[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 07-14176 and 07-14196 JUNE 29, 2009
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-60216-CR-JIC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KENNETH WILK,
a.k.a. Kenneth P. Wilk,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 29, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BIRCH and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Kenneth Wilk appeals his convictions for unlawfully killing a state law
enforcement officer assisting in a federal investigation, attempted second-degree
murder of a state law enforcement officer assisting in a federal investigation,
knowingly carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence, possession of child pornography, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy.
After thoroughly reviewing the record and considering the parties’ briefs, and with
the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In the summer of 2001, Wilk’s domestic partner, Kelly Ray Jones, was
arrested and convicted on child pornography charges.1 During Jones’s prosecution,
Wilk made threats against law enforcement personnel, some of which he made
online under his computer screen name “Wolfpackeines.” Wilk’s online profile
listed hobbies such as “hunting cops,” occupations such as “cop bashing,” and
“alerting people about kiddy porn stings.” Around this time, Wilk purchased
several firearms and participated in firearm skill shooting contests throughout
Florida. Wilk purchased additional firearms in 2002 and 2003.
On July 12, 2004, while on supervised release, Jones sent images depicting
child pornography to an undercover law enforcement agent. The images were
transmitted from Wilk’s internet account on a computer at the residence shared by
1
Jones was sentenced to 28 months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release.
A condition of Jones’s supervised release was that he not use the Internet.
2
Jones and Wilk. After further investigation, law enforcement obtained and
executed a search warrant on the residence. Officers recovered numerous child
pornography images and arrested Jones on the scene.
While Jones was incarcerated, he instructed Wilk to contact a witness whom
the police had told Jones not to contact. Wilk went to the witness’s apartment to
dissuade him from cooperating with law enforcement. At Jones’s direction, Wilk
sent derogatory e-mails to the witness’s business associate in an attempt to
discredit the witness. Further communication between Jones and Wilk suggested
that Wilk planned to threaten or kill a witness against Jones. Also at Jones’s
instruction, Wilk deleted e-mails relevant to Jones’s child pornography charges.
Federal agents obtained an arrest warrant for Wilk and a search warrant for
his residence. Early in the morning of August 19, 2004, Deputy Sheriff Todd Fatta
and Sergeant Angelo Cedeno of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”)
assisted federal agents, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent
Christopher Harvey, in executing the warrants. The agents initially planned to use
a ruse to lure Wilk from the residence but abandoned the idea after learning that
Wilk anticipated such a tactic. Cedeno determined the officers’ assignments and
the order of entry. After surrounding Wilk’s residence and announcing
themselves, the officers forcibly entered.
3
Fatta entered the residence first, followed by Cedeno. Upon entry, two
large caliber gunshots were heard, followed by several smaller caliber gunshots.
The other officers opened fire, allowing an injured Cedeno to escape. Wilk
appeared at the open front door and surrendered, and the officers found a gun in
the doorway where Wilk exited. Inside the residence, officers found Fatta on the
floor, motionless and not breathing. Despite revival attempts, he died from a shot
to the chest.2 Other than Wilk, no one was found in the residence. Tests on Fatta’s
gun revealed that he fired no shot.
A second superseding indictment charged Wilk with seven Counts: (1)
killing Fatta, a state law enforcement officer, while Fatta assisted in a federal
investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1121(a)(1)(A) and 1111; (2) killing
Fatta, a state law enforcement officer, while Fatta assisted a federal agent engaged
in the performance of his official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a) and
1114; (3) attempting to kill Cedeno, a state law enforcement officer, while Cedeno
assisted a federal agent engaged in the performance of official duties, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1113 and 1114; (4) knowingly carrying and using a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence, i.e., the killing and attempted killing of
2
All of the officers, including Fatta, were wearing bullet-proof vests. Because of the
type of gun used to shoot Fatta (a Winchester 30-30 rifle), the bullets would have penetrated
vests rated even higher than the ones the officers wore.
4
individuals assisting a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and
924(j)(1); (5) obstruction of justice in connection with the federal prosecution of
Jones, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); (6) possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2; and (7) conspiring to tamper with
a witness and destroy evidence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).
