United States v. Jordan

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 11, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 06-12583 CLERK
________________________

D. C. Docket No. 00-00213-CR-2-LAC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee
Cross-Appellant,

versus

ALBERT JORDAN,
JIMMY WOODWARD,

Defendants-Appellants
Cross-Appellees.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________

(September 11, 2009)

Before TJOFLAT, HILL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

In the Alabama 1998 general election, Jimmy Woodward, the incumbent

Sheriff of Jefferson County, a Republican, was defeated in his bid for reelection

by his Democratic opponent by 37 votes. Woodward suspected that numerous

felons not eligible to vote had cast absentee ballots in Jefferson County precincts

located in the City of Bessemer and decided to contest the election. He hired

Albert Jordan, a lawyer, to handle his case.

What transpired after Jordan took the case led to Jordan and Woodward’s

indictment by a Northern District of Alabama grand jury. The grand jury charged

them with using the Sheriff’s Office’s employees to access the National Crime

Information Center database—which houses the criminal records generated by

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies—and obtain the criminal

records of those who voted absentee in the Sheriff’s race in Bessemer, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 641.1 On January 11, 2006, a jury found the defendants guilty of

1
18 U.S.C. § 641, Public money, property or records, states, in pertinent part:
Whoever . . . knowingly converts to his use or the use of another . . . any record . .
. or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof . . .;
or

Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use
or gain, knowing it to have been . . . converted--

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but
if the value of such property in the aggregate, combining amounts from all the

2
conspiring to violate, and of violating, that statute, and the district court sentenced

each of them to probation for a term of six months and a fine of $500.2 They now

appeal their convictions.3 The Government cross-appeals their sentences. We

affirm.

I.

A.

In its case in chief, the Government undertook to establish the following.

The Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center (“ACJIC”) houses the Alabama

Criminal Justice Information System (“ACJIS”), a database that includes all

criminal records for the state of Alabama. ACJIC provides information in its

database to the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”).4 On April 10,

counts for which the defendant is convicted in a single case, does not exceed the
sum of $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.

The word “value” means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale
or retail, whichever is greater.
2
The sentences were imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 18-28 U.S.C.), and
the Guidelines promulgated thereunder by the United States Sentencing Commission.
3
This case has been before us twice before. In United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215
(11th Cir. 2003) (Jordan I), we vacated the district court’s dismissal of the indictment during the
Government’s case in chief and remanded the case for trial. In United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d
1032 (11th Cir. 2005) (Jordan II), we affirmed the district court’s denial of Woodward and
Jordan’s motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.
4
The Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains the NCIC.

3
1996, Jimmy Woodward, as Jefferson County Sheriff, signed an agreement with

the ACJIC that allowed his Sheriff’s Department access to the ACJIS and NCIC

criminal record databases exclusively for law enforcement purposes.5 The

database access was limited in this way because the public has a strong privacy

interest in these databases. See Jordan I, 316 F.3d at 1223 n.4; United States v.

Pedersen, 3 F.3d 1468, 1471 (11th Cir. 1993).

Alabama’s 1998 general election was held on November 3. Woodward

stood for reelection as Sheriff and lost, by only 37 votes.6 The polls had not

closed before he began receiving complaints of voting irregularities in the City of

Bessemer. A Republican Party poll-watcher at the Bessemer courthouse reported

that absentee ballots cast in Bessemer had not been counted; a member of the

Bessemer Voters’ League claimed that some absentee ballots had been stolen; and

5
The agreement stated that

the [Jefferson County Sheriff] shall inform all current and future officers and
employees under his . . . management [and] control, that all information obtained
through ACJIS is for the conduct of official criminal justice business and for this
purpose only and that the criminal penalties apply for misuse of said information.

The agreement also stated that such information would be “obtained, used, and further
disseminated in strict compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures .
. . [including] NCIC . . . regulations and operating procedures.”
6
Approximately 212,000 votes were cast in the election for Sheriff.

4
a Sheriff’s Department employee received phone calls to the effect that felons,

out-of-state residents, and deceased persons voted in Bessemer.

