[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 21, 2010
No. 09-15939
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-02713-CV-1-ODE
WILLIE BRUCE BRYANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AVERITT EXPRESS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 21, 2010)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Bruce Bryant appeals, pro se, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on his retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Bryant
sued Averitt Express, Inc., his former employer, alleging that the company
suspended and terminated him in retaliation for filing charges of race
discrimination with the EEOC. The district court granted summary judgment for
Averitt concluding that Bryant had failed to establish the causation element of a
prima facie case of retaliation. The court also concluded that Averitt was entitled
to summary judgment because the company’s reasons for suspending and
terminating Bryant—his citation for a DUI and use of abusive language towards
management—were legitimate and unrebutted. This is his appeal.
I.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and, “[i]n
so doing, we . . . view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party.” Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d
1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2010). A district court should grant summary judgment if
“the pleadings, the discovery and the disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to retaliate against employees for
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opposing unlawful employment practices, including racial discrimination. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff can establish a retaliation claim using either
direct or circumstantial evidence. When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence, we use the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework. See Bryant v.
Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307–08. “Under th[at] framework, a plaintiff alleging
retaliation must first establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he engaged
in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) he established a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Id.; see also Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1278
(11th Cir. 2008). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, “the
burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by
articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.” Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1308. See also Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “[t]he employer’s
burden of rebuttal is ‘extremely light’ ”). If the employer carries its burden by
articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the ‘legitimate’ reason
is merely pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct.” Sierminski v. Transouth Fin.
Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2000).
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To establish pretext, a plaintiff must “present concrete evidence in the form
of specific facts” showing that the defendant’s proffered reason was pretextual.
Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1308; see also Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d
763, 771 (11th Cir. 2005) (A plaintiff’s evidence of pretext “must reveal such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in
the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable
factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.”). “If the proffered reason is one
that might motivate a reasonable employer, a plaintiff cannot recast the reason but
must meet it head on and rebut it.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,
1088 (11th Cir. 2004). Conclusory allegations and assertions are insufficient. See
Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1308.
Bryant contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
for Averitt because he established a prima facie case of retaliation and the
company’s proffered reasons for suspending and terminating him were pretextual.
We disagree. Even assuming that Bryant established a prima facie case, summary
judgment for Averitt was warranted because Bryant did not present sufficient
evidence of pretext. The company explained that it suspended Bryant from his
“combination position” because he received a DUI citation and later terminated
him because he used abusive and profane language towards management in
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violation of company policy. Because Bryant did not present specific facts
establishing that those justifications were unworthy of credence, we affirm. See
Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1088.
AFFIRMED.
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