At trial, Wilk testified for six days in his defense. He testified that on the
morning of August 19, 2004, he was in his home drinking a cup of coffee and
heard no police announcement. Wilk explained that on that morning, he was
suffering from an ear infection that impaired his hearing, which was corroborated
by expert testimony. According to Wilk, he heard a crashing noise and grabbed his
gun, fearing that he was being attacked because he had previously been a victim of
anti-gay vandalism and hate mail. Wilk testified that a dark figure, pointing a gun
in Wilk’s direction, stood in the living room and confronted him and that no police
markings were visible. Wilk asserted that he fired his gun in fear for his life and
that he acted in self-defense. One of Wilk’s experts testified that Wilk suffered
from AIDS dementia at the time and that Wilk’s ability to assess a stressful
situation was impaired. Wilk also presented expert testimony that at the time of
the shooting, he suffered from diminished capacity, neurological disorders, brain
damage, and was insane.
5
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts except Count 3, on which the
jury found Wilk guilty of the lesser-included offense of the attempted second-
degree murder of Cedeno.
II. DISCUSSION
Wilk challenges on appeal numerous rulings by the district court. Among
other things, Wilk argues that the district court improperly excluded evidence of
the slain law enforcement officer’s steroid use and evidence pertaining to proper
police procedures; erred by failing to suppress evidence of Wilk’s confidential
medical records; and erred by modifying the self-defense jury instruction. We
address each of these issues in turn.
A. Evidence of Steroid Use and Proper Police Procedures
Wilk contends that the district court improperly excluded evidence of Fatta’s
steroid use and evidence that the officers did not follow proper police procedures
when they entered Wilk’s home. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2964 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court
applies an incorrect legal standard or makes findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous. United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
Fatta’s post-mortem examination revealed that he had steroids in his blood,
6
and Wilk sought to admit this evidence as relevant to his self-defense claim. In
excluding the evidence, the district court found that with respect to Wilk’s defense,
Fatta’s steroid use was clearly irrelevant, would not tend to prove or disprove any
material fact at issue, and that the prejudicial effect and confusion of the issues
substantially outweighed any probative value of the evidence. Wilk maintains that
this evidence was relevant to his defense because a person on steroids can act
aggressively and erratically, which would have corroborated his testimony that the
officers acted like armed home invaders instead of police officers. Wilk asserts
that the exclusion of the steroid evidence denied him the opportunity to (1) rebut
government’s theory of motive; (2) demonstrate the state of mind and level of
intent; (3) corroborate his claim of self-defense; (4) present his version of events to
the jury; and (5) establish his claim of self-defense.
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as that which has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Yet relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” F ED. R. E VID. 403.
Wilk fails to show how the district court abused its discretion in excluding
7
the steroid evidence. We agree with the district court that Fatta’s and the other
officers’ actions at the time of entry were relevant to Wilk’s defense, but that the
underlying reasons for Fatta’s mode of entry tended to neither prove nor disprove
any material fact at issue. Further, we find incredible Wilk’s claim that he was
unable to present his version of events to the jury, as he testified in his defense for
six days. Indeed, even Wilk’s record testimony that he was confronted by a dark
figure standing in his living room, pointing a gun in Wilk’s direction, fails to
corroborate his assertion that Fatta acted aggressively or erratically. The strongest
evidence supporting any aggressive or erratic behavior is that Fatta kicked out the
front window of the residence. Yet the record reflects that Fatta did so only as the
other officers were attempting, without success, to break through the front door.
Most importantly, no evidence exists that Fatta was the aggressor in the shoot-
out—to the contrary, the record shows that no shot was ever fired from Fatta’s gun.
In short, even if the steroid evidence had some relevance, we are hard-
pressed to see how it was crucial or necessary to Wilk’s establishment of a valid
defense. See United States v. Todd, 108 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1997) (a
court’s discretion to rule on the relevance of evidence “does not . . . extend to the
exclusion of crucial relevant evidence necessary to establish a valid defense”).