On November 4, Woodward retained Albert Jordan, an attorney specializing

in election contest cases. Jordan first attempted to obtain the absentee voter list

from the office of the Clerk of the Jefferson County Circuit Court in Bessemer.7

Jordan was unable to obtain the absentee list, so, on the morning of November 5,

he called Royce Fields, the Assistant Sheriff in charge of the Sheriff’s Bessemer

office, for assistance. After informing Fields that he had been retained by

Woodward to challenge the outcome of the November 3 election, he asked Fields

to get the absentee voter list from the Clerk’s office. Fields acquired the list and

phoned Jordan. Jordan asked him to run the “criminal histories” of the voters

named on the list to determine whether any were felons.

Over the next four days, with Woodward’s approval and under Fields’s

supervision, three Sheriff’s Office employees8 ran the names of 829 persons on the

7
Birmingham is the county seat for Jefferson County. Bessemer is a “Division” of
Jefferson County, having been created as a separate governmental division by the Alabama
Legislature in 1915, and is known as the “Bessemer Cutoff.” In recognition of this, the Circuit
Court of Jefferson County has two Clerk’s offices, one at the courthouse in Birmingham and one
at the courthouse in Bessemer; the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department has offices in
Birmingham and Bessemer; and the District Attorney has offices in both cities. An Assistant
Sheriff appointed by the Sheriff heads the Sheriff’s office in Bessemer, and a Deputy District
Attorney heads the District Attorney’s office in Bessemer.
8
The employees were Fields’s secretary in Bessemer and two clerks in Birmingham.

5
absentee voter list through the NCIC and ACJIS.9 They gave Fields the NCIC

printout for each voter having a criminal record. On November 9, Fields took the

printouts to Woodward. Woodward, in turn, instructed him to take the records to

Jordan. Fields did as instructed. Fields showed Jordan the printouts and stated that

he was worried about leaving them with Jordan because he was required to keep

records provided by the NCIC in his possession. Jordan replied that Fields could

leave the printouts with him.

On November 19, the morning edition of the Birmingham Post Herald

contained an article stating that Woodward had improperly used criminal databases

to check the criminal history backgrounds of absentee voters in the November 3

election.10 Later in the day, Woodward met with Jordan, Fields, and some of his

staff in Birmingham to discuss the Post Herald article. Woodward expressed

9
These employees proceeded as follows: First, they obtained the date of birth or Social
Security number for each person on the absentee voter list. Then, they inserted the voter’s name
with date of birth or Social Security number into the NCIC and ACJIS. If neither revealed a
criminal history for the voter, they shredded the printout for that person in accordance with
ACJIS regulations but made a notation on the NCIC search log indicating that the voter’s
criminal history had been searched.
10
Specifically, the Birmingham Post Herald published the following:

The Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center is looking into whether Sheriff
Jim Woodward improperly used criminal databases to check the backgrounds of
people who applied for absentee ballots. The center acted after Bessemer Cutoff
District Attorney William Russell forwarded a complaint from a Sheriff’s
Department employee. Woodward said he did nothing wrong, and has the
responsibility as sheriff to investigate voter fraud.

6
concern that he and Fields might be indicted for using the NCIC database to run

criminal record checks on absentee voters. A member of his staff suggested that a

criminal charge might be avoided if they had a complaint of voter fraud that might

justify the use of the NCIC.

To explore that possibility, Woodward asked the Deputy District Attorney of

Jefferson County, Roger Brown, to join the discussion. After Brown arrived,

Woodward briefed him about the evidence he had received of voter fraud in

Bessemer and asked him whether the evidence was sufficient to make out a

criminal charge. Brown stated that any allegations of voter fraud should be

handled by the Deputy District Attorney in Bessemer. He also recommended that

Woodward contact the Alabama Bureau of Investigation to avoid an appearance of

impropriety, given that Woodward had a personal interest in the outcome of the

election for Sheriff.

