’s reinstate-
ment rescinded.
No. 11-1124 7
II.
A.
We first consider the FPD’s arguments that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review a
district court’s decision to deny a motion for judgment
as a matter of law de novo. Harvey v. Office Banks & Real
Estate, 377 F.3d 698, 707 (7th Cir. 2004). Our review is
limited to determining only whether any rational jury
could have found for the plaintiff, examining all evidence
in the record to make that determination. Reeves v. Sander-
son Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Emmel
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1996).
“We are required to draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party . . . and we do not weigh
the evidence or make credibility determinations.” Harvey,
377 F.3d at 707. “Our job at this stage is not to determine
whether the jury believed the right people, but only to
assure that it was presented with a legally sufficient
basis to support the verdict.” Id.
The FPD argues that no rational jury could have
found for Hicks because he did not present sufficient
evidence at trial on his retaliation claim. To prevail on a
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence (1) that he opposed an unlawful
employment practice; (2) that he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) that the adverse employment
action was caused by his opposition to the unlawful
employment practice. Hall v. Forest River, 536 F.3d 615,
619 (7th Cir. 2008); David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851,
8 No. 11-1124
858 (7th Cir. 2003). The FPD argues that Hicks failed
to meet prongs two and three of the test.1
For the second prong, the FPD asserts that the
evidence presented at trial showed that Hicks volun-
tarily accepted his demotion to the serviceman II posi-
tion, and because the demotion was voluntary, there
was no materially adverse employment action. The FPD
points to the fact that Hicks was represented by union
counsel when the demotion was offered to him, that he
had an opportunity to discuss the demotion with his
wife before accepting it, and that he had the option to
remain in his mechanic position and challenge any
further disciplinary action the FPD might take against him.
To establish that a materially adverse employment
action has been taken, a “plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse.” Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). A demotion
to a different position that pays significantly less than
the former position is certainly materially adverse. Tart
v. Ill. Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 475 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting
that “courts have found the criteria for materially
adverse employment action to be met” where the “em-
1
The FPD does not contest the first prong—that Hicks op-
posed an unlawful employment practice (Thompson’s alleged
discrimination against Hernandez) through his participation
in the complaints and investigation into Thompson. This
qualifies as a protected activity for purposes of Title VII.
See David, 324 F.3d at 858.
No. 11-1124 9
ployee’s compensation, benefits or other financial terms
of employment are diminished . . . .”). The FPD relies on
Simpson v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 196 F.3d 873 (7th
Cir. 1999), to make its argument that Hicks’s demotion
was voluntary, but that reliance is misplaced. While we
held in Borg-Warner that a demotion taken voluntarily is
not an adverse employment action, see id. at 876, the
plaintiff in Borg-Warner specifically requested a demo-
tion and turned down a transfer to a different super-
visory position. Id. Here, Hicks did not request or even
acknowledge a need for a demotion; he was given a
choice between taking a demotion or staying in his
present role to face further disciplinary action up to
termination. Hicks testified that he had no choice but
to accept the demotion because he believed that he
would be fired if he did not, and the FPD made it clear
to Hicks that it would seek to terminate him if he
did not accept the demotion. Such a choice could be said
to be no choice at all, and the jury agreed. Thus, Hicks
presented sufficient evidence at trial for a reasonable
jury to find that his demotion was involuntary.
The FPD also argues that Hicks failed to meet the
third prong of a retaliation claim, causation, because he
did not present sufficient evidence that he was demoted
because of his participation in a protected activity. The
FPD bases this argument on two principal points: (1) that
twenty-two months elapsed between the time Hicks
participated in the investigation of Hernandez’s discrimi-
nation complaint against Thompson and the time that
Hicks was demoted; and (2) that the individuals who
offered Thompson the demotion (Carmen Sanchez-Bass,
10 No. 11-1124
Keino Robinson, and William Helm) had no retaliatory
animus toward Hicks.
The FPD principally relies on two previous cases
where we held that a reasonable fact-finder could not
infer that an adverse employment action was causally
related to participation in a protected activity when
long periods of time separated the two events. See
Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., 604 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2010),
and Haywood v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524
(7th Cir. 2004). In Haywood, the plaintiff was terminated
a year after she filed a complaint of discrimination at
her workplace. We held that “[t]his time period is far
too long—at least on this record—to allow a reasonable
fact-finder to infer that her termination was causally
related to the filing of her complaint.” Haywood, 323 F.3d
at 532. Likewise, we held in Everroad that in the absence
of other causation evidence, a year elapsing between
a protected activity and an adverse employment action
was too long to establish a causal connection between
the two. Everroad, 604 F.3d at 481.