Quite simply, Wilk fails to show any abuse of discretion by the district court.
8
Likewise, we find no reversible error in the district court’s exclusion of
expert testimony about whether the officers followed proper police procedure
during entry into Wilk’s residence. At trial, Wilk attempted to introduce the expert
testimony of William Gaut, whose report and testimony allegedly would have
revealed that the entry team was improperly dressed in civilian clothing, had
inadequate police markings, appeared to be armed invaders, and violated
established procedure in raiding the residence. According to Wilk, this evidence
went directly to his self-defense, justification, and imperfect self-defense claims.
The district court determined that testimony about the BCSO’s protocols,
standards, or policies in executing search warrants was irrelevant and would not
assist the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. We agree.
We first note that Wilk cites no authority about the admissibility of evidence
relating to police procedures. In any event, the evidence relevant to Wilk’s self-
defense claim was his perception of the officers’ actions that morning, not whether
the officers followed proper procedure in executing the search warrant. Cf. United
States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The issue in this case
was not whether it was proper police procedure for an officer to place his service
weapon out of reach before engaging a suspect in a physical confrontation, but
9
whether or not [the officer] actually did so.”). Further, no allegation exists that the
government attempted to introduce evidence that the officers strictly complied with
established procedures. Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in excluding the evidence when Wilk’s six-day testimony provided him
ample opportunity to present his perception of that morning’s events. No
reversible error exists.
B. Wilk’s Confidential Medical Records
Next, Wilk submits that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence and testimony relating to his medical and psychological records
from: (1) the University of Miami; (2) Dr. Fisher, one of Wilk’s treating HIV
physicians; (3) the Cleveland Clinic of Florida; (4) the Federal Detention Center;
and (5) Massachusetts Mutual. Wilk asserts that these records were protected by
the patient-psychotherapist privilege, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), and the Florida Statutes. The district court found
the psychiatrist-patient privilege inapplicable to certain records, declined to
recognize a physician-patient privilege, and found that Wilk’s other arguments
were equally inapplicable.3 The arguments that Wilk presents on appeal are
3
The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge assigned to the case, overruling Wilk’s objections to the Report and
Recommendation.
10
essentially identical to those raised in the district court.
As an initial matter, the magistrate judge who recommended that Wilk’s
motion be denied properly deemed the motion a motion in limine to exclude the
records as privileged under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Because Wilk did not
address this issue in a Fourth Amendment context but rather treated the issue as an
evidentiary matter, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Perez-Oliveros,
479 F.3d at 783.
All of the records at issue were submitted to the magistrate judge for in
camera review, and the magistrate judge heard argument on the motion. The
parties stipulated that all of the records, except those from the University of Miami,
were obtained by grand jury subpoenas after Wilk’s arrest. The University records
were obtained pursuant to an Order Enforcing Grand Jury Subpoena issued by the
magistrate judge.
Wilk has shown no abuse of discretion as to the admission of the records at
issue. Notably, the court granted Wilk’s motion to exclude two records authored
by psychologists from the Federal Detention Center, finding the two records
subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. However, none of the University
of Miami records, which Wilk claims should have been subject to the privilege,
indicated that Wilk ever consulted with any personnel about his emotional well-
11
being. Trial testimony also revealed that Wilk received no psychiatric treatment at
the University. Further, Wilk signed an “Informed Consent Form,” which
provided that the University would be required to release his information “as
specifically required by law.” A records request pursuant to a court order or grand
jury subpoena undoubtedly qualifies as a “required by law” situation. We find no
error in the district court’s finding that some of Wilk’s records were entitled to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and others were not.
As for the medical records concerning Wilk’s HIV status and treatment, the
record reveals that during his trial, Wilk continually relied on his mental status
from AIDS dementia as central to his defense. For example, Wilk told the jury in
his opening statement about suffering from AIDS dementia at the time of the
shooting, and later called expert witnesses to testify on his behalf who referenced
the medical records at issue. Indeed, the records from the Cleveland Clinic and Dr.