After the meeting adjourned, Woodward formed a “voter fraud task force”

and placed Captain Charles Horton in charge. The task force reviewed several

complaints of voter fraud and interviewed approximately eighty persons who had

voted absentee in Bessemer. The evidence obtained was apparently insufficient to

warrant criminal prosecution, as none was instituted.

B.

7
 On June 21, 2000, a Northern District of Alabama grand jury returned an

indictment charging Woodward and Jordan, in Count One, with conspiring, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,11 to violate 18 U.S.C. § 641 by receiving, retaining,

and converting NCIC records to their own use. Count Two charged Woodward

with conveying the NCIC records to Jordan, and Count Three charged Jordan with

receiving them, both acts in violation of § 641.12 The defendants entered pleas of

not guilty and promptly moved the district court to dismiss the indictment for

failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure because, in accordance with the language of the rule, they claimed that

the indictment failed to provide a definite written statement of the essential facts

11
Section 371 states:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years , or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy,
is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
12
The indictment contained two other counts, alleging that Jordan, in Count Four, and
Woodward, in Count Five, violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) and (c)(2). The jury acquitted the
defendants of these offenses. Nothing relating to Counts Four and Five offenses is relevant in the
parties’ appeals.

8
constituting the offense(s) charged.13 The district court denied their motions on the

ground that the indictment provided the defendants fair notice of the charges

lodged against them. Then, on January 3, 2006, following two appeals to this

court,14 the case went to trial. Eight days later, the jury found the defendants guilty

as charged of the above counts. Post-verdict, the defendants, presenting the

arguments they asserted in their motions to dismiss the indictment, moved the court

to arrest the judgment pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure. The court denied their motions. At sentencing on April 26, 2006, the

district court treated the § 641 violations as Class A misdemeanors instead of

felonies, because the value of the NCIC records obtained did not exceed the sum of

$1,000,15 and sentenced the defendants to concurrent terms of six months’

probation and fined each of them $500.

In their appeals, Woodward and Jordan seek the reversal of their convictions

on the grounds that the court erred in denying their motions to dismiss the

13
Rule 7(c)(1) states, in pertinent part: “The indictment or information must be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”
14
See supra note 3.
15
See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6). The indictment did not specify that the value of the NCIC
records exceeded $1,000. Though the Government introduced evidence from which the jury
could have found that the total value of the records obtained exceeded the sum of $1,000, the
district court, in its charge to the jury did not instruct the jury specifically to find the total value
involved. The Government has conceded that the convictions were for misdemeanor offenses.

9
indictment and to arrest the judgment. Alternatively, they seek a new trial,

asserting error in the court’s charge to the jury. The Government cross-appeals,

contending that the sentences the court imposed are unreasonable. We turn first to

the main appeals, then to the cross-appeal.

II.

A.

The appellants argue that the district court erred in denying their motions to

dismiss the indictment and to arrest the judgment. Boiled down to its essentials,

their argument is that the indictment failed to provide them with the notice

necessary to enable them to defend against the offenses charged.

The legal sufficiency of an indictment is a legal question that we review de

novo. United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002). An

indictment is considered legally sufficient if it: “(1) presents the essential elements

of the charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be defended

against, and (3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment under the indictment

as a bar against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the same

offense.” United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1046 (11th Cir. 2002). In

determining whether an indictment is sufficient, we read it as a whole and give it a

“common sense construction.” United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 192 (5th

10
Cir.1976);16 United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 813 (11th Cir.1984). In other

words, the indictment’s “validity is to be determined by practical, not technical,

considerations.” Gold, 743 F.2d at 813.

We find that the indictment gave the defendants adequate notice of the

charges against them. In its introduction, Jordan is identified as an attorney in the

private practice of law. He was “not a law enforcement officer, nor was he

authorized to access the NCIC and ACJIS systems.” (Indictment, ¶ 8.) Rather,

“the information in the systems could be obtained and used by [law enforcement]

agencies only for limited official purposes.” (Id. at 1, ¶ 3.)