The FPD’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. The
holdings of both Haywood and Everroad are factually
distinct from this case, as each stress that the absence
of evidence other than the plaintiffs engaging in a pro-
tected activity compelled rulings in favor of the defen-
dants. In both cases, the plaintiffs relied on indirect
evidence to establish causation, rather than direct evi-
dence. In contrast, here Hicks put forth direct evidence
of causation, primarily via Hruska’s testimony at trial.
Hruska testified that Thompson told him that Hicks and
No. 11-1124 11
Hernandez needed to be fired because they had filed
charges of discrimination against Thompson, and this
constitutes direct evidence that Hicks was demoted
because he engaged in a protected activity. While the
FPD assails Hruska’s credibility as a witness, pointing
out that he had only worked with Hicks for a little
over three months before he himself was fired (only a
few days before Hicks was demoted), it is not for us
to make determinations regarding Hruska’s credibility.
That task lay with the jury, and we will not second-
guess them. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986).
The FPD misunderstands the role a “suspicious timing”
argument plays in retaliation cases. When employing
a direct-proof method, as Hicks did here, “a plaintiff
may offer circumstantial evidence of intentional retalia-
tion, including evidence of suspicious timing, ambiguous
statements, behavior toward or comments directed at
other employees in the protected group, and other bits
and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory
intent might be drawn.” Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC,
489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007). The “suspicious timing”
argument seeks to prove that an adverse employment
action was caused by the plaintiff’s opposition to an
unlawful employment practice because the opposition
and subsequent adverse action were close in time.
When the plaintiff uses this fact alone to prove causa-
tion, generally he or she must demonstrate that “an
adverse employment action follows close on the heels
of protected expression . . . .” Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., 269
F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001). But Hicks does not employ
12 No. 11-1124
a “suspicious timing” argument here; rather, he points
to the direct evidence of retaliatory animus presented
at trial via Hruska’s testimony.2 The FPD’s arguments
on this point are thus mistaken. Furthermore, as the
district court noted in its order denying the FPD’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law, there
are no bright-line rules to apply when considering the
temporal proximity of adverse actions to protected ac-
tivities because it is a fact-intensive analysis. While
close timing between a plaintiff engaging in a protected
activity and then suffering an adverse employment
action is useful evidence to establish a causal link
between the two events, the law does not require there
to be close timing where, as here, direct evidence is
used to establish causation. See id. 790-91.
2
By the time Hruska began working at the Central Garage,
nearly a year and a half after Hernandez filed his discrimina-
tion complaint against Thompson, any “suspicious timing” was
an afterthought. According to Hruska’s testimony at trial,
Richard Bono (an FPD manager) told Hruska that Hicks
and Hernandez needed “to be gotten rid of” because they
had filed discrimination charges against Thompson. When
Hruska asked Thompson about the complaints, he verified that
Hicks and Hernandez had filed charges against him and
that “they needed to be gotten rid of.” Thompson also di-
rected Hruska to “write up Dwaine Hicks any time, all the
time, every time basically. Anything he did that was incorrect
or if he ordered a part incorrectly or if he worked too long
on a project to write him up.” This testimony proved fatal to
the FPD’s defense.
No. 11-1124 13
The FPD next argues that, because the individuals who
offered Thompson the demotion (Carmen Sanchez-Bass,
Keino Robinson, and William Helm) had no retaliatory
animus toward Hicks, he cannot show as a matter of
law that he was demoted in retaliation for engaging
in a protected activity. Hicks responds that the
colloquially named “cat’s paw” theory 3 of liability
imputes Thompson’s retaliatory animus against Hicks
to the decisionmakers who ultimately offered Hicks
the demotion. The Supreme Court recently held that the
“cat’s paw” theory applies as follows: “if a supervisor
performs an act motivated by [a discriminatory or re-
taliatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor
to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is
a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action,
then the employer is liable . . . .” Staub, 131 S. Ct. at
1194. Thus, it is appropriate to impute discriminatory
or retaliatory animus to a decisionmaker when the
3
In Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), the Supreme
Court explained the origin of the unusual name as follows:
“The term ‘cat’s paw’ derives from a fable conceived by Aesop,
put into verse by La Fontaine in 1679, and injected into United
States employment discrimination law by Posner in 1990. See
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). In the
fable, a monkey induces a cat by flattery to extract roasting
chestnuts from the fire. After the cat has done so, burning
its paws in the process, the monkey makes off with the
chestnuts and leaves the cat with nothing.” Staub, 131 S. Ct. at
1190 n.1. For further discussion, see Cook v. IPC Int’l Corp., ___
F.3d ___, No. 11-2502, 2012 WL 739303, at *2-3 (7th Cir. Mar. 8,
2012).
