In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-21-00412-CV
___________________________
MARVIN L. TROUTMAN, Appellant
V.
NASA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CIV-20-0419
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Marvin L. Troutman, pro se, appeals from the trial court’s turnover
and receivership order (the turnover order) in favor of Appellee NASA Federal Credit
Union (the Credit Union). In three issues, Troutman argues that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to render the turnover order and the underlying judgment, that the
turnover order was not supported by sufficient evidence, and that the trial court violated
his oath of office. Because Troutman’s issues are without merit, we affirm.
Background
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Credit Union in its breach of
contract suit against Troutman, and it awarded the Credit Union $31,779.40 in damages,
plus interest and attorney’s fees. Troutman filed a notice of appeal from the judgment,
but this court dismissed the appeal because of his “flagrant violation of the briefing
rules,” which he did not correct despite this court’s warning that a failure to do so would
result in dismissal. Troutman v. NASA Fed. Credit Union, No. 02-20-00401-CV, 2021 WL
1134453, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The Credit Union subsequently filed an “Application for Turnover Order &
Appointment of a Receiver” in order to collect on the judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002. The application asserted that the Credit Union had
established its right to a turnover order through deemed admissions. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
198.1. The attached requests for admissions, which were accompanied by a certificate
of service, requested Troutman to admit that he was indebted to the Credit Union for
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the amount in the judgment and that he had various types of property that were not
exempt from execution, including an active bank account. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a; Cruz
v. Sanchez, 528 S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied) (citing Tex. R.
Civ. P. 21a(e) and stating unchallenged certificate of service is prima facie evidence of
receipt). In response, Troutman filed a variety of documents, but none of the filings
addressed the requests for admissions or cited to or discussed Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code Section 31.002.1 After a brief hearing, the trial court signed the turnover
order.
Standard of Review
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s rendition of a turnover order.
Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). A trial court abuses its
discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles—that is, if its
act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v.
Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). Whether any evidence supports the
These documents were a “Judicial Notice of Liability: Attorney no
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Authority/Constitutional Challenge,” a “Judicial Notice of Facts and Laws,” a
“Deposition of Marvin Luther Troutman Victim,” and an “Objection to Plaintiffs
Application for Turnover Order & Appointment of a Receiver.” The documents
primarily cited federal law and Texas criminal law inapplicable to turnover proceedings.
One document stated that the trial court “is not allowed to use my Trade Name
MARVIN LUTHER TROUTMAN” and offered the court a Licensing Agreement to
use Troutman’s name. Several of the documents asserted that the Credit Union’s
attorney was not a licensed attorney.
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turnover order is a relevant consideration in determining if the trial court abused its
discretion by rendering the order. Beaumont Bank, 806 S.W.2d at 226.
Discussion2
I. First issue
In Troutman’s first issue, he challenges the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. The first several pages of argument under this issue are devoted to various
assertions about the Credit Union’s failure to prove its breach of contract claim in the
underlying lawsuit. He argues that the underlying suit should have been dismissed for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because there was no competent evidence to support
the Credit Union’s breach of contract claim. For the same reasons we rejected that
argument in Rocha, we overrule this part of Troutman’s first issue. See Rocha, 2022 WL
2176517, at *2.
Also under this issue, Troutman contends that the parties’ contract raised
standing and capacity issues because the contract was signed in Maryland and the law
of the contract is federal law, and because the Credit Union is not permitted to contract
with the general public. Troutman’s arguments under this part of the issue are very
2
Troutman’s brief is remarkably similar—in some sections identical—to the
appellant’s brief filed in unrelated appeal involving the Credit Union. See Rocha v. NASA
Fed. Credit Union, No. 02-21-00416-CV, 2022 WL 2176517, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth June 16, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Like the brief in that case, some of the
arguments in Troutman’s brief are difficult to parse, but we address them to the extent
we can understand them.
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similar to those made in Rocha, and they fail for the same reason the appellant’s
arguments failed in that case. See id. at *2 & nn.2–3. We overrule the remainder of his
issue.
II. Second issue
In Troutman’s second issue, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by appointing a receiver. He asserts that if we review the record of the hearing, we will
see that the Credit Union failed to provide testimony or other admissible evidence
showing the need for a receiver or that he owns non-exempt property. We construe his
issue to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the turnover order.