Count one, alleging a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 641, tracked the

language of § 641 and asserted that the defendants required employees of the

Sheriff’s office to access the NCIC and ACJIS databases, obtain printouts of the

criminal records of absentee voters, and then deliver the printouts, which as

property of the United States had a value in excess of $1,000, to Jordan for use in

Woodward’s election contest. (Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 1-7.) The overt acts committed in

furtherance of the conspiracy included the November 5, 1998 telephone

conversation between Fields and Jordan, the completion of the NCIC searches, the

16
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
close of business on September 30, 1981.

11
delivery of the information they disclosed to Jordan, and the meeting with District

Attorney Brown, all as described in part I.A., supra. (Id. at 5-6, ¶ 8.) In Counts

Two and Three, respectively, the indictment alleged that Woodward conveyed to

Jordan and Jordan received from Woodward a “thing of value of the United States,

that is, information contained in the NCIC records.” (Id. at 7.)

“An indictment that tracks the language of the relevant statute is sufficient,

as long as it also provides a statement of facts and circumstances that give notice of

the offense to the accused.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S. Ct.

1038, 1048, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962) (cited in United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d

1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007)). The indictment in this case met this standard. It

gave the defendants fair notice of the essential elements of the charged offenses,

that is, notice sufficient to enable them to prepare a defense.17

17
Appellants contend that the indictment failed to allege a § 641 offense, or a conspiracy
to commit the offense, because, according to the indictment’s allegations, Jordan was acting as
Woodward’s attorney and, as such, was entitled to receive the NCIC records. Put another way,
they argue that Jordan was entitled to the possession of the NCIC printouts in order to prosecute
Woodward’s election contest. We are not persuaded. First, § 641 is violated when, as here, the
NCIC is used for non-law enforcement purposes. Second, Jordan did not receive the printouts
from Woodward as part of a confidential communication between an attorney and his client.
When Fields delivered the printouts to Jordan, and he was not Jordan’s client; nor was he acting
as Woodward’s agent for the purpose of delivering a confidential communication from
Woodward to Jordan. Third, assuming that the printouts were part of a confidential
communication between a client and his attorney, the delivery of the printouts to Jordan
constituted a crime, and the crime-fraud exception removed the delivery of the printouts from the
protection of the attorney-client relationship.

12
 B.

Appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their

respective convictions. In determining whether the prosecution established a

defendant’s guilt, we consider the evidence, all inferences that reasonably can be

drawn therefrom, and credibility choices in the light most favorable to the

prosecution. United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).

To prove conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the prosecution must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt

the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective, the
defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy,
and the commission of an overt act in furtherance of it. However, if
the proof shows the defendant knew the essential objective of the
conspiracy, it does not matter that he did not know all its details or
played a minor role in the overall scheme.

United States v. Suba, 132 F.3d 662, 672 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

Thus, in the case at hand, the evidence had to show that Woodward and Jordan

entered into an agreement to access the NCIC database and obtain for a non-law

enforcement purpose a thing of value to the United States, to-wit: the criminal

record of anyone who voted absentee in the 1998 election for Sheriff of Jefferson

County. As for Counts Two and Three, the evidence had to show that Woodward

knowingly and without authority conveyed a thing of value, a criminal record

13
obtained from the NCIC, to Jordan, and that Jordan knowingly received and

retained it.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the United States, the

evidence established that Woodward retained Jordan as his personal attorney to

challenge the election results; Jordan asked Woodward’s employee, Fields, to

conduct a criminal record search for absentee voters; Woodward was aware that

Fields and his personnel were conducting the search; Woodward asked Fields to

provide the results to Jordan; Fields gave the NCIC printouts to Jordan and

explained that they had been generated by the NCIC; Jordan asked Fields to leave

the NCIC printouts with him, though Fields told him that he should not part with

the documents; and Jordan subsequently used some of the information the printouts

disclosed to prosecute Woodward’s election contest. Further, the day the

Birmingham Herald Post reported on Woodward’s use of the criminal databases,

Woodward held a meeting, which Jordan attended, to announce that a Sheriff’s

Department task force was launching a voter fraud investigation. A reasonable

factfinder could infer from this that Woodward convened the task force to cover up

his and Jordan’s use of the NCIC to prepare for an election contest. See Suba, 132

F.3d at 672.