Fisher were admitted as Defendant’s Exhibits 45 and 46. Further, the district court
correctly concluded that HIPAA authorizes the disclosure of confidential medical
records for law enforcement purposes, or in the course of a judicial proceeding, in
response to a court order or grand jury subpoena. See 45 C.F.R. §§
164.512(e)(1)(i), (f)(1)(ii)(A-C). Wilk also concedes that federal courts have
declined to recognize a physician-patient privilege in federal criminal trials. We
12
therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision declining to
adopt Florida’s physician-patient privilege as to Wilk’s HIV-related medical
records.
C. Modification of the Self-Defense Jury Instruction
Lastly, we address Wilk’s contention that the district court’s modification of
the self-defense jury instruction constituted reversible error. “We review the legal
correctness of a jury instruction de novo, but defer on questions of phrasing absent
an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir.
2000) (citations omitted). “Generally, district courts have broad discretion in
formulating jury instructions provided that the charge as a whole accurately
reflects the law and the facts, and we will not reverse a conviction on the basis of a
jury charge unless the issues of law were presented inaccurately, or the charge
improperly guided the jury in such a substantial way as to violate due process.” Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).
The district court issued the following as part of the self-defense instruction:
In order to refuse or negate a claim of self-defense, the
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
either: (1) [t]hat the Defendant knew or had reason to
know Todd M. Fatta and Angelo Cedeno were law
enforcement officers engaged in the performance of their
duties; or (2) [t]hat the Defendant’s use of deadly force
would not have qualified as self-defense even if Todd M.
Fatta and Angelo Cedeno had, in fact, been private
13
citizens.
(emphasis added). Relying on United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 842 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985), Wilk contends that the district court erred
in using the phrase “or had reason to know” because it improperly broadened the
government’s ability to negate Wilk’s self-defense claim. We disagree. Contrary
to Wilk’s contention, the district court’s instruction was not inconsistent with the
principles outlined in Alvarez, which clarified the “knowledge of official status”
requirement previously espoused in United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 1315
(11th Cir. 1982), United States v. Ochoa, 526 F.2d 1278, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1976),
and United States v. Young, 464 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1972).4
In Alvarez, the defendants were convicted of, among other things, first
degree murder and assault of a federal agent with a deadly and dangerous weapon
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 1111(a), and 1114. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 836. The
defendants alleged that they acted in self-defense in shooting two federal agents
because the defendants believed that the agents were members of the Mafia. Id. at
841. The defendants appealed the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury that
the government was required to prove that the defendants knew at the time of the
4
In all three of these pre-Alvarez cases, the defendant was convicted of assault of a
federal agent with a dangerous and deadly weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 111. Alvarez applied the
same rationale with respect to the “knowledge of official status” requirement in cases under 18
U.S.C. §§ 111, 1111(a), and 1114.
14
shootings that the victims were federal agents. Id. at 842. In clarifying our
previous holdings in Danehy and Young, we first repeated well-established
precedent that under 18 U.S.C. § 111, “[k]nowledge of the victim’s status as a
federal officer is not an element of the federal crime . . . .” Id. We also cited the
longstanding principle that “when a defendant presents evidence in support of a
claim of self-defense, the absence of self-defense must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt by the government.” Id. at 842-43 (citations and footnote
omitted).
Recognizing that some circumstances may exist where ignorance of the
official status of the person assaulted negates the existence of mens rea, we held
that when a defendant raises a self-defense claim based on ignorance of official
status, the government has several options available to negate a self defense claim.
Proof that the defendant knew of the victim’s federal status is merely one option.
Id. at 843. We held that “the defendant must either (1) know the person he is
impeding is a federal officer or (2) engage in conduct towards that individual
which would constitute a crime even if he were not a federal officer.” Id. at 843
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
These options available to the government are not inconsistent with
precedent established in Ochoa, also an 18 U.S.C. § 111 prosecution. 526 F.2d at
15
1278. In that case, Ochoa argued that he acted in defense of his family and
property in assaulting federal agents, lacking the mens rea necessary for a
conviction because he believed that the “intruders” into his home were home
invaders, not federal officers. Id. at 1281. In affirming Ochoa’s conviction, the
court stated that Ochoa would have been entitled to an acquittal if he was unaware
of the agents’ identity and reasonably believed that they intended to injure him. Id.