14 No. 11-1124
“party nominally responsible for a decision is, by virtue
of her role in the company, totally dependent on another
employee to supply the information on which to base
that decision.” Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.,
479 F.3d 908, 918 (7th Cir. 2007).
Hicks presented sufficient evidence at trial for the jury
to find that the FPD officials based their decision to
offer Hicks the demotion on the twenty-eight disciplinary
action forms he received either directly from Thompson
or with Thompson’s approval. While Thompson himself
did not participate in the hearing at which Hicks
was offered the demotion, Thompson submitted the
disciplinary action forms to Sanchez-Bass. Her testi-
mony at trial indicated that she relied on the forms
when offering Hicks the choice between accepting
the demotion or facing further disciplinary action, in-
cluding termination. The jury found that Thompson
had a retaliatory animus against Hicks, and since
Sanchez-Bass and the other FPD officials who demoted
Hicks were “dependent on another employee to supply
the information on which to base” their decision, his
animus can be imputed to the FPD under the “cat’s paw”
theory. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 918. Therefore, Hicks put
forth sufficient evidence to support the jury’s decision
on the retaliation claim.
B.
We next consider the FPD’s argument that it is entitled
to a new trial because the district court used an
improper jury instruction. “We review jury instructions
No. 11-1124 15
de novo to determine whether, taken as a whole, they
correctly and completely informed the jury of the ap-
plicable law.” Huff v. Sheahan, 493 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir.
2007). Ultimately, however, our “review of jury instruc-
tions is limited.” Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327,
1332 (7th Cir. 1996). We must determine whether the
court abused its discretion when it denied the FPD’s
motion for a new trial. Id. If the instructions are found
to be deficient, we determine whether the jury was con-
fused or misled by the instructions. Gile v. United Airlines,
213 F.3d 365, 375 (7th Cir. 2000). Even if we believe that the
jury was confused or misled, we must find that the FPD
was prejudiced before ordering a new trial. Id.
The FPD argues that the instruction given by the
district court inadequately stated Seventh Circuit law
and that the FPD was prejudiced by the instruction.
The district court instructed the jury as follows:
Plaintiff Dwaine Hicks claims that the Forest Pre-
serve District of Cook County, Illinois took adverse
employment action(s) against him in retaliation for
his cooperation with the investigations of Gronimo
Hernandez’s complaint(s) of discrimination. For pur-
poses of this instruction, an adverse employment
action is any action directed toward an employee
which would reasonably discourage him from co-
operating in the investigation of a charge of discrim-
ination.
In order to find that the Forest Preserve District
took adverse employment action(s) against Dwaine
Hicks, you must find the following:
16 No. 11-1124
1. that Dwaine Hicks cooperated in the investiga-
tion [sic] Gronimo Hernandez’s complaint(s) of dis-
crimination;
2. that the Forest Preserve District took adverse ac-
tion(s) against Hicks, and
3. that had Hicks not cooperated in the investigation
of the Hernandez complaint(s) of discrimination, the
adverse action(s) taken would not have been taken.
If you find that Hicks has proved all of these things
by a preponderance of the evidence, you must find
for Hicks.
If you find that Hicks has failed to prove any of these
things by a preponderance of the evidence, then
your verdict must be for the Forest Preserve District.
The district court based this jury instruction on language
from a Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction instead
of the Seventh Circuit’s model instruction on retaliation.
In essence, the given instruction merely stated that
Hicks had to show that he suffered an adverse employ-
ment action because he cooperated in the investigation
of Hernandez’s discrimination complaint, whereas if
the district court had used the model Seventh Circuit
instruction, the instruction would have identified the
specific adverse action Hicks suffered—to wit, his demo-
tion.4 The FPD contends that because the instruction
4
The pattern civil jury instruction for retaliation in the Seventh
Circuit is as follows:
(continued...)
No. 11-1124 17
did not specifically identify Hicks’s demotion as the
adverse employment action he suffered, the instruction
misstated Seventh Circuit law.5
This argument underscores why, when we review
jury instructions, “we are not looking for an idealized
set of perfect jury instructions. Instead . . . we construe
them in their entirety to determine if the instructions as
a whole are sufficient to inform the jury correctly of
the applicable law.” Knox, 93 F.3d at 1333 (7th Cir.