14
 In arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict, appellants advance a

different view of the evidence. Our task, however, is limited to determining

whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendants guilty on the basis of

the evidence presented; our task is not to choose between competing interpretations

of the evidence. The evidence does not need to “exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except

that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. McDowell, 250

F.3d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001). “Presented with two narratives, one tending to

establish the defendant’s guilt and another tending to establish innocence, the jury

was entitled to choose the account offered by the government.” United States v.

Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Here, we are

satisfied that the jury’s verdicts have ample support in the evidence.

C.

Given that we do not reverse their convictions on the grounds that the

indictment failed to state an offense or the evidence was insufficient to convict,

appellants alternatively seek a new trial on the theory that the district court erred in

15
refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with instructions Jordan requested.18

We review the district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for abuse

of discretion. United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006).

Such refusal constitutes reversible error if: “(1) the requested instruction was a

correct statement of the law, (2) its subject matter was not substantially covered by

other instructions, and (3) its subject matter dealt with an issue in the trial court that

was so important that failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to

defend himself.” Id. We find no abuse of discretion here.

Two of the requested instructions, numbers 26 and 27, related to Jordan’s

good faith defense. Jury Instruction No. 26 was framed as follows:

Good faith of the Defendant Albert Jordan is a complete defense to the
charges in the indictment against Defendant Albert Jordan since good
faith on the part of the Defendant is inconsistent with criminal intent
which is an essential part of those charges. The burden of proof is not
on the Defendant to prove good faith, of course, since the Defendant
has no burden to prove anything. The Government must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted with criminal
intent as charged in the indictment. One who acts based upon an
honestly held opinion, or an honestly formed belief, is not chargeable
with criminal intent even though the opinion is erroneous or the belief
is mistaken; and, similarly, evidence which establishes only that a
person made a mistake in judgment does not establish criminal intent.

Jury Instruction No. 27 stated:

18
Although the record is not clear on the point, we assume that Woodward joined in
Jordan’s requests for whatever benefit the proposed instructions may have afforded him.

16
 It is a complete defense to the offenses charged in the indictment that
the Defendant Albert Jordan had a good-faith belief that his actions
were not in violation of the law. It is not necessary for you to be
convinced that a reasonable person would have believed the
Defendant’s actions were lawful. Unless you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the Defendant
Albert Jordan believed his actions to be unlawful, then you must find
him not guilty.

Instead, the district court charged the jury that, to convict on the conspiracy

count, the evidence must show that “the defendant, knowing the unlawful purpose

of the plan, willfully joined in it.” Further, the defendant had to engage in the

unlawful conduct charged in the substantive counts “knowing[ly]” and “willfully.”

The court defined “knowingly” and “willfully” thusly:

The word knowingly as that term has been used in the indictment and
in these instructions means that the act was done voluntarily and
intentionally and not because of mistake or accident.

The word willfully as that term has been used means that the act was
committed voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do
something that the law forbids, that is, with criminal purpose, either to
disobey or to disregard the law.

The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Jordan’s

instruction numbers 26 and 27 because their concepts were substantially included

in the instruction that the criminal act must be done “knowingly” or “willfully.”

See Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no abuse of

discretion where definition of “knowingly” in jury instruction substantially covered

17
good faith concepts); United States States v. Giraldi, 86 F.3d 1368, 1376 (5th Cir.

1996) (same).

Appellants find error in the court’s refusal to give their proposed instructions

numbered 57, 60, and 61, which related to the duty of an attorney to review

documents provided by his client under the cloak of the privileged attorney-client

relationship. Number 57 is illustrative of the three requested instructions. It states:

[A] lawyer may review documents, things, information, etc. provided
by a client as part of the attorney/client relationship. The mere receipt
of such items or information from a client is lawful. It would only be
unlawful if the attorney had knowledge that the client intended to use
the information in a future criminal act.