But in concluding that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion
that Ochoa either knew or should have known the agents’ identities, the court
stated that “[i]t is critical to determine whether appellant could reasonably believe
that the intruders imposed a threat to his person, property, or family, and whether
he had reason to know the intruders were federal agents.” Id. at 1282 (emphasis
added).
Wilk refers to the court’s language as dicta and attempts to distinguish
Ochoa on the basis that Ochoa’s convictions resulted from a bench trial. We reject
these arguments. First, we are not convinced that the court’s “knew or should have
known” language was merely dicta when the court called it “critical to determine.”
Id. at 1282. Further, as for the knowledge requirement, the former Fifth Circuit
made no distinction between bench and jury trials. We find nothing in Alvarez
inconsistent with Ochoa, and Ochoa remains good law.
16
Most importantly, Wilk also ignores the fundamental principle restated in
Alvarez that the correctness of a jury charge must be considered in the context of
the instructions as a whole. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 845. Viewed in its entirety, the
charge given in Wilk’s case permitted the jury to find Wilk not guilty if it believed
his testimony that he acted in self-defense. See Young, 464 F.2d at 163 (“[I]f the
defendant asserts a lack of intention . . . based on ignorance of the identity of the
victim . . ., the jury must be allowed to consider the defendant’s evidence tending
to show that he was ignorant of the official capacity of the victim.”). Under
Alvarez, a defendant who raises a self-defense claim based on lack of knowledge of
the victim’s federal status is entitled to an instruction about the relevance of the
defendant’s state of knowledge, and the jury charge “should include (1) an
explanation of the essential elements of a claim of self-defense, and (2) and
instruction informing the jury that the defendant cannot be convicted unless the
government proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, either (a) that the defendant knew
that the victim was a federal agent, or (b) that the defendant’s use of deadly force
would not have qualified as self-defense even if the agent had, in fact, been a
private citizen.” Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 847 (emphasis added). Here, the district
court properly followed that directive, accurately instructing the jury on the
elements of self-defense and properly including the two-part instruction.
17
Considering the instruction as a whole, the instruction did not deprive Wilk of his
right “to have presented instructions relating to a theory of defense for which there
is any foundation in the evidence.” Id. at 847 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). On this record, we cannot find an abuse of discretion because the
instruction accurately reflects the law and the facts, and the jury was not guided in
such a way as to violate Wilk’s due process rights.
Moreover, even if Wilk had met his burden of production on his self-defense
claim, the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find the non-existence
of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt notwithstanding the “had reason to
know” phrase. In Alvarez, we acknowledged that upon an extraordinary set of
facts, the government may be required to prove that the defendant knew of the
victim’s federal status; for example, if the undisputed evidence shows that the
agent was the aggressor and that the defendant’s responsive force was reasonable.
Alvarez, 755 F.3d at 844. Here, that is simply not the case—no such undisputed
evidence exists. We thus conclude that any possible error in the district court’s
instruction in this case was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against
Wilk and the comprehensive self-defense instruction given by the court. Unlike in
Danehy and Young, the district court thoroughly instructed the jury on Wilk’s self-
defense claim, which permitted the jury to consider and decide whether Wilk
18
believed that he was defending himself against unknown intruders. See Young,
464 F.2d at 163 (concluding that a portion of the erroneous jury instruction was
broad enough to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty of the charged offenses
even if the jury believed the defendant’s testimony that he thought he was being
harassed by “local rowdies”). The jury considered Wilk’s legal excuse for his
conduct and rejected it, and he fails to convince us that a different outcome would
have resulted from the elimination of the “or had reason to know” language.
III. CONCLUSION
We find no reversible error in the district court’s resolution of the
evidentiary issues or in its instructions to the jury. As for the remaining issues that
Wilk raised before this Court, we also find no reversible error. Accordingly, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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