1996). Though the Model Civil Jury Instruction for re-
taliation in the Seventh Circuit includes a reference to
the specific adverse action taken by the employer, there
4
(...continued)
Plaintiff claims that he was [adverse action] by Defendant
because of [protected activity]. To succeed on this claim,
Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Defendant [adverse action] him because of his [protected
activity]. To determine that Plaintiff was [adverse action]
because of his [protected activity], you must decide that the
Defendant would not have [taken adverse action against]
Plaintiff if he had [not engaged in protected activity] but
everything else had been the same.
If you find that Plaintiff has proved this by a preponderance
of the evidence, then you must find for Plaintiff. However,
if you find that Plaintiff did not prove this by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, then you must find for Defendant.
F EDERAL C IVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE S EVENTH C IRCUIT , § 3.02
(2009).
5
The Ninth Circuit model instruction also called for a specific
identification of the adverse action.
18 No. 11-1124
is no case law mandating that a retaliation instruction
include the specific adverse action. For clarity’s sake,
however, we think it would be helpful to include it.
While we think it was unnecessary and probably mis-
guided for the district court to model an instruction
using language developed in a different circuit, it is
certainly not an error compelling a new trial. A district
court enjoys wide latitude in crafting jury instructions,
and as long as those instructions do not “misstate the
law or fail to convey the relevant legal principles in
full,” they will stand. Byrd v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
423 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir 2005). The instruction given
by the district court here accurately states what a
plaintiff must prove to prevail on a retaliation claim,
and the FPD is not entitled to a new trial.
Furthermore, we find no evidence of jury confusion.
The FPD argues that the absence of the specific adverse
action in the instruction could have confused the jury
by allowing it to think that the twenty-eight disciplin-
ary action forms filed against Hicks cumulatively con-
stituted the adverse action. We find this argument unper-
suasive. The trial focused on Hicks’s demotion, and in
the choice between twenty-eight citations at work or
a demotion to a different position with a concurrent
$9 per hour cut in pay, no reasonable juror could be
confused about which action was the adverse action at
issue. Since the district court did not misstate the ap-
plicable law and there is no evidence that the jury was
misled or confused, the FPD is not entitled to a new trial.
No. 11-1124 19
C.
Finally, the FPD challenges the district court’s order
to reinstate Hicks to his former position as a main-
tenance mechanic at the Central Garage. We review
a district court’s decision to impose the equitable
remedy of reinstatement for an abuse of discretion.
Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 861 (7th Cir.
2001). The decision is “consigned to the sound discretion
of the district court.” Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic
Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1994). The FPD
argues that Hicks’s former position has been filled and
that if Hicks returns to his position at the Central
Garage, he would be supervised again by Thompson,
with whom he has a decidedly less-than-ideal working
relationship. But the remedial purpose of Title VII is to
place the victim “where they would have been were it
not for the unlawful discrimination.” Id. And reinstate-
ment is “the preferred remedy for victims of discrimina-
tion, and the court should award it when doing so is
feasible.” Bruso, 239 F.3d at 862. While the relationship
between Hicks and Thompson may be acrimonious,
Hicks specifically requested reinstatement, and we
have ruled that mutual dislike between an employer
and an employee is not a satisfactory reason to deny
reinstatement. See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assocs., 966
F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, we must be
careful “not to allow an employer to use its anger or
hostility toward the plaintiff for having filed a lawsuit as
an excuse to avoid the plaintiff’s reinstatement.” Bruso,
239 F.3d at 851. Also, the district court correctly
noted that making the victim of discrimination whole
20 No. 11-1124
ordinarily requires reinstating him, even if that re-
quires pushing out someone who was hired to fill the
plaintiff’s old position. See Bruno v. Crown Point, Ind., 950
F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1991). The district court is in a
better position to evaluate whether reinstatement is an
appropriate remedy, and we find no abuse of discre-
tion by the district court when it ordered Hicks
reinstated to his maintenance mechanic position.
III.
Hicks presented sufficient evidence at trial for a rea-
sonable jury to find that he was demoted in retaliation
for engaging in a protected activity. The district court’s
jury instruction on retaliation, though worded differently
than the model Seventh Circuit instruction, accurately
informed the jury of the applicable law, and we see no
evidence that the jury was confused or misled by the
instruction. We can find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision to reinstate Hicks to his former
position. For the reasons articulated above, the district
court’s order denying the FPD’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law is A FFIRMED, the FPD’s request for a
new trial is D ENIED, and the FPD’s request to rescind
Hicks’s reinstatement is D ENIED.
4-18-12