This was both a confused and an incorrect statement of the law because it conflated

the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege with the duty of an

attorney to act competently when preparing a case19 and thereby appeared to render

the crime-fraud exception a nullity. Moreover, Jordan’s obligation to provide

Woodward competent service would not immunize Jordan from prosecution for

violating 18 U.S.C. § 641. To hold otherwise would imply that an attorney may

lawfully receive the fruits of an unlawful act under the guise of the attorney-client

relationship.

19
See Ala. R. of Prof’l Responsibility 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”)

18
 III.

The Government cross-appeals appellants’ concurrent sentences of six

months’ probation, contending that the sentences are unreasonable.20 We review

the reasonableness of a sentence under “a deferential abuse of discretion standard.”

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445

(2007). “This standard of review is altogether consonant with our traditional use of

the abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191

(11th Cir. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect

legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes

findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376

F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004). “The abuse of discretion standard of review

recognizes that for the matter in question [, i.e., in sentencing] there is a range of

choice for the district court and so long as its decision does not amount to a clear

error of judgment we will not reverse even if we would have gone the other way

had the choice been ours to make.” McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1128 (11th

Cir. 2001); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191.

20
The Government does not challenge the $500 fine imposed in connection with the
sentences.

19
 In the Guidelines sentencing context, the district court applies an incorrect

legal standard in fashioning a sentence, and therefore abuses its discretion, if it fails

to determine the Guidelines sentence range correctly, treats the Guidelines as

mandatory rather than advisory, fails to afford the parties their procedural rights,21

or fails to consider the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall, 552

U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597.22

In its cross-appeal, the Government concedes, and properly so, that the

district court correctly determined the Guidelines sentence range for each

defendant, which called for a term of imprisonment of 27 to 33 months.23 Since the

value of the property obtained from the NCIC did not exceed $1,000, however, the

violations of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Counts Two and Three) were treated as Class A

misdemeanors. The maximum penalty provided by statute for those misdemeanor

21
See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. Among the rights Rule 32 affords the parties at
sentencing is the right to introduce evidence relating to an objection to the presentence report or
an objection made during the sentencing hearing, to provide counsel for the parties an
opportunity to address the court, and to “permit the defendant to speak or present any information
to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(2), (4)(A)(i), (iii).
22
Gall’s list of legal requirements the district court must satisfy in arriving at a sentence
is not exhaustive. We mention the requirements pertinent to our review in this case.
23
In arriving at the sentence range, the district court grouped the two counts of which the
defendants were convicted pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), and fixed the total offense level at
18 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, and the criminal history category of I pursuant to the
sentencing table at U.S.S.G., Chapter 5, Part A., because the defendants’ criminal history points
amounted to zero. An offense level 18 at category I yielded a sentence range of 27 to 33 months’
imprisonment.

20
offenses was imprisonment for one year. 18 U.S.C. § 641. Since the statutory

maximum penalty was less than the Guidelines sentence range, the statutory

maximum penalty became the Guidelines sentence range.24

The seven § 3553(a) sentencing factors the district court was required to, and

did, consult before imposing sentence were as follows:

The first factor is a broad command to consider ‘the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.’ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The second factor requires the
consideration of the general purposes of sentencing, including:

the need for the sentence imposed-

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner. § 3553(a)(2).

The third factor pertains to ‘the kinds of sentences available,’ §
3553(a)(3); the fourth to the Sentencing Guidelines; the fifth to any
relevant policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; the
sixth to ‘the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities,’ §

24
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) provides that “[w]here the statutorily authorized maximum
sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized
maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.” The Government does not contend that the
court should have considered imposing consecutive one-year sentences (on the two counts for
which the defendants were convicted), so as to create a “guideline sentence” of 24 months.

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 3553(a)(6); and the seventh to “the need to provide restitution to any
victim,’ § 3553(a)(7). Preceding this list is a general directive to
‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes’ of sentencing described in the second
factor. § 3553(a).