See Z.M. Shayjayadam3, LLC v. Omnova Sols., Inc., No. 14-19-00623-CV, 2020 WL
6278615, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(construing “no evidence” argument seeking reversal and rendition as a challenge to
legal sufficiency).
Troutman is correct that the Credit Union did not introduce evidence at the
hearing—instead, it relied on the deemed admissions. The requested admissions
addressed the elements necessary for the Credit Union to establish its entitlement to a
turnover order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002; Robison v. Watson, No.
04-20-00138-CV, 2021 WL 2117936, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 26, 2021, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that a “turnover order requires a factual showing that the
judgment debtor owns non-exempt property” and that “[o]nce the judgment creditor
produces evidence that the judgment debtor owns property, the burden shifts to the
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judgment debtor to prove the property is exempt from turnover”). Further, under the
turnover statute, when a party establishes the right to a turnover order, the trial court
has the discretion to appoint a receiver to administer the turnover order. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002(b)(3); Robison, 2021 WL 2117936, at *2; Black v. Shor,
443 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, no pet.) (noting that
when Section 31.002 requirements for a turnover order are satisfied, trial court has
discretion to appoint a receiver to take possession of nonexempt property); cf. Remote
Control Hobbies, L.L.C. v. Airborne Freight Corp., No. 14-12-01088-CV, 2014 WL 1267073,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that
Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 64 requirements for receivers are not
applicable in a Section 31.002 proceeding); Schultz v. Cadle Co., 825 S.W.2d 151, 154
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1992) (stating that traditional requirements for appointment of
receiver are inapplicable in postjudgment turnover proceeding), writ denied, 852 S.W.2d
499 (Tex. 1993).
In the trial court, Troutman did not address the Credit Union’s requests for
admissions in any manner; he did not deny that he had received the requests or that he
failed to respond to them, and he did not ask the trial court to un-deem the admissions.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.3. Likewise, Troutman’s appellate brief does not address the
issue, and thus his brief does not address the basis on which the trial court rendered the
turnover order. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Lesher v. Doescher, No. 02-12-00360-CV, 2013
WL 5593608, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 10, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
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(noting that this court cannot create or develop arguments for an appellant). He argues
only that the Credit Union did not produce evidence at the hearing. We therefore
overrule the legal sufficiency part of his issue.
Also under this issue, Troutman argues that the trial court failed to submit
findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the turnover order.3 As we explained
in Rocha, a trial court’s failure to file properly-requested findings and conclusions is
harmless when that failure does not prevent the appellant from properly presenting its
case on appeal. See Rocha, 2022 WL 2176517, at *4; see also Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v.
Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014). Troutman does not explain how the trial court’s
failure to make findings and conclusions prevented him from properly presenting his
case on appeal. Like the appellant in Rocha, Troutman makes no argument that he was
left guessing the basis for the trial court’s order, and he was able to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the turnover order. See Rocha, 2022 WL 2176517,
at *4. Any error in failing to file findings and conclusions was harmless. See Tex. R. App.
P. 44.1; In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no
pet.); see also Isaac v. Burnside, 616 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
3
Troutman filed an “Affidavit in Support of Request for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law/Equity.” For purposes of this appeal, we assume that this
document met the requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 296. Troutman subsequently
filed a “Notice of Past Due Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law,” and we assume
that this document met the requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 297. See Tex. R. Civ.
P. 296, 297.
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2020, pet. denied); Tolpo v. Denny, No. 02-15-00231-CV, 2016 WL 1601068, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Apr. 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Finally under this issue, Troutman complains that the trial court ended the
hearing without asking Troutman if he had “anything else to say.” He further contends
that when he asked how the court could sign the order without any evidence, the court
mocked Troutman and then screamed at him to get out of the courtroom.
At the hearing, the trial court asked the parties if they had anything else to offer
beyond what was already “in the record.” The Credit Union’s attorney stated that the
Credit Union was relying on the evidence with its motion, i.e., the deemed admissions.
The trial court then placed Troutman under oath and gave him the opportunity to
speak. Troutman began by stating that he objected to everything the Credit Union’s
attorney said “due to hearsay” and because the attorney “is either an attorney or a
witness, and only an injured human being can testify; not an attorney.” He then stated
that he “further testif[ied] [to the] accuracy of all [his] affidavits and notices filed into
this court case. All the affidavits and notices have been unrebutted and stand as fact.”
