This is an original action by the petitioner, Pope County Judge Bill Abernathy, to have this court prohibit the Pope Circuit Court from proceeding to trial upon indictments issued against him by a special grand jury. Judge Abernathy contends the grand jury was selected illegally and, hence, its indictments are void. We granted a temporary writ of prohibition and required briefs pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. Having considered the arguments we now dissolve the temporary writ of prohibition.
On November 1, 1986, the Circuit Court of Pope County, acting pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-32-103 (1987) [Ark. Stat. Ann. § 39-205.1 (Supp. 1985)], selected at random a list of 800 members to serve as petit jurors for 1987. In May and June of 1987, the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, selected 60 names from the jury wheel to serve as a special grand jury.
On June 30 the grand jury returned one felony indictment and one misdemeanor indictment with four counts against Judge Abernathy, who then moved to void the indictments. Abernathy contends Ark. Code Ann. § 16-32-103 (1987) [Ark. Stat. Ann. § 39-205.1 (Supp. 1985)] exclusively controls the selection of jurors, whereas the respondent argues that the selection may be made in accordance with either Ark. Code Ann. § 16-32-201 (1987) [Ark. Stat. Ann. § 39-217.1 (Supp. 1985)], or § 16-32-103. The end result, as we interpret these contentions, is that Abernathy maintains § 16-32-103 requires the selection of 100 grand jurors, whereas the circuit judge selected only 60.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ and is never issued to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction, only where it is proposing to act in excess of its jurisdiction. Lowery v. State, 215 Ark. 240, 219 S.W.2d 932 (1949); Skinner v. Mayfield, 246 Ark. 741, 439 S.W.2d 651 (1969); Miller v. Reed, 234 Ark. 850, 355 S.W.2d 169 (1961).
Assuming, without deciding, that there were irregularities in impanelling this grand jury, it is clear its members were selected at random from a jury wheel compiled from the voter registration list. Whether the irregularities would constitute reversible error we will not here decide, we need only determine whether the Pope Circuit Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction.
Petitioner relies primarily on Streett v. Roberts, 258 Ark. 839, 529 S.W.2d 343 (1975), but we do not read Streett as holding that any irregularity in the selection of jurors by circuit courts can be challenged by writ of prohibition. In Streett there was no attempt whatever to comply with existing law, and no random selection of grand jurors, the circuit judge of Faulkner County simply dismissed an existing grand jury, presumably properly impanelled, and immediately proceeded to impanel another special grand jury by instructing the sheriff to select 25 grand jurors. That selection, it appears, was to be made by whatever method pleased the sheriff. The prosecuting attorney of that judicial district moved to prohibit this clear violation of law and a majority of this court held the prosecutor had standing to do so and that the circuit court was proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction. We find little similarity in the two situations.
Petitioner cites Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973), as holding that the provisions of the jury wheel act are mandatory. But we have recognized that some sections of the act are more important than others and that any irregularity in the selection process does not per se invalidate the proceedings. In Huckaby v. State, 262 Ark. 413, 557 S.W.2d 875 (1975), we said:
Act 568 of 1969 is a comprehensive statute by which the legislature directed the use of a jury wheel and made other changes in the selection of juries. In Horne v. State, 253 Ark. 1096, 490 S.W.2d 806 (1973), we held to be mandatory that section of Act 568 which requires the jury commissioners to meet each year and select prospective jurors for the following calendar year. . . .
In Home, however, we did not hold, as counsel now seem to argue, that every provision in Act 568 is mandatory in the sense that noncompliance requires that the jury panel be quashed. Some sections of the act are more important than others. . . . There was, in the circumstances, a substantial compliance with the statute.
In Harrod v. State, 286 Ark. 277, 691 S.W.2d 172 (1985), and Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887 (1982), we found substantial compliance with the act and rejected challenges to the jury selection. As we have seen, there was not even minimum compliance in Streett v. Roberts, supra.
We conclude that the circuit court of Pope County is not clearly without jurisdiction to proceed in this case and, hence, petitioner’s proper remedy, if it becomes necessary, is by appeal rather than by prohibition.
The Temporary Writ of Prohibition is dissolved and writ denied.
Hickman, J., and Glaze, J., concur. Purtle, J., dissents.