Gall, 552 U.S. at __, n. 6, 128 S. Ct. at 597, n.6

After taking these factors into account—in particular, the need for the

sentences to satisfy the objectives of §3553(a)(2)(A) through (D)—the district

court concluded that imprisonment was not needed “to protect the public from

further crimes of the defendant,” objective §3553(a)(2)(C), and focused on whether

imprisonment was necessary to satisfy the objectives of §3553(a)(2)(A) and (B).25

Regarding §3553(a)(2)(A), the need for punishment to reflect the seriousness of the

offenses, the court observed that “the nature of the offense is somewhat troubling

in that it is at one level a serious offense . . . [but] at another level, in the grand

scheme of things, is not so serious.” The judge based this observation on:

1) the duration and extent of the offense (this was an isolated crime of
relatively short duration); 2) the level of sophistication or complexity
of the offense (the offense involved very little planning or
concealment and could have easily been discovered); 3) the fact this
was not a violent crime; and 4) the fact there is no reported loss to the
alleged victim(s) of this crime.

25
Although the district court did not explicitly address the need for rehabilitation, §
3553(a)(2)(D), in the probation context, the court indicated that rehabilitation was not an
objective of the sentences it was imposing, citing Jordan’s excellent reputation as one who
attempted to combat voter fraud and Woodward’s “flawless” record of law enforcement service.

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 The court also found that the defendants’ conduct did not violate any voter’s

privacy because the information obtained was publically available, i.e., apart from

the NCIC database, and not used for blackmail.

The district court then considered whether a sentence of probation would

satisfy the deterrence purpose of §3553(a)(2)(B), stating:

So to afford adequate deterrence for criminal conduct, I don’t think
there’s any suggestion here that the public suffering of these two
defendants or damage to their reputation, the five and a half or six
years that this has been pending, such is not a deterrence in and of
itself to anyone who might consider similar conduct.

In its post-judgment sentencing report, which memorialized what the court

had stated on the record at the sentencing hearing, the court wrote: “The

conviction, in and of itself, and this sentence with the attendant public humiliation,

the monetary cost of a six-year defense, and the loss of earning power in the future

. . . will deter similar criminal conduct.”

After the court heard from counsel for the parties and afforded the

defendants their right of allocution, it sentenced them to probation for a term of six

months. The prosecutor thereafter read the following objection into the record:

I would submit, Judge, that there has been abuse of the public trust in
this case given what defendant Woodward's position was, and given that defendant
Jordan is a member of the Court. I think these are unfortunate circumstances for
the defendants, their family, and their friends, however, the defendants have not
expressed any legitimate or compelling reasons why the Guidelines calculation of
18 which imposes a jail sentence should not be imposed. I would direct the Court

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too to the fact that punishment, Your Honor, should not just mean punishment but
it also should serve as a deterrent factor for the community. In this particular case,
we are talking about corruption. We are talking about two individuals who
happened to be in a position that other people don't have the opportunity to be in.
Being elected to a public office is an honor. Being—having the ability and the
opportunity to go to law school to become a member of the Bar is something that
most members of our community don't enjoy and don't have the opportunity.

In its brief on cross-appeal, the Government argues that the sentences of

probation are unreasonable because the district court undervalued the sentencing

objective of §3553(a)(2)(A) in that it “did not deem the offense to be serious.”

(Appellee Br. at 66.) The Government supports its argument by citing the court’s

statement, which is quoted above, that the offense was both serious and not so

serious and by positing that the court “based its sentencing determination on the

‘not so serious’ side of the scale . . . viewing the [defendants’] conduct as no crime

at all . . . and engag[ing] in judicial nullification.” (Id.)

The Government’s argument does not persuade us that the district court

abused its discretion in this case. First, the court’s decision to place the defendants

on probation is supported by findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous.

Second, the court followed the Supreme Court’s instructions on the law, as spelled

out in Gall. Among those was the instruction that the district court give

appropriate consideration to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The court did so

and, moreover, gave a full explanation for its deviation from the Guidelines

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sentence range. In concluding that the deviation was permissible, we have

followed Gall’s teaching, “taking into account the totality of the circumstances,

including the extent of [the] variance from the Guidelines range [and] giv[ing] due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors justif[ied] the

variance.” 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597.

IV.

The judgment of the district court is, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.

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