The following exchange then occurred among the trial court, Troutman, the Credit
Union’s attorney, and an unidentified speaker:
THE COURT: All right. Anything else from anybody?
[The Credit Union’s attorney]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I’ve signed the document entitled Order Granting
the Motion for Turnover and Appointment of Receiver. Everything set
out therein is the order of the court. These parties are excused. Thank you.
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MR. TROUTMAN: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I don’t hear an objection.
MR. TROUTMAN: Well, how can you sign a document that has
no testimony?
THE COURT: I use my pen. You’re excused.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, for the record
criminal charges have been pressed against [the Credit Union’s attorney].
He is not a licensed attorney. He does not have any authority. He’s
simulated a legal process. You are an accessory to the fact. I am a witness.
I accept your oath to the State of Texas and the United States of America.
Do not touch me.
THE BAILIFF: You need to go.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I accept your oath. You are an
accessory to the facts of criminal and civil – assimilating a legal process.
THE COURT: You’re not a party to this suit and you are excused.
Please leave the courtroom.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You are assimilating a legal
process.
THE COURT: Escort him out, Mr. Bailiff.
THE BAILIFF: Judge said go.
MR. TROUTMAN: Your Honor, are you and [the Credit Union’s
attorney] committing trust malfeasance?
THE COURT: Get out of my courtroom. You’re out of order.
Both of you.
Troutman argues that this exchange shows that the trial court “did not request
any evidence or testimony from a competent witness, nor any sworn statements from
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[the Credit Union] that a debt was still existing. . . .” We disagree. Although the trial
court’s comment about signing the order with his pen was perhaps flippant, the court’s
handling of the hearing and its ordering Troutman to leave the courtroom showed
nothing more than the court controlling the courtroom. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46
S.W.3d 237, 240–41 (Tex. 2001) (stating that a trial judge had discretion over the
conduct of a trial, that a court “has the authority to express itself in exercising this broad
discretion,” and that “a trial court may properly intervene to maintain control in the
courtroom”). Nothing in this exchange negates the evidence that the trial court had
before it. We overrule the remainder of Troutman’s second issue.
III. Third Issue
In Troutman’s third issue, he asserts that the trial court “failed to provide due
process of law to [him] and violated [the court’s] Oath of Office and Fiduciary Duty as
Trustee to the Public Trust.” Under this issue, he argues that the trial court committed
fraud by deliberately concealing material information from him, but he does not specify
what that information was or otherwise discuss the elements of fraud. See Tex. R. App.
P. 38.1(i). Citing to Clearfield Trust Company v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 364, 63 S. Ct.
573, 574 (1943), Troutman then argues that under “the Clearfield doctrine,” lower courts
“are actually under control of the Uniform Commercial Code,” that they are not “a
judicial venue created by an act of Congress” and are instead “private banks using
commercial paper,” and that they are thus mere private corporations. Clearfield Trust has
no application to this case, and Troutman’s argument is without merit. See id.; United
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States v. Hakim, No. 1:18-cr-126-MLB-AJB, 2018 WL 6184796, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
22, 2018, report and order) (explaining Clearfield Trust and its limited application), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-cr-00126, 2018 WL 4791085 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4,
2018); Bey v. S.C. Berkeley 9th Judicial Court, No. 2:17-cv-3248-RMG-MGB, 2018 WL
1135382, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 2018) (report and recommendation) (stating that the
plaintiff had contended that the state court was a “private corporation” and taking
judicial notice that plaintiff’s contention was “simply wrong”).
Finally, Troutman argues that the trial court “cut the hearing short, skipped
evidence, overlooked admissible evidence from [Troutman], and made a decision that
would benefit the court, not the people.” To the extent that he argues that the trial court
was biased, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994);
De Los Reyes v. Maris, No. 02-21-00022-CV, 2021 WL 5227179, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Likewise, “judicial remarks during the
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” Dow
Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 240 (citing Liteky). We have rejected Troutman’s argument that the
Credit Union’s motion was unsupported by sufficient evidence, and he does not explain
how his “admissible evidence”—presumably his trial testimony and the documents he
filed in the trial court—defeated the Credit Union’s entitlement to a turnover order.
Further, he has provided no citations to legal authority or to the record to support his
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argument that the rendition of the turnover order benefited the trial court. We overrule
Troutman’s third issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Troutman’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s order.
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: August 18, 2022
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